

WORKING PAPER

#161

From: J2

TO: COMJTF

14 Jul 8

McNaught,

COMJTF

DEPUTY

COVER

— Sir, I believe ~~any~~ we will have to execute in 7-21 days*

— Listed below are a few ^{SEE [P. 8]} ideas for your consideration concerning ^{HELIO} ~~forward~~ deployment, insertion techniques, Spectra/Command + Control presence and extraction.

~~(C)~~ — Helio Deployment

— ~~Make~~ ^{fly} Norfolk Helio's in

21s to Dover at dusk, move into Hangar, disassemble, Transfer to ~~████████████████████~~

for assembly and further movement by ship and/or ~~over~~ self contained air.

- 1 -

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CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92

REVIEWED BY DDO NMCC

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#524
pg. 1000

2 of 78

Cmus

and support C130 BB

E (C) - Move [Spectra] to Europe
 [redacted] to support TRAINING
 EXERCISE.

Gross Pacom

E (C) - Move [Spectra] and C130 BB
 to [redacted] of
 a

J, C, E (S) - Begin irregular [redacted]
 flights of [redacted]

[redacted] And
 [redacted], with occasional
 Run at both Locations.

A (S) - Two/three flights before possible
 execution based selected crew
 member of Talon/Spectra fly
 [redacted]
 [redacted]

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(4) - Possibly Equip ^{3 of 8} Charters
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

A: Compound [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(4) - Night Prison to execution

[REDACTED] with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Lands
at ~~Mehrabad~~ at
Mehrabad and Ron's.

(4) - Next day [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Recon the
select evacuation Strip deposit
[REDACTED]

A, C
That night charter departure
from Mehrabad approx 90 minutes
A Head of Execution
window - delays depart
30-40 minutes checking
NAV. gear - finally departs (3)

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45-30 minutes prior to
Execution window — Departs
— goes out bound — and
30 minutes out in order
from Com JTF ~~to~~ Drogas
Abt- (may declare emergency)
~~land returns to~~ fly to
pickup landing site —
(may re declare emergency
say they are crashing
(Report wrong location)
Lands at P/U site after
Ground Execution has
started — prep blackout
itself out — prepares to
receive Delta + Hostages.

ALTERNATIVE
on next pages

(4)

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A. ~~[REDACTED]~~ Helio Movement ^{5 or 8}
into country

(1) Establish ~~[REDACTED]~~
~~[REDACTED]~~ ~~[REDACTED]~~ F-27/B
~~[REDACTED]~~ arranged

C (1) Establish ~~[REDACTED]~~
~~[REDACTED]~~ along
Ingress route ~~[REDACTED]~~
~~[REDACTED]~~ arranged charter
Cargo flights - 3-5 days
prior to execution day
Night

(2) ~~On day~~ be

(2) Night Before execution
the charter flight with
spare fuel for helio -
acts as pathfinder for
Helios // Helios land at
selected "encasement site"

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maxK landing ^{6 of 1st} at step here
Charter // Charter lands
unloads fuel ~~into~~ ^{into} tank
and resumes flight.

(3) Helo - + Crews etc go
into concealment

A (4) Execution Night Helos
initiate [REDACTED]
Appropriate time - Charter
homes/circles // Helo's
lift off and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] which is actually,
on this mission, [REDACTED]
~~not CTF~~ acting as
[REDACTED] and airborne
[REDACTED] for ComJTF -

A (5) ~~etc~~ [REDACTED] Acts as
Pathfinder for Helo -
- ComJTF Directs insertion
(6)

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offset to 5th
of Heli from Airborne
orbit or from ground
staging area

(E)

(C) If multiple chaperon flights
could be developed/patterned
additional a few days
before execution additional
Aircraft, [REDACTED]

A, B

could be brought into the
area to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

AirLift, or enhance ground
reinforcement.

(7)

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G WORKING PAPER FOR COL [REDACTED]

#162

INFILTRATION OF (ADVANCE PARTY) FOR
RICE BOWL

1. PROBLEM (TS): To infiltrate advance parties of various size and composition into Tehran in support of RICE BOWL.

2. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM (TS) (✓)

a. The major means of legitimate entry into Iran are by commercial air from Europe/Asia; by road from Pakistan Turkey, and Iraq; by rail from Turkey; and by ship from another Persian Gulf port or some more distant location.

b. [REDACTED] particularly the border areas and unpopulated eastern deserts is possible if thoroughly planned. Means of such entry include [REDACTED]; etc.]

c. RICE BOWL has demonstrated a capability to introduce mission personnel into IRAN by both legitimate means [REDACTED] and through [REDACTED] insertion.

3. ASSUMPTIONS (TS) (✓)

a. That infiltration of advance party personnel to support RICE BOWL could be by either legitimate [REDACTED] means.

b. That current Iranian entry procedures will remain relatively unchanged during the foreseeable future and that commercial airlines will continue to service Tehran and other Iranian airports.

c. That [REDACTED] will support RICE BOWL with [REDACTED] as required.

d. That any decision to infiltrate advance party personnel into Iran would not constitute a firm commitment to launch the actual mission.

e. That [REDACTED] will be available [REDACTED] if required.

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REVIEWED BY DDO NMCC

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f. That the political climate in Iran, while unstable, will remain such that foreigners can legitimately move about the country.

4. DISCUSSION (TS) (S)

a. The presence of a limited number of RICE BOWL personnel in Tehran prior to the execution of the actual mission would serve to materially enhance the chances of success. These personnel could perform the following types of activity:

1. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED]

b. Recent experience with both [REDACTED] and legitimate infiltration techniques has demonstrated that both methods are feasible given proper detailed planning and development. [REDACTED] entry [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] offers the advantage of allowing both personnel and equipment to be introduced at the same time and place. Legitimate entry establishes a bonafide reason for being in Iran and consequently allows a similar means of exfiltration/departure. In either case, all advance party personnel would require [REDACTED]

c. The timeframe for insertion of advance parties is [REDACTED] prior to the actual execution of the Compound assault. Because of the unrest in the Turkish and Iraqi border areas, infiltration by overland means [truck/train] would be dangerous and time consuming. The same circumstances apply, although to a lesser degree, in the case of the Iran-Pakistan border. Insertion overland from Iraq is an even less palatable option. Commercial airlines serve Iran from points in both Europe and Asia. US military aircraft have the capability to [REDACTED]

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C [REDACTED] With proper [REDACTED] a reasonably intelligent individual or small group can enter Iran without undue difficulty or risk. There are several hotels in Tehran at which foreign travellers comprise the normal clientele. Iranian diplomatic posts are issuing visas for travel to Iran. Arrival and departure formalities are more stringent for Iranians than for foreigners. While individuals can enter and exit Iran relatively freely, the introduction of equipment such as radios could not be accomplished by this means.

5. CONCLUSIONS (TS) (S)

a. Insertion of advance parties could significantly contribute to the success of the RICE BOWL mission.

C b. Insertion is feasible by legitimate, [REDACTED] or a combination of the two means.

c. Support would be required from [REDACTED]

d. Any infiltration entails risk to both the involved personnel and to operations security for the mission. The size and nature of the advance party would dictate the location means and timing of insertion.

e. The mission of each advance party element would dictate its activities and location once in Iran.

AC f. A minimum [REDACTED] would be required to develop [REDACTED] for personnel being introduced through Tehran International Airport. Advance party members inserted by [REDACTED] means would have to be prepositioned in the Middle East at least [REDACTED] prior to infiltration for rest/final briefings.

g. Phasing of the infiltration would allow decision makers to cancel or modify the operation as it proceeds.

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6. RECOMMENDATION (TS): That COMJTF explore the idea of an advance party with the CJCS at an appropriate juncture to avoid expenditure of resources and planning time sans raison.

A
Appendix A: Listing of possible [REDACTED] and current JTF in-house [REDACTED] by country/language.

Appendix B: Recapitulation of operational needs which can only be satisfied by in-country advance party personnel, Notional time sequence of infiltration flow for personnel and equipment.

G

[REDACTED]
J2, USAF
J2

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

22 April 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CJCS

Subject: RICE BOWL Observer Program, Update #3

This memo provides chronology of ██████████ insertion program.

JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

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CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug-92

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~~TOP SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

16 April 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CJCS

Subject: RICE BOWL Observer Program, Update #1 (TS)

1. (U) The following is an update to my memorandum of 12 April 1980, same subject.

BC
(U) The Army is working to develop several other sources capable of reporting on the situation in Tehran. I view these as longer term propositions which are still tentative in nature. If the present contacts prove to be promising, it will still require [redacted] of processing, training, and evaluation before we could logically expect to employ any of the prospects.


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EYES ONLY

C 7. (TS) Collectively, the above actions and associated travel expenses are projected to cost [REDACTED] over the next several months. None of the Service intelligence elements have budgeted funds to cover such an outlay.

8. (S) Request CJCS advise Director, DIA, of the priority attached to the RICE BOWL observer program in order that DIA can initiate those actions required to properly obligate necessary funding.


JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

12 April 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR CJCS

Subject: Rice Bowl Observer Program

1. (TS) IAW your direction action is underway to develop/expand the DoD Rice Bowl on scene observer program.

2. (TS) As of 12 April 1980 the following actions are underway:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. (U) Will provide update status on Wednesday 16 April.

JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

4/14 DCS - If we can get the info in (a) from [REDACTED] we should carefully consider what the risks of doing [REDACTED]

to be sure can get the [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

LACAGAGAGAG

MSG197
281430Z APR 80

FM JTF RC [REDACTED] 503 G
TO SITE ALPHA [REDACTED]

SUBJ: STATUS OF [REDACTED]

DEF: YOUR 280630Z APR 80

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] NO STATUS ON REMAINDER. HOWEVER
MAY GET MORE WHEN [REDACTED] ARRIVES. 1

REVM 28 APR 10

I-180

C

NNNN

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1. Move Vehicles, Equipment and Personnel From [REDACTED] to Tehran via ROUTE: [REDACTED]



TEHRAN

2. Move Vehicles and Equipment from [REDACTED] to Tehran, Route as Above, Rendezvous with Personnel Between [REDACTED] Tehran.

ASSUMPTION

[REDACTED] Non-Interference

PROBLEM AREAS

1. [REDACTED]-IRANIAN BORDER
- Access to [REDACTED] airfield(daylight only/customs)
 - Access to [REDACTED]
 - Laager of vehicles/equipment
 - Snow Conditions

2. BORDER CROSSING
- Clearance Rqmts [REDACTED] Iranian
 - Standing Time/Snow
 - [REDACTED] Rqmt

3. BORDER-KURD CONTROLLED AREA
- Snow Conditions
 - [REDACTED] Rqmt

4. IRAN ARMY CONTROL AREA-TEHRAN
- Standing Time
 - Fuel Locations
 - Checkpoint Methodology
 - Urban Transit
 - (Rendezvous Location)

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12 Aug 92

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COMMON PROBLEM AREAS

Control of the Operation by NCA
Flexibility
Political Embarrassment Potential
No Ready extraction/Reaction Capability
Significant Unknowns
 Weather
 Maintenance/POL
 Checkpoint Methodology
Four Weather Zones
Stationary Confinement of Personnel en route
Rqmt for Constant Truck Movement
 Sleep
 Exercise
Language
Papers
Actions on Detection/Capture

OPTION ONE

E (X) VEHICLE, EQUIPMENT, PERSONNEL MOVE TOGETHER FROM [REDACTED]

NOT RECOMMENDED

High Risk of Detection
No Flexibility
Poor Control by NCA
Physical Hardship/Danger for Personnel
High Political Embarrassment Potential

OPTION TWO

E (X) VEHICLE, EQUIPMENT, PERSONNEL MOVE TOGETHER FROM [REDACTED]

NOT RECOMMENDED

A Requires [REDACTED] Approval
Poor Control by NCA
High Political Embarrassment Potential
Physical Hardship on Personnel
Minimal Flexibility
High Detection Risk in Iran

OPTION THREE

EQUIPMENT TRANSIT BY VEHICLE, PERSONNEL INFILTRATE TO TEHRAN

RECOMMENDED

High Probability of Success
Best Control Option
Most Flexible
Lowest Embarrassment Potential
Difficulty in Arranging Rendezvous
Uncontrollability of Maintenance

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E (C) FOOT CROSSING OF [REDACTED] IRAN BORDER

Necessitated by high risk checkpoint(if determined)

- (S) Requires 5-8 mile cross country move
- snow pack most likely
- at night
- navigation difficulties [REDACTED] option)
- rendevous problem with [REDACTED]
- detection probability 25%

RENDEVOUS PERSONNEL WITH TRUCK PRIOR TO TEHRAN

Necessitated by distance/risk

Rendevous selection

- Below USSR/IRAN radar (if abn option)
- outside of urban area or checkpoint visual
- identifiable by driver
- probable stop point for a [REDACTED]
- concealment for personnel available

REQUIREMENTS

- (S) Immediate [REDACTED] of route]
- Access to [REDACTED] and related commo
- Selection of [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- Internal heat, including rear compartment
- compartmented/ventilated
- Maintenance/POL capability
- [REDACTED] drivers
- [REDACTED]
- Cold weather clothing and equipment
- Forward positioning of vehicles and equipment

~~SECRET~~

4186

2912308 Oct 80

MSG 395
DTG 291230Z OCT 80
FM: [REDACTED]
TO: 1 30W
12131
[REDACTED]
DELTA
R2403

(U) THE FOLLOWING E & E CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS WAS APPROVED IN PRINCIPAL BY COMMANDER JTD. THE ENTIRE CONCEPT IS STILL OPEN FOR SUGGESTIONS, REVISIONS AND EXPANSION AS A WORKING GROUP IS DIRECTED BY INDIVIDUAL UNIT COMMANDERS.

1. (U) SITUATION

A. ENEMY (SEE BASIC OPLAN.)

B. FRIENDLY. [REDACTED]

C. (U) ASSUMPTIONS

- (X)(U) THE HOSTAGE RECOVERY OPERATION IS CONDUCTED INDEPENDENT OF OTHER OPTIONS/OPERATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA.
- (X)(U) IRANIAN MILITARY FORCES WILL OPPOSE ALL POST-OPERATION EVASION ATTEMPTS.
- (X)(U) THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN WILL ENLIST ALL IRANIANS IN EVASION-LOCATION SEARCHES, COUNTRY-WIDE.
- (X)(U) THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR ZONE SEVERELY RESTRICTS ANY MOVEMENT IN THE WESTERN PORTION OF IRAN.
- (X)(U) DUE TO SEVERE COLD DURING NOV-APR EXFILTRATION BY GROUND MEANS INTO TURKEY WOULD BE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

D. (U) MISSION. MISSION FORCES WILL CONDUCT EVASION AND ESCAPE OPERATIONS, AS REQUIRED, TO ATTAIN REFUGE AND SUBSEQUENT REPARATION OF US CONTROL.

E. (U) EXECUTION:

- 1. (U) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. SEE BASIC OPLAN.
- 2. (U) CONCEPT OF E&E OPERATIONS. MISSION SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS, ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF THE DETAILED PLANS WHICH WILL EMERGE FROM THIS CONCEPT. JOINT E&E OPERATIONS WILL NORMALLY BE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE GROUND FORCES COMMANDER OR AIRCRAFT COMMANDER AS APPROPRIATE. IN CASE OF NO CLEAR COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY, THE INDIVIDUAL MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE/EXPERIENCED IN E&E TACTICS SHOULD ASSUME THE COMMAND.

F. (U) TASKS OF SUBORDINATE UNITS:

- (1) ALL UNITS WILL PLAN FOR AND ACCOMPLISH TRAINING FOR THE CONDUCT OF E & E AS NOTED ABOVE. (CONCEPT OF E & E OPS)

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SECRET- SYSTEM SAR. THIS SAR WILL COMPRISE THE PRIMARY INITIAL SAR EFFORT DURING THE EXECUTION OF THE MISSION (SEE ANNEX --).

~~SECRET~~

C (C) TASKS OF FRIENDLY FORCES:

(1) ~~(U)~~ NAVAL FORCES SUPPORT ESE OPERATIONS OF THIS PLAN AS DIRECTED BY CINCPAC, TO THE LIMIT OF THEIR CAPABILITY, AND TO THE EXTENT THAT THEIR CAPABILITY SUPPORTS POST-OPERATION ESE.

(2) ~~(U)~~

C (3) ~~(U)~~ EXTERNAL-BASED SAR EFFORT WILL BE UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE MISSION COMMANDER. THIS EXTERNAL SAR EFFORT WILL NOT BE INITIATED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF PLANNED EXFILTRATION PHASE OR CANCELLATION OF THE MISSION OR AS DIRECTED BY THE MISSION COMMANDER.

(4) ~~(U)~~

A,B,C (C) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

A (1) (C) COMMON PROCEDURES:

(A) ~~(U)~~ PRIMARY MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE BY SECURE VOICE RADIO, IF POSSIBLE. BACKUP COMMO WILL BE BY CREEP SURVIVAL RADIOS.

(B) ~~(U)~~ HOSTAGES, REGARDLESS OF RANK, WILL NOT ACT WITH COMMAND AUTHORITY, EXCEPT AS DIRECTED BY THE SENIOR RECOVERY FORCE ELEMENT COMMANDER. IN A CONFLICT OF OPINION ON WHERE TO GO, OR HOW TO EVACUATE BETWEEN DELTA/FAUCER ~~(U)~~ FORCE PERSONNEL AND OTHER PERSONNEL (AIR CREW), THE RANKING DELTA/RAN-SAR ~~(U)~~ WILL HAVE COMMAND AUTHORITY REGARDLESS OF SENIORITY RANKS.

(C) ~~(U)~~ PERSONNEL CONDUCTING E AND E OPERATIONS WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO REMOVE WOUNDED PERSONNEL WITH THEM AS THEY EVACUATE. NO MISSION PERSONNEL WILL BE LEFT BEHIND UNLESS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO AVOID TOTAL OPERATIONAL/ELEMENT FAILURE. KIA'S LEFT BEHIND WILL BE CONCEALED AS BEST POSSIBLE;

(D) ~~(U)~~ IDENTIFICATION AND COMPROMISING DOCUMENTS REMOVED, --
-- THE LOCATION MARKED ON A MAP FOR FUTURE RECOVERY AND RECOVERY/RECOVERY AFFAIRS PURPOSES.

(E) ~~(U)~~ ONLY PERSONNEL, ONLY, WILL BE IDENTIFIED ON THE FLYER POINT, TIME, AND COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO MISSION LAUNCH. OTHER PERSONNEL WILL BE LISTED ONLY ON THE E AND E CONCEPT IN BROAD TERMS, AND ONLY PROVIDED WITH INITIAL BALLY POINT/COORDINATION POINT INFORMATION TO RECEIVE FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. SPECIAL CASES WILL BE APPROPRIATE BY THEIR COMMANDERS.

(F) ~~(U)~~ SAR EFFORT IS PRIMARILY BASED ON DIRECTING PERSONNEL TO MAKE A RECOVERY PRE-PLANNED SAR EFFORT CAN MAKE AN INITIAL MISSION. PRIMARY MEANS OF EVACUATING WOUNDED PERSONNEL IS BY CREEP, SECONDLY BY SYSTEM SAR DURING THE EXECUTION OF THE MISSION AND BY AERIAL-POSITIONED, PRE-PLANNED, POST-MISSION SAR. PROLONGED SAR WILL BE THE LAST OPTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL, IF ALL OTHER SAR EFFORTS FAIL.

(G) ~~(U)~~ E AND E CONCEPT WILL BE BROKEN INTO 3 PHASES: COUNTRY INFILTRATION, ENVIRONS OF TERRAN PRIOR TO H HOUR, ENVIRONS OF TERRAN AFTER H-HOUR (PHASE TO EXFIL "E" HOUR). ENVIRONS OF TERRAN AFTER H-HOUR (POST-EXFIL "E" HOUR), 72 HOURS AFTER H-HOUR, (PHASES E AND E).

~~SECRET~~

(10) COUNTRY/INFILTRATION PHASE: PRIMARY SAR WILL BE COMPLETED BY THE HELO BUDDY-SYSTEM PLAN. IF THIS CANNOT BE COMPLETED, THE DOWNED PERSONNEL WILL GROUP TOGETHER AND HOLD IN THE VICINITY OF THE AIRCRAFT. THE DOWNED PERSONNEL MUST BE PREPARED TO CONCEAL THEMSELVES AND THEIR AIRCRAFT FROM GROUND OBSERVATION FOR UP TO 36 HOURS.

(2) ENVIRONS OF TEHRAN PRIOR TO H-HOUR. ALL DOWNED PERSONNEL WILL BE PICKED UP BY THE BUDDY SYSTEM. IF PICK-UP IS NOT POSSIBLE, AND THE DOWNED PERSONNEL ARE OUTSIDE THE TEHRAN BUILD-UP AREA, MOVEMENT AWAY FROM THE CITY PROPER AND, DEPENDING ON POSITION WHERE DOWNED, EITHER TOWARD EXFIL POINTS AT PEGGY, PAITY OR OTHER DESIGNATED SITES.

(3) ENVIRONS OF TEHRAN AFTER H-HOUR (PRIOR TO EXFIL "E" HOUR):

(A) FROM EMBASSY:

1. PRIMARY HELO EXTRACTION IS FROM THE EMBASSY. IF EXTRACTION IS NOT POSSIBLE FROM THE EMBASSY GROUNDS, THE FOLLOWING AREAS WILL BE USED (IN ORDER) TO PROVIDE EXFIL POINTS:

(A) STADIUM. IF NO PICK-UP, THEN TO

(B) CONSTRUCTION SITE IN NORTH TEHRAN.

2. IF EXTRACTION IS NOT COMPLETED AT THE CONSTRUCTION SITE, [REDACTED]

(C) FROM MFA:

PRIMARY HELO EXTRACTION IS FROM THE MFA GROUNDS. IF EXTRACTION IS NOT POSSIBLE THEN PERSONNEL WILL MOVE TO THE FOLLOWING POINTS FOR EXTRACTION:

1. PARDIS-SHARK:

IF EXTRACTION BY HELO IS NOT POSSIBLE, MOVEMENT MUST BE MADE BY VEHICLE TO CONSTRUCTION SITE.

2. CONSTRUCTION SITE IN NORTH TEHRAN:

IF NO EXTRACTION CAN BE MADE AT THE CONSTRUCTION SITE, MOVEMENT TO LZ PAITY MUST BE MADE (SEE REGS).

(4) ENVIRONS OF TEHRAN AFTER E-HOUR:

(A) DOWNED PERSONNEL WILL MOVE TOWARD SELECTED HIDING SITES. [REDACTED]

(B) DEPENDING ON POSITION IN THE CITY, PERSONNEL WILL EITHER HIDE AND ATTEMPT TO OR MOVE DIRECTLY TO THE LAR VALLEY. WITHIN 48-72 HOURS A SAR WILL BE LAUNCHED (W/ PERMITTING) AND DIRECTED TO THE LAR VALLEY FOR EXTRACTION OF STRANDED PERSONNEL.

~~SECRET~~

IF NO PICK-UP IS MADE BY 72 HOURS AFTER EXFIL, THE
INDIVIDUAL MUST PREPARE FOR A PROLONGED E AND E SITUATION.

(C) ~~CO~~ ~~COORDINATION~~ DESIGNATION. TWO GENERAL AREAS HAVE
BEEN DESIGNATED FOR ESCAPE AND EVASION MOVEMENT,
REFERRED TO AS THE EASTERN AREA AND THE WESTERN AREA.
THE WESTERN AREA IS A NORTH-SOUTH STRIP RUNNING ALONG A
LINE SOUTH FROM TEHRAN TO ISFAHAN TO KAFSANJAN SOUTH TO
BANDAR ABBAS. THE EASTERN AREA RUNS FROM SEMNAN SOUTH
ALONG THE MAJOR ROAD TO KERMAN THEN S/EAST TO SABZEVARAN,
THEN SOUTH TO BANDAR ABBAS.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

A C
A. (U) LOGISTICS. [REDACTED]

OTHER LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS WILL BE
COORDINATED WITH [REDACTED] SHOULD SERVICE ELEMENTS BE UNABLE TO
PROVIDE; I.E., COMPASSES, SIGNAL PANELS, SIGNAL MIRRORS,
ETC. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR SURVIVAL BUNDLES TO BE
DROPPED TO EVASION ELEMENTS WILL BE CONFIGURED BY [REDACTED]
UPON RECEIPT OF D-DAY/C-DAY AUTHORIZATION FROM JCS. [REDACTED]

B. (U) ADMINISTRATION. SEE BASIC OPLAN

B. (U) COMM AND SIGNAL:

A. (U) SIGNAL. SEE ANNEX THIS OPLAN, AND TAB THIS
APPENDIX FOR COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES.

A B. (U) COMM. JOINT E AND E OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED
UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE SENIOR DELTA/RANGER [REDACTED] PERSON
PRESENT, REGARDLESS OF RELATIVE RANK. UNILATERAL E AND E
OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE
SENIOR PERSON PRESENT. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL
HOSTAGE PERSONNEL BE PLACED IN A COMMAND POSITION OF
MISSION FORCES, REGARDLESS OF HOSTAGE RANK/POSITION.

(U) THE ABOVE CONCEPT WILL BE EXPANDED INTO A FULL ANNEX.
THERE WILL BE A CONFERENCE HELD AT JTD 5-7 NOV TO COMPLETE
THE DETAILS OF THIS ANNEX. PLEASE SEND NAME OF ATTENDEE BY
3 NOV 89.

REVISED OCT 89
BT

~~SECRET~~

OPSEC PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

184

This document addresses general and specific procedures that must be considered to avoid compromise of the operation and to maintain a high degree of OPSEC. Some of the measures have already been incorporated while others remain unfulfilled.

~~(1)~~ I. MOVING FORCE TO OVERSEAS STAGING BASE

A. DELTA

1. HUMINT Threat to include inadvertent disclosure by the press, through family and friends.

E a. [REDACTED] Responsibilities

(1) Continue [REDACTED]

(2) Continue personnel welfare activities such as residence checks, financial support, caring for families, etc.

A (3) Monitor [REDACTED] community (especially [REDACTED]) for indications through use [REDACTED], and other sources.

(4) Monitor attachments and civilian hire (cooks, KPs, guards, etc.).

(5) Divert press inquiries to HQDA PAO while otherwise refusing to talk to the media.

b. Delta Main REsponsibilities

(1) Conduct stringent OPSEC briefing to personnel.

A, B (2) Train and live in isolation; restrict contact of personnel with others; [REDACTED]

(3) Move in isolation - no exposure when possible, [REDACTED] apply need-to-know principle stringently.

(4) Minimal exposure times on ground.

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Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
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(5) [REDACTED]

A, B (6) [REDACTED] and transport only essential cargo.

(7) Eliminate access to areas by foreign nationals when possible.

2. PHOTINT/SIGINT Threats

a. Program [REDACTED] with movement times and [REDACTED] when applicable.

7, B b. Emplace [REDACTED]

c. Use maximum COMSEC procedures to include secure systems, [REDACTED] etc.

B. USAF

1. Maintain similar measures as Delta.

A 2. Special attention [REDACTED] overseas.

C. [REDACTED] RANGERS

1. Maintain similar measures as Delta.

2. Move force under [REDACTED] and have [REDACTED]

D. POTENTIAL DAMAGE FACTORS IN EVENT OF COMPROMISE

1. Hostages killed.

2. Increased security/vigilance by Iranians.

3. Hostages moved.

4. Combination of above.

(6) II. MC-130 INSERT FROM STAGING BASE TO REFUEL/LAGER SITE

A. DELTA MAIN (HUMINT/PHOTINT/SIGINT THREATS)

1. Secure storage and facilities for personnel and equipment not taken forward.

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2. Continue COMSEC procedures with emphasis on [REDACTED] from staging base.

B. RANGERS - same as for Delta.

C. USAF

1. Same as for Delta.

2. Minimal use [REDACTED] to avoid [REDACTED] by USSR, Iranian, and other applicable ground/air stations.

3. [REDACTED]

4. Route planning [REDACTED]

5. Establish appropriate OPSEC measures for 1 or more aircraft encountering in-flight emergency.

D. CONSEQUENCES OF COMPROMISE

1. Same as I. D. above.

2. Possible decisive engagement of force by air defense guns/missiles and/or aircraft intercept.

III. RH-53 INSERT TO REFUEL/LAGER SITE

A. Develop plan [REDACTED] Threat is from [REDACTED]

B. Develop plan to [REDACTED] of RH-53s. Threat is same as III. A. with additional [REDACTED]

C. Route planning to [REDACTED]

D. Establish appropriate OPSEC measures for 1 or more aircraft having in-flight emergency.

E. Minimal use of [REDACTED] with COMSEC emphasis.

F. CONSEQUENCES OF COMPROMISE - same as II. D. above.

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~~(S)~~ IV. TAKEOVER AND LAGER AT NA'IN

A. RANGERS (HUMINT/PHOTINT/SIGINT THREATS)

1. Recover/dispose of air items if applicable.

2. Total elimination or capture of guarding force

3.

(e.g. food, water, sanitation, trash considerations; etc.).

4. Develop plan to give

5. Stress COMSEC procedures.

B. USAF

1. Develop landing techniques to avoid ground observation. Attention to light and noise conditions.

2. Ensure minimal ground time for aircraft with appropriate light/noise discipline - will engines be shut down; what is parking pattern, turn around, and takeoff procedures; what are refueling procedures?

3. Develop OPSEC procedures if 1 or more aircraft is unable to takeoff.

C. RH-53s

1. Same as for USAF.

2. Develop plan to

D. DELTA - same as for rangers.

E. CONSEQUENCES OF COMPROMISE - Same as I. D. as well as possible decisive engagement of the force on the ground.

V. MC-130 RETURN FROM NA'IN TO STAGING BASE

Same as I and II above for USAF.

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VI. RECRUITMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF DRIVERS AND GROUND TRANSPORT
(HUMINT THREAT)

A. Standard agent recruitment procedures must be followed but time may not be sufficient to vet personnel and to ascertain full reliability of drivers.

B. Vehicles must be procured, delivered, and stored in such a manner as to avoid suspicion/investigation.

C. Compromise may result in same potential damage as in I. D. above as well as possible intercept and decisive engagement of force.

VII. GROUND TRANSPORT MOVE FROM TEHRAN TO LINK-UP POINT (HUMINT THREAT)

A. Vehicles must be configured for concealment by trusted and reliable personnel to preclude leaks.

B. Cut-outs should be used to assemble and mate drivers to vehicles to avoid compromise.

C. Plan must be developed to prepare vehicles for movement to link-up point to include appropriate cover, documentation, and procedures for drivers. Route planning must occur for passage of check points and routing of vehicles so driver does not necessarily know true destination.

D. Vehicles must be parked near link-up point with an ostensible reason for being there or with concealment to avoid ground/air observation.

E. Consequences of compromise are the same as VI. C. above.

VIII. AIR MOVE FROM NA'IN TO LINK-UP POINT (HUMINT/SIGINT THREATS)

~~(C)~~ A. RH-53s

1. Establish OPSEC procedures in event 1 or more aircraft cannot take off or have in-flight emergencies.

2. Route planning to [REDACTED]

3. COMSEC measures.

4. Landing must be in isolated area to avoid ground observation with special attention to noise and light discipline.

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A B. DELTA/RANGERS

1. Movement plan from aircraft to vehicles without being detected.
2. Last minute concealment check after loading vehicles and prior to move out.
3. Capture or eliminate any personnel observing aircraft.

(C) IX. RH-53 GROUND TIME (HUMINT/SIGINT THREATS)

A. [REDACTED]

B. Maintain security around aircraft, capture or eliminate ground observers or passers by.

C. Maintain radio silence.

(U) X. GROUND MOVE FROM LINK-UP TO TEHRAN (HUMINT THREAT)

A. Develop plan to bypass checkpoints or to pass through them to include control of drivers.

B. Noise/light discipline in vehicles.

C. Maintain COMSEC measures.

XI. MC/AC-130 MOVE FROM STAGING BASE TO MANZARIYEH

Same considerations as for II above.

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TIME	EVENT/SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
1700L	1 MC-130 with Rangers depart <u>Egypt</u> Successful Unsuccessful: Launch Rangers in spare A/C within two hours	None Delay entire mission by whatever it takes to get airborne	Go Go, inform RH-53 KC-135s & MC-130
	Unable launch within two hours	No force to secure Main, unable to arrive at hideout before sunrise	Abort, inform other forces Delay 24 hours
1730L	5/MC-130 with fuel (3) and Delta (2) depart 10 min separation If spare is available for launch within two hours If no spare and a Delta A/C aborts If no spare and a fuel A/C aborts	Mission will be delayed Lose 1/2 mission force Fuel for helos degraded	Go, inform other forces of delay Abort Advise Kitty Hawk to only launch four helos
1815 L	Launch 2/air refuelable tanker (ART): If either gets airborne If delayed less than 2 hours If delayed more than 2 hours	Sufficient fuel for Ranger MC-130 Must orbit of Ranger MC-130 Cannot get helos to hideout by first light	Go Go, advise other A/C of delay Abort, recall MC-130s and helos if launched
1830	6/RH-53 depart Kitty Hawk: ≥ 4 get airborne ≤ 3 get airborne	Sufficient helos to accomplish the mission plus one spare Insufficient helos for mission	Go Abort, recall MC-130's & KC-135/ARTs

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<u>(U) TIME</u>	<u>EVENT/SITUATION</u>	<u>CONSEQUENCES</u>	<u>DECISION/OUT</u>
1845L	1/KC-135 & 3/ART's launch: > 2 get airborne < 2 get airborne	Will have to share fuel from more than one tanker for one of the MC-130s Not enough fuel for MC-130s	Go, except a for refuelin at least one the MC-130's Abort, advis MC-130s and helos
1845	If a helo goes down while within the range of the SAR helos -- no injuries -- with injuries	Aircrew on the ground in Iran Will use one of mission helos to return crew to the carrier	Go, launch S for pickup If there are 4 mission he continue - If less th abort, advis KC-135 and M
1920	1/MC-130 air refuels with ARTS: Unsuccessful:	No Ranger force for security at Main	- Try the se tanker, if g go, if no re possible, ab recall helos MC-130s and KC-130..
1950	5/MC-130s air refuel		
2030	with 4/ARTS and 1/KC-135: - All successful - One of the fuel A/C fails to refuel - More than one fuel A/C fails to refuel - One of the Delta A/C fails to refuel	None Insufficient fuel for 6/RH-53s Insufficient fuel for the mission Insufficient force for the mission	Go - Instruct a in excess of to return to carrier Abort, advis MC-130, RH-5 ARTS/KC-135 Abort, advis other aircra(

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<u>TIME</u>	<u>EVENT/SITUATION</u>	<u>CONSEQUENCES</u>	<u>DECISION/CPT</u>
2215L	RH-53s reach turn around point: 4 helos operational	Sufficient helos for operation	Go, from here an abort must worked out of Main
	4 helos operational	Insufficient helos for operation	Abort
2250L	1st MC-130 with Rangers lands at Main to secure the field: - Runway blocked - MC-130 has problem on landing	Field will be ready to receive follow-on force Unable to air land Rangers Runway must be cleared for follow on force	Go - Jump rangers into target area to secure the base, clear the runway - Off load MC-130 aircraft will be destroyed prior to departure, Abort mission
2320 0000L	Follow-on MC-130s land at Main - Field not secure when A/C arrive	Delta plus fuel will be ready to receive fuel Need to complete the security if mission is to go	Go Land Delta to assist Rangers in completing security. If warning outside Main is suspect abort, refuel helos and send them back to the carrier. Recover rest of force in MC-130s
0000- 0030	2/MC-130s that brought in Delta depart	Partially clears Main for arrival of helos	If problem arises later, fuel MC-130s can carry Delta and Rangers out after refueling helos

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<u>TIME</u>	<u>EVENT/SITUATION</u>	<u>CONSEQUENCES</u>	<u>DECISION/OPTION</u>
0030	6/RH-53 land at Nain Military to refuel	4 RH-53s operational force is adequate for mission	Go
	- RH-53s unable to find Nain Military by 0100, launch MC-130 to provide UHF/ADF homing from 7000.	Helos must arrive at Nain by 0130 or MC-130s will be short of fuel for return	If helos can arrive Nain by 0130, mission still Go If helos arrive later than 0130
	- RH-53s unable to arrive Nain By 0130	MC-130s must depart to reach tanker with sufficient fuel	- Pump fuel to one bladder with three fuel MC-130s (gives one MC-130 hour delay). When helos arrive pump remaining fuel to helos get max number that can return to the ship. all helos back towards carrier and set the fuel helos as necessary, pick up crews and proceed.
0130	The one Ranger and two Delta MC-130 depart for [REDACTED]	Clears ramp. Delta will go with helos. security force will return on the fuel MC-130.	Go
	Any MC-130 has problem and cannot depart Nain	Mission will be compromised	Abort, return helos to carrier take Rangers Delta to [REDACTED] MC-130s.
0130	6/RH-53s with Delta and the Ranger security depart Nain	All of Delta and 12 Rangers can proceed on the mission.	Go

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<u>TIME</u>	<u>EVENT/SITUATION</u>	<u>CONSEQUENCES</u>	<u>DECISION/OPTION</u>
	3 helos get airborne	Spread Delta and Rangers	Go
	3 helos get airborne	Mission badly degraded	Continue in degraded status or abort
0310	RH/53s arrive at landing zone to drop off Delta	Delta will depart for Tehran in vehicles	Go
	There are no vehicles at the LZ	Delta unable to move to Tehran	Leave reception team at LZ. Move helos and rest of force to hideout. Del 24 hrs, 48 hr abort
0330	RH-53s depart LZ to hideout. Delta moves to Tehran		

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TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/COMMENTS
2/0800Z (0300 Est)	Decision to launch MC-130	N/A	N/A
2/1000Z (0500 Est)	Launch MC-130: a. 5/MC-130 Airborne b. 4/MC-130 "	None Reduced fuel for Helo's	Go Go, will provide 19 operational bladders to complete mission
	c. <4/MC-130 Airborne	Insufficient fuel for Helo's	No Go/Delay 24 hr
	d. >1:00 delay in T/O	Will not get fuel to helos in time for them to reach hideout by daylight	No Go/Delay 24 hr
2/1115Z (0615 Est)	KC-135 launch: 3 KC-135 Airborne <3 KC-135 Airborne	None Unable to accomplish MC-130 refueling	Go No Go
2/1150Z (0650 Est)	2 ARTS & 1 KC-135 launch, <2 ARTS & 1 KC-135 launch,	None Unable to accomplish MC-130 refueling	Go No go
2/1340Z (0840 Est)	MC-130 refueling: 5 successful 4 successful	Sufficient fuel for 6 Helos Sufficient fuel for 5 helos, can move camouflage to hideout	Go Go, Foldup 6th Helo and leave it + TAC
	<4 successful	Insufficient fuel for Helos	No Go
2/1430Z (0930 Est)	Helo launch a. 6/Helo airborne (5 w/ Delta/1 w/ extra support equipment, i.e., portable TACAN plus camouflage nets) b. >5/Helo airborne with no more than 1:00 delay c. <5/Helo airborne	Improves Delta's chances of having adequate helo support at the target AND MINIMUM AIRCRAFT Max delay, and still be able to reach hide out by daylight with sufficient aircraft Would unacceptably degrade equip and personnel for "Delta"	Go If there is a delay instruct MC-130's to orbit No/Go, delay 24 hr Inform MC-130's & KC-135's

< = less than
> = greater than
≤ = less than or equal to
≥ = greater than or equal to

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(U)	TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
		d.>1:00 delay	Cannot reach hideout by daylight	No Go, delay 24
	2/1430Z 1515Z (1140 EST)	Helo goes down over water - Delta Helo down	Force unacceptably degraded	No Go, Recall He advise MC-130s to take 2nd refuel and RTB. Scram SAR from Carrier advise KC-130s/A
		- Cargo Helo down	TACAN and camouflage nets gone	Option 1 - Delta Helos continue, launch SAR from Carrier Option 2 - Recall Helos advise MC-130s to refuel and RTB launch SAR
	2/1640Z (1140 EST)	MC-130 refueling: 5 successful 4 successful	Sufficient fuel for 6 helos Sufficient fuel for 5 helos, can move camouflage to hide out	Go Go, Foldup 6th H and leave it + T
		<4 successful	Insufficient fuel for helos	No Go, recall He
	2/1515Z 1810Z (1015 1310 EST)	Helo goes down prior to turn around point: - Delta Helo down	Force unacceptably degraded - may lose TACAN and camouflage nets	Other 5 helos land and spread the load. Advise MC-130 to delay by no. minutes required recovery. - If injuries: Option 1: 6th lands, dumps cargo if necessary, if injured and return to carrier.
		Cargo Helo down	Crew requires recovery	Option 2: Abort recall helos, advise MC-130's RTB, advise KC-135's Option 1: Launch Delta Helos continue

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(U) TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTION
			Option 2: Land of the other helos and load crew member camouflage net each. The Team should be able to go on one of the helos. Advise MC-130's to
	More than one helo goes down	Force unacceptably degraded	Abort, recall, advise MC-130 RTB, call for KC-135 support
2/1810Z 1918Z (310-1416 EST)	6 helos operational for entire route	Arrive at refueling with all Delta and extra equipment	Go
	Delta or cargo helo goes down, no injuries	Part of attack force down, must be recovered	Option 1: Land helos and spare load. Continue refuel point Option 2: Land helo and p/u plus crew.
	Delta helo goes down with injuries	Force could be unacceptably degraded	NOTE: Any one can recover plus the crew cargo helo is 2000 lbs light Option 1: A proceed to refuel point, take fuel, return carrier. Option 2: Proceed to refuel point helo will return carrier with Remaining 4 on mission. No camouflage can be taken (hideout)

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(U) TIME	(U) EVENT/ SITUATIONS	(U) CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/CPE/CON
2/1948Z (1445 EST)	<p>Airdrop of fuel bladder:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- 5 MC-130s make drop- 4 MC-130's make successful drop. Bladders loaded 5/aircraft; one aircraft only has 4. <p><4 MC-130's make successful drop or <19 bladders are usable.</p>	<p>Enough fuel for all 6 helos if all bladders OK</p> <p>Worst case, if no bladders break, there will be 19 available. Best case, 20 bladders available, can break one.</p> <p>Insufficient fuel for 4 helos to make target</p>	<p>Go, can proceed number of helos desired</p> <p>Can go with 4 helos if we get 19 fuel</p> <p>Option 1: Try to extract fuel from extra helos so as to get 4 operations</p> <p>Option 2: Spread personnel over 3 helos, strip down and return to ship</p> <p>Option 3: Delay 24 hours to get more fuel the next night</p>
2/2248Z (1745 EST)	<p>Helos launch from refueling:</p> <p>6 helos airborne</p> <p>5 helos airborne</p> <p>4 helos airborne</p> <p>3 helos airborne</p>	<p>Will have extra helo support for extraction</p> <p>Adequate support for extraction</p> <p>Marginal support for extraction</p> <p>Minimum helos for extraction</p>	<p>Go, use 6th helo carry max fuel</p> <p>Go, fold up 6th and leave it. Extract extra fuel operational helos</p> <p>Go, spread Delta Helo crews and equipment over operational helos</p> <p>Option 1: Proceed mission in degraded status</p> <p>Option 2: Spread personnel over 3 helos, strip down and return to carrier.</p> <p>Option 3: Delay 24 hrs. Try to fix helos or get more fuel, as required</p>

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(U) TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTION
	2 helos airborne	Inadequate helo support for mission	Option 1: Delay hours, try to get helos or get fuel, as required. Option 2: Load personnel on strip down and to RV near beach. Call for SAR. Option 3: Delay hours, fly per to Manzarieh to meet MC-130 Rangers. Option 4: Delta crews fly to vicinity of Delta Takeover airfield the next night. MC-130's land extract.
	1 helo airborne	Same as above	Same as option above except the one helo. Delta from report to vicinity of Darband
	Zero helos airborne	Same as above	Walk to Darband call for MC-130 when ready.
2/2248Z+ 1:00 (1748:1 hr Est)	Helos must be off by 2348Z	After this, cannot reach hideout by daylight	Delay 24 hours
2/2318 (1818 EST)	Helos pass point where they could turn around and return to carrier	Once beyond this point, the force is committed to Manzarieh for extraction	JTF Commander recall the force to the carrier contact means
2-3/2248Z 0124Z (1748-2024 EST)	Helo goes down between refueling point and Delta's dropoff point:		
	- 6 helos available cargo helo goes	Aircrew on the ground with camouflage nets	2 helos land crew and nets
	- 6 helos available, Delta helo goes	Delta force unacceptable degraded	3 helos land, Delta or crew

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(U) TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/REMARKS
			the cargo helo, Delta board each the other two he
	5 helos available, Delta helo goes	Same as above	4 helos land and load the personnel attempt lift off with nets, if un- dump nets.
	4 helos available, Delta helo goes down	Same as above	Abort, strip down spread personnel among 3 helos, proceed to hideout extract on MC-130 the next night.
	3 helos available Delta helo goes down.	Same as above	From here on we find a recovery airfield to secure and call for the MC-130's
3/0124Z (2024 EST)	Any major problem at the dropoff point	Mission could be blown and/or force degraded	Option 1: Abort, move to hideout, meet MC-130s next night. Option 2: Continue ground commander's decision.
3/2200Z 2210Z (1700-1710 EST)	Helo goes down enroute to hideout	Will affect ability to perform extraction	If 3 or more helos available, continue if < 3, inform Delta and abort to Manzariyeh.
3/0124Z 2135Z (2024-3/1635)	Delta is discovered enroute while helos are at hideout	With the force split Delta must be able to call the helos to a predetermined RV	Move helos at night to RV to pick up Delta then to Manzariyeh for extraction.

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(U) TIME	EVENT/ SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIC
3/1500Z (1000 EST)	AC-130 launch		
3/1630Z (1130 EST)	MC-130 Launch 5 MC-130 OK 4 MC-130 OK 3 " " 2 " " 2 " "	Personnel jammed on A/C - Unable to extract all hostages + Delta + Rangers (149 people)	GO - P/U only hos + wounded - Direct launch and P/U some leftovers
3/1545 (1045 EST)	KC-135 launch for MC-130 3 KC-135 OK 2 " OK	Insufficient fuel for 5 MC-130	Refuel at least MC-130, more if possible.
3/1605 (3/1105 EST)	KC-135 launch for AC-130 MC-130 refuel 2 MC-130 OK 2 MC-130 OK	Unable to extract all hostages + Delta and Rangers	Go Same as above
3/1900 (3/1400 EST)	AC-130 Refuel MC-130 refuel 2 MC-130 OK 2 MC-130 OK	Same as above	Same as above
3/2135Z (1635 EST)	Helo lift off from hideout 3 RH-53 OK 3 RH-53 OK	Unable to lift out all hostages + Delta	Use extras (>3) CAS - Cycle helos f Manzariyeh to Embassy
3/2230Z (1730 EST)	MC-130's arrive at Manzariyeh find R/W blocked	- Unable to land secure airfield	- Paratroop Rang onto airfield - Wait for Delta helos to arri to secure field clear R/W
3/2230Z (1730 EST)	Helos land at Embassy 5 RH-53 OK 3 RH-53 OK 2 RH-53 OK	Will have extra helos Min req'd helos for for extraction Not sufficient helos for extraction	- Use extra hel - Land helos si use other 2 for - Cycle helos f extraction
3/2230Z 2300Z (1730-1800 EST)			

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TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
32245Z (1745 EST)	Extraction: 3 Helo's OK 1 Helo OK Zero Helo's OK	Normal operation Unable to extract all personnel Unable to extract by Helo	Go Cycle Helo's Use ground vehicle to drive to Manzariych
32300Z (1800 EST)	Helo's arrive at Manzariych 3 RH-53 OK 3 RH-53 OK 3 RH-53 w/5 MC-130 Zero helo's OK	All personnel can be extracted immediately on MC-130 Not all personnel can be recovered in single cycle Helo's will be in cycle made with extra MC-130's on the ground MC-130's will have to wait for personnel	Each MC-130 will leave as soon as loaded - MC-130's depart when loaded - Launch loaded MC-130 plus 1 or extra MC-130 - Keep all MC-130 ground till per sonnel arrive - Launch two MC-1 for cover relay or for departur
4/0015 (3/19/5 EST)	AC-130 departs area		
4/0045 (3/19/5 EST) Movement of Delta	AC-130 refuel Delta is discovered	Mission if blown	- Have Delta set prearranged rally points. If discovered, dis- engage, proceed to rally pt. When helo's li- off, direct the to appropriate P/U zone. - Establish Manzariyeh as rally point, He go to Manzariyeh if no contact with Delta

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(#188)

1. Brother - Sister. I am a Moslem like you. I was an engineer in Mecca the home of G then I came to Iran. I was working in Kerman when revolution took place.

BARADAR - KHAHAR - MAN MESLE SHOMA MOSALMAN HASTAM. MAN MOHANDESE KHANEHE KHODA D MACCA BUDAM. BE IRAN AMADAM. DAR KERMAN BUDAM KE ENGHELAB SHOD.

2. A man took money from me to take me out of the country, but he brought me to Tehra He deceived me. Now I am alone without a place and food.

YEK MARD AZ MAN POOL GEREFT KE MARA KHAREJ KONAD VALI OU MARA GOOL ZAD VA BE TEHR. AVARD. HALA TANHA VA BE DUNE JA VA GAZA HASTAM.

3. I have a wife, 5 small children, an old mother and father. They are waiting for m You may have children too. You have father and mother and you know how I feel.

MAN ZAN, VA PANJ BACH CHE KUCHAK MADAR VA PEDAR DARAM ANHA MONTAZERE MAN HASTAN SHOMA HAM BACHCHE - MADAR VA PEDAR DAREED VA MIDANEED HALLE MARA.

4. You Iranians and Moslems are famous for hospitality. For the sake of God help m I need your help.

SHOMA IRANIHA VA MOSALMANHA BE MEHMAN NAVAZI MAAROOF HASTEED. BE KHATERE KHODA I MAN KOMAK KONEED. I NEED YOUR HELP.

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Declassified ON: ~~OADR~~

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC

12 Aug 92

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HELP
COME HERE
DON'T MOVE
GET DOWN
SIT DOWN
STAND UP
PUT DOWN
OPEN
CLOSE
RIFLE
PISTOL
KNIFE
AMMUNITION
HAND GRENADE
MACHINE GUN
WE ARE BROTHERS
IMAM

WHERE AM I
WHICH WAY IS
NORTH
SOUTH
WEST
EAST
ROAD
TRAIN
BUS
TAXI

KOMAK
BIYA ENJA
TA KAN NA KHOR
BE KHAB
BEN SHEINID
BOLAND SHOW
BEGZAR ZAMIN
BAZ
BAS TE
TOFANG
HAF TEAR
CHA GH0
FE SHANG
NARENJAK
MO SAL SAL
MA BARADAR HAS TEAM
EMAM

MAN KOJA HAS TAM
RAHE KOJAST
SHOMAL
JO NOB
GHARB
SHARGH
RAH
GHATAR
AUTOBOS
TAXI

کملک بیا اینجا
کان نخور بخواب
بنشینید بلندشو
یلزار زمین باز کن
بته تفنگ
هفت تیر چاقو
فشنگ نازنجک
ملل ابرار میم
امام من کجا هستم
کجا است شمال
جنوب
غرب
شرق راه
قطار اتوبوس
ناکی

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BICYCLE	DOCHARKHE
MOTORCYCLE	MOTOR CEAK LET
TRUCK (LORRY)	MACHINE BARY
WATER	AB
BREAD	NAN
CLOTHES	LEBAS
BLANKET	PATO
SHOES	KAFSH
SOCKS	JORAB
HAT	KOLAH
COAT	COAT
PANTS	SHALVAR
OVERCOAT	PALTO

دو چرخه
موتور سیکلت
کامیون
آب
نان
لباس
پتو کفش
جوراب
کلاه
کت
شلوار
پالتو

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۱- برادر - خواهر عزیز . من مثل شما مسلمان هستم . من در هله . خانه خدا
کار میکنم و مهندس ساختمان هستم . به ایران آمدم و در تهران کار میکنم
که اللاب شد .

۲- مری از من پول گرفت که مرا به خارج از کشور ببرد ولی مرا گول زد و به
تهران آورد و الان در تهران سرگردان و بیدار غذا و جا هستم .

۳- من زن و پنج بچه کوچک و پدر و مادر و برادر دارم که منتظر من هستند . شما هم
بچه دلا اقل پدر و مادر دارید و حال مرا می فرمید .

۴- شما ایرانی ها و مسلمانان : مهمان نوازی و کمک کردن شهرت دارید بخاطر
خدا بمن کمک کنید من به کمک شما نیاز دارم .

قریبالشها .

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA 22030

191
17 MAR 1981



REPLY TO
ATTN OF INRA

SUBJECT Worldwide Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Contingency Guide
for Southwest Asia (IRAN, AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN), USAFINTEL 400-10 Volume I

TO JCS/J-3 SOD
Washington, DC

1. A copy of the SERE Contingency Guide for Southwest Asia with accompanying graphics, is at Attachment 1.
2. This Guide was produced by HQ AFIS/INR, Evasion and Escape/Prisoner of War Directorate of the Air Force Intelligence Service. Assistance in research and analysis is provided by selected members of the Air Force and Navy Intelligence Reserves.
3. Users are reminded that this Guide was primarily intended for use in operational evasion and escape (E&E) planning, E&E intelligence briefings, and various aspects of SERE training. Please refer to the introductory remarks and instructions contained in Section 01 for additional information on this Guide.
4. SERE Guides are furnished to designated Unified, Specified, and Major Commands and other special action agencies/offices noted in distribution list. Request that those distributees arrange for further reproduction and dissemination on a need-to-know basis to subordinate echelons or affiliated commands. Distribution for operational purposes will be determined by the primary distributees. This latter request is predicated on the limited printing and photo reproduction capabilities of the producer and a determination that the primary distributees should control distribution. Computer print tape versions of the Guide are not available.
5. SERE Guides are reviewed for currency as needed. Substantive changes will be forwarded to primary distributees as required.
6. Request that users forward comments, recommendations for improvements, and suggested additions or corrections directly to the producer, at the following address: HQ AFIS/INRA, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060
7. Compendia of plants, animals, diseases, and general survival information has been distributed to elements listed in Attachment 1 of this letter. We will no

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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longer provide details and 35mm slides in each Guide for individual plants, animals or diseases. If detailed information is needed, users should refer to the compendia.

8. Due to an anticipated six to eight weeks delay in photographic reproduction, only the Potential Evasion Locales (PEL) graphic overlays are included with this volume. 35mm slides will be forwarded with Volume II.

9. When Attachment 1 is withdrawn or not attached, this letter becomes "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY".

Frank J. Capillupo

FRANK J. CAPILLUPO, Lt Colonel, USAF
Director, Evasion and Escape/Prisoner
Of War

1 Atch

SWA SERE Guide, 31 January 1981

[REDACTED] 1 Cy.



~~TOP SECRET~~
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

6-#155
7 JANUARY 1981

SUBJ: ESCAPE AND EVASION

1. (U) (TS) The following Escape and Evasion plan is the final product, based on Option 12. This plan should be used in its entirety only if Option 12 is used.
2. (U) (TS) The intent of this plan is to provide an off-the-shelf capability to support Option 12 only. However, this document will hopefully also provide the framework for any other option to be developed.

David G. Prevost

DAVID G. PREVOST
Maj, USAF

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EG 12356

CONDUCTED ON 17 Aug 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

☐ DECL. EXEMPTED TO Secret

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

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INFORMATION CLASSIFIED BY: JCS-J3
DATE FOR () DECLASSIFICATION
OR () REVIEW
IS: 6 JAN 2001

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
ESCAPE AND EVASION

(U) REFERENCES: See basic OPLAN.

1. (U) SITUATION:

a. (U) Enemy. See Annex B, this OPLAN.

b. ~~(S)~~ Friendly. 

A, B, C
 However, there are several areas which are designated general Selected Areas For Evasion which should provide water, game, and opportunity to obtain shelter.

c. ^(U)~~(S)~~ Assumptions

(1) ^(U)~~(S)~~ The hostage recovery operation is conducted independent of other options/operations in the Persian Gulf area.

(2) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Iranian military forces will oppose all post-operation evasion attempts.

(3) ^(U)~~(S)~~ The Government of Iran will enlist all Iranians in evader location search, country-wide.

(4) The Iran-Iraq war zone limits any movement in the southwestern portion of Iran.

(5) Due to severe cold during Nov-Apr exfiltration by ground means other than vehicles into Turkey would be extremely hazardous.

(6) Although there are networks being used by Iranians opposed to the government to leave Iran covertly into Turkey, no penetration of their structure has yet been made. These networks are dominated by Kurds in the Tabriz and Rezayeh areas.

- 2. (S) MISSION: JTF forces will conduct evasion and escape operations; as required, to return all U.S. forces to U.S. or friendly country control.

3. (U) Execution:

a. ^(U)~~(S)~~ Concept of Operations. See basic Oplan

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REVIEW ON 5 JANUARY 2001

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Tabs -

- A. E and E Phases
- B. SAR SOP (1-75)
- C. Evasion Aids
- D. Visual Signals/LZ Markings
- E. Communications Procedures

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ESCAPE AND EVASION

Country Infil/Exfil

1. Upon boarding any fixed wing aircraft the senior ground commander, or his designated representative, will obtain from the navigator a 1:2,000,000 map with the legs of flight route (for both ingress and egress) depicted, to include approximate flight times for each major leg. (Map will remain with the aircraft). Ground element will then use this chart to flight follow and will be responsible for knowing the approximate position of the aircraft during ingress and egress. For short, rotary-wing legs of flight, the ground forces must flight-follow on their own maps.

2. Actions to be taken on forced/unplanned landing:

a. On decision to execute a forced landing, aircraft navigator will notify ground element commander of aircraft location.

b. Immediately upon stop, all personnel will comply with the directions of aircrew to exit the aircraft.

c. After rallying a safe distance from the aircraft, (500 meters west of the aircraft, if possible) the following actions will be taken

(1) Injured/wounded cared for

(2) Establish local security

(3) Destroy classified material

(4) Inventory personal/aircraft survival and evasion aids.

(5) Senior ground element officer/NCO briefs all personnel on the evasion plan, i.e., breakup in groups and evade, stay together, stay with aircraft.

(a) The decision to take one of these options will depend on the security of the downed aircraft position. If the aircraft is not burning and the downed position is reasonably secure/remote, the first option will be to remain together and within 5 km of the aircraft. If possible, movement should be made on a cardinal heading from the aircraft position toward cover. Mark your direction of movement by placing a "T" (stem at least 15 ft in length) with the bottom of the "T" pointing south. This will be an authenticator. Any other direction of the "T" will indicate compromise. Place the "T" near the quarter of the aircraft, indicating your direction of movement.

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(b) If the aircraft is burning or the landing is made in a populated or hostile area, a determination must be made whether to break into small groups and evade or to attempt to hide as a large group. In all probability, there would be no external SAR effort launched until the objective has been met and exfil is nearing an end. A 24 to 36 hour maximum prior to launch of a SAR effort is realistic. For the timeframe H+36 hours, all personnel should, if possible, attempt to remain in one group. Initial evasion should be attempted in the direction which will provide the most cover and security for the evaders.

(c) SAR forces should make contact within 36 hours of H-hour. In the time between downing and pick-up, a secure zone should be maintained with a safe access to an adequate helo landing area. For contact/pick-up procedures see SAR ANNEX.

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(S) 3.

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~~(S)~~ TAB B SAR PLAN, 101st ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I. GENERAL:

A. Purpose: The purpose of this SOP is to outline the basic procedures that will be used by the 6 and 12 man SAR teams. This also outlines the basic organization, responsibilities, procedures and special equipment used by this team.

II. TEAM ORGANIZATION:

A 12-Man Team: The SAR Team should work as a 12-man team whenever possible to provide maximum coverage and security on the target. the 12-man SAR Team is broken down into two elements; the Personnel Rescue Element and the Security Element. The 12-man SAR Team break-down to include primary and alternate duties are:

PERSONNEL RESCUE ELEMENT:

SAR Team Leader: Responsible for SAR Team; directs all actions on the objective; controls and directs all personnel on the ground; controls the use of the SAR aircraft; directs fire control and fire support.

Aid and Litter Team 1: Consists of 2 men; responsible for transporting all personnel from the right side of downed aircraft to appropriate SAR aircraft; responsible for security sweep of right side of aircraft; alternate demo team; alternate equipment destruction team; alternate aircraft entrance team.

Aid and Litter Team 2: Consists of 2 men; responsible for transporting all personnel including navigator from the left side of the downed aircraft to appropriate SAR aircraft; responsible for security sweep of left-side of aircraft; primary aircraft entrance team.

Aid and Litter Team 3: Responsible for acting as guides for all uninjured and slightly injured walking personnel to appropriate SAR aircraft; responsible for engine shut-down and equipment zero; responsible for pilot removal and transportation of injured pilots to appropriate SAR aircraft; primary demolition team/primary equipment destruction team.

Counter: Responsible for accountability of all personnel being picked up according to each aircraft load. Directs flow of personnel being loaded to insure aircraft are loaded equally if possible.

Security Element: Responsible for security of target area while the Personnel Rescue Element works. If needed the Security Element may be reinforced by the Personnel Rescue Element upon direction of the SAR Team leader.

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Assistant SAR Team Leader: Responsible for positioning security forces to secure SAR aircraft and personnel in the target area; keep SAR Team Leader informed on all security matters. Remain updated on all situations in order to assume command of the SAR team if necessary.

Security Personnel: Consists of 2 M-60 gunners and one assistant gunner; responsible for maintaining 100% alertness and observation; informs Security Team Leader of any approaching forces or dangers that may keep the SAR Team from completing its mission safely.

b. 6-Man Team: The capability of the 6-man SAR Team is greatly reduced in comparison to that of the 12-man SAR Team. However, there are situations when the reduced number of personnel would be favorable and still complete the mission. Such situations would include aircraft down due to maintenance where there are no injuries and the area is not populated or built-up. Aircraft down with only the flight crew on board could be handled by the 6-man team. The organization and the duties of the 6-man team follow closely those of the 12-man team:

Team Leader: Responsible for shut-down of engines; zeroing all secure equipment; security sweep of the aircraft; responsible for SAR Team and actions or objective.

Aid and Litter Team 1: Transporting all injured personnel to appropriate SAR aircraft; primary aircraft entrance team.

Aid and Litter Team 2: Guide for all uninjured and slightly injured personnel to appropriate aircraft; primary demo team; primary equipment destruction team.

Security Team: Consists of one M-60; protect the SAR aircraft; keep team leader informed of the security situation.

(C) III. Weapons and Equipment:

a.

b.

c.

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
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
- d. Special Equipment:
- Pry bars: 2
 - Bolt cutters: 2
 - POW kits: 8
 - M5 bags: 2
 - Airborne litters: 2
 - 120' Rope: 2
 - Demo kits: 2
 - Fire Extinguishers: 2

IV. Chalk leads:

SAR Acft 1



SAR Acft 2:



1. Team Leader and Assistant Team Leaders should position themselves on the aircraft so that they are seated to the inside of the formation when flying staggered.
2. Teams should position themselves together on chalk loading.
3. Key personnel and teams should be positioned where they can be controlled by the Team Leader.
4. Always cross load.


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DOWNED AIRCRAFT

V. Landing Configuration:

a.



1. When landing aircraft on the target area SAR aircraft 1 faces the downed aircraft on the right side of the downed aircraft (right side in relation to the direction of flight)
2. SAR aircraft 2 lands to the left of the downed aircraft in relation to the direction of flight, facing the downed aircraft.
3. Spare aircraft should land close by to the downed aircraft maintaining a safety watch on the downed aircraft for any signs of fire.

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5. If downed aircraft is in an area where a simultaneous landing by all three SAR aircraft is impossible, SAR aircraft 1 will land first, off-load SAR team and take off. Then SAR aircraft 2 will land to off-load SAR personnel and take off. The spare SAR aircraft will then land for loading of appropriate personnel and then take off. SAR aircraft 2 will land for loading followed by SAR aircraft 1. Landing will always be with the nose of the SAR aircraft pointed toward the target, if possible. Once an aircraft has cleared the PZ, that aircraft should signal clear to the next aircraft to land.

6. Should a SAR team have to off-load and move a considerable distance to secure a target, the drop-off LZ will be the primary PZ. Once a target is secure or located, an alternate PZ may be selected on the target area or enroute. This will be marked by an IR strobe light. If all three aircraft can land the IR strobe light marks aircraft 1's location. IR chemlights will mark the PZ for aircraft 2 and 3. If only one aircraft can land, the landing sequence will be aircraft 3, 2 then 1.

b. General Procedures:

(1) Once the aircraft has landed, all aid and litter teams 1 and 2 move to their respective areas on the downed aircraft and begin to remove personnel and equipment.

(2) Aid and litter team 3 move to the front of the downed aircraft, assemble all injured and mobile personnel, and guide them to the appropriate aircraft.

(3) The counter will count each individual as he loads the aircraft.

(4) A&L 1 and 2 will remove all injured personnel to appropriate aircraft from their location.

(5) A&L 3 will return and extract pilot and co-pilot.

(6) A&L 3 or 1 will then either destroy equipment or aircraft after A&L 3 or 1 zeros the equipment.

(7) Once personnel are removed, weapons and sensitive material will be removed and loaded on A&L team aircraft.

(8) SAR Team Leader will direct and supervise.

VI. Loading of Injured and Uninjured from Downed Aircraft:

a. Loading of uninjured or slightly injured:

(1). Enroute to objective, any uninjured or slightly injured mission ground team members including the pilot of the downed aircraft and who are able to continue the mission, will be loaded on the spare aircraft to continue the mission.

(2) The ground team leader will decide whether a man is able to continue his mission.

(3) The copilot, navigator and crew chief along with all injured personnel unable to continue the mission will be loaded equally on SAR aircraft 1 and 2 in order to receive medical attention.

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(4) Injured will be loaded to the front first with their backs against the crucible.

(5) Load priority:

- a. Mission able personnel
- b. Walking wounded
- c. Seriously injured
- d. Dead

VII. Priorities of SAR Team At The Objective Area:

- a. Security
- b. Load uninjured and mission-able injured to continue mission.
- c. Load seriously injured
- d. Zero equipment and collect sensitive material and weapons.
- e. Destruction of equipment and/or aircraft
- f. Perform first aid in flight.

VIII. Actions Of Personnel In Downed Aircraft:

- a. Shut down engines, fuel system and electrical system.
- b. Assemble all injured at the nose of the downed aircraft.
- c. Uninjured form local security in front of the aircraft.
- d. Remove all weapons and sensitive material and secure.
- e. Each individual should retain personal gear.
- f. Attempt to zero all secure equipment and leave hood up as signal to the SAR team that this has been accomplished.
- g. Maintain a fire watch to provide warning if the aircraft catches fire.
- h. Set up IR strobe to signal SAR aircraft that LZ is clear and secure.
- i. Be prepared to assist Aid and Litter Teams.
- j. Pilot is in charge of personnel until SAR arrives.

IX. Demolitions:


- a. SAR team will be responsible for destruction of aircraft:
 - (1). No aircraft will be blown enroute to the objective. All secure gear and control panels will be smashed.
 - (2) Demolitions of aircraft enroute from objective to transload point:
 - a. Demo will be set on command of the SAR commander.
 - b. Demo will be set after area is clear just prior to SAR aircraft take off.
 - c. 5 minute time fuze will be used.
 - d. Primary demo location will be the left side fuel cap.
 - e. Alternate demo location will be inside the aircraft, next to the auxiliary fuel tanks.

x. Larger Area Security:

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
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a. Security for 3 SAR aircraft:



Security for 3 SAR aircraft will be formed by placing half moon perimeters on each side. M60 #1 has front security. M60 #2 has rear security.

b. Security for additional aircraft:



For additional aircraft in the Laager area, the additional aircraft must land between SAR aircraft #1 and #2. Half moons will be to the front and rear with flank security provided by the door guns.

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- XI. Aircraft Accessories needed for SAR:
 - a. Head sets for ground commander on each aircraft.
 - b. All seats out except Pilot and navigator.
- XII. Command and Signal:
 - a. Communication:
 - (1) Ground to air (SAR Team Leader to flight leader) FM (secure)
 - (2) Communications between the 2 SAR elements while in the air will be conducted through the pilots' over-the-flight net.
 - (3) SAR element communications while on the ground will be conducted over MX-360.
 - b. Signals:
 - (1) Downed aircraft signal, clear to land: IR strobe light.
 - (2) 100% accountability of SAR team: up and down movement of Illum tape.

ANNEX:

- 1. Zeroing Secure Equipment
- 2. Location of Sensitive Material
- 3. SAR Support Plan from Objective Area

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ANNEX 1 ZEROING SECURE EQUIPMENT TO SAR STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES.

A. General: There are a total of five pieces of equipment on a UH-60 to be zeroed to prevent compromising communications security. Four of five pieces of this equipment can be zeroed manually. The manual method will be used by the SAR element.

B. Location of equipment to be zeroed:

(1) The equipment to be zeroed is located in the nose of the aircraft.

(2) The nose hood can be lifted by releasing two latches.

(3) The nose hood may be secured with a lock. It can be easily broken by using a pry bar or axe.

(4) Once the hood is up, three of the items to be zeroed are located under a black cover which is along the back portion of the compartment. This cover can be removed by pulling the cover

off. The equipment will be three gray boxes side by side. Each has a sliding type button on the front. To zero, slide each button up.

(5) Item number four is a black box located to the right, in the main compartment. It can be zeroed by pushing a button located on the front of the box.

(6) Item number five is a long gray box located in the center of the compartment. It can only be zeroed from the pilot control panel. Facing the panel, the knob to zero the equipment is to the left of the flight instruments. The knob must be turned all the way to the left to zero it.

(7) Once zeroed, all equipment will be smashed with an axe unless the aircraft is being destroyed. The instrument panel and navigational computer will also be smashed.

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ANNEX 2 - LOCATION OF SENSITIVE MATERIAL TO SAR SOP

- ..A. General: To insure the successful recovery of sensitive papers, codes, and maps, these items should be kept in a single location when not in use. They should be in some type of binder or folder. This container should be located between the copilot's seat and the instrument console.

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ANNEX 3 - SAR SUPPORT PLAN FROM OBJECTIVE AREA TO SAR SOP

SAR Flight #1

- 10: PW's
- 11: PW's
- 12: SAR Element
- Empty Hawk

SAR FLIGHT #2

- #6: PW's
- #7: PW's
- #13: SAR Element
- Empty Hawk

A, B ~~Get~~ 

SAR FLIGHT # 3:

- Pavelow or Hawk
- Pavelow or Hawk
- Pavelow or Hawk
- #2 Security Elem.(Black)
- Empty Hawk
- Empty Hawk

SAR FLIGHT # 4:

- Pavelow or Hawk
- Pavelow or Hawk
- Pavelow or Hawk
- #3 Security Elem (Black)
- Empty Hawk
- Empty Hawk

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"BLOOD CHIT"

1. Brother- Sister. I was an engineer in Mecca, the home of God, then I came to Iran. I was in Ahwaz when the Iraqis attacked.

BARADAR - KHAHAR. MAN MOHANDESE KHANEHE KHODA DAR
MACCA BODAM. BE IRAN AMADAM. DAR VAKTI KE IRAQIAN
TAARUZ KARDAND MAN DAR AHVAZ BODAM.

2. A man took money from me to take me out of the country,
but he brought me to Tehran. He deceived me. Now I am
alone without a place and food.

YEK MARD AZ MAN POOL GEREFT KE MARA KHAREJ KONAD VALI
OU MARA GOOL ZAD VA BE TEHRAN AVORD. HALA TANHA VA
BE DONE JA VA GAZA HASTAM.

3. I have a wife, 5 kids, an old mother and father. They
are waiting for me. You may have kids, you have father and
mother and you know what I feel.

MAN ZAN, PANJ BAHCHE, MADAR VA PEDAR-E-PEER DARAM.
ANHA MONTAZERE MAN HASTAND. SHOMA HAM BAHCHE- MADAR
VA PEDAR DAREED VA MIDANEED HALLE MARA.

4. You Iranians and Moslems are famous for hospitality.
For the sake of God, help me. I need your help.

SHOMA IRANI HA VA MOSALMAN HA BE MEHMAN MAVAZI
MAAROOF HASTEED. BE KHATERE KHODA BE MAN KOMAK
KONEED. MAN KOMAK MIKHAM.

HELP

KOMAK

COME HERE

BIYA ENJA

DONT MOVE

TA KAN NA KHOR

ک
یا اینجا
تکلیف نخر

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GET DOWN	BE KHAB	بجواب
SIT DOWN	BENESHEE	نشستن
STAND UP	BOLAND SHOW	بلند شو
PUT DOWN	BEGZAR ZAMIN	نگذار زمین
OPEN	BAZ KON	باز کن
CLOSE	BASTE	بسته
RIFLE	TOFANG	تفنگ
PISTOL	HAFTEAR	هفت تیر
KNIFE	CHAGHO "	چاقو
AMMUNITION	FESHANG	فشنگ
HAND GRENADE	NARENJAK	نرنجک
MACHINE GUN	MOSALSAL	مسلسل
WE ARE BROTHERS	MA BARADAR HAS TEAM	ما برادر هستیم
IMAM	EMAM	امام
WHERE AM I	MAN KOJA HASTAM	من کجا هستم؟
WHICH WAY IS	RAHE _____ KOJAST	راه _____ کجاست
NORTH	SHOMAL	شمال
SOUTH	JONOB	جنوب
WEST	GHARB	غرب
EAST	SHARGH	شرقی
ROAD	RAH	راه
TRAIN	GHATAR	قطر
BUS	AUTOBOS	اتوبوس
TAXI	TAXI	تاکس
BICYCLE	DOCHARKHE	دوچرخه
MOTORCYCLE	MOTOCEAKLET	موتوسیکلت
TRUCK	KAMYUN	کامیون

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WATER	AB	آب
BREAD	NAN	نان
CLOTHES	LEBAS	لباس
BLANKET	PATO	پاتو
SHOES	KAFSH	کفش
SOCKS	JORAB	چراپ
HAT	KOLAH	کلاه
COAT	COAT	کوت
PANTS	SHALVAR	شلوار
OVERCOAT	PALTO	پالتو

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY OPERATIONAL GROUP
US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

194

IAGPC-OP

23 May 1980

SUBJECT: FISCAL/Man Hour Expenditures (U)

Special Operations Division
Room 2C840 Pentagon
ATTN: LTC [REDACTED]
Washington, DC 20310

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92

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☐ DECL. ES. DOWNGR. TO CONFID

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

1. (U) Reference phonecon between LTC [REDACTED] and LTC [REDACTED] on 20 May 80, subject: SAB.

2. (S/NOFORN) Per request, above reference, the following information is provided. Operational expenses were incurred during the period [REDACTED] 80. [REDACTED]

a. [REDACTED]

(1)	\$15,000
(2)	2,825
(3)	1,750
(4)	1,700
(5)	5,990
(6)	2,000
(7)	
	<u>2,500</u>

SUB TOTAL

\$31,765

b. O&MA

(1) Travel, Lodging Per Diem Expenses (Europe)	\$5,000
(2) CONUS Travel/Per Diem	<u>9,000</u>

SUB TOTAL

\$14,000

c. Total Expenditures

\$45,765

(c) d. In addition to the above, additional expenditures are required due to the fact that [REDACTED] are continuing in CONUS. [REDACTED] is being considered for

CLASSIFIED BY DIAM 58-11, ENCL 3
REVIEW 23 MAY 2000

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IAGPC-OP
SUBJECT: FISCAL/Man Hour Expenditures (U)

23 May 1980

[REDACTED] is [REDACTED] Estimated expense for the remainder of [REDACTED]

3. (S/NOFORN) The following is a breakout of the total manhours committed exclusively for the coordination, control, and tasking of [REDACTED]

a. HQ INSCOM (ADCSOPS) (Approx. 5 persons) 50

b. HQ [REDACTED]

(1) Operations Section - (8 persons) 321
(2) Collection Requirements Section (3 persons) 191

SUB TOTAL (11 persons) 512

c. [REDACTED]

(1) Command/Operations (2 persons) 376
(2) Case Officers (4 persons) 1256

SUB TOTAL (6 persons) 1632

d. Total Manhours (22 persons)

2194

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[REDACTED]
LTC, MY
Operations Officer

Copy Furnished:
ADCSOPS
[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

198

Sovi-

TOR/231706Z
el

~~BKEJJCILHLDPANRG~~

TLMSG NO: 0123

DTG: 231655Z MAY 80

FM: 1 SOW/A-2

TO: JTF/J-2

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

REFERENCE: YOUR MSG/ DTG 221527Z MAY 80 (SAME SUBJECT)

1. THE BEST ESTIMATE OF INTELLIGENCE MAN HOURS EXPENDED IN SUPPORT OF THE MISSION ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. 7 NOV 79 TO DEPLOYMENT DATE: 3,600 MAN HOURS (INCLUDES JTF MISSION INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AT [REDACTED])

B. DEPLOYMENT DATE TO 30 APR 80: 1200 MAN HOURS.

2. ALL FIGURES INCLUDE ESTIMATE OF [REDACTED] INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL WHO WERE INVOLVED.

RVW 23 MAY 80

BT

48

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY RDO NMCC

☐ DESL [X] DOWNGRD TO CONFID

REYN ON OADR

DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DISPOSITION FORM

~~SECRET~~

For use of this form, see AR 340-15, the proponent agency is TAGCEN.

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

IAFM-OPS-HU-SA

SUBJECT

Intelligence Support

i-195

to Special Operations Div (SOD) FROM ADCSOPS-HUMINT

DATE 22 May 1980

CMT 1

JCS

USAINSCOM

LTC [REDACTED] 1f/7829

Pentagon

ATTN: LTC [REDACTED]

1. Per your request, the following data pertaining to subject is provided:

a. 129 intelligence reports were prepared and disseminated to your organization during the period 23 Nov 79 to 23 May 80. Approximately 1032 manhours were expended in data acquisition, transcription/assembly, and preliminary analysis of these reports

b. Courier distribution of the finished intelligence reports is estimated at 104 manhours.

c. General intelligence analysis, assembly of operational data, analyst-analyst meetings, and other operational planning activities are estimated at 160 manhours.

d. Total estimated manhour expenditure by this activity in support of your requirements is 1296 manhours.

2. Other fiscal expenditures are estimated as follows:

a. 129 cassette tapes = \$225.75.

b. Incidental technical equipment = \$4.96.

c. Facilities rental = \$153.61.

d. Mileage reimbursement for mission essential POV travel = \$310.00.

e. Total monetary expenditure is estimated at \$694.32.

3. INSCOM Action Officer is LTC [REDACTED] IAFM-OPS-HU-SA, AVN:923-7829/2769, CIV:(301)677-7829/2769.

The three day period of intensive support from 220000 April 80 to 250230 April 80 resulted in a dedication of approximately 236 manhours, of which 160 hrs are already included in PARA 1d above. Again, I stress that overall figures are on the conservative side.

Regards,

DA FORM 2496

REPLACES DD FORM 86, WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

Classified By: JCS

Declassified ON: OAI

Declassified by:

WORKING PAPER 4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NOV 77 - 30 April 80

MAN HOURS

EXCESS COST

DIA min 35,000 H \$6,000
DMA (11,094(?) H \$50,000
ARMY (crew) 21,941 H 50,000.
(WH) 1,032 H , 700.
USAF (7602) 525 H \$,000.
(OSI) 79 H ~
(Poly) 120 — \$128
49888 (1,000)
\$165,828

~~OPERATIONAL FORCES~~

- JFDD - 6,132 -
- [REDACTED] -
- 7 SOW - 4,800 - 3,000
JTF - 5,000 - 5,000
15,932 \$123,828
123,000

Classified By: ~~DDO~~ DDONmee
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WORKING PAPER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SOD SUMMARY SHEET *6-201*

Field 22
15

TO: CJCS	CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	S-D CONTROL NUMBER			
SUBJECT: Blivet Drop Concept (TS) (U)		ACTION			
		APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INITIALS	OTHER
				X	

REMARKS

- (U)* The attached concepts were developed in response to verbal instructions.
- (U)* Three options are outlined. They are as follows:
 - 2 Night Option
 - 3 Night Option
 - 4 Night Option

Classified By: *DDANmcc*
Declassified ON: *OADR*
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
13 Aug 93

ACTION OFFICER COL, USA SOD, J-3 EXT 55078	INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL						
	OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION
	J-3 P						
	EXEC						
	TN CBF						
	VCOPB						
	COPB						
DATE OF PREPARATION							
28 March 80							

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~~TOP SECRET~~

WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

I. SUBJECT: Blivet Drop Concept.

II. PURPOSE: To address the blivet drop concept.

III. MAJOR POINTS:

A. The helos must be refueled at some point along the ingress route.

B. Blivet drop specifics:

- The blivets are 500 gal collapsable fuel bladders of which approximately 450 gal can be pumped into the helicopters.
- If Delta and attachments were transported aboard helicopters from the carrier to a HLZ, a minimum of six helicopters would be required.
- A minimum of 28 blivets are required to refuel the helos at the selected refuel site.
- Six MC-130s can deliver 30 blivets, 3 M-274 (mules) and associated pumps.

C. Operational Concepts

OPTION 1:

- Delta is prepositioned on the carrier with helicopter crews.
- First night. 6 MC-130s insert 30 blivets and a four man (approx) refuel party by parachute at a remote refuel site. The refuel party will consist of Delta personnel so as not to overload the helos during the flight to Tehran. The refuel party will position the blivets,

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~~TOP SECRET~~

check the pumps and camouflage the equipment. If the refuel party reports breakage, the operation will be delayed one night and an additional paradrop conducted the next night to replace the required items.

- Second night. If there are no problems, 6 helos with Delta onboard will fly to the refuel site and conduct refueling operation. The refuel party will depart on the helos with the Delta force.

- Due to the decreasing hours of darkness, the helos will not be able to fly all the way to the original HLZ/hideout. The helos will stop at a new HLZ/hideout located approximately 1-1 1/2 hours from the original HLZ. The helos and Delta will hideout at this location until 1930 hrs. The helos will then fly to the original HLZ arriving at approximately 2100 hours. The Delta force will be met by trucks at this location and proceed immediately into Tehran to conduct the rescue. Extraction will be as originally planned at

Manzariyeh.

OPTION 2:

- E ()
- Delta is prepositioned on carrier.
 - MC-130s prepositioned at [REDACTED]
 - 1st Night - 6 MC-130s and C-130 (AWADS) deliver by parachute 35 fuel blivets and a refueling team (4-6 man) into a designated remote LZ along helicopter ingress

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

route. Team recovers, inspects, positions, and

) camouflages blivets and equipment. Status report rendered.

- 2nd Night. If required, MC-130s deliver replacement blivets and equipment prior to helicopter arrival. Six helicopters with Delta aboard launch from carrier and proceed to refueling site. Helicopters refuel, recover refueling party and proceed to hide site.

~~✓~~ - 3rd Night. Helicopters depart hide site, deliver Delta to drop site and then proceed to a temporary hide site.

A Delta moves [REDACTED] to a holding area; conducts reconnaissance. Delta moves into position and assaults compound. Delta extracted from compound and stadium by helicopter and evacuated Manzariyeh air field. Manzariyeh evacuation would be as originally planned.

OPTION 3:

- Prepositioning same as Option 2 above.

- First Night. Same as Option 2 above.

- 2nd Night. Same as Option 2 above.

~~✓~~ - 3rd Night. Helicopters depart initial hide site, proceed to Delta drop off point and then enter a new hide site.

A Delta moves [REDACTED] to ware house. Conducts coordination with in-country assets and prepares for leaders recon.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 4th Night. Delta moves from hide site and assaults compound as envisioned in current plan. Compound extraction and Manzariyeh/evacuation would also be as originally planned.

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS/J-3	CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	SOD CONTROL NUMBER 1-203	
SUBJECT: Request for MC-130 Flight Across [REDACTED]	ACTION		
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION
	X	X	

REMARKS

(TS) The attached message requests RADM Packer to task one EUCOM C-130 to fly a survey route across [REDACTED]. The purpose of the flight is to attempt to [REDACTED]. Routing will approximate [REDACTED] that to be flown during the rescue mission.

(U) Full requirements for mission to include routing, timing, altitudes, etc. have been passed telephonically to [REDACTED] at OTFE.

(U) Request signature on attached message. SOD will deliver to SSO Privacy Communication Office upon approval.

Point Paper on MC-130 Signature [REDACTED]

Classified By: ~~TOP SECRET~~ DDONmcc
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

ACTION OFFICER [REDACTED] OD, J-3 XT 55078 [Signature]	INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL						
	OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION
	J-3	P				[Signature]	55079
	EXEC						
	TM CH						
	VCOPB						
DATE OF PREPARATION 4 March 80	COPB						

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE	DRAFTER OR RELEASER TIME	PRECEDENCE	LMP	CLASS	CIC	FOR MESSAGE CENTER/COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY		
		ACT INFO				DATE-TIME	MONTH	YR
01 of		00		TT			MAR	80
BOOK	MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS							
<p>FROM: JCS</p> <p>TO: SSO USEUCOM</p> <p>TOP SECRET NOFORN EYES ONLY</p> <p>PERSONAL FOR RADM PACKER, EUCOM/J3 FROM LTGEN SHUTLER, JCS/J3</p> <p>SUBJ: CONFIRMATION OF REQUEST FOR ROUTE ACROSS [REDACTED] {TS}</p> <p>REF: TELECON BETWEEN RADM PACKER AND LTGEN SHUTLER</p> <p>1. {TS} REFERENCE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WAS TO ASCERTAIN AVAILABILITY OF MC-130 AIRCRAFT TO FLY A PRESCRIBED ROUTE FROM [REDACTED] TO [REDACTED]</p> <p>2. {TS} REQUEST ONE MC-130 BE TASKED TO FLY FROM [REDACTED] VIA NORMAL AIRWAYS TO [REDACTED] PROPOSE THAT, IF POSSIBLE WITHIN NORMAL CLEARANCE PROCEDURES, AUTHORITY BE REQUESTED FOR THE FLIGHT TO DEVIATE FROM STANDARD AIRWAYS TO CONDUCT LOW LEVEL TRAINING DURING THE RETURN FLIGHT. FULL PARTICULARS, OBJECTIVES, ROUTING AND OTHER RELATED INFORMATION HAVE BEEN PASSED TO [REDACTED] [REDACTED] OF SOTFE/J3.</p> <p>REVW 25 MAR 00</p> <p>DELIVER DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS</p>								
DISTR:								
DRAFTER TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE						SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS		
RELEASER	TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE							
	SIGNATURE					SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		DATE TIME GROUP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE	DRAFTER OR RELEASES TIME	PRECEDENCE	LMP	CLASS	CIC	FOR MESSAGE CENTER/COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY		
		ACT INFO				DATE-TIME	MONTH	YR
01 OF BOOK		00		TT			MAR	80
MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS								

FROM: JCS

TO: SSO USEUCOM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY

PERSONAL FOR RADM PACKER, EUCOM/J3 FROM LTGEN SHUTLER, JCS/J3

SUBJ: CONFIRMATION OF REQUEST FOR ROUTE ACROSS [REDACTED] (S)

REF: TELECON BETWEEN RADM PACKER AND LTGEN SHUTLER

1. (S) REFERENCE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WAS TO ASCERTAIN

AVAILABILITY OF MC-130 AIRCRAFT TO FLY A PRESCRIBED ROUTE FROM

[REDACTED] TO [REDACTED]

(S) REQUEST ONE MC-130 BE TASKED TO FLY FROM [REDACTED] VIA

NORMAL AIRWAYS TO AND FROM [REDACTED] FULL

PARTICULARS, OBJECTIVES, ROUTING AND OTHER RELATED INFORMATION

HAVE BEEN PASSED TO [REDACTED] OF SOTFE/J3.

DELIVER DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS.

DISTR:

[REDACTED] DATE		SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS	
J-3, EXT 55078			
RELEASES	TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE		DATE TIME GROUP
	SIGNATURE		
		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	

DD FORM 173 (OCR)

Alternate version

S/N 02-LF-001-6000

☆U.S.G.P.O. 1979-291-118

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET/NOBIS~~

1-204

FROM SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

TO AMEMB [REDACTED]

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR [REDACTED]

SUBJ: C-130 USE OF [REDACTED] (U)

1. (S) TO FACILITATE SHIFT FROM [REDACTED] OF FLEET SUPPORT OPERATIONS, AS AGREED DURING RECENT NEGOTIATIONS ON ACCESS, AND TO CONDUCT TRAINING EXERCISES WITH AND SUPPORT OF TF-70, EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO FORMALLY APPROACH GOVERNMENT OF [REDACTED] FOR USE OF [REDACTED] 18-26 APRIL. THIS ACTIVITY IS OF AN URGENT NATURE AND MUST BE CONDUCTED DURING THE PERIOD SPECIFIED IN ORDER TO MESH WITH TF 70 CHANGEOVER SCHEDULE.
2. (S) SEA SURVEILLANCE TRAINING EXERCISES/SUPPORT MISSIONS WOULD BEGIN ABOUT 18 APRIL. APPROXIMATE SCHEDULE IS FOR ONE MC-130 TO ARRIVE FROM [REDACTED] ON 18 APRIL, TWO MC-130S FROM [REDACTED] ON 20 APRIL AND THREE C-130S/ONE MC-130 FROM [REDACTED] ON 22 APRIL. IN ADDITION, WE WOULD EXPECT TO OPERATE C-130 MISSIONS FROM [REDACTED] PROVIDING SUPPLY SUPPORT FOR THESE ACTIVITIES ON 18, 22 AND 24 APRIL, AND ONE OR TWO C-141 SUPPORT MISSIONS FROM [REDACTED] ON 24 APRIL. WE ANTICIPATE NO MORE THAN EIGHT AIRCRAFT ON THE GROUND AT ANY ONE TIME. THIS EXERCISE IS PLANNED AT THIS TIME TO LAST ONLY A FEW DAYS. A TOTAL OF APPROXIMATELY 100-125 PERSONNEL WOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE EXERCISE, AND THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE THEIR OWN FOOD AND BILLETING.
3. (S) FUEL REQUIREMENTS (JET A-1) FOR THE AIRCRAFT WILL BE A TOTAL OF 175,000 U.S. GALLONS. COMPENSATION FOR FUEL WILL BE PROVIDED BY AF FORM 15 WHICH CAN BE PROCESSED THROUGH THE DAO.

~~SECRET/NOBIS~~

25B21

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Declassified ON: [REDACTED]

DDON mcc

~~SECRET/NOBIS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. ~~(S)~~ (X) FOR PURPOSE OF THIS OPERATION WE DESIRE BLANKET DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE FOR OPERATIONS AT [REDACTED] 18-26 APRIL WITHOUT DIPLOMATIC NOTES SUBMITTED AS PRESENTLY REQUIRED ON EACH AIRCRAFT IN ADVANCE. HOWEVER, FLIGHT DATA FOR INDIVIDUAL AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS WILL BE PROVIDED BY ICAO FLIGHT PLANS.

G 5. ~~(S)~~ (X) [REDACTED], PLUS TWO, WILL BE IN COUNTRY MISSION COORDINATOR. THEY WILL ARRIVE [REDACTED] ON 15 OR 16 APRIL AND CONTACT EMBASSY PERSONNEL PRIOR TO TRAVEL TO [REDACTED]

E 6. ~~(S)~~ (X) REQUEST YOU APPROACH [REDACTED] GOVERNMENT AT HIGHEST LEVEL AND OBTAIN APPROVAL AS SOON AS PRACTICAL BUT NOT LATER THAN APRIL 16.

ABOVE INFORMATION CAN BE RELEASED ON A CLOSE HOLD BASIS AS NECESSARY TO SECURE APPROVAL.

DECL 14 APR 86

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET/NOBIS~~

25R22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN

DD 001400Z APR 68
FM COMJTF, SITE ALPHA
TO DEPCOM JTF, WASH DC

0011

~~SECRET~~

E (1) JUST LEARNED FROM LOCAL USAF BASE COMMANDER THAT THE
LOCAL [REDACTED] SECURITY FORCE COMMANDER, A FIRST
LIEUTENANT, MAY ATTEMPT TO OBSERVE EACH OF OUR ARRIVING
AIRCRAFT LOADS WHICH ARE DUE IN TONIGHT. HE TAKES ORDERS
ONLY FROM [REDACTED] HENCE HE CANNOT BE INFLUENCED BY THE
LOCAL COMMANDER. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE GEN [REDACTED]
IN [REDACTED] TO ASK HIS HELP. HAVE LOW CONFIDENCE THAT HE
CAN WORK THIS PROBLEM SATISFACTORY FROM HERE. PLEASE
ASK HIGHEST LEVELS THERE TO HELP. MEANWHILE WE WILL DO
WHAT WE CAN FROM HERE.

Classified By: ~~DDO~~ DDONMCC
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC

12-1-83

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STAT 0310Z
50

DTG 152322Z APR 80
FM: JTF/LTC [REDACTED]
TO: SITE ALPHA/LT COL [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~
PASS TO JOSE HODIG.
LT COL [REDACTED] IS NOW SAC TANKER TASK FORCE COMMANDER. EFFECTIVE
25 APR 80 LT COL [REDACTED] WILL BECOME TTFC.
BT

E, G

i-262

NNNN

Classified By ~~DDO NMCC~~
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0700201900Z APR 83
FM : JTF
TO: JCS/ RC

SUBJ: JTF SITREP NO 1 (AS OF 210000Z)

1. JTF FORCE ARRIVALS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. JTF STAFF AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL (41 TOTAL) ARRIVED

200032Z APR

B. HELO FORCES AND CARRIER LIAISON GROUP
(23 PERSONNEL) ARRIVED 200600Z AND NINITE
200615Z.

C. TWO MC-130 ARRIVED FROM

200810Z/0000Z.

D. TWO KC-135 TANKERS ARRIVED 201400/1410Z.

2. JTF FORCES NOW ON STATION:

A. JTF STAFF AT

B. THREE MC-130S AT

C. EIGHT HELOS AND CROWS ON NINITE

D. THREE KC 135 TANKERS AT

E. FOUR KC-135 TANKERS AT

(U) 3. OPERATION PREPARATIONS PROGRESSING SATISFACTORILY.

(U) 4. COMMUNICATIONS:

A. SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN EXPERIENCING
NOISE BURST DURING PERIODS WHEN INSUFFICIENT
POWER IS TRANSMITTED TO THIS LOCATION.
THESE BURST ARE DISRUPTIVE TO SECURE VOICE
AND DATA COMMUNICATIONS. ASSISTANCE HAS
BEEN REQUESTED FROM YOUR HQ. F. ALL CIRCUITS UP AT THIS TIME.

XXXXXVOLUTARY CORRECTION: PART 1. PARAGRAPH "B" CHANCE TO READ 63
PERSONNEL IN 63 PERSONNEL VICE 60 PERSONNEL.
BT

NNNN

MESSAGE 03 RECEIVED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By
Declassified ON

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

TOT 202033E
VC

259

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0016

TOT/202005-2
130V

PRIORITY

FM: JTF NINITE (PITMAN)

E TO: JTF [REDACTED] (VAUGHT)

G JOC (JOC) [REDACTED]

SUBJ: HELO DET. STATUS (U)

- (U) 1. [REDACTED] TONIGHT'S PERSONAL RECON INDICATES HELO LAUNCH COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED AS EARLY AS 1500Z (1900Z LCL) BASED ON ACTUAL LEVEL OF ACKNLS. ACTUAL COAST IN WILL OCCUR ABOUT 30 MIN AFTER LAUNCH. THIS WILL PERMIT A SLIGHTLY EARLIER ARRIVAL AT REFUEL POINT.

E, A 2. [REDACTED] NON-RFI PINS, SERNOB 107 AND 111 RETURNED TO [REDACTED] TODAY VIA MAC 8-121. DOCUMENT INDICATED MARCH- APR AS FINAL DESTINATION.

FDSCTCLP XFX

Classified by: DDONMAC
Declassify on: OADR

Classified By: JCS

Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by:

DDO NMCC

12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0025
O 210745Z APR 80
FM SITE ALFA/J2
TO JCS/RC-J2
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~
SUEJI TGT PRIORITIES

(C) 1. COMJTF HAS REQUESTED A J2 RECOMMENDATION ON:
WHICH OF THE TARGET ALREADY NOMINATED SHOULD BE
ATTACKED BY [REDACTED] PROTECT/ENHANCE MSN.
CHOICES INCLUDE:

- A. [REDACTED]
B. [REDACTED]
C. [REDACTED]
D. [REDACTED]
E. [REDACTED]
F. [REDACTED]
G. [REDACTED]

(C) 2. OTHER FACTORS TO CONSIDER:
AL MAJ [REDACTED] IN A PREVIOUS CONVERSATION.
INDICATED F-4'S, ESPECIALLY AT [REDACTED]
WOULD POSE A THREAT TO [REDACTED] AND OTHER
AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA, USING THEIR OWN ON-BOARD RADAR.
HE ALSO INDICATED [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] WHAT DO OTHER AGENCIES SAY ABOUT WHERE
ALERT A/C ARE KEPT?

A. [REDACTED] MEANING VITAL [REDACTED] NEED TO BE
[REDACTED] BEFORE [REDACTED]
(C) 3. WITH SOME OF THE ABOVE IN MIND, HOW DO WE APPRECIATE AN
RC/J2 RECOMMENDATION ON WHICH [REDACTED] AND
IN WHAT ORDER (WITH SPECIAL CONSIDERATION TO FIGHTER
THREAT ASSESSMENT AND HOW BEST TO NEUTRALIZE.)

BT
#0025

NNNNAAAA

TOT / 0905
RC

#248

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
REWRITING BY DDO NMCC
☐ DESI (S) DOWNING TO CONFID
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources
JS, [REDACTED]

Classified By JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT 09557
RA

SSN 0027
O 210905Z APR 80
FM SITE ALFA/J2
TO JCS/RC-J2
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

E (C) SUBJECT: [REDACTED] REACTION TO US OVERFLIGHTS
DURING EXECUTION PHASE.

(C) REQUEST J2 UPDATE ON PROBABLE [REDACTED]
REACTION IF KC-135'S OR OTHER USN A/C
ARE DETECTED OVER [REDACTED] IF
THEY SCRAMBLE FIGHTERS AND IDENTIFY
A/C AS U.S. WILL THE [REDACTED]

A. ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE US A/C TO LAND.

B. ESCORT US A/C OUT OF [REDACTED] AIRSPACE

C. ENGAGE IF US A/C DO NOT COMPLY WITH

E (C) [REDACTED] INSTRUCTIONS

IF [REDACTED] FIGHTERS CANNOT IDENTIFY OUR
A/C, WILL THEY ENGAGE THEM?

BT
#0027

241

NOGON

AAK

Classified By: [REDACTED] DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6A JTF
NIMITZ
1200Z 12 AUG 92
FM JTF
TO 1000 NIMITZ/1200Z 12 AUG 92

1276

A 0305Z

1. DELTA HAS 37 MEN (LESS DRIVERS AND MONITORS)
270 LBS PER MAN. 97 DELTA PLUS 2
DELTA RECON ABOARD SHIP, 3 MONITORS, PLUS
2 RED EYE GUNNERS (FOUR WEAPONS), 5
DRIVERS, 7 [REDACTED] FOR A TOTAL OF
118 PERS. WITH THE NUMBER OF PAX
WEAPONS, AND AMMO, DELTA WILL WEIGH 5200
LBS PER HELO (5 HELOS). RECONIZE
THAT THIS IS 400 LBS OVER YOUR MAX.
REQUEST THAT YOU REDUCE
TO ONE 50 CAL AND ONE GUNNER.
PUT ALL SECOND 50 CALS AND SECOND GUNNERS
ON SEVENTH RH 53. IF ONLY SIX A/C MAKE REFUEL SITE
THEN SECOND 50 CALS AND GUNNERS PLUS CREW FROM SEVENTH A/C
WILL COME BACK VIA C-130. IF SEVEN
AIRCRAFT DEPART DESERT AND ONE GOES DOWN INROUTE THEN SECOND
50 CALS WILL HAVE TO BE LEFT AT P/U SITE. IF SEVEN AIRCRAFT
MAKE IT TO HIDE OUT THEN SECOND 50 CAL AND GUNNER WILL BE PUT
BACK ON 6 RH-53'S
2. REQUEST THAT YOU PERSONALLY INSPECT ALL HELOS TO ENSURE NO
EXTRA WEIGHT IS TAKEN.
3. DETAILED WT. AND COMPOSITION OF EACH LOAD FOR SIX RH-53'S
WILL BE SENT IN APPROX 8 HOURS.
4. IF EIGHT RH-53 IS OP READY FLY IT, EMPTY LOAD, AS FAR INTO
MISSION AS POSSIBLE. COL KYLE HAS ASSURED ME THAT SUFFICIENT
FUEL IS ON HAND TO FUEL EIGHT HELO. DETAILS ON REFUEL FOR EIGHT
HELO WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY SEP MSG. UNDERSTAND PROBABILITY
OF 8 HELOS LAUNCHING IS NOT GOOD BUT TRY YOUR BEST.
5. GEN VAUGHT SENDS
BT

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Classified By *DDO NMCC*
Declassified On *OADR*
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

T.O. 219272
RS

#235

SSN 0040
DTG 211500Z APR 80
FM JTF
TO: JCS / RC
~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: JTF SITREP NO 2 (AS OF 211800Z)
1. JTF FORCE ARRIVALS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

J-3
W21 C.41

- A. THREE EC-130 ARRIVED [REDACTED] 202020Z, 202030Z, AND 202110Z.
B. TWO MC 130S ARRIVED [REDACTED] 202100Z AND 210145Z.
C. THREE C-141S W/DELTA FORCES ARRIVED [REDACTED] 210535Z, 210630Z, AND 211150Z.
D. THREE KC-135S ARRIVED [REDACTED] 211517Z, 211523Z, AND 211633Z

2. JTF FORCES NOW ON STATION:

- A. JTF STAFF AT [REDACTED]
B. THREE MC-130S AT [REDACTED]
C. TWO MC-130S AT [REDACTED] ONE TO MOVE TO [REDACTED] ON 22 APR.
D. THREE EC-130S AT [REDACTED] UNTIL 22 APR.
E. EIGHT HELOS AND CREWS ON NIMITZ
F. SIX KC-135S AT [REDACTED]
G. FOUR KC-135S AT [REDACTED]

(U) 3. COMMUNICATIONS: THE SHF SYSTEM TO FT DETRICK WAS ONLY APPROX 50 PERCENT USABLE DURING THE PAST 24 HOURS. IMMEDIATE IMPROVEMENT IS REQUIRED TO INSURE A POSITIVE COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS LINK WITH WASHINGTON.

BT

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12 Aug 92

NNNN

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232

C.F. / 212654
101
B.W.
QSL 2300Z

MSG 845
212210Z APR 80
FM SITE ALPHA/J2
TO JCS/RC-J2
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~
SUBJ: SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY

(U) 1. REF MSG 212010Z APR 80 FM HELO DET. SAG.

2. REQUEST UR VIEWS ON SOVIET VESSELS [REDACTED]

A. HOW OFTEN HAVE THEY DONE THIS IN THE PAST?

B. HOW LONG AGO WAS THE LAST INCIDENCE?

A C. SIGNIFICANCE TO [REDACTED] PLANNING, IF RE-POSITIONING OFFORGES IS TAKING PLACE?

D. ESTIMATED LENGTH OF TIME FOR SUCH AN EXERCISE?

3. CONCERNING HEADNET RADAR: HOW CLOSE TO THE [REDACTED] CIP FLIGHT ROUTE MUST THE KRIVAK BE IN ORDER TO DETECT THE A/C FLYING AT 502' AGL AND BELOW?

(U) 4. PERHAPS WE CAN ADD THIS TO THE "CRY WOLF" LIST.

(U) 5. NO OFFENSE INTENDED ON S. TRAN COVERAGE FOR CON. JUST ANTICIPATING AS YOU RECOMMENDED.

ET

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DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

☐ DEEL ☐ DOWNGR TO COME

KEYW ON OADR

SERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

[REDACTED] JB

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

228

TOT/0713

E KC

RELAY TO Nim

120600Z APR 92
FM: SITE ALPHA/J2
TO: NIMITZ/HFLO DET

E, G

C

SUBJ: SOVIET NAVAL SUBVILL
1. RPT FM USS NIMITZ THAT K... LAST LOC 01 05N/062 10E
ON COURSE 190 DEG AT 10 00N 11 10 10

C, E

2. KALINKA HOUNTS HEAT AT 01 10 AND COULD POSE THREAT
TO [REDACTED] FLT CRNG.

G

3. FURTHER DETAILS ON LOC 01 10 WILL BE [REDACTED] NIMITZ.
ADDITIONAL INFO ON UNREP'S DETECT [REDACTED] FORTHCOMING.

BT

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M
MSG 067
DTG 221245Z
FM: CERJTF SITE ALPHA
TO: JTF/RC SOD

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: SENATIVE LETTERS

(U)1. REFERENCE HY 220915Z APR 83

E, G
2. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR [REDACTED] FOLLOW. WE HAVE JUST LEARNED [REDACTED] IS TOY EUCOM FOR A SECURITY ASSISTANCE MEETING. ESTIMATED TO RETURN [REDACTED] LATE FRIDAY OR SATURDAY.

E, G
3. COL [REDACTED] IS SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO [REDACTED] EVENING OF 23 APR. HE OBVIOUSLY WAS NOT AWARE OF [REDACTED] SCHEDULE.

E, G
4. THIS REQUIRES ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ON TWO COUNTS. FIRST, WE SHOULD CONSIDER TASKING [REDACTED] TO BRIEF A TRUSTED AGENT WHO WOULD BE AT [REDACTED] MAC CREWS SHOULD HAVE A CONTACT FOR BRIEFINGS AND ASSISTANCE. SECOND CONSIDERATION: IF [REDACTED] TRAVELS TO [REDACTED] WE WOULD NOT HAVE SECURE VOICE INTO [REDACTED] NOR WOULD WE HAVE THE ABILITY TO INFORM [REDACTED] MILITARY THAT AN EXERCISE IS ABOUT TO KICK OFF OR UNDERWAY.

E
5. GAST PROVIDED GEN SHUTLER WITH THOUGHTS ON ADVISING [REDACTED] YOU MAY WISH TO DWAN ON THEM.

E, G
6. THERE ARE SEVERAL OPTIONS. RECOMMEND THAT [REDACTED] BRIEF TRUSTED AGENT ENOUGH ON IMPORTANCE OF DELIVERY OF LETTER TO [REDACTED] ONLY. [REDACTED] REMAINS AT [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] RETURNS ON 24 APR. [REDACTED] VALUE [REDACTED] MATURITY BUT WOULD BE COMFORTABLE WITH [REDACTED] ON SCENE. IF IT IS TOO TOUGH TO GET [REDACTED] BACK, BURNET SHOULD BRIEF TRUSTED AGENT AT [REDACTED] ALL TRUSTED AGENTS SHOULD BE MILITARY.
GAST SENDS

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TO TC 14045
GRK

SSN 8068
O 221330Z APR 80
FM CMDR JTF SITE ALPHA
TO JTF/HQ SOD
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~
SUBJECT: [REDACTED] DEFENSE RADARS

- E, G
1. ON 28 APR 80 COL [REDACTED] AF SECTION
[REDACTED] ADVISED LT COLS [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]
OF USAF AIR DEFENSE STUDY FOR [REDACTED]
 2. [REDACTED] PLANNED TO REVIEW STUDY AND FORWARD
RECOMMENDATIONS IF APPROPRIATE. PLEASE
ADVISE SOONEST.

BT
#0266

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E-210

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DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

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MSG 343
DTG 222250Z APR 68
FM: SITE ALPHA/JEP CDR JTF
TO: NMITE
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: COORDINATION DATA (U)
REF: TELECON PITTMAN AND GAST

(U) 1. OVER THE WALL TIME IS PLANNED FOR 2100Z.

2. **DELTA** PLANS TO CALL AT 2020Z. THIS CALL WILL PROVIDE LATEST ESTIMATE FOR OVER THE WALL TIME. (ASSUMING MISSION IS A GO).

(U) 3. HELOS SHOULD BE IN POSITION FOR PICKUP PLUS 15 MINUTES AFTER ESTIMATED OVER THE WALL TIME.

4. IF HELOS DO NOT HEAR A CALL FROM **DELTA**, ASSUME RADIO PROBLEMS AND PLANNED OVER THE WALL TIME OF 2100Z. HELOS SHOULD LAUNCH IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO BE IN POSITION FOR FIRST PICKUP AT 2115Z.

~~TOP SECRET~~

BT

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12 Aug 92

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0135

#201

J-2

SSN 0101
DTG 222355Z APR 80
FM: JTF MAIN: COL [REDACTED]
TO: USS NIMITZ/COL [REDACTED]
~~SECRET~~
SUEJ: TACAIR CAP SUPPORT (S)

REF 1 (U) USS NIMITZ 221425Z APR 80
REF 2 (U) CINCPAC SUBJ TACAIR CAP SUPPORT (U)

1. (U) REF 1 NIGHT ONE REFUELING SUPPORT
REQUEST FOR AIR CAP SUPPORT, A KC-135
AIR REFUELABLE TANKER (ART) REFUELED BY TWO (2)
KC135A AIRCRAFT CAN PROVIDE A FOUR (4)
HOUR LOITER PERIOD OVER 2420N 58E OFFLOADING
22K LBS. REF 2 LIST 1930-2330Z AS
THE MOST CRITICAL TIME PERIOD. ANY POSITION
NORTH OF THE ARCP NEAR THE END OF THE LOITER
PERIOD WOULD REDUCE OFFLOAD/LOITER.
THIS SUPPORT PLUS PREVIOUS JTF MISSION TASKING
UTILIZES ALL TANKER ASSETS AT [REDACTED]
AND DOES NOT ALLOW FOR MECHANICAL
FAILURES.

2. (U) FYI: FOUR KC-135'S WILL TRANSIT YOUR
AREA ENROUTE TO ARCP AT 2300N 5833E.

FOR C-130 REFUELING SUPPORT. TWO KC-135'S WILL
BE ON STATION 2215-2315Z WITH TWO MORE
2315-0020. AIR REFUELING FREQUENCY IS 321.6 SECURE.

3. (U) NIGHT 2 REF MSG PARA 6 ADDRESSED
BY SEPARATE MSG.
BT

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i-205

101/2305552
B&W

QSL 230555Z

Copy to
J-2

HSC 100
JCS 230515Z APR 82
FM JTF ALPHA/J2
TO JCS/J2
BT

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: TEHRAN STREET DEMONSTRATION

RPTS HAVE SHOWN CONSIDERABLE TURMOIL SINCE THE REFUGEE ON AND AROUND
CAMPUS OF TEHRAN UNIV. PLS PROVIDE UP TO DATE EFFECT OF THE
DEMONSTRATIONS MAY HAVE, IF ANY, ON PLANS TO APPROACH/ATSAULT MOS
AND EMBASSY.

~~SECRET~~

BT

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2-268

TOR/230/138
CSMCN
101

COPY 2

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MSG #72

DTG 222325Z APR 88

FM: JCS/RCS

TO: SITE ALPHA/J2

INFO: SFOD/S2

1 SOW/A2

CLASS O P S E C R E T

SUBJECT: THREAT REVIEW

SITE ALPHA/J2 PASS TO COMJTF

CLASSIFIED

1. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS COPY OF MEMO PROVIDED TO CJCS ON 22 APR 88.

2. THE FOLLOWING COMPRISES THE JTF J-2 ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT TO RICE BOWL POSED BY SOVIET, IRANIAN, AND OTHER MIDEAST NATIONS' RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES. THE ASSESSMENT IS DIVIDED BY COUNTRY AND COLLECTION MEANS.

3. SOVIET CAPABILITIES.

A. PHOTO

1. SATELLITE PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE:

[REDACTED]

2. AIRCRAFT PHOTO/VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE: THE SOVIETS PRESENTLY HAVE FOUR IL-38 MAY RECON AIRCRAFT IN PROXIMITY TO THE RICE BOWL AREA OF OPERATIONS. TWO OF THESE ARE AT ADEN AND TWO ARE AT ASMARA. THE IL-38'S PRIMARY MISSION IS MARITIME SURVEILLANCE AND ASW.

[REDACTED] THE MAY HAS AN OPERATING RADIUS OF 1400 NM.

3. SOVIET COVERAGE OF [REDACTED] AND THE HELD HIDE SITE WOULD HAVE TO BE PROVIDED BY SATELLITE. COVERAGE OF [REDACTED] COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY EITHER SATELLITE OR AIRCRAFT. WE PROJECT [REDACTED] REACTION TIME FOR SUCH COVERAGE IS THE SOVIETS RECEIVE INDICATIONS OF INCREASED

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IRANIAN DETECTION/SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES.

A. IRANIAN PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE: IRAN HAS A LIMITED CAPABILITY TO PHOTOGRAPH OR VISUALLY RECONOITER US NAVAL UNITS OPERATING IN THE PERSIAN GULF OR NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA UTILIZING P-3 AIRCRAFT. ADDITIONALLY, IRANIAN F-4S AND C-130S HAVE SOME VISUAL RECON CAPACITY. WE BELIEVE THAT ANY THREAT TO SECURITY OF RICE BOWL FROM ANY OF THESE PLATFORMS IS NEGLIGIBLE.

B. AURAL DETECTION: WE BELIEVE THAT THE GREATEST DANGER OF DETECTION FOR BOTH THE HELICOPTER AND FIXED-WING ELEMENTS OPERATING IN IRANIAN AIRSPACE ON NIGHT #1 IS IMPOSED BY GENDARMERIE POSTS. THESE POSTS (USUALLY CONSISTING OF 6-10 MEN) ARE SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY ALONG MAJOR LINES OF COMMUNICATION. MISSION PLANNING HAS TAKEN THEIR LOCATIONS INTO ACCOUNT AND FLIGHT ROUTES ARE DESIGNED TO AVOID ALL KNOWN POSTS.

C. VISUAL DETECTION: DESPITE FLIGHT ROUTES WHICH AVOID POPULATED AREAS, THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT AIRCRAFT COULD BE SEEN BY MOTORISTS OR NOMADS. THE LATTER, LACKING COMMUNICATIONS, CAN BE DISCOUNTED AS A WARNING SOURCE. CRITICAL AREAS FOR VISUAL DETECTION ARE THE GULF COASTAL REGION, THE REFUELING SITE, AND THE TRANSFER POINT/HELO SHIDE AREA. WE ASSESS THE POSSIBILITY OF DETECTION AT MANY OF THESE LOCATIONS AS LOW-MODERATE. WHETHER A TRUCK DRIVER WOULD BOTHER TO REPORT SIGHTING AIRCRAFT TO SOME OFFICIAL ENTITY OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT IS PROBLEMATICAL.

D. SAC PENETRATION ANALYSIS OF SEVERAL GENERIC LOW LEVEL ROUTES INDICATED LOW PROBABILITY OF DETECTION/INTERCEPTION ON ALL THE INBOUND LEGS AND ONLY A SLIGHTLY HIGHLY POSSIBILITY OF DETECTION/INTERCEPTION ON THE EGRESS ROUTES. SAC TEAM PREPARED STUDY FOR MC130 AT 500 FEET, AND STATED PROBABILITIES WOULD INCREASE IF C141 OPERATING AT HIGHER ALTITUDES (1,500-2,000 FEET) WAS USED. HOWEVER THE PROBABILITIES WOULD STILL BE ON THE LOW END OF THE SPECTRUM IF ROUTE PLANNING TOOL ADVANTAGE OF AVAILABLE TERRAIN AIR DEFENSE NETWORK WAS NOT ON HIGH/ACTIVE ALERT POSTURE.

4. REVIEW OF INCOUNTRY TACTICAL PHASES IS UNDER PREPARATION WILL FORWARD UPON COMPLETION.

286

22
TOP 21302
JB MCN 089
Burotch 101523A

0 220345Z APR 80

FM NIMITZ/PITMAN
TO JTF/VAUGHT

~~SECRET~~
SUBJ: STATUS (U)

A. NIMITZ/PITMAN 220345Z APR 80
1. PLEASE CORRECT REF A. PARA 3. LINE 7 TO READ - ONLY 200
RDS AMMO VKR SUP WITH ADDITIONAL AMMO IN NUMBER SEVEN AND...
REYN: 21 APR 80
BT

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

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TOR/2325
5B mng 2

(C) 0 221745Z APR 80

FM [REDACTED]
TO JC3/300
JTF/ LTG GAST

BT
~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: SITRLP #6

(1.) [REDACTED] COMMANDER, [REDACTED] WILL ARRIVE [REDACTED] 23 0745Z APR. 80
HE HAS ASKED TO MEET WITH LT/COL. [REDACTED] AND
AND WILL PRESUMABLY ASK TO VISIT CAMP SITE AND
TOUR AN AIRCRAFT.

-280

(2.) WE PLAN TO USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REQUEST
SUPPORT FOR DELIVERY OF SENSITIVE LETTER
TO U.S. AMBASSADOR IN [REDACTED] UP COMING
MUSLIM WEEKEND. [REDACTED] WEEKEND STANDDOWN.
WEEKEND STANDDOWN, AND LACK OF SECURE COMM.
BETWEEN [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] MAKE
IT IMPERATIVE THAT WE USE THIS OPPORTUNITY
TO BROACH THE SUBJECT WITH [REDACTED].

(3.) WE PROPOSE TO INFORM [REDACTED]
THAT [REDACTED] HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PROCEED TO
[REDACTED] ON 25 APR. TO PROVIDE U.S. AMBASSADOR
WITH A DETAILED INTERIM REPORT ON SEA SURVEILLANCE
ACTIVITIES TO DATE AND THAT [REDACTED] SUPPORT IS
REQUESTED.

(4.) WILL INFORM YOU OF RESULTS OF MEETING WITH
BENNETT AS SOON AS COMPLETED.

(5.) REMAINING EC-130 AND MC-130 AIRCRAFT ARRIVED BET-
WEEN 1145Z AND 1230Z. ALL AIRCRAFT NOW IN PLACE.
BT

NNNN

DDRFHCYIHRV

S

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DDO NMCC
12 Aug 72

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RSCB76
DTG: 230015Z APR 81

FMT JCS/RC-J2
TO: SITE ALPHA/J2

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: C-130 ACTIVITY TAPES

1. COLONEL [REDACTED] USAF, WILL DEPART CONUS 23 APRIL FOR ALPHA VIA RAMSTEIN. COLONEL [REDACTED] HAS IN HIS POSSESSION: MAGNETIC TAPES CONTAINING VOICE, C-130 AIR COMMUNICATIONS; A TAPE RECORDER; AND COMMUNICATIONS CIRCUITS CARDS REQUESTED BY YOUR SITE.

2. HIS ITINERARY:

ETD DOVER - 230500Z

ETA RAMSTEIN - 231330Z

ETD RAMSTEIN - 240515Z

ETA ALPHA - 241045Z.

3. COLONEL [REDACTED] IS TOP SECRET SI/TK CLEARED AND HAS EXTENSIVE SIGINT EXPERIENCE.
BT

NNNN

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12 Aug 92

RS

MCN 099

Copy to

#274

FM JTF/RC
TO JTF COR/SITE ALPHA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET

Handwritten: E.A. 0201
OR
RS
MCN 098

SUBJ: SENSITIVE LETTERS
REF: YOUR 222345Z APR 68

(1) UNDERSTAND YOUR NEED TO HAVE AUTHORITY FOR RELEASE OF LETTERS
ASAP. GEN PUSTAY INFORMED FIRST CHANCE YOU HAVE TO GIVE GEN. [REDACTED]
LETTER IS 230730Z.

Handwritten: Copy to
G Col [REDACTED]

(U) 2. AUTHORITY FOR YOU TO RELEASE LETTERS TO DESIGNATED US MILITARY
OFFICERS HAS NOT REPEAT NOT BEEN OBTAINED YLT.

(3) AUTHORITY FOR RELEASE AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR GEN. [REDACTED] GEN. [REDACTED]
AND COL. [REDACTED] EXPECTED AT 231600Z AFTER AN SCC MEETING. CURRENT
PLAN IS TO SEND THESE INSTRUCTIONS TO YOUR LOCATION AT THE TIME
AUTHORITY FOR RELEASE IS APPROVED. AT THAT SAME TIME, [REDACTED]
COMMUNICATIONS SITES WILL RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO FACILITATE
NOTIFICATION OF DESIGNATED MILITARY OFFICERS SO THEY CAN
ACCOMPLISH FINAL RELEASE OF LETTERS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE AMERICAN
AMBASSADORS, WHEN THAT AUTHORITY HAS BEEN OBTAINED.
BT

Handwritten in circle: 272

NNNN

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12 AUG 72

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~~SECRET~~

12. SOVIET PROPAGANDA CLAIMS THAT MOSCOW HAS ALREADY
BEGUN EFFORTS TO CIRCUMVENT A POSSIBLE US BLOCKADE OF IRAN. AN
ARTICLE IN THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE "MOSCOW NEWS WEEKLY" SAID CARGO
FROM WEST EUROPE IS POURING INTO IRAN, AND THAT TRANSIT OF IRANIAN
IMPORTS VIA SOVIET TERRITORY IS OF "VITAL IMPORTANCE TO IRAN
BECAUSE OF A THREATENED US ECONOMIC BLOCKADE."

A. AREA OF U.S. BATTLE GROUPS: AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR
AND A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE CONTINUE SURVEILLANCE AS THE USS NIMITZ AND USS
CORAL SEA BATTLE GROUPS AND AMPHIBIOUS READINESS GROUP ALPHA

THEIR WHEREABOUTS ARE UNKNOWN.

D.
DEVALAK

15. SATELLITE OVERVIEW: AS OF 2100Z FRIDAY (18 APRIL)

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WJW

TOP SECRET

~~SECRET~~

30

Figure 1

REF JTF/J3 2014552 APR 68

SUBJECT - FLEET TACAIR SUPPORT CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. ~~EST~~ REF REQUESTED TX-7C KC-135 SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.

- [illegible]

INTER WORD

“JST/SONING”

2 ARTS. 2 ALFA (STRIP ALIAS/ARTS JACKET
FROM COMBINATION OF ARTS/3 ALPHA (2/3 ARTS) STRIP ALIAS/ARTS JACKET
WILL IMMEDIATELY LAUNCH A JACKET COMBINED ARTS, AND COMBINATION
ALPHA TANKER FOR JURY STRIP ALIAS. [REDACTED] TO
CAYMAN, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] 3 BARRING AVAILABLE
AT LOW TANKER SHIPS YEAR TO YEAR. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
TANKER SHIPS WILL LAUNCH AS NEEDED AT APPROXIMATE 1000 HRS.
IT IS TO BE MAINTAINED AND ASSETS TO COVER EMERGENCY
INFILTRATION AS POSSIBLE. TANKER SHIPS ALSO TO BE AVAILABLE AT
POSSIBLE IN-TARGET COUNTRY AREA AT LOW MOUNTAIN INFLUENCE
VIBRATIONS OF 20-30% OF-YR. TANKER SHIPS WILL BE LAUNCHED BY 1000.
TANKER SHIPS WILL ALSO BE PROVIDED AT NATIONALLY LAUNCH
IN 10-15% FROM [REDACTED] AT INTERNALS COMBINATION
NEARBY/10% PERIOD. THE MAINTAINING THE TANKING MAINTAINING
ESTABLISHED.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - DAY TWO: TF-72 WILL PROVIDE FORTY-FIVE AIRCRAFT TO CAP PLANNED EXFILTRATION ROUTE FROM AN UNKNOWN POINT IN VICINITY OF CORRAL DO BUEY, RD-100 TANKERS WILL LAUNCH NATIONALLY (INTERVAL) DEFENSES IN ANTICIPATION (MID) FROM [REDACTED] TO ARRIVE OVER TF-72 AT PLANNED EXFILTRATION TIME. IF [REDACTED] AVAILABLE, 3 HOURS INTO MISSING DOBBY REFUELING WILL BE LAUNCHED TWO HOURS OF ORBIT FLIGHT ON THE L-3 AFTER A FLIGHT CAPABILITY. (FROM 1-14'S REQUIRED 41,000 LBS FUEL 3 HOURS LOITERO). 15 F-105(S) ARRIVE VICINITY OF MIGHTY 1-14'S WILL LAUNCH JOHN AND GORDON THEN TO ABOVE MENTIONED ORBIT POINT. TANKER ON-STATION CAPABILITY CAN BE INDICATED BY [REDACTED] FOR [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

3. RECOMMEND FOLLOWING COMBINED REFERENCE RATING TO BE USED BY

~~FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY - DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES~~

- CAP ALTA (CHASCO) 35-40-1941, 31-10-41
 CAP ARRAVE (HUEL) 35-40-1941, 31-10-41
 CAP BARRIL (CHARD) 35-40-1941, 31-10-41
 CAP BELLA (CHASCO) 35-40-1941, 31-10-41
 CAP BHO (CHARRAL) 35-40-1941, 31-10-41
 CAP FORNAT (CHARRAL) 35-40-1941, 31-10-41
 CAP HOLE (CHARRAL) 35-40-1941, 31-10-41
 CAP HUEL (CHARRAL) 35-40-1941, 31-10-41

GROUND TARGETS/1) 170.0 HIGHS OF 1000.0 FEET ON 301.4 AND
(PRIMARY) 240.5 HIGHS (SECONDARY) 1000.0 FEET ON 301.4 AND 301.5.
GROUND TARGETS/2) HIGHS OF 1000.0 FEET ON 301.4 AND 301.5.
CALL SIGNS WILL BE COORDINATED PRIOR TO THE USE OF WEAPONS.

[illegible]

AND CAN BE USED AS LONG AS SUFFICIENT PREPOSITION PAYMENT AT ALTITUDE DURING PERIODS OF VULNERABILITY. NECESSARY MINIMUM WEAPON ASSETS (A-60, A-6500) REMAIN DESIGNATED ESSENTIAL. ALL F-7E THUNDER PILOTS ARE NOW QUALIFIED IN A-106 REFUELING. 100

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12 Aug 92

WAS WITHDRAWAL ALTITUDE OF INTERSECTION 1-141' (AGL) 12-10-62 FROM
TARGET COUNTRY ON 11/11/62. WHILE SAY ONE IS A CONTINUING TARGET, BAY
TWO T-14 CAP 1 CONSIDERED A PRUDENT EMANATION FOR MISSIONAL
SUCCESS.

VERY RESPECTFULLY,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE 01 SELECTED.

TOT / 0710Z
KCL

SSN 0052

O 220600Z APR 80

FM ALPHA/JZ

TO

BT

SUBJ: SATRAN EXTENSION

FOLL IS ANTICIPATED RECON/SURV COVERAGE

DURING PERIOD 200400/000001 TO 240400/240000

FOR UR LOG:

#313

As

0052

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12 AUG 92

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO 12355

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~~SECRET~~

FBI/DOJ/RC/12
TO: SITH ALPHA/30
1. SON/A2
WAB/S2

317

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: SATRAM EXTENSION

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE/SURVEILLANCE
COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 200400/200001 TO 200400/240000

1E

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

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12 AUG 72

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SMHUS
DIA

P 200300Z APR 80
FM WALNUT
TO DUCKHUNTER/MAJ
BT

~~SECRET~~
SUBJ: SITREP NUMBER 1

COMMUNICATION CENTER IS OPERATING ON COMMERCIAL POWER WITH GENERATORS
AS BACK UP.

EQUIPMENT STATUS

2 GENERATOR GREEN

1 GENERATOR AMBER. WE HOPE TO HAVE IT REPAIRED TODAY. TWO OF THEM HAD WATER
AND SAND IN FULL COUPLERS.

1 TT-76 AMBER. KEY BOARD NEEDS REPLACING.

1 UGC-128 GREEN

1 WSC-3 GREEN

1 KW-7 GREEN

2 TH-22'S GREEN

ALL OTHER ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT IN GOOD WORKING ORDER.

EQUIPMENT NEEDED.

1. TT-76 KEYBOARD

1 THREE MAN TENT WITH POLES AND METAL STAKES

3 RATIONS FOR THREE MEN TO LAST AT LEAST 12 DAYS.

MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS NEEDED.

SOFT DRINKS, ICE IF POSSIBLE, COLEMAN STOVE OR HOT PLATE AND

SOME JUNK FOOD.

MORAL IS GOOD THIS FAR. THANKS FOR ANY HELP YOU CAN GIVE US "T"

NNNN

Classified ~~By~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~
Declassified ~~ON~~ ~~QADR~~

Declassified by:

DDO NMCC

12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Col. H. H. H.

TCR-12002
KCL 12

DATA INTER. US. FOR THE. IN. IMMEDIATE MESSAGES

211010Z APR 68
FM JTF NIMITZ (PITMAN)
TO JTF [REDACTED] (VAULT)
BT

[REDACTED] T/JOMINT DO NOT PASS ON INTEL BROADCAST

ARRIVAL REPORT [REDACTED] (U)

[REDACTED] PARTY OF SIXTY THREE ARRIVED [REDACTED] 220000Z AND NIMITZ
ARRIVED.

1. [REDACTED] AT [REDACTED] ONE OF THE DUTY WORKING PARTY PROVIDING
SUPPORT DURING C-141 LAYOVER WAS MEMBER OF HM-16 AND RECOGNIZED
HM-16 MEMBERS IN OUR PARTY. OSD [REDACTED] THE
HM-16 SAILOR INVOLVED, WAS THEN TAKEN TO NIMITZ WITH THIS PARTY.
OSTENSIBLY, HE WAS TO LOUPT SPECIAL EVENING LIGHT CARGO TO HIS
SHIP. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY ANGRY THAT SOMETHING WAS HAPPENING BECAUSE
HE WOULD HIS OWN, [REDACTED] FROM HM-16 TO TELL HIM WHO HE'D SEEN.
[REDACTED] HAS BEEN CAUTIONED, AND TOLD THAT [REDACTED] WOULD BE ESCORTING
HIGH PRIORITY CARGO TO THE NIMITZ. AN USUAL REACTION EXPECTED
WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR.

(U) 2. [REDACTED] REQUEST LATEST DATA ON C-130 FULL OFF LOAD CAPABILITY
USING 6000 GALLON SYSTEM. LAST REPORT INDICATED 500 GALLONS
UNUSABLE. -

(U) 3. [REDACTED] CURRENT HELD STATUS GIVEN OUT OF EIGHT MISSION CAPABLE
(HM-16 REPORT).

(U) 4. [REDACTED] REQUEST PROVIDE DAILY SURFACE TO 2000 FT WINDS FORECAST
FOR TRACK, TEMPERATURE AND DENSITY ALTITUDE PREDICTIONS ON THE
SURFACE AT LAND AND TAKE-OFF TIMES FOR SHIP, DESERT TRACK, HIDE
AND CITY.

(U) 5. [REDACTED] REQUEST HOLD LOADS BY AIRCRAFT 1 THROUGH 6. NUMBER OF PAX,
THEIR WEIGHT (WITH GEAR), CARGO AT AND ITS DESCRIPTION.

(U) 6. CINCPAC LNO HAS DISCUSSIONS WITH TANKER TASK FORCE COMMANDER
RE: OPTIONS FOR FIGHTER SUPPORT REFUELING. 23 FLEET AIRCRAFT
(F-14, KA-6S) COMPLETED LAST NIGHT, EXPECT AS MANY MORE TONIGHT.
ALL TRAINING BOMB RAIN ORIGIN OF SEVERAL VOICE.

BT

MCN

013

350

Classified By: ~~DDO NMCC~~
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

348

000000 (174), 10, 740000 (174) 727

TOR 1451 Z
KCL

Play to

P 201225Z
FM
TO JTF

JCS/SOD(TYGEN GAST)

MCN

TOT 017
1530Z
RC

SUBJ: SITREP #2

1. SECURITY ON AND AROUND THE AIRBASE IS NO PROBLEM. HOWEVER OUR PRESENCE HAS BECOME COMMON KNOWLEDGE ON THE
2. SCULP 52 AND GORL 93 (MC-130'S) ARRIVED ON 20 APRIL AT 0530Z AND 0810Z RESPECTIVELY. JST 12 GROUND ABORTED ITS MORNING MISSION FOR IGNITION EXCITER AND INS PROBLEMS. EXPECT TO HAVE IT FIXED TODAY. FLEW ONE SEA SURVEILLANCE MISSION TAKEOFF 201200Z APR 62 AND ETR 201500Z APR 62.
3. FUEL COSTS TRANSMITTED IN SITREP #1 SHOULD READ APPROXIMATELY ONE DOLLAR AND FIFTY CENTS PER GALLON.
4. IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY TO ORDER AN ADDITIONAL 33 AIR MATTRESSES SINCE MOST COMING OUT OF PACAF HAD HOLES IN THEM. IN ADDITION, REQUESTS HAVE BEEN PASSED TO COMCOM VIA THE JTF FOR ADDITIONAL STORES: ELECTRICAL CORD, TOILET CHEMICALS, TRASH BAGS, PORTABLE SHOWERS ETC.

Classified By: ~~TOP SECRET~~ DDD NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by:
DDD NMCC
12 AUG 72

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

21
0529
TOT
VC
835

338

E

E

E

C
E

11 502 000
JIF
003/000 (LTC EAST)

BE ADVISED THAT

GROUP WILL BE LEADED BY

WE ARE ALSO INFORMED THAT
WILL ACCOMPANY THE GROUP AS WELL AS SEVERAL NEWS
REPORTERS.

WE WERE ADVISED LAST EVENING BY JTF CONCERNING THE SUITABILITY OF
AIRFIELD FOR C-141 OPERATIONS. APPARENTLY MAC IS RELUCTANT TO
USE THE FIELD WITHOUT FIRST CONDUCTING AN OFFICIAL MAC SURVEY. SUCH A
SURVEY DOES NOT APPEAR POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME NOR WOULD IT BE POLITICALLY
PRUDENT SINCE IT WOULD TEND TO OVERLOAD THE SYSTEM WITH ANOTHER SHORT
NOTICE DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE REQUEST. BASED ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACILITY
AND THE JUDGEMENT OF FORMER C-141 CREWMEMBERS WHO ARE WITH THE HC-130
DETACHMENT, THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEM IN USING THE MAIN RUNWAY FOR TAKEOFF
AND LANDING AND THE HARDPACK AIRSTRIP FOR TAXI AND OFFLOAD. THE DIRT
RUNWAY IS COMPOSED OF A TOP LAYER OF TWO INCHES OF COMPACTED SAND AND
GRAVEL OVER A BEDROCK BASE. FOR FURTHER DETAILS ON AIRFIELD
OPERATORS SHOULD REFER TO THE TECHNICAL FACILITIES REPORT, FEBRUARY
1962. REFERENCE IN REPORT TO DIRT RUNWAY BEING C-130 CAPABLE WAS BASED ON
CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS, LAUNCH AND TAKEOFFS OF C-130 AIRCRAFT.

Classified By ~~DDO NMCC~~
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

MESSAGE IS RECEIVED.

PROALYKSELQXIAINSEVEN 00 31

000001 7:25:11 0045/

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR | 0758Z
KCL |

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

MCN
036

0758Z DUCK HUNTER DE FOXFIRE

#337

O 210511Z APR 80
FM HELO DET/SZ
TO SITE ALFA/JTF J-2
BT

(u)

~~0 210511Z APR 80~~ ~~FM HELO DET/SZ~~ ~~TO SITE ALFA/JTF J-2~~ ~~BT~~

SUBJ: PRDG REP 01

1. HELO INTEL NODE OPERATIONAL AS OF 20 APR 80. MSN PLANNING
PROCEEDING IN DEDICATED SPACES.

2. YOUR AIR SUMMARY IN ABBREVIATED FORMAT IS SAT FOR OUR
PURPOSES.

3. WE ARE WAITING FIRST MX. REQ EXPEDITE TRANSMISSION.

4. ANY POSSIBILITY OF GETTING US DMA MFA GRID?

REVM: 21APR80

BT

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR / 1136 ZV
FCL

#334

MCN

038

MESSAGE 01 RECEIVED.

P 211117Z APR 82

FM [REDACTED]
TO JCS/SEC (LTS GAST)

BT

~~SECRET~~
SUBJ: [REDACTED] SITREP #4

REF SITREP #3 DTG 210550Z APR 82

1. REF DISCUSSED 24 APR VIP VISIT TO [REDACTED] WITH [REDACTED] OPERATIONS OFFICER
HE ASSURED US THAT IT IS [REDACTED] DESIRE NOT TO ALLOW NEWSMEN TO ACCOMPANY
VIPS. EXPECT THE VISIT TO BE ROUTINE AND UNEVENTFUL.

NNNN

Classified By ~~708~~ DDD NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NO. 10110

~~SECRET~~

(#332)

TOR / 12382

RC

MCN ✓

Ø41

MESSAGE 13 RECEIVED.

1236Z DUCK HUNTER DE FOXFIRE

O 211145Z APR 84
FM CTF 78
TO JCS
BT

~~DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL CHANNELS.~~
SUBJ: RH-530 SITREP 211145Z APR (U)
1. SEVEN ACFT IN FULL UP STATUS. EIGHTH ACFT UP
FOR POST MAINTENANCE TEST FLIGHT.
~~REVISED 20 APR 84~~
BT

NNNN

MESSAGE 14 RECEIVED.

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


MSG #27
UTC 211423Z APR 80
FM JCS/RC-J-2
TO: SITE ALPHA
SF00/S2
1-50W/S2

*(#328) TOP 1754
JPB C*

MCN
046-

SUEJI SATRAN EXTENSION (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE
SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 287400/288000
TO 240400/240800



BT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONmcc
☐ DECLASSIFIED TO Secret
BY OADR
REVIEW ON [redacted]
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

Classified BY JCS
Declassified ON OADR
Downgraded by:
DDO WACC
12 Aug 92

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MSG 034
DTG 212215Z APR 80

G FMI JTF RC [REDACTED]

G TO ALPHA/ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

325

YOR 121245Z

CT MCN51

copy to

REF: A. YOUR MSG DTG 211836Z AP 80 SUBJ: LOG SUPPORT UPDATE

B. MSG (KYLE) DTG 211836Z AP 80 SUBJ: LOG SUPPORT

C. MSG. THIS HQ DTG 211245Z AP 80 SUBJ: RESUPPLY OF EXERCISE PLAYERS.

1. REF A ESTABLISHED MOVEMENT PRIORITIES FOR REMAINING GEAR IN EUCON ACKNOWLEDGED AND SAID THAT EQUIPMENT SHOULD ARRIVE YOUR LOCATION APPROXIMATELY 221300Z AP. PER PARA 2 YOURS. WE CONSIDER YOUR MA-3 AC RONT IS FILLED.

2. REF B ROSTO ADDITIONAL PARTS FOR [REDACTED] RECEIVED REF C AND B AND IS WORKING TO FILL. INDICATIONS ARE THAT PARTS WILL DEPART COMIS [REDACTED] TOMORROW.

3. RADAR PARTS WILL DEPART [REDACTED] 220400L AP 80.

4. THIS HQ INFORMED [REDACTED] THAT ENGINE BOOTS [REDACTED] ALONG WITH [REDACTED] LINES CLOSED [REDACTED] PLEASE REPORT IF THIS IS NOT SO.

5. MAINTAIN A SENSE OF HUMOR.
BT

Classified by [REDACTED] m:OADR

Declassified by [REDACTED] OADR

Downgraded by:

1009 MCC

12A-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

012010Z
FM: HLLD DET/S-21)
53 51/J-2
SCEJ: INTREP 22

~~SECRET~~

C

TOR/211
JB/mcu

1. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY INDICATIONS OF
BY ARABIAN SEA PLATFORMS.

FFG 693 HAS DEPARTED CTF 73 MODLOC. KRIVAK LAST
LOCATED VIC 21 58N 82 13E ON COURSE 133 - 10 KTS AT
191900Z.

AGI 477 REMAINS IN SURVEILLANCE
OF AMPHIB READY GROUP. [REDACTED] IN STRAIT OF

USS GRUMBY MAU
RECONNOITERED BY IRANIAN C-130 VIC 25. IN 057 46E AT 0650Z.

NIMITZ IS ENDEAVORING TO GET POSITIVE PLOT HN KRIVAK 693.

IS A POSSIBLE THREAT TO FLIGHT OPS VIC AL MASIRAH.
IF 693 IS IN THAT AREA.

5. WOULD APPRECIATE WX. EARLY AM 22 APR 88Z
FATHER BOE

NO TAPE
S-2 has
copy

324

Classified By ~~JCS~~
Declassified ON ~~OADR~~

WANT 05L 00V AMN I NEED ZDN OF YOUR LAST
0500Z JSA

2833/78

.11

XHPIMKD

YANTHCGURDPLL

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW IN 1995
EXEMPTED ON 177-AD-000-000
REMARKS BY 000-000-000
REF ID: A6000000
REF ID: A6000000
REF ID: A6000000

~~SECRET~~

NSC42

CTC: 220030Z APR 80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FM: JCS/RC-J2

TO: SITE ALPHA/J2

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: C-141 ACFT FROM [REDACTED]

REFERENCE: SITE ALPHA/J-2 MSG 202130Z APR 80

1. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST IN REFERENCE, WE SUGGEST THAT MAC C-141 ACFT FILE [REDACTED] FLIGHT PLAN FROM [REDACTED] FOLLOWING TAKE-OFF. ACFT SHOULD ATTAIN NORMAL ALTITUDE (ABOUT 3000FT) FOLLOWING FLIGHT ROUTE A-1 AND BEGIN [REDACTED] BEGIN SLOW DESCENT [REDACTED] AT CAPE CHECK POINT [REDACTED] UPON REACHING [REDACTED] TURN NORTH TO INTERSECT COAST LINE AT CP [REDACTED]

2. FROM COASTAL CHECK POINT, FLY BY DIRECT ROUTE CLIMBING TO ATTAIN [REDACTED] TO CHECK POINT AT [REDACTED] FROM THIS POINT, TURN [REDACTED] TO INTERSECT NEXT CHECK POINT [REDACTED] MAINTAIN NORMAL ALT OF 6000 FT AGL FOR THIS LEG TAKING CARE NOT TO DIRECTLY OVERFLY [REDACTED] THIS ROUTE SHOULD MINIMIZE CHANCES OF DETECTION BY [REDACTED]

3. FROM CHECK POINT [REDACTED], FOLLOW ROUTE SIMILAR TO THAT ORIGINALLY PLANNED FOR MC-130 ACFT AT [REDACTED] AGL ALONG RIDGELINE TO CHECK POINT [REDACTED] REMAINDER OF C-141 ROUTE IS THE SAME AS MC-130 ROUTE MAINTAINING [REDACTED] FT AGL ALTITUDE. BT

Classified By [REDACTED]
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by:

DDO NMCC

12 AUG 92

NR00K

AND MAE THAT IS ALL FOR M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR / 220310
VC / 057 V

copy to
J-2 +
MAC

DDO NMCC
318

APR 10

FM JTE

TO: SEC

FROM: JTE

SITE ALPHA

TOR/16492 V
RC

361

SUBJ: SITUATION REPORT IRAN

1. THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED THESE FURTHER SANCTIONS:

- NO FINANCIAL TRANSFERS BY PERSONS SUBJECT TO U.S. JURISDICTION EXCEPT IN REAS GATHERING OR TO HOSTAGES BY THEIR FAMILIES;
- AN ON IRANIAN IMPORTS TO THE U.S.;
- NO TRAVEL BY U.S. CITIZENS TO IRAN EXCEPT FOR REAS GATHERING.

2. IN ADDITION, MILITARY EQUIPMENT IMPOUNDED AFTER PURCHASE BY IRAN IS TO BE USED BY THE U.S. OR SOLD. THE PRESIDENT WILL ASK CONGRESS FOR AUTHORITY TO PAY REPARATIONS OUT OF IRANIAN ASSETS; THESE ASSETS WILL ALSO BE AVAILABLE TO PAY AMERICAN CLAIMS.

3. THE A COMENSATIVE IRANIAN ECONOMIC IS NOT FORTHCOMING. FUTURE COPS WILL INCLUDE FANNING U.S. EFFECTS OF COOL TO BEING TO IRAN AND CONSULTATION WITH INTELSAT MEMBERS. THE IRANIAN USE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES.

4. IN RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT, IF NO ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS AND ACTIONS BY OUR ALLIES IS TAKEN, THEN THE ONLY NEXT STEP AVAILABLE THAT I CAN SEE IS SOME SORT OF MILITARY ACTION. THE PRESIDENT ALSO SAID "I CANNOT PRECLUDE" THE OPTION OF INTERFERING IN THE OIL SUPPLY.

5. FRANCE - THE FOREIGN MINISTER ADDRESSING THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY "...THE SOLIDARITY THAT UNITES FRANCE TO THE UNITED STATES IN THE CRUEL OFFENSE THAT IT UNDERGOES CANNOT BE KEPT FROM OFFERING HERSELF, AND AT THE PRESENT MOMENT, THE MEASURES WHICH SHE JUDGES TO BE MOST APPROPRIATE TO EFFICIENT."

6. GERMANY - THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO A PRESS CONFERENCE IN COFFIN "NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT WE HAVE NO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.A. WE DO NOT APPROVE OF THE (HOSTAGE-TAKING) AS VIOLATING INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC CONVENTIONS MUST BE RESPECTED."

7. JAPAN - THE ECONOMIC MINISTER TO THE FUNDSTOCK EVEN IF THE COUNTRIES DO NOT TAKE A COMMON STAND, THE MAJORITY OF THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WILL DECIDE ON BOYCOTT MEASURES. THE PARTNERS MUST SHOW THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH THE U.S. THROUGH "ACTIONS AND FEELING".

8. ORGANIZATION GENERAL ASSEMBLY - UNGA PRESIDENT SAID IN TOKYO THE HOLDING OF THE HOSTAGES IS "COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE." CONTRARY TO ALL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. "GIVEN THE DESIRE OF ALL CONCERNED IT WOULD NOT BE IMPOSSIBLE TO IMMEDIATELY RELEASE THE HOSTAGES AND ON THE OTHER HAND SATISFY AT LEAST SOME (IRANIAN CRIVANCES)."

9. THE IRANIAN INTERIOR MINISTRY OFFICIALS AS SAYING THAT THE SECOND ROUND OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, SCHEDULED FOR MAY 2, MAY BE DELAYED FOR TWO WEEKS BECAUSE OF HOLIDAYS AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE FIRST ROUND.

Secret

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CR BY DDO NMCC
☐ DEB ☐ DELETED TO
REFR BY DAPL
REFR BY Multiple Sources

TOP SECRET

1. A PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT COMMUNIQUE REPORTED BY AFP
ANNOUNCED APRIL 17 THAT PORTUGAL HAS DECIDED TO BREAK OFF
ITS TRADE RELATIONS WITH IRAN.

2. SOVIET ACTIVITY IN INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTH CHINA SEA

A. SOVIET INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR AND A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE
CONTINUING SURVEILLANCE OF THE USS NIMITZ AND USS CORAL SEA BATTLE
GROUP AND AMBITIOUS REALNESS GROUP ALPHA

1. IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS REPORTING WITH INCREASED ANTI-US
TENDENCY IN SOVIET PRESS AND NEWS COMMENTARIES AS MOSCOW PUBLICLY
ADVANCED THE PROSPECT OF POSSIBLE US MILITARY INTERVENTION.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR / 1640Z
RC

i-363

A

TO: 162000Z APR 92
FM: JTF 702
TO: ~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: MFA HOSTAGES

1. ON 16 APRIL 1992 DOS/IMC RECEIVED TELECON FROM LAINGEN, HOWLAND, JOM BETH. THE FOLLOWING IS QUOTE FROM DOS MLPC: THE TRIO HAS BEEN MOVED TO A NEW ROOM WITHIN THE PROTOCOL SUITE OF OFFICES. BRUCE DESCRIBED IT AS THE DINING ROOM. HE SAID THEY ARE NOW ALLOWED ONE HOUR A DAY IN THE OUTSIDE GARDEN UNDER SUPERVISION OF A GUARD. UNQUOTE

2. DURING CONVERSATION LAINGEN GAVE THEIR NEW TELEPHONE NUMBER AS 321-246 REPEAT 321-246.

3. JTF EXPLORING ALL MEANS TO DETERMINE EXACT LOCATION WITH MFA FLOC.

REVW 1. APR 18

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

☐ DESL DES DOWN TO CONF

REVW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM JS

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOR / 14152
RC

MESSAGE 11 RECEIVED.

BTG 171430Z APR 82
FROM JTF/J2
TO 1504/42

BTG/J2
SITE ALIWA

#367

SUBJ: SITUATION IN IRAN ON 17 APRIL 1982

1. YESTERDAY, THE RULING REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL ANNOUNCED IT IS CONSIDERING YET ANOTHER POSTPONEMENT OF THE SECOND ROUND OF THE PARFYTAEGLER313:500. THE SECOND ROUND, WHICH WAS SCHEDULED FOR 2 MAY, WILL BE POSTPONED FOR AN ADDITIONAL WEEK IF APPROVED BY THE COUNCIL. NO REASON FOR THE DELAY WAS PROVIDED. FOLLOWING THIS ANNOUNCEMENT, AYATOLLAH KHAMENEI, LEADER OF THE HAROLINE FACTION IN THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, SAID THE FUTURE PARLIAMENT MIGHT NOT DECIDE WHAT TO DO WITH THE HOSTAGES UNTIL JULY. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE END OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES WOULD CHANGE THE SITUATION OF THE HOSTAGES. IN FACT HE CLAIMED THAT "THEIR PERSONAL SITUATION WILL BE BETTER DEALING WITH THEM." HE SAID THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR IRAN TO PARDON THE HOSTAGES WITHOUT A TRIAL IF THE "POLITICAL BACKGROUND WAS RESOLVED." HE ADDED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION MIGHT HELP IN THIS RESPECT.

2. HEALTH OFFICIALS WHO VISITED THE HOSTAGES CONFIRMED IN A PRESS INTERVIEW YESTERDAY THAT SEVEN OR EIGHT HOSTAGES WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING SPIES ARE BEING KEPT IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT.

3. PRESS REPORTS QUOTE ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AS SAYING THAT PRESIDENT CANER WILL ANNOUNCE AT A PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY AN EMBARGO ON FOOD SHIPMENTS TO IRAN AND ASK THE UNITED STATES ALLIES TO FOLLOW SUIT. ALTHOUGH SUCH AN EMBARGO WOULD HAVE A SLIGHT EFFECT AS FAR AS AMERICAN SHIPMENTS ARE CONCERNED, THE ADMINISTRATION REPORTEDLY BELIEVES THAT A FOOD EMBARGO BY U.S. ALLIES WOULD BE A SEVERE BLOW TO IRAN. JODY POWELL DENIED THE REPORT OF EMBARGO ON FOOD THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATES IT TO OTHER COUNTRIES.

4. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS FROM LONDON, BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO IRAN, SIR JOHN GRAHAM, WAS TO RETURN TO HIS POST THE NIGHT OF APRIL 16. THE EC-3 NATIONS ARE CURRENTLY CONSIDERING A WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR AMBASSADORS FROM TEHRAN.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGR TO
REVW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

~~TOP SECRET~~

...SOME OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, HAVE ...
...PRESENTED THEM ...
...NATIONAL ...

6. WHILE THE AMBASSADORS OF COUNTRIES ALLIED WITH THE U.S.
ARE RETURNING HOME FOR CONSULTATIONS ON THE HOSTAGE CRISIS, SEVERAL
NATIONS ARE SEEKING TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TEHRAN.

7. RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ REMAIN TENSE, BUT THERE
APPEARS TO BE SOME EASING IN IRAN'S MILITARY POSTURE.

~~SECRET~~

[5]

REF ID: A67777

SECRET

OF DATA ATTENTION (U)

369

TOR / 0300Z
VC

X

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE/
SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 170400Z/120000
TO 2100Z/120000Z

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET E8 12355

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

☐ DER ☒ DOWNER TO Secret

REVISED BY OADR

DERIVED FROM DIA

REV 12 APR 10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(# 372)

25 JANUARY 1980

G

From: Maintenance Officer, HELMINERON SIXTEEN
TO: [REDACTED] USMC

SUBJ: Inventory and custody of special mission items.
ENCL: (1) Serial numbers of items "t." through "x."

1. Inventory of subject items is as follows:

a. pilot's oxygen masks.....	8	
b. sleeping bag straps.....	44	
c. ammo pouch (old style).....	19	
d. canteen covers.....	80	
e. canteen (plastic).....	80	
f. cartridge belts.....	40	
g. first aid packs.....	41	
h. belt suspenders.....	40	
i. aviation body armor.....	38, 27	(3 short; 10 reg; 14 long)
j. ponchos.....	40	
k. poncho liners.....	32, 12	
l. aviation gas masks.....	65	
m. watch caps (wool knit).....	40	
n. sleeping bags.....	40, 38	
o. scarf material.....	1	(bolt of material)
p. compass (magnetic).....	40	
q. SVRB aviation survival vests.....	40	
r. rations, "C" TYPE.....	119	
s. water cans (5 gal, plastic).....	14	
t. M16A1 rifles.....	40	(serial numbers attached)
u. Caliber .38 pistols.....	40	(serial numbers attached)
v. Caliber .50 MG, M2.....	16	(serial numbers attached)
w. Pyrotechnic pistol MK8.....	20	(serial numbers attached)
x. Night vision goggles.....	20	(serial numbers attached)
y. flight jackets, nomex.....	39	(16 small; 17 med; 6 large)
z. thermal underwear (bottoms).....	41	(21 large; 20 medium)
aa. thermal underwear (tops).....	38	(19 large; 19 medium)
bb. desert boots.....	35	(1-7D; 1-7H; 3-8D; 1-8E; 5-8H; 3-9D; 7-9H; 4-10H; 3-11D; 1-11H; 3-11E; 1-12D; 212H)
cc. canteen cups.....	40	
dd. duffelbags.....	40	
ee. camouflage netting.....		
ff. netting support braces.....		
gg. <u>M55 EX. ARMOR (STG)</u>	8	<u>Tony</u>
hh. <u>Caliber .50 MG</u>	16	<u>Tom</u>
ii. <u>Caliber .38 MG</u>	41	<u>Tom</u>
jj. <u>EXTRAORDINARY RANGE TIPS</u>	24	<u>Tom</u>

2. The above items are on board USS NIMITZ (CV-68) and secured in storage area 5-138-20. Access to this space is restricted to five officers. The following officer has assumed control and custody by affixing his signature to this memorandum and initialing all changes or additions.

[REDACTED], Lieutenant Commander, USN, [REDACTED]

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: DJ50A
Declassified ON: OADR

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure (1) to basic memorandum on inventory and custody of special mission items dtd 25 JANUARY 1980.

1. Serial numbers of Pyrotechnic Pistols (MK8): (20 count)

E77890; 265923; 282175; 275394; E109697; 268983; 290353; ; 276333;
268503; 276057; E139217; 283007; 268105; E226573; 281709; 265808; 268964;
287906; 269523; 276035

2. Serial numbers of night vision goggles: (20 count)

2015C; 1985C; 1978C; 1979C; 1975C; 1992C; 1972C; 1999C; 2242C; 1974C; 1977C;
1965C; 2264C; 1983C; 2240C; 1981C; 2026C; 1967C; (+ 29 Batteries); 2000C; 2257C

3. Serial numbers of M16A1 Rifles: (40 count)

747034; 643585; 638298; 688264; 746488; 643182; 992581; 774466; 580823; 665754
746116; 616322; 685230; 668738; 688329; 1078311; 1625732; 1093105; 1062406;
1793826; 1624267; 1628398; 622392; 740840; 690440; 1659076; 1630348; 769924;
778020; 1629502; 770571; 1898229; 745897; 778236; 689001; 1193976; 675030;
1630554; 857857; 703802.

4. Serial numbers of Caliber .50 MG, M2s: (16 count)

1170273; 1170879; 1164568; 1141547; 1143410; 1169450; 1612714; 1142323;
458473; 1146842; 1143737; 1251051; 1169711; 1142381; 1164578; 2023125.

5. Serial numbers of Caliber .38 pistols: (40 count)

4D13332; 4D17794; 4D17908; 4D17489; 4D17481; 4D12074; 4D13095; 4D13384;
4D13364; 4D13024; 4D17499; 4D13376; 4D17572; 4D17362; 4D13437; 4D13487;
4D13743; 4D13930; 4D17326; 4D13740; 4D11822; 4D13594; 4D13677; 4D13485;
4D17793; 4D13161; 4D13018; 4D16316; 4D13117; 4D17866; 4D16895; 4D13509;
4D13822; 4D17457; 4D17857; 4D13449; 4D12380; 4D13483; D156285; 153-57582.

G

 , LCDR, USN

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure (1)

~~SECRET~~
INTRODUCTION

(# 370)

TF - Formed mid-November

- Mil options discussed with you on 8 Dec - ability then too low.

- Since then capability has been strengthened significantly.

1 ~~(S)~~ INTEL - Much better in all respects. (Big ~~REDACTED~~)

- PLANNING - A sound mechanically achievable plan has been devised.

- TRAINING - Four full scale rehearsals have been conducted in the US.

7 ~~(S)~~ EQUIPMENT - Night vision devices, precise navigation aids, air landed rapid refueling system, satellite comms, silent, ~~REDACTED~~

~~(S)~~ SUPPORT - Eight RH-53's on Nimitz; ~~REDACTED~~

In sum, the Joint Chiefs agree that we have a sound achievable plan.

Next, I'd like to outline briefly the current situation and then follow with the plan.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY PDO NMCC

☐ DECL 25 DOWN TO Secret

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources
~~REDACTED~~

~~Downgraded to SECRET
for security
PDO (NMCC)
N404
11/20/90~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By: 103
Declassify on: OADR~~

Classified By: ~~DISA~~ 18 October 1982
Declassified ON: ~~OADR~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) CURRENT SITUATION

HOSTAGES

50 at Emb

3 at FM

- Reasonably sure we know where they are.
- Kept by 125-150 persons at least a third armed with rifles and pis
- Embassy is 27 acres - with fence 10 - 12 ft high.

LIKELY REINFORCEMENTS

- Up to 100 persons from nearby stations could arrive within 10-15 minutes after the rescue has begun.
- 200 + more in the next 15 minutes.
- Several hundred could be expected within 45 minutes.
- Organized elements of the regular armed forces are not expected during the first hour.
- There is a low probability that the regular armed forces will discover or interfere.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~(S)~~ CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

E The operation would be accomplished during a nine day period (7 days for warning and positioning the force and 2 days for execution and recovery). Heavy helicopters (RH-53s), AC and MC-130 aircraft, KC-135 tankers, C-141 airlifters, and one C-5A will be used. The helicopters will launch from the Nimitz. Other air operations will be from [REDACTED]

- The operation in Iran takes approximately 38 hours (two nights and one day). It is divided into three phases - Insertion, Hostage Release and Extraction.

A, E Upon last light of the insertion day, SOFD-Delta (90 Delta personnel plus [REDACTED] monitors) and Rangers (46 personnel) will be airlifted by 3 MC-130s from [REDACTED] to Nain Military Airfield, Iran.

- The first MC-130, equipped with FLIR, will overfly the airfield and indicate clearance for the Ranger MC-130 to land. Upon landing, the Rangers will secure the field and prepare for reception of the two Delta MC-130s.

- These 3 A/C will soon be followed by 3 MC-130s w/fuel bladders.

- In the meantime, 6 RH-53s will have departed the USS Nimitz to marry up with the force at Nain. While at Nain, the helos will refuel from the MC-130 bladder birds and load the Delta personnel. (The refuel and load evolutions should take approximately 40 minutes.)

- Once refueled and loaded, the helos will fly to a hideout area which is located approximately 100 KM from Tehran.

- A, E -- The MC-130s at Nain will return to [REDACTED] leaving a force of 22 Rangers and two friendly [REDACTED] to maintain control and insure that the operation is not compromised.

- Once the helos reach the hideout area, they will be camouflaged and defensive positions set up. This evolution will be completed prior to sunrise.

- A, C -- The Delta force will [REDACTED] from the hideout area to a warehouse which is located approximately 15 KM from Tehran [REDACTED]

- While at the warehouse, final preparations will be made for the hostage release phase.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A ~~(C)~~ That night, Delta will be moved into Tehran [redacted] enter the compound during the early morning hours.

-- The hostage release can be completed in less than one hour - most will be out in 30 minutes or less.

-- Two AC-130s will fly from [redacted] compound and provide on-call gunfire support if required.

7 E -- In the meantime, 5 MC-130s w/ Rangers (75 personnel) will capture Manzarriyeh and prepare for arrival of a C-141 [redacted] and the helos from Tehran.

-- A third AC-130 will be available to provide on call gunfire support at Manzarriyeh.

-- Once Delta has initiated the hostage release by entering the Embassy compound, the helos will be called in for extraction and transportation of the hostages and Delta to Manzarriyeh.

-- A separate fully coordinated plan will be used to free Mr. Laingen + 2 from the Foreign Ministry.

7 E -- At Manzarriyeh the former hostages will be loaded on the C-141 which is staffed with an emergency medical team. The C-141 will fly to the nearest US military hospital, [redacted] on to Germany.

-- All other personnel will board the MC-130s and depart for [redacted]

7 E -- A sixth MC-130 from [redacted] will extract the main force once the Manzarriyeh extraction has been completed.

7 E -- All AC-130 flights from [redacted] to Iran and return will require air refueling over [redacted]

TO SUM UP -

- The mission can be done.

- It is highly dependent upon surprise.

- The next best time is 27-29 March followed by 3-5 Apr.

- After 5 April, shorter nights drive us to (3-day plan with increased risk).

- Sir, we await your orders.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

373

SECRET

WORKING PAPER

A (S) Subject: Concept for use of [REDACTED] in Hostage Recovery Option [REDACTED]

(S) 1. CONCEPT.

- Based on force capability, weather [REDACTED] and environment, the [REDACTED] is best munitions to achieve desired results.

1, B [REDACTED] along the south wall, as required, prior to [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED]

- Specific employment techniques and crew training will be accomplished prior to operation.

(S) 2. MUNITION DESCRIPTION. (See attached photo)

- The [REDACTED] includes a [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] each containing [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] permits [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] from various [REDACTED] between [REDACTED]

1, B - When the [REDACTED] functions, the [REDACTED] over the target area.

- After [REDACTED] desired [REDACTED] should [REDACTED] for approximately [REDACTED]

(S) 3. AVAILABILITY.

- Army has 1964 at [REDACTED] Depot.

- Shipping weight is [REDACTED]

1, B (S) 4. Delta Force will also have [REDACTED] munitions for use, as required.

(S) 5. No [REDACTED] should result from use of [REDACTED] are [REDACTED] but should pose no greater hazard than [REDACTED] if employed in buildings or urban areas.

1 Enclosure
A/S

DDO NMCC 12 Aug 82
JES
Classified By
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~
SOD SUMMARY SHEET

(#314)

TO: CJCS	CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	SOD CONTROL NUMBER			
SUBJECT: Use of [REDACTED] in Iran Hostage Rescue (TS)		ACTION			
		APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
		X		X	

REMARKS

1. (TS) The attached memorandum outlines the requirement for and requests approval of discriminate use of [REDACTED] during the hostage rescue in Iran.
2. (TS) The JTF was previously authorized* to plan for use and train in the use of [REDACTED]. However, final approval to use [REDACTED] was deferred.
3. (U) Recommend the attached memorandum be approved and forwarded to the Secretary of defense.

* Summary Sheet/Memo, Subject Use of [REDACTED] in Iran Hostage Rescue (TS)

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

☐ DECL 123-DOWNER TO Secret


REVISED ON OADR

DERIVED FROM JS

ACTION OFFICER [REDACTED] SOD, J-3 EXT 55078	INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL						
	OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION
	J-3 P						
	EXEC						
	TIM CNF						
	VCOPS						
	COFS						
DATE OF PREPARATION 13 April 80							

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~ ~~SECRET~~

OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

TO: CJCS✓	CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATE SECRET			
THRU: DJS	<i>Hansen</i> EYES ONLY	DJSM NO.	ODJS SUSPENSE DATE		
		DJSM DATE			
SUBJECT: Use of  Tehran Hostage Rescue (TS)		ACTION			
		APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
		X	X		

REMARKS

1. (TS) The attached memorandum outlines the requirement for and requests approval of discriminate use of [REDACTED] during the hostage rescue in [Tehran]. [REDACTED]

2. (U) Recommend approval and signature on proposed memorandum.

In view of the [REDACTED] of this final approval to [REDACTED] it is suggested that the Team be authorized to plan for use and train in the use of the [REDACTED] requested but the final authority to use during the operation not be issued until the deployment order is approved. [REDACTED] If [REDACTED]

Philip D. Hunter

CLASSIFIED BY: 1015
DATE FOR (1) DECLASSIFICATION
OR (2) REVIEW
IS: 21 November 1997
EXTENDED BY:
REASON:

EYES ONLY

[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

~~EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Use of [REDACTED] in Tehran Hostage
Rescue (TS) (C)

1. (TS) The current analysis of the tactical situation associated with the rescue of the hostages from the Embassy has established a requirement for authority to discriminately use [REDACTED]. The intention is to use an [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] characteristics and minimum [REDACTED] at the Embassy Compound to [REDACTED] predictable enemy reaction.

2. (TS) The advantages of limiting [REDACTED] by exercising [REDACTED] while improving the probability of mission success outweighs the possible [REDACTED] risk to the hostages and Iranians.

3. (TS) As a point of information, [REDACTED] have been used [REDACTED]

4. (TS) It is recommended that approval be granted to assemble the necessary supplies, conduct training, and prepare to use [REDACTED] as outlined in paragraph one above.

From
CJCS

OK -
But not approved.
How far have
Each approval would
be [REDACTED]
7.5

22
Nov
79

CLASSIFIED BY: Chairman, JCS
DATE FOR () DECLASSIFICATION
OR (X) REVIEW
IS: 22 November 2009
EXTENDED BY:
REASON:

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

~~EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

A Subject: Use of [REDACTED] in Iran Hostage
Rescue (TS) (S)

1. (S) (TS) Current analysis of the tactical situation associated with the rescue of the hostages from Iran has established a requirement for authority to [REDACTED]

A, B [REDACTED] An [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] characteristics and [REDACTED] would be used to [REDACTED] predictable enemy reaction.

A 2. (S) (TS) The advantages of limiting [REDACTED] by exercising [REDACTED] while improving the probability of mission success outweighs the possible [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] risk to the hostages and Iranians.

3. (S) (TS) As a point of information, [REDACTED] have been used [REDACTED]

A 4. (S) (TS) It is requested that approval be granted to use [REDACTED] as outlined in paragraph one above.

David C Jones

4/14
Approved.
Harold Brown

CLASSIFIED BY: Chairman, JCS
DATE FOR () DECLASSIFICATION
OR (X) REVIEW
IS: 12 April 2010
EXTENDED BY:
REASON:

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

SIGS SUMMARY SHEET

4375

CLASSIFICATION

FOR USE BY ORIGINATING AGENCY

~~TOP SECRET~~

DISM NO.

DATE FORWARDED

DISM DATE

ACTION

~~APPROVAL~~

SIGNATURE

DATE

BY

X

X

REMARKS

1. (S) The attached memorandum outlines the requirement for and requests approval of [REDACTED] during the hostage rescue in Tehran.

2. (U) Recommend approval and signature on proposed memorandum.

CLASSIFIED BY: DDO NMCC

DATE FOR () DECLASSIFICATION OADR

OR () REVIEW

IS: 12 Aug 92

EXTENDED BY:

REASON:

ACTION OFFICER

J-3, SOD

EXT 75279

COORDINATION/APPROVAL

OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION
J-3	[REDACTED]	55805			
J-33	[REDACTED]	74008			
J-31	Has seen [REDACTED]				

SECRET



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

~~EYES ONLY~~

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Use of [REDACTED] in Tehran Hostage Rescue (S) (TS)


A, B
1. (S) (TS) The [REDACTED] by the rescue force is considered a necessity to [REDACTED] levels. Minimum force is being employed, both inside and outside the Embassy, while maintaining a capability to affect a successful egress from the Embassy [REDACTED]

A
2. (S) (TS) An evaluation of the following [REDACTED] is being conducted by the rescue force; [REDACTED] The desire is to employ an [REDACTED] reasonable period of [REDACTED]

3. (S) (TS) The members of the rescue force are familiar with both employment of [REDACTED] conduct of operations while [REDACTED]

A, B
4. (S) (TS) The primary advantages of limiting the [REDACTED] by exercising [REDACTED] while greatly enhancing the probability of mission success, far outweigh the [REDACTED]

5. (U) Strongly recommend approval and that the attached proposed memorandum be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.


JAMES B. VAUGHT
MG USA
CJTF - RICE BOWL

Attachment
a/s

APPROVED _____

DISAPPROVED _____

CLASSIFIED BY: Director, J-3
DATE FOR () DECLASSIFICATION
OR (X) REVIEW
IS: 21 November 2009

EXTENDED BY:
REASON:

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Downgraded to Secret
by DDON MCC
12 Aug 2002



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

~~EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

A Subject: Use of [REDACTED] in Tehran Hostage
Rescue (TS) (S)

A 1. (TS) The current analysis of the tactical situation associated with the rescue of the hostages from the Embassy has established a requirement for authority to [REDACTED]. The intention is to use [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] at the Embassy Compound to [REDACTED] predictable enemy reaction.

A 2. (TS) The advantages of limiting [REDACTED] by exercising [REDACTED] while improving the probability of mission success outweighs the possible [REDACTED]

3. (TS) As a point of information, [REDACTED] have been used [REDACTED]

A,B 4. (TS) It is recommended that approval be granted to assemble the necessary supplies, conduct training, and prepare [REDACTED] as outlined in paragraph one above.

From
CJCS →

OK -
But not approve
now for use.
Such approval will
be addressed later
AF

22
Nov
79

CLASSIFIED BY: Chairman, JCS
DATE FOR () DECLASSIFICATION
OR (X) REVIEW
IS: 22 November 2009
EXTENDED BY:
REASON:

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

TIME
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EVENT/
SITUATION

~~TOP SECRET~~
CONSEQUENCES

DECISION/OPTION

535 2005

1/MC-130 w/ 50
DELTA Dep [REDACTED]
- MC-130 Aborts

Lead DELTA Team
late or unavailable

- Abort
- Have spare MC-130
ready; transload
DELTA continue

555 2025

1/MC (50 DELTA)

OK,

556 2026

& 1/EC (FUEL)
T/O from [REDACTED]
- MC-130 ABORT

DELTA unavailable

- ABORT advise
MC-130
- Transload DELTA
spare - continue
- Use 3rd EC-130 as spare
fuel A/C

- EC-130 ABORT

- REQUIRE 2/EC-130 AT
REFUEL POINT.

E NOTE: Any delay of
these A/C beyond 10
min requires notifi-
cation to Helos for
possible delay

556 2026

7/Helos dep carrier
6 airborne
5 airborne

OK
Allows only one
spare for entire
mission
Insufficient helos for
mission

Continue
Depending on
execute ... abort

>5 airborne

ABORT

602/3/4

1/MC-130 (21/
DELTA)
2/EC-130 (FUEL)
T/O from [REDACTED]
- 1/MC-130 Abort

Equip & parts of DELTA
unavailable

Transload to spare
MC-130, if un-
available .. ABC
and recall all
forces

- 1/EC-130 ABORT

Still sufficient fuel
at refuel point for
helos

Continue

2/EC-130 ABORT

Insufficient fuel
for helos

- If no refueling
available for
MC-130 ... ABORT
- If refueling
available, conti-
give 5000# from
of 3/MC-130s to
helos, plan a
5 helo launch out
of refueling

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified By:
Declassified ON:

DDO NMC
Downgraded
OADR DDO NMC

TIME
DU IRAN

EVENT/
SITUATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONSEQUENCES

DECISION/OPTIONS

35

1/MC-130 (DELTA
lands at refuel
point

OK

Continue

Blind landing

gui
pilot to landing
the road

- A/C damaged or
breaks through
crust on landing

A/C will have to
be destroyed in
place

- ABORT: Land t
helos at the ref
point, on load f
from the MC-130,
split the 60
personnel betwee
helos and return
the carrier

OR

Continue

Make damaged A/C

and burn it

39

Helos pass turn
around

5 helos OK

Sufficient force to
to support extraction
Insufficient helos

Continue

<5 helos OK

ABORT

55

2nd/MC-130
lands at refuel
point

OK

Continue

- A/C damaged
or breaks through
crust

Our presence will be
discovered the next day

ABORT - Land helo
take fuel out of
damaged MC-130 f
helos, load 60
people on 1st MC
return to
destroy MC-130 in
place, helos ret
to carrier.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TIME
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EVENT/
SITUATION

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

CONSEQUENCES

DECISION/OPTIONS

058

1st/EC-130 lands
- A/C damaged

OK
Presence will be
discovered

Continue as plan
bring an MC-130
back in the 2nd
night to destroy
damaged aircraft
and remove the
security force
Continue

002

3rd MC-130 lands
- A/C damaged

If we have security
force
OK
Presence will be
discovered

Continue, bring
crew out on MC-1
Continue
Continue
ABORT ... all
personnel return
initial departur
point. Destroy
A/C in place

005

2nd/EC-130
lands
- A/C damaged

OK
- Same options as
above

Continue
Same as above

- Because of damage
or malfunction, unable
to pass fuel

- LAND 3RD EC-130

Continue

006

3rd EC-130 enters
orbit over landing
site

Provide terminal
guidance for helos

Continue

020

Helos arrive
at landing site

OK

Continue

- If helos are more
than min late

Not enough
darkness to reach
hideout

Helos refuel and
move north to
desert hide
location -- noti
reception party
of DELAY

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

TIME
FLU IRAN

EVENT/
SITUATION

CONSEQUENCES

DECISION/OPTIONS

100

(S)

Helos depart refuel
point with DELTA
5 OK

Sufficient helos
for operation

Continue

<5 OK

Insufficient helos for
for operation

Good helos return
to carrier, rest
of force return
[redacted] on C-130

NOTE: If there is a
problem with any A/C
departing the refuel point,
it will be destroyed
in place and [redacted]

320

Helos arrive
at dropoff with
DELTA
- No reception
party

OK

Continue

DELTA unable to
move to city

- DELTA moves to
hideout with helo
- DELTA remains
dropoff to wait
trucks

- Helo breaks
at dropoff

Possibility of
discovery

- Leave [redacted]
[redacted] at Helo

- Force discovered
at dropoff

- Mission blown

- Load force on
and return to
desert track
- If possible,
capture discover
keep with helos
hideout, release
when helos leave
continue

350

Helos depart
dropoff

OK

Continue

305

Helos arrive
hideout

OK

Continue

Helos must be in the
hideout by 0016Z to
arrive in total
darkness

TIME
DU IRAN

EVENT/
SITUATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONSEQUENCES

DECISIONS/OPTIONS

07/9

2/MC-130 depart

OK

Continue

-1/MC-130
aborts

Rangers/CCT not
available at
Manzariyeh

Transload to spare MC-130
continue

-2/MC-130s
abort..Launch
spare

Reduced force to
secure Manzariyeh

- 24 hour hold
- Continue,

- 3/MC-130s abort

No security force

- 24 hour hold
- Continue, MC/EC-130s fr
proceed to
Manzariyeh without
security, CCT will set
lights for C-141's.

03

- 1/EC-130 aborts
3/AC-130 depart

No extra fuel, reduced b/u
extraction capability
OK

- Go

- 1 Depart

Minimum support

- 24 hour hold, recall
force
- Continue

A, E
- 1 Depart

support

- 24 hour hold, recall
force
- Continue, don't tell
Charlie

20

1/MC&2/EC-130
Depart
for Manzariyeh

OK

- Continue

39

1/KC-135 depart

OK

- Continue

- KC-135 aborts,
launch spare

OK

- Continue

- No KC-135

No Refuel

- MC-130s continue, get
fuel at Manzariyeh

51

3/KC-135's depart

OK

- Continue

- 1/KC-135 Abort

Insufficient fuel
for A/C 130

Launch spare

NOTE: If this
launch requires the
use of ~~more than two~~
spares we will affect
the return refuel-
ings.

35

2/MC-130s refuel

OK

- Continue

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Number outlined

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

TIME
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EVENT/
SITUATION

CONSEQUENCES

DECISIONS/OPTIONS

- 1/MC-130 unable to receive fuel Reduced security force for Manzariyeh

- Continue
The MC-130 that cannot refuel will continue to Manzariyeh to get fuel

- KC-135 unable to pass fuel or both MC-130s unable to receive MC-130s will require fuel from EC-130 at Manzariyeh

- Continue rest of mission on schedule, land both MC-130s at Manzariyeh, take fuel from EC-130.

53

~~1/AC-130's~~ refuel

OK

- Continue

≥ 1 A/C 130 unable to refuel Minimum AC-130s available to support DELTA

- Continue

No AC-130s able to refuel

No gunship support for DELTA

ABORT, recall all forces

- Continue, have AC-130s land at [REDACTED], refuel and launch for Tehran.
- If MC-130s have successfully refueled: continue to Manzariyeh & refuel from EC-130
- Continue, AC-130s, return to [REDACTED]

11

2/C-141 depart [REDACTED] for Manzariyeh
1/C-141 OK

Sufficient airlift to carry out 307 personnel
Max load departing Manzariyeh using MC-130 support

- Continue

- Continue

[REDACTED] will not let C-141s launch

Insufficient airlift to extract personnel

- Utilize alternate rescue party from [REDACTED] (MC/EC-130).

40

AC-130 arv at Embassy
NOTE: AC-130s will have 2+00 station time available.

OK

- Continue

NOTE: If EC-130s with fuel are at Manzariyeh and the other forces (MC-130s) have sufficient fuel, an AC-130 can land and take on fuel at Manzariyeh to extend station time.

45

2/MC-130s land at Manzariyeh

OK

- Continue

- Find R/W blocked Unable to airland

Jump in Rangers to clear runway then land.

~~TOP SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

TIME
LU IRAN

EVENT/
SITUATION

~~TOP SECRET~~
CONSEQUENCES

DECISIONS/OPTIONS

56	2/C-141 arrive Manzariyeh	OK	- Continue
	- 1st/C-141 crashes on R/W	R/W particully blocked if 2nd C-141 cannot land, insufficient airlift to evacuate all forces.	- Land the 2nd/C-141 and use him to extract hostages, use MC/EC- 130s to extract combat force. - Send 2nd/C-141 back, use MC/EC-130s to extract entire force.
		NOTE: C-141s will require at least 5000' to operate at moderate loads.	
Call	Helos start up		
00	DELTA execute at Embassy (approx time)	OK	- Continue
Call	Helos arrive at Embassy		
	- 5 OK	Sufficient helos for extraction	- Continue
	4	Will require helos to shuttle to Manzariyeh	- Consider fuel for AC-130 to provide extra static time.
	Zero helos	Unable to extract by helo	Will have to reach Manzariyeh by ground vehicle
10	2/C-141s depart Manzariyeh	OK	- Continue
	- Only 1/C-141 able to depart	Some of force will have to come out on MC/EC-130	Transload force to MC/EC- 130 for extraction.
	- Zero C-141s depart Manzariyeh	Entire force must come out on MC/EC-130	Transload force to MC/EC- 130s
15	MC/EC-130s depart Manzariyeh	OK	Continue
	≥ 3 MC/EC-130 depart	OK	Continue
3	MC/EC-130 depart	Insufficient lift for entire force	Force transition to E&E plan, make pickup at predetermined location next night.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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SEE: [REDACTED] for details o
questions on info provi
below.



~~E~~ [REDACTED] SUPPORT AVAILABLE

15 Jan 80:

ITEM	ON-SITE	REQUIREMENT	SHORTFALL	IN-THEATER ?
COTS	200	800	600	Harvest Eagle
MATTRESSES	50(not good)	800	Recommend Sleeping Bags per man	
BILLET (US assigned)	280	800	600	Requires [REDACTED] Govt turnover for US use.
LATRINES	19	24	5	Being constructed
SHOWERS	11(HEADS)	19	8	Harvest Eagle
WATER	3 Buffalos 10 Lister Bags	6 Buffalos 20 Lister Bags	3 Buffalos 10 Lister Bags	Harvest Eagle
Water Storage w/demin	4x500gal	8x500gal	4x500gal	Harvest Eagle
A-2 Water Trucks	1	2	1	Not in theater(SA
Water Kits for KC135	0	as req	as req	KC-135 deploy wit them.
MOBILE CLINIC	1	1	0	n/a
INSECT REPELLANT	1 per pers	1 per pers		each pers deploy insect repellant
LAUNDRY	3 washers	6	3	In Theater Quarte
CLASS VI	BEER 330 cases Soda 100 cases	as required " "	get from AAFES, EUR	Yes
RUNWAY LIGHTS	MINIMAL	VACI	VACI	Not in Theater (TA
R-14 Berms	1	2	1-2	[REDACTED] will con struct with 24 hrs notice.
ELECT POWER	175 KW, 380V, 50Cycle (220V) 2x6hr periods	Present + 2x200KW	2x200KW Convertible to 220, 60Cy	[REDACTED] DDO W/MC Classified By: [REDACTED] 12AL

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~~(C)~~ E

LIGHTING	ALL Shelters and Buildings	Same	Wire/Pigtails	
MHE	1 All Terrain Forklift w/ long forks	2 of same	1 All terrain w/long forks	ALCE?
PALLET LOADER	NONE	?	?	ALCE?
POL	240,000gal on base ? +100,000gal avail w/24hrs notice		?	 need 48 hr notice to assure no shortfall

2/0200Z (0300 Est)	Decision to launch MC-130	N/A	N/A
2/1000Z (0500 Est)	Launch MC-130: a. 5/MC-130 Airborne b. 4/MC-130 "	None Reduced fuel for Helo's	Go Go, will provide 19 operational bladders to compl mission
	c. <4/MC-130 Airborne	Insufficient fuel for Helo's	No Go/Delay 24 hr
	d. >1:00 delay in T/O	Will not get fuel to helos in time for them to reach hideout by daylight	No Go/Delay 24 hr
2/1115Z (0615 Est)	KC-135 launch: 3 KC-135 Airborne <3 KC-135 Airborne	None Unable to accomplish MC-130 refueling	Go No Go
2/1150Z (0650 Est)	2 ARTS & 1 KC-135 launch, <2 ARTS & 1 KC-135 launch,	None Unable to accomplish MC-130 refueling	Go No go
2/1340Z (0840 Est)	MC-130 refueling: 5 successful 4 successful	Sufficient fuel for 5 helos, can move camouflaged to hideout	Go Go, Foldup 6th He and leave it + TA
	<4 successful	Insufficient fuel for Helos	No Go
2/1430Z (0930 Est)	Helo launch a. 6/Helo airborne (5 w/ Delta/1 w/ extra support equipment, i.e., portable TACAN plus camouflage nets) b. >5/Helo airborne with no more than 1:00 delay c. <5/Helo airborne	Improves Delta's chances of having adequate helo support at the target Max delay, and still be able to reach hide out by daylight with sufficient aircraft Would unacceptably de-grade equip and personnel for "Delta"	Go If there is a del instruct MC-130s orbit No/Go, delay 24 h Inform MC-130's & KC-135's

< = less than
> = greater than
= = less than or equal to
≥ = greater than or equal to

3

TS

I-378

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12 Aug 92

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TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
	d.>1:00 delay	Cannot reach hideout by daylight	No Go, delay 24 h
2/1430Z 1515Z (UNCLASSIFIED)	Helos goes down over water - Delta Helo down	Force unacceptably degraded	No Go, Recall Hel advise MC-130s to take 2nd refueling and RTB. Scramble SAR from Carrier, advise KC-130s/AR
	- Cargo Helo down	TACAN and camouflage nets gone	Option 1 - Go Helos continue, launch SAR from Carrier Option 2 - Recall Helos advise MC-1 to refuel and RTB launch SAR
2/1640Z (UNCLASSIFIED)	MC-130 refueling: 5 successful 4 successful	Sufficient fuel for . 6 helos Sufficient fuel for 5 helos, can move camouflage to hide out	Go Go, Foldup 6th He and leave it + TA
	<4 successful	Insufficient fuel for helos	No Go, recall Helo
2/1515Z 1810Z (UNCLASSIFIED)	Helos goes down prior to turn around point: - Delta Helo down	Force unacceptably degraded - may lose TACAN and camouflage nets	Other 5 helos land and spread the load Advise MC-130 to delay by no. of minutes required for recovery. - If injuries: Option 1: 6th He lands, dumps can if necessary, p, injured and return to carrier. Option 2: Abort, recall helos, advise MC-130's RTB, advise KC-135's
	Cargo Helo down	Crew requires recovery	Option 1: Launch Delta Helos continue

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2/1810Z
1918Z
(1310-1918 EST)

More than one helo
goes down

6 helos operational
for entire route

Delta or cargo helo
goes down, no
injuries

Delta helo goes
down with injuries

Force unacceptably
degraded

Arrive at refueling
with all Delta and
extra equipment

Part of attack force
must be recovered

Force could be
unacceptably
degraded

Option 2: Land one
of the other 5
helos and load 1
crew member and 1
camouflage net on
each. The TACAN
should be able to
go on one of the
helos. Advise the
MC-130's to delay

Abort, recall helo
advise MC-130's to
RTB, call for earl
KC-135 support

Go

Option 1: Land all
helos and spread
load. Continue to
refuel point

Option 2: Land car
helo and p/u De'
plus crew.

NOTE: Any one helo
can recover Delta
plus the crew. The
cargo helo is

2000 lbs lighter
Option 1: Abort,
proceed to refuel
point, take max
fuel, return to
carrier.

Option 2: Proceed
refuel point, one
helo will return to
carrier with injur
Remaining 4 helos
on mission. (NOTE
No camouflage nets
can be taken to
hideout)

~~TOP SECRET~~

TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
2/1948Z (1445100)	Airdrop of fuel bladder: - 5 MC-130's make drop - 4 MC-130's make successful drop. Bladders loaded 5/aircraft; one aircraft only has 4. <4 MC-130's make successful drop or <19 bladders are usable.	Enough fuel for all 6 helos if all bladders OK Worst case, if no bladders break, there will be 19 available. Best case, 20 bladders available, can break one. Insufficient fuel for 4 helos to make target	Go, can proceed w/ number of helos desired Can go with 4 helos if we get 19 bladders Option 1: Try to extract fuel from extra helos so as get 4 operational Option 2: Spread personnel over 3 helos, strip down and return to ship Option 3: Delay 24 hours to get more fuel the next night
2/2248Z (1748130)	Helos launch from refueling: 6 helos airborne 5 helos airborne 4 helos airborne 3 helos airborne	Will have extra helo support for extraction Adequate support for extraction Marginal support for extraction Minimum helos for extraction	Go, use 6th helo to carry max fuel Go, fold up 6th helo and leave it. Extract extra fuel from operational helos Go, spread Delta Helo crews and equipment over operational helos. Option 1: Proceed mission in degraded status Option 2: Spread personnel over 3 helos, strip down and return to carrier. Option 3: Delay in place 24 hrs. Try to fix helos or get more fuel, as req'd

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TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
	2 helos airborne	Inadequate helo support for mission	Option 1: Delay 2 hours, try to fix helos or get more fuel, as required Option 2: Load all personnel on 2 helo strip down and fly to RV near beach. Call for SAR. Option 3: Delay 2 hours, fly person to Manzarieh in t to meet MC-130s and Rangers. Option 4: Delta crews fly to vicinity of Darba Takeover airfield the next night. MC-130's land and extract. Same as option 4 above except c) the one helo w/ Delta from refuel point to vicinity of Darband
	1 helo airborne	Same as above	Walk to Darband, call for MC-130's when ready.
	Zero helos airborne	Same as above	Delay 24 hours
2/2248Z+ 1:00 (1748-1755 EST)	Helos must be off by 2348Z	After this, cannot reach hideout by daylight	JTF Commander can recall the force to the carrier, contact means Go
2/2318 (1758-1805 EST)	Helos pass point where they could turn around and return to carrier	Once beyond this point, the force is committed to Manzarieh for extraction	
2-3/2248Z 0124Z (1748-2048 EST)	Helo goes down between refueling point and Delta's dropoff point:		
	- 6 helos available cargo helo goes	Aircrew on the ground with camouflage nets	2 helos land and crew and nets
	- 6 helos available, Delta helo goes	Delta force unacceptable degraded	3 helos land, 13 Delta or crew bc

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~~TOP SECRET~~

TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
	5 helos available, Delta helo goes	Same as above	the cargo helo, 5 Delta board each o the other two helo
	4 helos available, Delta helo goes down	Same as above	4 helos land spread load the personnel attempt lift off with nets, if unable dump nets.
	3 helos available Delta helo goes down.	Same as above	Abort, strip down, spread personnel among 3 helos, proceed to hideout extract on MC-130' the next night.
3/0124Z (1044ZST)	Any major problem at the dropoff point	Mission could be blown and/or force degraded	From here on we must find a recovery airfield to secure and call for the MC-130's Option 1: Abort, move to hideout, meet MC-130s next night. Option 2: Continue ground commander's decision.
3/2200Z 2210Z (1750-1710ZST)	Helo goes down enroute to hideout	Will affect ability to perform extraction	If 3 or more helos available, continue if < 3, inform Delta and abort to Manzariyeh.
3/0124Z 2135Z (1204 - 3/435)	Delta is discovered enroute while helos are at hideout	With the force split Delta must be able to call the helos to a predetermined RV	Move helos at night to RV to p/u Delta then to Manzariyeh for extraction.

TS

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TIME/REMARKS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTION
3/1500Z AC-130 launch 3/1630Z MC-130 Launch 5 MC-130 OK 4 MC-130 OK 3 " " 2 " " 2 " "	Personnel jammed on A/C - Unable to extract all hostages + Delta + Rangers (149 people)	GO - P/U only hostage + wounded - Direct launch and P/U some leftovers
3/1545 KC-135 launch for MC-130 3 KC-135 OK 2 " OK	Insufficient fuel for 5 MC-130	Refuel at least 2 MC-130, more if possible.
3/1605 KC-135 launch for AC-130 MC-130 refuel 2 MC-130 OK 2 MC-130 OK	Unable to extract all hostages + Delta and Rangers	Go Same as above
3/1900 AC-130 Refuel MC-130 refuel 2 MC-130 OK 2 MC-130 OK	Same as above	Same as above
3/2135Z Helo lift off from hideout 3 RH-53 OK 3 RH-53 OK	Unable to lift out all hostages + Delta	Use extras (>3) for CAS - Cycle helos from Manzariyeh to Embassy
3/2230Z MC-130's arrive at Manzariyeh find R/W blocked	- Unable to land secure airfield	- Parachute Rangers onto airfield - Wait for Delta helos to arrive to secure field and clear R/W
3/2230Z Helos land at Embassy 5 RH-53 OK 3 RH-53 OK 2 RH-53 OK	Will have extra helos Min req'd helos for for extraction Not sufficient helos for extraction	- Use extra helos provide - Land helos sing use other 2 for if need - Cycle helos for extraction
3/2230Z 2300Z		

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TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
32245Z (171500)	Extraction: 23 Helo's OK 21 Helo OK Zero Helo's OK	Normal operation Unable to extract all personnel Unable to extract by Helo	Go (E) Cycle Helo's Use 15 Manzariych
3300Z (180000)	Helos arrive at Manzariych. 23 RH-53 OK 23 RH-53 OK 23 RH-53 w/5 MC-130 Zero helo's OK	All personnel can be extracted immediately on MC-130 Not all personnel can be recovered in single cycle Helos will be in cycle made with extra MC-130's on the ground MC-130's will have to wait for personnel	Each MC-130 will leave as soon as loaded - MC-130's depart when loaded - Launch loaded MC-130 plus 1 or 2 extra MC-130 - Keep all MC-130's ground till per- sonnel arrive - Launch two MC-130 for or for departure
4/0015 (3/1915 EST)	AC-130 departs area		
4/0045 (3/1915 EST) Movement of Delta	AC-130 refuel Delta is discovered	Mission if blown	- Have Delta set u prearranged rall points. If discovered, dis- engage, proceed to rally pt. When helo's lift off, direct them to appropriate P/U zone. - Establish Manzariych as rally point, Hel go to Manzariych if no contact with Delta

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SC 1607Z

#458

SSN 2142
O 231500Z APR 80
FM: SITE ALPHA/JTF
TO: JTF/RC
BT

E ~~TOP SECRET~~
SUBJ: [REDACTED] OVER FLIGHTS
REF: COMJTF MSG 230950Z APR, SAME SUBJECT AS ABOVE.

7 (C) 1. SUBJECT MISSION HAD SOME OMISSIONS PLEASE CHANGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
.....

E (C) 2. THE COMMANDER THOUGHT THAT THE SUGGESTED APPROACH COULD BE USED BY
[REDACTED] IF THE FORCE WERE DISCOVERED IN [REDACTED] AIRSPACE
ENROUTE TO OBJECTIVE AREA.

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BT

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12 AUG 92

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#457

1. IN THE EVENT OF A LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS, THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS WILL HAVE AN/PPH-1 PLACED IN POSITION OF.

2. ONE AN/PPH-1 WILL BE WITH HELIOS, TWO WITH DELTA AND ONE WITH GAMMA AND KANZARIYER.

3. THE FOLLOWING COLLECTIONS WILL BE USED BY THESE ELEMENTS:

ELEMENT	AN/PPH-1S CODE
HELIOS	
DELTA	
GAMMA	

4. FORWARD AIR CONTROL WILL BE ON UNIFORM FREQUENCIES (PRIMARY) IN ACCORDANCE WITH CECI.

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Declassified ON: OADR

Declassified by
DDO mcl
12/11/99

NNNN

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SECRET
301 07 APR 76
102
1070000

EG

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COMMERCIAL FLIGHT

ALL THIS IS A SUMMARY OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE AS OF 12 MAY 83 UNTIL
UNCLASSIFIED AVAILABLE AS OF 12 MAY 83 UNTIL

ORIGIN	FLT NR.	ORIG	DEST	SERIAL NO.
IRAN	IR 1703	TEHRAN	FRANKFURT	230855/
YUGOSLAV	JP 1950	TEHRAN	LJUBLJANA	230858/230855
SYRIAN	YKAFG (VIP)	DAMASCUS	TEHRAN	231400/231815

#455

4017131
013/2112
1141236
2173
ST
1013

WNNH

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Amended by DDONMCC
12 May 92

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

142

#454

EG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DELTA
RYLL
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. DELTA SECURITY FORCE EQUIPMENT
2. CLOUFEAGE NETS FOR HELOS WILL ARRIVE HOUR 130 VIA C-130
240430Z APR 60. ADDITIONALLY LOAD WILL CONSIST OF TWO (2)
MOTORCYCLES ONE (1) 1/4 TON JEEP AND SIX (6) MEMBERS FROM DELTA
SECURITY FORCE.
3. REQUEST YOU HAVE ~~ITEMS~~ DISTRIBUTED EQUALLY ON THE THREE EC-130'S
TO EXPEDITE TRANSFER OF DELTA FORCE AT ~~REFUEL SITE~~ ALSO BRIEF EC-130
CREWS TO KICK OUT ~~AT~~ REFUEL SITE.
4. THE 1/4-TON JEEP AND MOTOR BIKES AND PAX MUST BE
MANIFESTED ON THE FIRST MC-130 FLYING TO REFUEL SITE.
BT
#0142

NNNN

*Declassified by
DDO NMCC
May 92*

Classified By: *DDO NMCC*
Declassified ON: *12 Aug 68*
GADR

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY 17356

EXEMPTED ON

REMARKS BY

☐ RECLASSIFIED TO

REVIEW OF

REVIEW BY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

E, G

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

(6) 1. EXECUTE ABOVE RELEASE AT EARLIEST PRACTICABLE TIME.

SSN # ~~8758~~
#447

E, G

(6) 2. FINAL RELEASE: COL [REDACTED] AND LTC [REDACTED] ARE BEING DIRECTED TO PERSONALLY DELIVER RESPECTIVE LETTERS TO [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] U.S. AMBASSADORS [REDACTED] WILL BE ADVISED OF LETTER CONTENT SUBSEQUENT TO CUCS AUTHORITY FOR FINAL RELEASE.

E, G

(6) 3. A COPY OF LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR COL [REDACTED] IS BEING FORWARDED TO YOU. REQUEST COLONEL [REDACTED] INSTRUCTIONS BE PLACED IN A SEALED ENVELOPE AND BE PROVIDED TO [REDACTED] FOR DELIVERY [REDACTED] SHOULD BE ADVISED TO DELIVER BOTH THE RESIDENTIAL LETTER AND THE LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS TO COLONEL [REDACTED]

G

(6) 4. LTC GAST IS RECEIVING SEPARATE LETTER OF INSTRUCTION FOR COORDINATION WITH LTC [REDACTED]

NNNN

DDO Jmcc
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DDO Jmcc
12 Aug 9

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#446

TO JCS/RC
SUBJECT: JTF UTREP NA - (NO OF 231400Z)
1. JTF FORCE ARRIVALS AS FOLLOWS:
2. TWO C-141 ARR [REDACTED] RANGERS: 230701Z AND 230843Z
3. ONE C-141 ARR [REDACTED] W/MEDICAL: 231120Z
4. ONE MC-130 ARR [REDACTED] : 230150Z
5. TWO AC-130 ARR [REDACTED] : 231400Z AND 231405Z
6. FIVE KC-135 ARR [REDACTED] : 231507Z, 231627Z, 231406Z, 231417Z, AND 231530Z
7. JTF FORCE NOW ON STATION:
8. [REDACTED]
9. JTF STAFF
10. THREE MC-130. 567 NMC PARTS. 572 NMC #4 PROP VALVE HOUSING CHANGE. ETIC 240400 LOCAL.
11. FOUR AC-130. 569 NMC MINOR ENG. PROBLEM. 572 NMC INERTIAL NAV. ETIC 240400 LOCAL.
12. ELEVEN KC-135. ALL FMC
13. DELTA. MOVES TO [REDACTED] TOMORROW.
14. [REDACTED] MOVES TO [REDACTED] TOMORROW.
15. RANGERS
16. [REDACTED]
17. [REDACTED]
18. THREE EC-130. ALL FMC
19. FOUR MC-130. ALL JMC
20. NIMITZ. EIGHT HELOS AND CREWS. ALL HELOS CAMOFLAGE PAINTED AND FMC.
21. [REDACTED] FOUR KC-135. ALL FMC.
22. OPERATIONAL REHEARSALS CONDUCTED BY DELTA AND CCTS LAST NIGHT. REHEARSALS AND RANGER TRAINING TO BE CONDUCTED TO NITE.
23. COMMUNICATIONS.
24. AFTER EXTENSIVE SYSTEM RECONFIGURATION AND REALIGNMENT THE JHF SYSTEMS LOOK THE BEST THEY HAVE EVER BEEN.
25. C141 WITH WSC-3 ARRIVED TODAY. IT CHECKED GOOD IN SATCOM MODE WHILE ON THE GROUND THIS LOCATION.
26. AS OF THIS TIME ADEQUATE COMMS ARE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT MISSION.
27.

A, E

(u)

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by DDO N mcc
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G

[REDACTED]

#445

G

WILL FIRST TWO HELOS WAITING
FOR REFUEL AND REARM (REQUIRED).
THIRD HELO WILL RECEIVE APPROX 550 GALS
FUEL UP. MIXED AMMO FOR HELOS. CREW CHIEFS
WILL HAVE TO ASSIST [REDACTED] IN LOADING
AMMO. FIRST TWO HELOS WILL RETURN TO
START POINT MIDWAY TO TANGO AS BACKUP.
SARILL/DOARM POINT WILL BE AT MID POINT
TANGWAY. REQUIRE THIRD HELO TO REFUEL
AND POSITION AT POINT TANGO AND REMAIN
ROTORS TURNING UNTIL ALL BUT LAST C-130
HAS DEPARTED. SHUTDOWN WILL BE ON
TANGWAY.

G (u)

C-130'S LOADING SIX SLIMITS. A C-130 [REDACTED]
WILL BE AT FULL POINT WITH GUNS AND AMMO.
[REDACTED] WILL BE AT DESERT TRACK. [REDACTED] WILL BE
INSTRUCTED TO PUT HIM ON HELO 5 WITH [REDACTED].
I REGRET LAST MIN CHANGES BUT WANT YOU TO RECEIVE THIS INFO.
BEN VAUGHT SENDS.
BT

VN/1

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Declassified by OADR
Declassified by
DDONMCD
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOOTH
TOT
2328
10/2

NO EOM.

SSM126
Y TTTT
0 102007Z
FM JTF ALPHA
TO JCSM126

E, G

JCS/RC
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~
SUBJ: CTF 78 CAP SUPPORT

1. CTF 78 WILL SUPPLY CAP SUPPORT TO GROUND/AIR UNITS
REQUIRING ASSISTANCE. UNITS MUST
HAVE UHF COMM ON 341.4 MHz (PRI) AND 240.5MHz
(SEC) BEFORE CAP UNITS CAN COMMIT. USE UNIT
CALL SIGNS LISTED IN CE01 AND GIVE POSITION
USING ECAP POINT CODE WORDS. GROUND UNITS USE SMOKE TO
ASSIST IF POSSIBLE.

ECAP POINT	DISCRIPTION	COORDINATES
ALPHA	REFUEL AREA	33-0425N/55-52-55E
BRAVO	HEL0 HIDE-	
CHARLIE	WAREHOUSE-	
DELTA	EMBASSY	35-42-43N/51-25-30E
ECHO	MANZARIYCH-	
FOXTROT		
GOLF		
HOTEL		

INDIA ROAD RAILROAD JUNCTION 35-15-08N/52-45-00E

2. CAP A/C WILL MONITOR TACAN CHAN 95. GIVE POSIT
IN RANGE AND BEARING FROM NEAREST ECAP POINT. IF
NOT POSSIBLE PROVIDE LAT LONG COORDINATES.

3. PASS THIS INFO TO ALL UNITS PRIOR TO
START OF MSN.

4. REQUEST CTF 78 PUBLISH CAP CALL SIGN TO
ALCON ASAP.

BT

NNNN

MESSAGE 26 RECEIVED.

NO EOM.

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12 Aug 92

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EC

#450

~~SECRET~~
JULY WEATHER OBS

WEATHER OBS FOR REQUESTED STNS WVKMIL FOR 23/1900Z HOUR.
PLACENTIA
145 MTD, HGT - 413, WEA - 1ND DIR/SP (KTG) - SEA LVL PRESS - TEMP

TABRIZ
JUL 1900-1900M - 12KM, HAZE - 24/11 - 1000.0MB - 21 DEG C.

REZVAYEH
JUL 1900-1900M - 10KM, HAZE - 350/10 - 1006.1MB - 20 DEG C.

TEHRAN
JUL 1900-1900M - 15KM, I. STORM - 240/20 - 1007.1MB - 20 DEG C.

DEHAHAN/KHATSAHI
JUL 1900-1900M - 12KM, NONE - 240/10 - 1006.3MB - 26 DEG C.

BIRJAND
JUL 1900-1900M - 12KM, NONE - 220/10 - 1003.6MB - 30 DEG C.

ISFHAH
JUL 1900-1900M - 10KM, DUST - 100/12 - 1006.2MB - 32 DEG C.

ZAHEDAN
CLEAR - 12KM, NONE - 630/10 - 1007.0MB - 32 DEG C.

~~SECRET~~

BT
#0144

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12 AUG 92
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12 AUG 92

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438

(U) 1. TO ENSURE POST MISSION PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY, ALL MISSION PERSONNEL WILL BE MANIFESTED AND LOADED AFTER A HEAD-COUNT. MISSION HOSTAGES AND AIRCREW WILL BE FACED INDIVIDUALLY AFTER THE MISSION. TO FACILITATE AHEAD COUNTING, LANDING CONFUSION/RECOVERY, AND PATIS WILL BE PLACED ON EXPLANATION. PRIOR PRELIMINARY, HOSTAGE AND CASUALTY REPORTING: PRELIMINARY COUNT WILL BE REPORTED ONCE ALL AIRCRAFT HAVE REPORTED. HOWEVER, THIS REPORT SHOULD BE RECEIVED WITH SKETICISM BECAUSE OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THEY WILL BE ACQUIRED.

(C) 2. UPON ARRIVAL AT [REDACTED] ALL PERSONNEL TO INCLUDE HOSTAGES AND AIRCREW WILL BE MET BY RECEPTION TEAMS. EACH INDIVIDUAL TO BE CHECKED BY NAME AS THEY DEFILE. DATA WILL BE COMPILED AT JTF HQ. ONCE COMPILED, A SECOND RELIABLE REPORT WILL BE RENDERED.

(C) 3. CASUALTY REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED AFTER SECOND BY NAME ON OR AT [REDACTED]. AGREE CASUALTY NOTIFICATION SHOULD BE PERFORMED BY RESPECTIVE SERVICE. POSITIVE ID OF KIA, IF ANY, WILL BE ATTENDED.

DO NOT BELIEVE IT FEASIBLE TO RETROGRADE THOSE HELD PERSONNEL NOT LAUNCHED ON MISSION. THOSE MISSION CREWS WILL BE RETROGRADED THRU [REDACTED] PROVIDED CLEAN CLOTHING AND SHIPPED WITH DELTA TO CONUS FOR DEBRIEFING. THOSE REMAINING ABOARD THE NIMITZ WOULD BE TRANSPORTED THRU MAC CHANNELS. THEIR ARRIVAL IN CONUS WOULD COINCIDE WITH OR SHORTLY THERE AFTER RELEASE OF MISSION CREWS FROM ISOLATION.

(C) 4. [REDACTED] AND SELECTED STAFF WILL REMAIN BEHIND TO COMPLETE ROLLUP. CONUTE, DECONUTE TENTATIVELY WILL DEPART WITH DELTA.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By: JES
Declassified ON: OADR

Classified by
DDO/mc
12 Aug 94

Declassify
OADR

Declassified by
DDO/mc
12 Aug 94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E, G

E

(C) AIRLIFT SUPPORT FOR [REDACTED]
REFERENCE YOUR MSG 23 APR 70
(1) THERE ARE THREE AIRLIFT SUPPORT MISSIONS
SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE [REDACTED] 24 APR 70
(2) THE THREE MISSIONS ARE SCHEDULED
AS FOLLOWS:

AIRCRAFT	ETA [REDACTED]	FUEL REQ
C-130	240540Z APR	3,700 G
C-141	241040Z APR	20,000 G
C-141	241115Z APR	20,000 G

3. THE C-141S SHOULD ONLY REQUIRE APPROXIMATELY
12,000 GALLONS OF FUEL EACH. HOWEVER,
WE ARE REQUESTING THE HIGHER AMOUNT
IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE IMPACT ON OUR
FUEL SUPPLIES.
BT

UNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

i-437

DDONMCC
12 Aug

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassified ON: OADR

Migrated to CONF
by DDONMCC
12 Aug 9

~~SECRET~~

TOT 24/1452

~~SECRET~~
~~[REDACTED]~~

ONE MESSAGE RECEIVED,
RELATED WITH OTHER INTEL, AND
WAS SENT TO DELTA FORCE. MESSAGE
FROM THE CHAIRMAN AT THAT TIME.

#436

WARR

MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED.

JCS
Classified BY ~~DA~~
Declassified ON ~~OADR~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE OF BY DDO NMCI
☒ DECLASSIFIED TO ~~Secret~~
REVIEW BY ~~OADR~~
CLASSIFIED TO ~~[REDACTED]~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7/7/15/42
②

G

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: PAR PREPARATIONS
1. ENSURE THAT PAR COMMUNITY TREATS
KNOWLEDGE AND ANTICIPATED PREPARATIONS FOR
PAR EFFORT IN SENSITIVE COMPARTMENT CHANNELS.
2. PHYSICAL PREPARATIONS ARE NOT REPEAT NOT
ALLOWABLE PRIOR TO 300012 APR 52
OF

#435

MAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassified
by DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92
Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

CSM 1177
12-1307 APR 80
FM: JCS/RC-J2
TO: SITE ALPHA/J2
TOM NINTEZ/HELO JET

RETRANS FOR YOUR INFORMATION


MSG124
DTG: 240335Z APR 80

FM: JCS/RC-J2
TO: SITE ALPHA



~~SECRET~~



SUBJ: HOSTAGES LOCATION

1. THIS OFFICE HAS BEEN RECEIVING FRAGMENTARY INFORMATION FROM
VARIOUS AND SEPARATE SOURCES OF UNKNOWN RELIABILITY THAT



2. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT IT BE KEPT IN MIND ALL INFORMATION PROVIDED
TO THIS POINT WILL BE DATED BY THE TIME OF OPERATION. DUE TO
DEMONSTRATIONS EXPECTED ON THE 24TH AND POSSIBLY THE 25TH THERE
MAY AGAIN BE A RESHUFFLE/CONSOLIDATION OF THE HOSTAGES AND
INCREASE IN MILITANT/REVOLUTIONARY GUARD ALERTNESS ON THURSDAY
NIGHT AT LEAST. THIS SITUATION COULD LAST INTO FRIDAY IF DEMONSTRA-
TIONS CONTINUE AND COME NEAR THE COMPOUND.

3. FOR MAJ  PLS PASS BEST WISHES/LUCK TO COL PITTMAN
FOR ME, AND TO THE CREWS FM J2. THANKS, 
TOP SECRET
BT

Classified By 
Declassified On 

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW IS 17355

CONDUCTED ON

REVIEWED BY

DATE OF REVIEW

REVIEWED BY

DATE OF REVIEW

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#425

154 1175
NY 11111
TO 2-11111
FM JTF
TO JCS/NO

(C) [REDACTED]
SUBJ: MOVEMENT
TWO C-141S [REDACTED]
FOR [REDACTED] AND 240510Z APR 82
ETA [REDACTED] 241140Z AND 241110Z.
BT
#2175

E

NNNN

Classified By ~~DDO~~ DDO, NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded to CONF
by DDO, NMCC
12 Aug 92

RCR QSL AT 2000Z INI 3608Z AND IF U DONT HAVE
ANYMORE I HAVE ONE FOR U INT-REX RRR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SSN 0177

T.T. 011600
NSL 0650Z

E, G

FLYER FLYER FLYER
ON 1116
TO 011600
000/000
BT

E, G

1.) REQUEST IN STATE DEPT OF AMEMB
TO DETERMINE LOCATION OF [REDACTED]
2.) LTG COL [REDACTED] IS PLANNING TO DELIVER
SENSITIVE LETTER TO THE [REDACTED] IN [REDACTED]
HOWEVER, ON 18 APRIL THE [REDACTED] AS IN
THE [REDACTED] NEED TO
KNOW HIS PRESENT LOCATION.
3.) REQUIRE ANSWER AT EARLIEST. BECAUSE OF
MUSLIM WEEKEND, ADDRESS ALL MESSAGES
TO AMEMB [REDACTED] URGENT IMMEDIATE.
4.) IF [REDACTED] IS IN [REDACTED] IT WOULD
EXPEDITE MATTERS TO HAVE U.S. AMBASSADOR
MEET [REDACTED] IN [REDACTED]
(v) 5.) IF LTG GAST IS COMING WITH INFORMATION,
DISREGARD THIS REQUEST.
BT
0016

#423

RELAX

Classified By [REDACTED]
Declassified ON: OADR

Ungraded by [REDACTED]
DDO nmc 12 Aug 92

NNNNBZ\$50

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SSN 0177
ZNY 11111
LTC 0 240345Z APR 80
FM JTF
TO JTF/RO
BT

(C) [REDACTED] LOCATION OF [REDACTED] REFERENCE [REDACTED] NSC
240315Z APR 80
REQUEST YOUR IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE
IN LOCATING THE [REDACTED] AND
IF APPROPRIATE COORDINATE MEETING
BETWEEN [REDACTED] AND US AMBASSADOR
IN [REDACTED]
BT
#0179

E, G

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Classified By ~~DDO Nmc~~ 12 AUG 92
Declassified ON OADR
Declassified by:
DDO Nmc
12 AUG 92

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(E) LTO 032315Z APR 80

FM JCMJTF

TO DEPOOM JTF, FIXED WING AIR OPS [REDACTED] COL KYLE
DEPOOM JTF, HELO OPS, NIMITEZ/ COL PITTMAN

~~SECRET~~
SUBJ: REPORTS

1. (S) THE FOLLOWING REQUIRED REPORTS ARE IN ADDITION
TO THOSE LISTED IN PARA 84, JTF 79 CEOI (18 APR 1980)

INDIV MAKING REPORT	ACTIVITY REPORTED	CODEWORD	MEANS
COL KYLE (WOODPECKER)	ALL 130 TYPE ACFT DEPARTED DESERT LAND	SWEETROLL	MC 130/WSC3 SECURE
COL PITTMAN (ZEBRA)	RH53'S ARRIVED AT HIDEOUT LOCATION	HONEY DEW	WSC3 SECURE OR PT 25 SECURE OR PSC-1

BT

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Classified By ~~DDO~~ NMC

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Downgraded by
DDO NMC

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7 CT
2410414
652 2915-

SSN 6184
ZNY TTTT
DTG 240000Z APR 82
FM COMJTF/VAUGHT
TO CJCS
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~
SUBJECT: SENSITIVE LETTER

1. I HAVE PASSED THE [REDACTED] LETTER TO [REDACTED] HE WILL PASS IT TO [REDACTED] WHO WILL CONVEY IT TO [REDACTED] [REDACTED] WILL STAY IN [REDACTED] THROUGHOUT THE OPERATION. [REDACTED] WILL STAY IN [REDACTED] TO FACILITATE THE C-141 MISSION AND PROVIDE ASSURANCES AND CLARIFICATION ON ANY ACTIVITY DETECTED BY [REDACTED]
2. ALL PARTIES WILL BE TIED IN WITH GEN CAST BY SECURE COMMUNICATION. EACH WILL KNOW WHAT TO DO. THEY WILL BE TRUEFUL OR [REDACTED] WOULD LIKE STATE OR SOMEONE TO BRIEF [REDACTED] ABOUT THE SAME TIME [REDACTED] IS INFORMED.
- (U) 3. ALL ELSE GOES WELL. WEATHER LOOKED GOOD AT 0700Z. WILL MAKE DECISION ABOUT 1300Z..

BT

#0184

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Classified By ~~DDO NMCC~~
Declassified ON ~~OADR~~ 12 Aug 92

Downgraded to conf
by DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SC / JSC 09282

SSN 2187
ZNY TTTT
DTG 240920Z APR 82
FM ALPHA/J2
TO JCS/RC-J2
BT

#417

SUBJECT: FIGHTER REACTION TIMES

(G)(U) 1. AFTER QUESTIONING HAS [REDACTED]
HAVE LEARNED THAT ALERT FIGHTERS CAN
START ENGINES WHILE STILL IN HANGAR/ETTE.

- HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE AN ALERT F-4 WITH
ENGINE RUNNING TO BECOME AIRBORNE
ONCE IT EXITS ITS HANGAR/ETTE?

- HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE AN ALERT F-4 THAT
IS NOT IN A HANGAR/ETTE TO BECOME
AIRBORNE ONCE MAINT/ETTE PERSONNEL
ARRIVE AT THE A/C AND BEGIN TO PREPARE IT FOR LAUNCH?

2. WHAT IS BEST EST OF FIGHTER ON-STATION
TIME AT [REDACTED] ONCE ACTIVITY
AT THAT LOC IS DETECTED?

BT

#0187

Classified By

Declassified ON: OADR

DDONMCE
12 Aug 92
Downgraded to CONF
By DDO JMC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~45C 09302~~

SEN AIR
ZNY
LTC 241017 APR 68
FM JTF
TO JCRC/RC
BT

~~#415~~

SUBJ: AIRCRAFT STATUS

AIRCRAFT STATUS AC OF 240900Z APR 68 IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. NIMITZ - EIGHT HELOS ALL FMC

(1) THREE MC-130S. ONE NMC DUE TO LACK OF
BRAKE PARTS (ETIC PARTS PLUS 4).

(2) FOUR AC-130S. ONE FMC DUE TO AUTOPILOT HOLD INOP/ALR-40
INOP (ETIC PARTS PLUS 2).

(3) ONE C-141 FMC. TWO ENROUTE TO

(4) ELEVEN KC-135S. ALL FMC.

C.

(1) FOUR MC-130S FMC

(2) THREE MC-130S FMC.

D.

SEVEN KC-135S ALL FMC.

E. IF PARTS DO NOT ARRIVE FOR NMC MC-130 AND
FMC AC-130, CANNIBALIZATION FROM C-130S WILL BE CONSIDERED.

BT

#2168

NNNN

~~Classified By JCS~~
~~Declassified ON OADR~~

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

Classified by
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92
Declassify on
1000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

TO: [REDACTED]
FROM: [REDACTED]
SUBJECT: SATRAV EXTENSION (U)

THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE/
2235:

SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 230400/120000
TO 270400/240000

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

REVW 23 APR 80

#414

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DPO NMCC

☐ DESL EX DOWNGR TO Secret

REYN ON OADR

DERIVED FROM JS DIA

~~SECRET~~

CSN 1101
(C)NY TITIT
DTG 0 231602Z APR 80
FM HELO DET/NIMITZ/J-2
TO SITE ALFA/J-2
INFO JCS/RC-J2/LEHANN

~~SECRET~~

QSC 10552
#091

BT
TOP SECRET//NO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER OPINTEL BROADCAST
SUBJ: INT REP 85

1. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY

2. AGI 472 PERMITS SUE SOVIET SURVEILLANCE PLATFORM IN
OUR IMMEDIATE AREA. AS OF 231702Z SNOOPER WAS LOC VIC 22.2N
67.5E IN TRAIL OF ARG.

AT 0730Z FRENCH DDG 540
AND FE 725 WERE SIGHTED BY NIMITZ SCOUT A/C VIC 22.1N 63E
ON NW COURSE AT 12KTS. SECOND SCOUT LOCATED FRENCH AOR 626 28NH
EAST OF AL NASIRAH (VIC 22.2N 65.1E) PROCEEDING E18 AT 12KTS.

ANTICIPATE THEY WILL BE WELL CLEAR OF OUR AO BY TOMORROW
A.M. NO KNOWN SOVIET MERSHIPS IN THE BOX ALTHOUGH AOR LEMINA IS
UNLOCATED. BUT WE
ARE STILL CHECKING TODAY'S FAC RECCE PHOTOS.
3. IN ADDITION TO IL-39 ACTIVITY REPORTED IN MY INT
REP 84.

BOTH REMAINED MINIMUM 250NM FROM NIMITZ
AND DISPLAYED NO INTEREST IN CTF 70. IRANIAN AIR RECCE PREVIOUSLY
NOTED. NO INDICATION OF CONCERN IN

4. AT APPROX 0800Z LT COL SIEFFERT AND CAPT (NSN PRIMARY
NAV) FLEW LEADERS SERIAL RECCE OF CIP IN YA-35 A-6E. REVIEW OF
FLIR TAPES AND DEBRIEF INDICATE OUR CHARTS OF CIP AREA ARE
ACCURATE.

5. NEXT INT REP WILL BE ON THE WAY NLT 240930Z AS PER YOUR
REQUEST.

REVA: 23APR80

BT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355

CONDUCTED ON 12 Apr 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

☐ DECL ☒ CONTINUED TO Secret

REYN ON OADR

DERIVED FROM

NNNN

RCR QSL AT 0555Z INT QSL AT 0555Z MXXX

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(#409)

0 241020Z APR 68
FM HFO DET/NIMITZ/S-2
TO SITE ALPHA/J-2
INFO
JCS/RC-J2/LENANA

BT
TOP SECRET //DO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER OPINTEL BROADCAST
SUCJ INT REP 66

1. ALL SOVIET NAVAL COMBATANTS REMAIN WELL CLEAR OF NIMITZ
AGI 477 IS LOCATED
WESTERN OF ARG ALFA CURRENTLY MAINTAINING
SURVEILLANCE OF CTF 70 UNITS. AS OF 240800Z 477 WAS 212NM FROM
NIMITZ AT APPROX 22.00N 063.19E PROCEEDING CRSE 100, SPEED 10KTS.
2. PRIMARY SOVIET PLATFORM OF CONCERN IS AOR LENINA. LAST
POSITIVELY LOCATED

HOWEVER, CTF 70 UNITS AND A/C MONITORING PERSTAN
WLF HAVE NOT SIGHTED LENINA IN TRANSIT

FLEET SCOUT A/C
OPERATING IN THIS AREA HAVE NOT SEEN HER BUT NIMITZ IS SCHED TO
FLY ANOTHER MISSION THIS AFTERNOON.

3. GIVEN UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDING AOR'S LOC BELIEVE IT PRUDENT
TO CONCLUDE SHE IS IN MASIRAH AREA AND PLAN ACCORDINGLY. LENINA
HAS NO AIR SEARCH RADAR BUT MUST BE CREDITED WITH PASSIVE
COLLECTION CAPABILITIES FOR BOTH ELINT AND COMINT. CONSEQUENTLY
RECOMMEND THAT MC-130'S USE RADAR ALTIMETER ONLY (VICE TERRAIN
MAPPING) IN GULF TRANSIT AND STAY OFF THE AIR AS PLANNED. SIDE
LOBE PATTERN OF ALTIMETER AT 500 AGL IS SO SMALL THAT LIKELIHOOD OF
DETECTION IS NEAR ZERO. CHANCE OF VISUAL ID IN PROJECTED FLIGHT
ROUTE CLEARING DARKNESS IS SAME. SAME LEVELS OF CAUTION ADVISED
ON OUTBOUND OVER WATER LEG.

4. NO KNOWN RED FLAG MERSHIPS IN THE BOX BUT COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC
REMAINS HEAVY THROUGH STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

5. FURTHER INTREPS WILL BE ON AS REQUIRED BASIS FOCUSING ON LENINA
AND AGI. YOUR MSG 882 OF 221830Z REQUESTED "LOCATION AND DTG OF
INFO ON SOV AND OTHER SHIPS" IN THE BOX. GIVEN COURSE/SPEED
POSSIBILITIES, TO PROVIDE ALL POSSIBLE MERSHIPS IN THE AREA WILL
REQUIRE APPROXIMATELY 4 PAGES OF SINGLE SPACE POSITS AND TWO
MAN DAYS OF CALCULATION. UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED INTEND TO
REPORT RED FLAGS ONLY.

BEYV: 26APR68

BT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EB 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 72

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

☐ DESL (2) CORNER TO Secret

BEYV ON OADR

DERIVED FROM

NR000000

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT/1117
KCL

E, G

UPON ARRIVAL OF [REDACTED] WORK
LOCATION. IMMEDIATELY OBTAIN KEYLIST
USING 447 AT, DAY 24 AND KEY GUN.
PROGRAM ON AND COORDINATE WITH
[REDACTED] TO KEY UP ALL AC-133
AIRCRAFT IN TANKER TASK FORCE.

2. INSURE THAT KEYING IS DONE AFTER
AIRCRAFT IS ON OWN INTERNAL POWER
AS KY-25 WILL UNKEY WHEN POWER IS
CHANGED FROM POWER CART TO APU.
3. LISTED BELOW IS KEY SETTING FOR DAY 24
TO BE USED SHOULD SALVAN NOT
ARRIVE IN TIME. PROCURE KEY GUN
FROM LOCAL RESOURCES [REDACTED]

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
MP MN LN MP LP MN MP LP MN G D F K E G

15 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
H J A J A B C E C H E

27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37
K MN MN LP MP LN MN LN MP LP MN

38 39 40 41
LN MP MP MP

4. INSURE ALL AIRCRAFT ARE KEYED WITH SAME
KEY GUN.

~~TOP SECRET~~
BT
#8132

18NNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#402

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassify on: OADR
Downgraded
DDO: [REDACTED]
R. A. [REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

ZZ 24 105Z APR 92

FM COMJTF (VAUGHT)

TO DEPCOMJTF (dist)

DEPCOMJTF/FIXED WING AIR OPS/ (KYLE)

CDR (BECKWITH)

DEPCOM HELO OPS NIMITZ (PITTMAN)

INFO JTF/RC

BT

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: EXECUTE ORDER

EXECUTE MISSION AS BRIEFED

WE ARE READY AND ABLE. GOD SPEED

BT

#401

Classified by DDO
Declassified by JCS
Downgraded by OADR
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT 1300
PCL
EG

SSN 203

ZNY TTTTT

ZZ 24 125 12 APR 63

FM JTF/

TO

B

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: EXECUTE ORDER

THIS IS EXECUTE ORDER FOR

MISSION. LAUNCH KC-135 AIRCRAFT

FOR PREPLANNED SUPPORT OF CTF 70 AND

MC/EC-130 MISSIONS.

B

NNNNX

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#400

Classified By: JES
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE 1 JUL AT 1234Z TOTAL 10000

399

2/OSC 12423/K

SSN 1153

TTTTT

7 041240Z APR 60

FM SITE ALPHA

TO JTF/J-3

JTF/RC

INFO JTF

BT

SUBJ: SCHEDULE ADJUSTMENT

1. REQUEST YOU MAKE THE FOLLOWING CHANGES TO NIGHT TWO FLOW PLAN:

A. ADJUST AC-130 DEPARTURE TIME FROM [REDACTED] TO 1420Z (VICE 1503Z)

B. ADJUST AC-130 PRE-ARCT TIME TO 1730Z (VICE 1753-1818Z)

C. ADJUST DC-130 POST-ORCT TIME TO 0120Z (VICE 0134Z)

D. ADJUST AC-130 RECOVERY TIME TO 0450Z (VICE 0459Z)

CHANGES ARE REQUIRED TO ACCOMMODATE

15 MINUTE SENSOR ALIGNMENT (OVERHEAD

AND FINAL FLIGHT PLANNING

BASED ON UPDATED ENROUTE WIND PREDICTION.

2. REVISED TIMES DO NOT AFFECT

TIMES AT THE ORBIT POINT OR

AVAILABLE TIME ON TARGET.

BT

15158

Classified By ~~300~~ DDON MC
Declassified ON OADR
Downgraded by
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

CON 12001
FMV TTTT
O 241312Z APR 90
FM ALFA/J2
TO JCS/RC-J-2
BT

1. REQUEST ASSESSMENT OF FIGHTER
THREAT TO AC-130 GUNSHIPS OPERATING
OVER [REDACTED]
SPECIFICALLY, INCLUDE ESTIMATES OF TIME
REQUIRED FROM [REDACTED]
UNTIL FIGHTERS ARRIVE OVER [REDACTED] AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF FIGHTERS AGAINST [REDACTED]

2. TO REDUCE/ELIMINATE CHANCES OF
FIGHTERS FINDING FRIENDLY A/C AT [REDACTED]
WHICH [REDACTED]

3. SAME QUESTION AS PARA 2 ABOVE
FOR [REDACTED]

BT
#0201

NNNNDO

Classified By [REDACTED]
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7-17 105.24-10

- 1337 A

10 - 1337 A

395

TO 240012Z APR 72
FM ALPHA/02
TO JCS/RY-JE

FMITZ/4610 10T

INFO: MTF MCD

1. ONCE HELIOS/100'S LAUNCH,
[REDACTED] TO OR LOCS
WOULD NORMALLY FOLLOW.

2. IN ORDER TO AVOID THIS
[REDACTED] JTF WILL XMIT

TFC TO OR LOCS DURING
EXECUTION PHASE OF OPN. ON WSC-3 UPLINK FREQ 285.875 TFC
WILL INCLUDE COMPLETELY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OF TFC

[REDACTED] XMITTED TO YOU. QSL

IF THIS TRAFFIC BY YOUR STA IS NOT DESIRED.

3. [REDACTED] TFC WILL BEGIN AND
END WITH CODEWORD QUOTE

NONBAT END QUOTE.

BT

#2106

NNNN

RRRRRRR QSL AT 0920Z IMI QSL 5 0920Z KKKKKK

Classified By: ~~DDO NMCC~~ 12 Apr 92
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Apr 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

392

TOT/1512
KC

DDI 2204
ZNY TTTTT
LTC O 241402Z APR 80
FM JTF
TO JTF/KC
BT

SUBJ: C-141 INGRESS/EGRESS ROUTES TO MANZAR
1. C-141 INGRESS ROUTE FROM [REDACTED] BASED ON A PLANNED
TAKEOFF OF 1811Z. NUMBER TWO AIRCRAFT WILL FOLLOW
AT 15 MINUTE INTERVAL.

[REDACTED]

ETE	ETA
12	1823
3	1826
35	1901
19	1920
6.6	1926.6
4.7	1931.3
6.1	1937.4
9.5	1946.9
3.7	1950.6
15.2	2005.6
5.5	2011.1
5.2	2017.3
4.6	2021.9
7.6	2028.9
12.0	2040.9
3.9	2044.8
7.2	2052.0

2. C-141 EGRESS ROUTE COORDINATES FOLLOW WITH ETE.

[REDACTED]

2.0
8.2
5.4
6.8
7.3
5.8
13.8
3.5
5.5
5.7
4.3
5.1

3. LAST COORDINATE IS COAST OUT POINT. ROUTE
FROM THIS POINT WILL BE A VFR CLIMB TO
INTERCEPT NORMAL IFR ROUTES TO CROSS

02204

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

.....
CSN 0206
ZNY TTTT
ZC 241510Z APR 60
FM JTF SITE ALPHA
TO JCS/RC
BT

~~SECRET~~
SUBJ: ALERT ORDER
REF: A. JCS/RC 241227Z APR 60
1. CINCPAC INST 53711.20 AND
MODIFYING MESSAGES LISTED IN
REF A ARE NOT HELD AT THIS SITE.
2. REQUEST SPELL OUT APPLICABLE ROE
IN EFFECT FOR TAC AIR SUPPORT
BT
#0285

1-390

NNNN

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

Classified By JCS
Declassified On: OADR

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
100 115,272
K2

#389

ESN 7207
DNY 11111
175 2415212 APR 80
P ALPHAZIE
10 1000-02

LOCATION REQUEST
PROVIDE LOC OF IRAQI
EMBASSY IN TEHRAN. CURRENT
CITY MAPS AT THIS LOC SHOW
IT AT DIFFERENT PLACES.
BT
#207

~~Classified By JCS~~
~~Declassified ON OADR~~
Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#388

.....
SSM 1200
JNY 1111
ZC 041845L APP
FM JTF
TO JCS/RC
T

~~SECRET~~
f) SUBJECT: AIRCRAFT LAUNCH
1. EIGHT HELIOS AIRBORNE 1527Z.
2. THREE MC130S AND THREE EC-130S
AIRBORNE ON TIME FROM [REDACTED] LAST
[REDACTED] AIRBORNE 1527Z
BT
#2200

NNNN

Classified by: DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92
Declassify on: OADR
Declassified By: JCS
Declassified on: OADR
Downgraded by:
NMCC DDO
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

384

FSN 1212
FM 1111
TO 24-1802 APR 72
FM 1111
TO JCS/RC
BT

EX-1
SUBJECT: C-141 EXTRACTION AIRCRAFT STATUS
1. TWO C-141 FMC [REDACTED] ONE C-141 35- [REDACTED] 242110Z APR.
2. FLIGHT NON-PASS [REDACTED] TAX SPENDING NIGHT ON A/C EQUIPPED WITH
DUA POWER.
3. JOSE RIGGING A/C FOR WHICKEY 3 ANTENNA. WILL ATTEMPT CONTACT
WHEN INSTALLED.
4. CLEARANCE RECEIVED FOR [REDACTED] OVERWATER [REDACTED] EXERCISE.
5. [REDACTED] ENROUTE [REDACTED] TO HANDLE ANY [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
PROBLEMS.
BT
1217

UNRNOV

OPPR3ECTOPMS
DTG 242005Z
PARA 1 ETA EXX DHAMARAN

OSL DTG 242055.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By [REDACTED] DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92
Declassified ON GADR
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~SECRET~~

.....
SSM 0010
ZNY TTTTT
Z 24100Z APR 60
FM JTF/SEN VAUGHT
TO NIMITZ/ [REDACTED]
BT

(Handwritten: 383)

SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORTS

1. ADVISE [REDACTED] ELEMENT AT YOUR LOCATION
THAT ALL REPEAT ALL SITUATION REPORTS WILL BE SUBMITTED
FROM JTF HQ ONLY. REQUEST [REDACTED] FOR POS DESIST IN
REPORTING TO WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY.

BT
#0217

NNNN

(Handwritten: 12 Aug 92)
Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassified On: [REDACTED]
Downgraded by: [REDACTED]
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

CLASSIFICATION CENTER IS 1235
CONTROLLED BY: [REDACTED]
REVIEWER: [REDACTED]
☐ NO REVIEW TO SECRET
REVIEW BY: [REDACTED]
REVIEW DATE: [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

TOR / 0212
171168

FM: JCS/RC
TO: ALPHIA
DELTA
1500

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL. 25-DOWNGR TO Secret
REF BY OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

467

1. IN RESPONSE TO THE AGONIZED RESCUE ATTEMPT ON 24-25 APRIL.

IRANIAN PICNITIARIES INCLUDING AVATIONIAN KIAKALI AND THE CDR OF IRAN'S ARMY AVIATION, GEN GHODADI, IN CHARGE OF THE SEARCH OPERATION, REPORTED THAT 2 HELICOPTERS REMAINED INTACT AND "HAT MAPS, WEAPONS, MONEY (1 MILLION RIALS AND 11,000) HAD BEEN FOUND AT THE SIGHT ALONG WITH 3 DAMAGED HELICOPTERS AND 1 DAMAGED C-130. THE BODIES OF 5 US SERVICEMEN WERE RECOVERED AND FORWARDED TO TEHRAN.

2. IRANIAN PRESIDENT BANI-SADR STATED ON THE 20TH THAT THE BODIES OF US SERVICEMEN KILLED IN THE RESCUE ATTEMPT WOULD BE RETURNED TO THE US WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS. TO DISCOURAGE ANY FURTHER RESCUE ATTEMPTS. HOWEVER, HE STATED THAT THE HOSTAGES WOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE EMBASSY AND BE DISPERSED AROUND TEHRAN. THE MILITANTS AT THE EMBASSY ANNOUNCED THAT THE HOSTAGES WOULD LATER BE DISPERSED AROUND THE COUNTRY, WITH THE FIRST GROUP BEING DISPATCHED TO THE CITY OF

THE IRANIAN AIR CORPS ADMITTED THAT, PRIOR ON 26 APRIL THAT THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE HAD BOMBED AND DESTROYED 2 OF THE US HELICOPTERS TO PREVENT THEIR FUTURE USE BY US FORCES. IN THIS OPERATION, THEY HAD INALVERTENTLY KILLED 2 IRANIAN GENDARMES WHO WERE SIMULTANEOUSLY CONDUCTING A GROUND SEARCH OF THE AREA. FURTHER MILITARY RESPONSES TO THE US OPERATION MAY FORTHCOMING AFTER A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS DISCOVERED AT THE TABAS SITE.

PRESIDENT BANI-SADR CALLED FOR A UNILATERAL GOVERNMENT CEASEFIRE IN KURDISTAN ON 26 APRIL. KURDISH SPOKESMEN EXPRESSED THEIR CONTINUED DISTRUST OF THE GOVERNMENT AND DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THEIR FIGHT FOR SOME FORM OF AUTONOMY. ALTHOUGH

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

[REDACTED]
IA CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT FULL-SCALE HOSTILITIES
BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN ARE UNLIKELY ALTHOUGH BORDER INCIDENTS ARE
EXPECTED TO CONTINUE. [REDACTED]

6. IN BAHRAIN GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES HAD TO USE TEAR GAS TO
DISPERSE DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING THE ALLEGED USE OF BAHRAINI
FACILITIES FOR REFUELING US AIRCRAFT IN THE RESCUE ATTEMPT.
INTERNATIONALLY, DIPLOMATIC RESPONSES WERE MUCH AS COULD BE EXPECTED
WITH EGYPT, ISRAEL, AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES EXPRESSING SUPPORT AND
UNDERSTANDING WHILST THE SOVIET UNION, PLO, AND OTHER COUNTRIES
CLOSE TO IRAN CONCERNING THE LATEST US MOVE.

7. SOVIET ACTIVITY IN INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTH CHINA SEA

A. AREA OF U.S. BATTLE GROUPS: AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR,
IN SURVEILLANCE OF THE USS NIMITZ AND USS CORAL SEA BATTLE GROUPS
AND AMPHIBIOUS READINESS GROUP ALPHA WAS SIGHTED REPLENISHING FROM
AN OILER YESTERDAY. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

B. SOVIET PRESS: THE SOVIETS ARE STANDING BY THEIR DENOUNCEMENT OF
THE ABORTIVE U.S. RESCUE ATTEMPT. NO NEW COMMENTARY WAS APPEARED.
ET

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EN 12356

CONDUCTED ON _____
DERIVATIVE CL BY _____
☐ DESL ☐ DOWNGR TO _____
DEYN ON _____
DERIVED FROM _____

Classified By *JCS*
Declassified On *OADP*

NO WNN

SECRET [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

505

Addressed to
JCS AC

FM: JTF/J3
TO: JCS AC

TOR 1609
KEL 025

MESSAGE IS RECEIVED.

251500Z APR 84

TO: JTF/J3

SUBJ: AIRCRAFT REDEPLOYMENT

1. MC-130 84-0312 IS TO BE RETURNED TO LAG ON 21-01-84. THIS AIRCRAFT WAS KEPT OUT OF MAJOR REPAIR TO ACCOMPLISH THIS MISSION. SINCE IT WAS SUBJECT TO HIGH IMPACT LANDING ON NIGHT ONE OPERATION IT IS UNDER GOING INSPECTION AT THIS TIME. PENDING OUTCOME OF THAT INSPECTION RECOMMEND ITS RETURN FLIGHT TO CONUS BE KEPT TO MAINTAIN FULL HEIGHT OF APPROXIMATELY 40,000 FEET. FLIGHT FROM [REDACTED] AND THE CONUS WOULD MINIMIZE STRESS ON AIRCRAFT. [REDACTED] WOULD RECEIVE APPROXIMATELY 10 HOURS OF REMAINING LIFE.

2. MC-130 82-1011 HAS AMP THAT WILL NOT HOLD IN LOCKED POSITION UNLESS UNDER HYDRAULIC PRESSURE OR WHEN AIRCRAFT IS PRESSURIZED. REPAIR CAPABILITY DOES NOT EXIST HERE ON [REDACTED] RECOMMEND THIS AIRCRAFT REDEPLOY THROUGH THEIR-MAIN OR OTHER J-100 MAINT FACILITY FOR REPAIR BEFORE RETURNING CONUS.

BT

Classified By: JCS DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by: DDO NM
17 AUG 9

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOP 2604.
C. men R.

E, G

SECRET
1. REQUEST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR SUPPORT
OF NO-1000 SOV SURVEILLANCE MISSION.
A. LOCATION AND DIRECTION OF TRAVEL OF
CURRENT SOVIET INTEL FORCES IN WASHINGTON DC.
C. SECURITY/HOMOSEXUAL FACILITIES AND
CALL SIGNS OF NO-1000 FORCES IN WASHDC.
E. NO-1000 CALL SIGNS THAT CURRENTLY ARE IN
USE.

500

INSTRUCTED VIA WSC-3
TO RECODERS QUESTIONS
TO JTF/EC (J-2)

Classified By: ~~TOP SECRET~~ DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TTTTT ZMSH235
00 250530Z APR 68

TOR / 064
KCL / # 0:

E, G

E

REQUEST [REDACTED] LANDING APPROVAL FOR 5 AUG-1968
AIRCRAFT FLYING IN SUPPORT OF JTF 73.
PERTINENT INFORMATION FOLLOWS:

A. AIRCRAFT DATA

SN	CALL SIGN	ETA	LTD
042564	FLOUG 42	270000Z	283730Z
637785	QUEST 14	270130Z	283730Z
621843	NUDE 73	271300Z	283800Z

B. PERSONEL DATA

SN	AIRCRAFT COMDR	TOTAL CREW/PAX
042564	CAPT [REDACTED]	24
637785	CAPT [REDACTED]	21
621843	CAPT [REDACTED]	21

C. REQUEST ARRIVAL DATA BE PASSED TO LTC [REDACTED]

BT
2735

496

NNNN

Classified By JCS DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

MESSAGE 03 RECEIVED.

NO EOM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

☐ DESL C3-DOWNER TO CONFID

REFN ON OADR

REVIEW FROM JS

DECL 11251

TOR 26 0901
JC 226

PER CSL AND HERE IS THE NEXT

490

ASC 156

269828Z APR 82

FM JCRC

TO DOD JED DET

SICIL SEARCH LIST

REF: 1. 1000 1000 1000 1000

REF: 1. 1000 1000 1000 1000

ARE ITEMS INCLUDED ON THIS LIST WHICH WERE ON ACFT RECOVERING
TO NMIC. IF SO REQUEST DESIGNATION BY CITY AND SERIAL NUMBER OF THOSE

NOT 1000

Retransmitted
to NMIC

Classified By JES
Declassified ON OADR

A

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HM HOW ON THAT ONE KK

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGR TO CONFID

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM JS

OSL 0902

MSG 1BT
260552Z APR 88
FM JTF/RC
TO JTF ALPHA
BT

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: EOD
REF: JTF 260535Z APR 88

1. EOD TASKING PROVIDED EUCOM 260550Z APR 88.

2. REQUEST ADDITIONAL INFO AS FOLLOWS:

- A. APPROX GEX AND GENERAL TYPE OF CHARGE.
- B. DESARM AND MOVE, OR DETONATE AT
- C. ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED?

BT

#489

TOR / 26 APR 88
VC / 8227

acknowledged

Classified By
Declassified On

AND HATE THAT WAS THE LAST I HAVE ATT INT OSL KK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AG 142
FM COR [REDACTED] FROM [REDACTED]
TO COM JTF//ATTN [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR/10
VC/

SUBJ: RANGER RETURN

A 1. FIRST C-141 RETURNING [REDACTED] ARRIVED
062630Z. AIRCRAFT #2 WITH REMAINING FAY AND ALL PALLET
EQUIPMENT IS OUT AROUND 062700Z.

2. THE FOLLOWING STEPS HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN IMMEDIATELY UPON
RETURN:

A. ALL RANGERS ON THE MISSION WERE ISOLATED AND BRIEFED ON THE
COMJTF GUIDANCE THAT ALL INCIDENTS ARE NOT WITH THE RESPONSE OF
"NO COMMENT".

B. NO PHONE CALL HAVE BEEN ALLOWED

C. THE BATTALION IS CONDUCTING A DEBRIEFING OF ALL PER-
SONNEL INDIVIDUALLY FOR THOSE ON NIGHT #1. BY TEAM OF THOSE
INVOLVED IN NIGHT #2.

D. ONLY THE BATTALION EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND THOSE DUTY
PERSONNEL AT THE AIRFIELD KNOW OF THE RANGER RETURN.

3. THE FOLLOWING STEPS ARE PLANNED:

A. COMPLETE EQUIPMENT ACCOUNTABILITY

B. CONDUCT A COMPLETE SHARFOM INSPECTION OF ALL PERSONNEL

C. BEGIN RELEASING RANGERS A 061700Z UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED.

4. NATURALLY, QUESTIONS EXIST OVER FUTURE PLANS.
AND WILL BE ADDRESSED IN A SUBSEQUENT MESSAGE. IMMEDIATE GUIDANCE
IS NECESSARY IF CHANGES IN RANGER PROCEDURE IS REQUIRED.

5. PLEASE ADVISE ACP.
BT

#488

Amended

Classified By: JCS DDO NMCC

Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

MESSAGE IS RECEIVED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOP 1321

MSG171
241310Z APR 82

FM JTF/AC
TO ALPHA (PASS TO NIMITZ)

#485

SUBJECT: REDEPLOYMENT OF JTF PERSONNEL REGARD NIMITZ

1. REQUEST YOU CDD REF 20 PERSONNEL FROM NIMITZ
TO [REDACTED] IN TIME TO REDEPLOY WITH MC OR MC -132
ACFT [REDACTED] ACFT CURRENTLY SUE TO DEPART
[REDACTED] ON 27 APR 82.

2. FOR [REDACTED] PLS ADVISE TO ALL ADDRESSES SCHEDULED
DEPARTING TIME OF MC & EC 132'S FOR [REDACTED]

CEVH 26 APR 82

NNN21

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ON 12/5/82

CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

☐ DER. EXEMPTED TO CONFID

REVIEW ON OADR

REVIEW FROM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT	12542 - JT
RC	12552 - NIM

19-00000

(U) 1. REPLY: REDEPLOYMENT OF JTF PERSONNEL SECOND UNIT.
2. REQUEST YOU COORDINATE REDEPLOYMENT OF
JTF PERSONNEL SECOND UNIT.
3. ADVISE AND SEND REPORT FROM [REDACTED] MORROW.
4. SUPPORT W/O ARE REPORTEDLY LOST.
5. PLEASE ADVISE.

425

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

☐ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CONFID

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JS.

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

MSC 178
061115Z APR 80
FM JCS/RC-J2
TO: SITE ALPHA
INFO: [REDACTED]

BT

SUBJ: INTELL SUPPL: SITUATION IN IRAN AS OF 0530 ESTG APR. 23 80

MCN
#0231

483

2. IN RESPONSE TO THE ABORTED US RESCUE ATTEMPT, THE MILITANTS AT THE US EMBASSY ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WOULD KILL THE HOSTAGES IF ANOTHER ATTEMPT IS MADE. HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN NO INDICATION YET THAT THE MILITANTS PLAN TO TAKE ANY ACTION AGAINST THE HOSTAGES AT THIS TIME. ACCORDING TO THE LATEST REPORTS, THE MILITANTS HAVE CALLED FOR REINFORCEMENTS AND HAVE BUILD UP THE 24-HOUR PATROLS AROUND THE EMBASSY. THE REACTION BY THE MILITANTS COULD BE TO MOVE SOME OF THE HOSTAGES TO ONE OR MORE UNOCCUPIED LOCATIONS. HOWEVER, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THIS WOULD OCCUR. THE MILITANTS ARE FACING LOGISTICS AND COORDINATION PROBLEMS. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THEY WILL SUPPORT PROBLEMS NEARBY. THE MILITANTS ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE THE SECURITY OF THE EMBASSY AND THE CITY NEAR TEHRAN AND THE GULF.

3. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI WILL MOST LIKELY USE THE ATTEMPT TO ONCE MORE DIVERT THE IRANIAN PEOPLE'S ATTENTION FROM DOMESTIC PROBLEMS AND TO REVIVE FOREIGN PERCEPTION OF THE REVOLUTION. HE WILL CITE THE ABORTED RESCUE ATTEMPT AS PROOF THAT THE US IS TRYING TO UNDERMINE THE REVOLUTION.

CLASSIFICATION REF ID: A7256
UNCLASSIFIED BY: 12 AUG 9
REMOVED BY: DDB/AM
DATE: 23 AUG 9
LOAD: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR / 261715Z
100 237

(C) 201007 APR 82
NIMITZ HELD SET
JTF MAIN/LOL

TE, G

2001 WILE OR DING

OR TRANSPORTATION PLANS FOR NIMITZ SET

(U) FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED TO CONFIRM INFO PASSED TO ACCESS
SERVICE BY VICE.

(C) PRESENT PLAN IS TO MOVE SET FROM NIMITZ TO CORAL SEA
Y HELD 270200Z FOR FURTHER TRANSPORT TO [REDACTED] BY C-2.

CORAL SEA REPORTS C-2 NOW IN DOWN STATUS. IF C-2 REMAINS DOWN,

SET WILL REMAIN IN NIMITZ UNTIL 29 APRIL WHEN HE WILL MOVE TO

[REDACTED] OR MAC CHANNEL LINK UP. C-2 WILL REQUIRE TWO SORTIES TO

MOVE SET FROM CORAL SEA TO [REDACTED] (THREE HRS REQUIRED FOR SORTIE)

(U) C. HELD SET CONTAINS 19 SOULS WITH PERSONAL BAGGAGE. CARGO

1. TWO (2) 30 CU FT BOXES OF PERSONAL BAGGAGE REMAINING FROM

HELLO CHENS. WT ESTIMATED AT 2200 LBS TOTAL.

ALSO MAY [REDACTED] STEEL CLASSIFIED ROLL AWAY CONTAINER

WILL 30. THIS ESTIMATED AT 30 CU FT AND 200 LBS. TOTAL CARGO IS

100 CU FT AND 2200 LBS.

(U) IF SET FALLS BACK TO [REDACTED] CHANNEL TRANSPORTATION, BOTH
CARGO BAGGAGE AND [REDACTED] CONTAINER WILL REMAIN IN NIMITZ.

BT

NOTE
C

DDO NMCC
JES
Classified By
Declassified On OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

1001000000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

AND REPERCUSSIONS KNOWN TO THE PUBLIC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0 251011Z APR 80
FM HELLG APT/C-4
TO KCF/SC
BT

~~FOR 125/11~~
~~FR 11/1~~
11/1

SUBJ: SERIALIZED ITEMS ISV

A. JTF/RC 260920Z APR 80

1. REF REQUESTS SERIALIZED ITEMS RECOVERED ABOARD LITNET AFTER
TERMINATION OF OPERATION.

2. ACCORDINGLY, FOLLOWING SERIALIZED ITEMS ARE CURRENTLY
IN CUSTODY HELLG ABOARD SHIP:
AUG RIFLE, M100

7

148P

746115

778236

678230

602442

1588220

B. CAL .39 PISTOL

40 13740

40 13743

40 17300

40 17431

C. PINS

226

282

D. ~~APRC-90~~

1 18135 ~~11/1~~

14567 16348

15869 ~~11/1~~

EJK MOTOROLA MX350

NONE

F. CAL .53 MG

1159453 1146242K

1163711 11640122

G. ~~APRVS-5~~ (NW3)

19780 ~~11/1~~

19670 31460

19836

19770

BT

1476

3/31/92

NOT 1-1-1

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified On: OADR~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR / 27031
VC / 0243

(#472)

E

TO: [REDACTED]
FROM: [REDACTED]
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

G

URGENT: SENSITIVE LETTER
REF: 000/000 251317Z APR 42
1. LT. COL [REDACTED] DELIVERED LETTER 26 0400Z APR 42
2. COMPLIED WITH INSTRUCTION IN REF. MSG.

DDO NMCC
Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92
NOTED
Retransmitted

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

1. AT 0115 EST THE WHITE HOUSE RELEASED THE FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT:

A. THE PRESIDENT HAS ORDERED THE CANCELLATION OF AN OPERATION IN IRAN WHICH WAS UNDERWAY TO PREPARE FOR A RESCUE OF OUR HOSTAGES. THE MISSION WAS TERMINATED BECAUSE OF EQUIPMENT FAILURE. DURING THE SUBSEQUENT WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL THERE WAS A COLLISION BETWEEN OUR AIRCRAFT ON THE GROUND AT A REMOTE DESERT LOCATION IN IRAN.

B. THERE WERE NO MILITARY HOSTILITIES, BUT THE PRESIDENT DEEPLY REGRETS THAT EIGHT AMERICAN CREW MEMBERS OF THE TWO AIRCRAFT WERE KILLED AND OTHERS WERE INJURED IN THE ACCIDENT. AMERICANS INVOLVED IN THE OPERATION HAVE NOW BEEN AIRLIFTED FROM IRAN AND THOSE WHO WERE INJURED ARE BEING GIVEN MEDICAL TREATMENT AND ARE EXPECTED TO RECOVER.

C. THIS MISSION WAS NOT MOTIVATED BY HOSTILITY TOWARD IRAN OR THE IRANIAN PEOPLE AND THERE WERE NO IRANIAN CASUALTIES.

D. PREPARATIONS FOR THIS RESCUE MISSION WERE ORDERED FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS, TO PROTECT THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THIS COUNTRY, AND TO ALLEVIATE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS. THE PRESIDENT ACCEPTS FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DECISION TO ATTEMPT THE RESCUE.

E. THE NATION IS DEEPLY GRATEFUL TO THE BRAVE MEN WHO WERE PREPARING TO RESCUE THE HOSTAGES.

F. THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO HOLD THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES.

G. THE UNITED STATES REMAINS DETERMINED TO OBTAIN THEIR SAFE RELEASE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.

H. THE PRESIDENT WILL ADDRESS THE NATION THIS MORNING AT 7:00 EST. FAMILIES OF THE HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED AND CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS JUSTICE/SSC/WH/HE ALSO BRIEFED. AT THIS TIME, WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE OF ANY REPRISALS AGAINST THE HOSTAGES.

2. THERE HAS BEEN NO MAJOR REACTION FROM TEHRAN TO THE NEWS OF THE RESCUE OPERATION. AS OF 0400 EST, TEHRAN RADIO HAD NOT YET CARRIED ANY REPORTS IN ITS LOCAL BROADCASTS. ACCORDING TO AFP, IRANIAN LEADERS HAVE ORDERED AN IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATION INTO THE INCIDENT. ARMY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF SHAHMEH SAID HE HAS NO INDICATION OF EXACTLY WHERE THE AIRCRAFT COLLIDED. SHAHMEH SAID A STATEMENT WOULD BE ISSUED LATER IN THE DAY.

3. THE MILITANTS AT THE COMPOUND SAID THEY WOULD RELEASE A COMMUNIQUE IF THE NEWS WERE CONFIRMED. THIS COMMUNIQUE WOULD SPECIFY WHAT ACTION THE MILITANTS WOULD TAKE. A SPOKESMAN INDICATED, AS OF 0430 EST, THE MILITANTS HAD NOT YET MADE ANY STATEMENTS.

4. THE FIRST BULLETIN FROM TASS CARRIED THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT IN A FACTUAL MANNER WITHOUT COMMENT. SYRIAN STATE RADIO HAS CALLED THE REPORTED ATTEMPT AN "OVERT ACT OF AGGRESSION." TEHRAN RADIO REPORTS THAT THE RESCUE MISSION WAS LAUNCHED IN IRAN AND STOPPED OVER THE IRANIAN BORDER. SOURCE: [REDACTED]

5. TEHRAN RADIO AT 0430 EST REPORTS THE ABORTIVE ATTEMPT TO RESCUE THE HOSTAGES AT THE U.S. EMBASSY WITHOUT COMMENT. PARS NEWS AGENCY IS CARRYING AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT THE WRECKAGE OF AN AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN SPOTTED NEAR TABAS IN EASTERN KHORASAN PROVINCE.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

COMPLETED ON 17 AUG 82

REVIEWED BY DDO NMCC

☐ DECLASS. BY [REDACTED] TO Secret

REVIEW ON OADR

REVIEW FROM Multiple Sources

~~SECRET~~

6. THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAD NO IMMEDIATE COMMENT ON THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT OF "AN ABORTIVE RESCUE ATTEMPT, OTHER THAN TO ORDER AN IMMEDIATE PROBE INTO THE INCIDENT. DIA EXPECTS A HARDENING OF THE MILITANTS' POSITION ON THE HOSTAGE ISSUE.

7. THE LATEST PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE FIGHTING BETWEEN KURDISH GUERRILLAS AND GOVERNMENT FORCES HAD TAKEN ON THE FORM OF A FULL SCALE WAR. A GROUP IN TEHRAN, KNOWN AS THE KURDISH SOCIETY, SAID YESTERDAY THAT 60 PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND MORE THAN 200 WERE INJURED ON THE 23RD WHEN THE ARMY FIRED ON THE KURDISH PROVINCIAL CAPITAL OF SANANDA. FROM HELICOPTERS. IN ADDITION, THE GOVERNMENT FORCES REPORTEDLY LAUNCHED A ROCK-KEY ASSAULT FROM PHANTOM JETS IN WHICH PART OF THE CITY'S ONLY HOSPITAL WAS DESTROYED. IN A STATEMENT YESTERDAY THE ARMY ACKNOWLEDGED FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT IT WAS USING HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS IN THE SANANDA FIGHTING.

10. ON 21 APRIL THE PAKISTANI PRESS REPORTED THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT APPROVED AIRLINE CALLED "SHAHEN AIRLINES." IT WILL RUN PASSENGER SERVICES ON DOMESTIC ROUTES AND CARGO FLIGHTS TO THE PERSIAN GULF.

THE PRESS RELEASE NOTED THAT THE COMPANY WOULD PURCHASE EIGHT BOEING 747 AIRCRAFT, WHICH INDICATES THE IRANIANS MAY USE THEIR AIR FORCE 747'S FOR THIS PURPOSE. IT IS POSSIBLE THE IRANIAN ARMY IS TESTING THE AIRLINES AS A MEANS OF TRANSPORTING WEAPONS AND CARGO IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE AIRCRAFT.

Classified by: JCS

Declassified on: OADR

SECRET

1/15/72 NEW ORN DE FICER, BAW... HERE WITH LEE WITH ORL

030100Z

10000000 WILL SHIFT BACK TO DE BOY VOY FOR DSL

Addressed
to JCS/AC

MAW

507

O 251430Z APR 80
FM NIMITZ HELO DET
TO JTF MAIN
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ // DO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER SPINTEL BROADCAST

SUBJ: CASUALTY REPORTS

1. MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL REQUIRES A CASUALTY REPORT IN THE FOLLOWING FORMAT WITHIN 48 HRS OF DEATH. THIS UNIT POSSES RECORDS OF EMERGENCY DATA ON ALL HELD VICTIMS. THEREFORE MUST INITIAL REPORT. THE FOLLOWING FOUR MESSAGES HAVE BEEN PREPARED FOR RETRANSMISSION TO REQUIRED ADDRESSES INDICATED AT YOUR DISCRETION. MESSAGE IS CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET FOR EXERCISE PURPOSE ONLY. REQUESTING RELEASING AS UNCLAS, SECURITY PERMITTING, TO FACILITATE CASUALTY PROCEDURES.

2. PROPOSED CASUALTY REPORTS AS FOLLOWS:

A. SERGEANT JOHN D. HARVEY USMC

FROM: JCS

TO: JMC WASHINGTON D.C.

INFO: SECNAV WASHINGTON D.C.

NAVY BOMED WASHINGTON D.C.

MCFC KANSAS CITY MO

CS SECOND MAG

MAG TWO SIX

HMM FOUR SIX ONE

CMC FOR MSPA-1

SUBJ: REPORT OF DEATH HOSTILE

REF: (A) HGO P3840.4A (MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL)

1. INW REF A FOL INFO RPT.

A. SERGEANT JOHN DAVIS HARVEY [REDACTED] 0012/0032 USMC

1. HMM 461, MAG 25, 20MAY 1980 01461

C. KIA

D. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 2200 IN IRAN. DIED WHEN THE RH-53, WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAKING AFTER REFUELING, COLLIDED WITH A ML-130 ACFT AND WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES.

E. GRN

F. 000125

G. [REDACTED]

H. NO

I. PAY DATA

(1) 773307 153

(2) 1570.80

(3) HONORARY MEMBER

(4) HONOR

(5) LAST LGS IN SAC FOUR MONTHS OF NOV 73

J. SGLI DATA

(1) 120.000.000

(2) 70000

K. CAPTIST COUNCILMAN NO ATTORNEY COMPLAINT

L. MAJOR LESLIE [REDACTED] USMC-KIA

MAJOR JAMES H. SCHAFER JR [REDACTED] USMC-KIA

STAFF SERGEANT DENLEY L. JOHNSON [REDACTED] USMC-KIA

CORPORAL GEORGE H. HOLMES [REDACTED] USMC-KIA

M. 000424

N. REASON RPT DELAYED MORE THAN 48 HOURS. (IF NECESSARY)

O. STAFF SERGEANT DEAN L. JOHNSON USMC

FROM: JCS

TO: JMC WASHINGTON D.C.

INFO: SECNAV WASHINGTON D.C.

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

NAVY BUREAU WASHINGTON D.C.
MCFC KANSAS CITY MO
CG SECOND MAW
MAG TWO SIX
HHH FOUR SIX ONE
CHC FOR MSPA-1

SUBJ: REPORT OF DEATH HOSTILE

REF: (A) MCO P3840.4A (MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL)

1. IAW REF A FOL INFO RPT:

A. STAFF SERGEANT DEWEY LEE JOHNSON [REDACTED] 6123 BORG

B. HHH 461 MAG 26 20MAN RUC 01401

C. KIA

D. 25 APRIL 1986 AT 0200 IN IRAN. DIED WHEN THE RH-53, WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAXING AFTER REFUELLING, COLLIDED WITH A HL-133 ACFT AND WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES.

E. CHN

F. 800112

G.

1. NAME

2. PAY DATA

(1) 868412

(2) 898.30

(3) 95.00 CREW MEMBER

(4) NONE

(5) LAST LBS IN SGL FOR MONTH OF FEB 79

3. SOLI DATA

(1) 123,702.03

(2) 702905

4. PROJECT-NO ATTENDING CHAPLAIN

5. MAJOR LEO L. PETTY [REDACTED]

1STSGT CARLOS H. SCHMETER JR [REDACTED]

SERGEANT JOHN DAVIS HARVEY [REDACTED]

CORPORAL GEORGE N. HOLMES [REDACTED]

6. 824424

7. REASON RPT DELAYED MORE THAN 48 HOURS. (IF NECESSARY)

8. CORPORAL GEORGE N. HOLMES JR. USMC

9. 800112

10. CHC WASHINGTON D.C.

INFO: SECNAV WASHINGTON D.C.

NAVY BUREAU WASHINGTON D.C.

MCFC KANSAS CITY MO

CG SECOND MAW

MAG TWO SIX

HHH FOUR SIX ONE

CHC FOR MSPA-1

SUBJ: REPORT OF DEATH HOSTILE

REF: (A) MCO P3840.4A (MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL)

1. IAW REF A FOL INFO RPT:

A. CORPORAL GEORGE NIEMEYER JONES JR [REDACTED] 113 BORG

B. HHH 461 MAG 26 20MAN RUC 01401

C. KIA

D. 25 APRIL 1986 AT 0200 IN IRAN. DIED WHEN THE RH-53, WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAXING AFTER REFUELLING, COLLIDED WITH A HL-133 ACFT AND WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES.

E. CHN

F. 800112

G.

1. NAME

2. PAY DATA

(1) 712104

(2) 523.00

(3) 79.00 CREW MEMBER

(4) NONE

(5) LAST LBS IN SGL FOR MONTH OF OCT 79

3. SOLI DATA

NAVY BUREAU WASHINGTON D.C.
MCFC KANSAS CITY MO
CG SECOND MAW
MAG TWO SIX
HHM FOUR SIX ONE
CHC FOR MSPA-1

SUBJ: REPORT OF DEATH HOSTILE

REF: (A) MCO P3843.4A (MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL)

1. TAW REF A FOL INFO RPT:

A. STAFF SERGEANT DENY LEE JOHNSON [REDACTED] 0123 DORG

B. HHM 461 MAG 26 20MAW RUC 01401

C. KIA

D. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 0200 IN IRAN, DIED WHEN THE RM-53, WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAKING AFTER REFUELLING, COLLIDED WITH A HL-133 ACFT AND WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES.

E. CHN

F. 800112

G.

H. DATE

I. PAY DATA

(1) 660412

(2) 698.30

(3) 95.00 CREW MEMBER

(4) NONE

(5) LAST LEE IN SER FOR MONTH OF OCT 73

J. SOLL DATA

(1) 120,000.00

(2) 700000

K. PROJECT-HO ATTENDING CORP. IN

L. MAJOR LESLIE A. PLTTY [REDACTED]

MAJOR CHARLES H. SCHNEPPEN JR. [REDACTED] USMC-11A

SERGEANT JOHN DAVIS HARVEY [REDACTED] USMC-11A

CORPORAL GEORGE N. HOLMES [REDACTED] USMC-11A

800112

N. REASON RPT DELAYED MORE THAN 48 HOURS. (17 HOURS LATE)

O. CORPORAL GEORGE N. HOLMES JR. USMC

PROJ. JULY 1980

TO: CMC WASHINGTON D.C.

INFO: SECNAV WASHINGTON D.C.

NAVY BUREAU WASHINGTON D.C.

MCFC KANSAS CITY MO

CG SECOND MAW

MAG TWO SIX

HHM FOUR SIX ONE

CHC FOR MSPA-1

SUBJ: REPORT OF DEATH HOSTILE

REF: (A) MCO P3843.4A (MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL)

1. TAW REF A FOL INFO RPT:

A. CORPORAL GEORGE NIEMEYER JONES JR. [REDACTED] 113 DORG

B. HHM 461 MAG 26 20MAW RUC 01401

C. KIA

D. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 0200 IN IRAN, DIED WHEN THE RM-53, WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAKING AFTER REFUELLING, COLLIDED WITH A HL-133 ACFT AND WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES.

E. CHN

F. 800112

G.

H. DATE

I. PAY DATA

(1) 700000

(2) 523.00

(3) 70.00 CREW MEMBER

(4) NONE

(5) LAST LEE IN SER FOR MONTH OF OCT 73

J. SOLL DATA

(2) 770815
K. LUTHERAN-NO ATTENDING CHAPLAIN
MAJOR LESLIE B. PETTY USMC-VIA
MAJOR JAMES H. SCHAEFER JR USMC-VIA
STAFF SERGEANT DEWEY L. JOHNSON USMC-KIA
SERGEANT JOHN DAVIS HARVEY USMC-KIA

H. 800424

N. REASON RPT. DELAYED MORE THAN 48 HOURS. (IF NECESSARY)

J. MAJORS LESLIE B. PETTY USMC AND JAMES H. SCHAEFER USMC

FROM: JCS

TO: CMC WASHINGTON D.C.

FOR MCPA-1

SUBJ: HOSTILE CASUALTY

REF: (1) MCO P3040.4A (MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL)

(1) A. MAJOR LESLIE B. PETTY 56473902 USMC

B. MMH 461 MAG 2612DMAN RUC 01461

C. 800424

D. IRAN

E. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 0200 IN IRAN. INJURED WHEN THE RH-53,

WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAXING AFTER REFUELING,

COLLIDED WITH A MC-130 ACFT AND WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES.

F. CONDITION AND PROGNOSIS: SECOND DEGREE BURNS/JUNK

G. PRESENT LOCATION: (TO BE INCLUDED)

H. YES

I. [REDACTED]

(2) A. MAJOR JAMES HENRY SCHAEFER JR 755477577/235

USMC

B. MAMTS-1 3DMAN RUC: 01243

C. 800424

D. IRAN

E. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 0200 IN IRAN. INJURED WHEN THE RH-53,

WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAXING AFTER REFUELING,

COLLIDED WITH A MC-130 ACFT AND WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES.

F. CONDITION AND PROGNOSIS: SECOND DEGREE BURNS/JUNK

G. PRESENT LOCATION: (TO BE INCLUDED)

H. YES

I. [REDACTED]

REVW: 25APR80

BT

NNNN

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

MMH

NO EOM.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DR 12511 412
BMD/MCN

MCN 01211

MSG 084
230900Z APR 80
FM: JCS/RC-J-2
TO: SITE ALPHA
INFO: SFOD
1ST SOW

RANGERS

591

SUBJ: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 0500Z 23 APR 80

1. TEHRAN RADIO REPORTED YESTERDAY THAT CAMPUS UNREST AROUND THE COUNTRY HAD CALMED, AS VARIOUS POLITICAL GROUPS CLOSED THEIR OFFICES. IN TEHRAN, SUPPORTERS OF THE LEFT-WING FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT REPORTEDLY EVACUATED TEHRAN UNIVERSITY AFTER A DAY OF FIERCE CLASHES WITH ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS WHICH LEFT THREE DEAD AND AT LEAST 350 WOUNDED.

3. IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTEZADEH APPARENTLY STILL HAS PLANS TO VISIT VARIOUS ARAB STATES TO PLEAD HIS CASE FOR ISLAMIC UNITY AGAINST VARIOUS THREATS, INCLUDING THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS AND IGNORANCE CONCERNING THE GOALS OF HIS COUNTRY'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. ACCORDING TO THE MOST RECENT INFORMATION HE PLANS TO VISIT AT LEAST SYRIA, LEBANON, KUWAIT, SAUDI ARAB AND THE UAE, PROBABLY DEPARTING SOMETIME THIS WEEK.

4. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, HEAVY FIGHTING CONTINUED IN SANANDAJ YESTERDAY. KURDISH GUERRILLAS REPORTEDLY BESIEGED THE IRANIAN ARMY OFFICER'S CLUB AND THE LOCAL RADIO AND TELEVISION STATION. THE ARMY SAID KURDISH REBELS SURROUNDED THE OFFICER'S CLUB AND HAD CUT OFF WATER, ELECTRICITY AND TELEPHONE LINKS. NEITHER SIDE GAVE FIGURES FOR YESTERDAY'S CASUALTIES, BUT THE ARMY ADMITTED LOSING 20 DEAD AND 36 WOUNDED ON THE 21ST WHEN KURDISH GUERRILLAS ATTACKED AN ARMY COLUMN SKIRTING SANANDAJ ON ITS WAY NORTH TO RELIEVE GOVERNMENT FORCES IN SAQOZ. MEANWHILE, KURDISH SOURCES IN SAQOZ REPORTED YESTERDAY THAT FIERCE FIGHTING WAS STILL RAGING THERE. THEY CLAIMED THAT THE ARMY WAS SHELLING HOUSES FROM A HILLTOP GARRISON AND HAD EMPLOYED PHANTOM FIGHTER PLANES SPORADICALLY TO FIRE ROCKETS AT GUERRILLA POSITIONS.

Classified By 32
Declassified On: a

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12258
EXEMPTED BY 12 Aug 92
EXEMPTED BY 12 Aug 92
EXEMPTED BY 12 Aug 92
EXEMPTED BY 12 Aug 92
EXEMPTED BY 12 Aug 92

SECRET

G. SATELLITE OVERVIEW: AS OF 2100Z TUESDAY (22 APR) THERE WERE ONE HIGH-RESOLUTION PHOTO SATELLITE, ONE MANNED SPACE STATION WITH A POSSIBLE VISUAL/PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY, ONE EORSAT, TWO SECOND-GENERATION ELINT AND SIX THIRD-GENERATION ELINT SATELLITES IN ORBIT.

H. SOVIET PRESS (U): NO CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS REPORTING WITH INCREASED ANTI-US POLEMICS IN THE SOVIET PRESS AND NEW COMMENTARIES AS MOSCOW PUBLICLY WARNS TEHRAN AND THE ARAB WORLD OF POSSIBLE U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION.

BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT / 12-66
RS

#509

UNIT
DELTA
UNIT
TO JTF HQ

TO: JTF HQ
1. BE ADVISED THAT THE FOLLOWING
HAVE BEEN INITIATED:

UNIT	TIME	TIME
DELTA	(1) 2011Z	LANCLEY
	(2) 2011Z	LANCLEY
RANGERS	(1) 2011Z	[REDACTED]
	(2) 2011Z	2011Z

2. COMUTE DEPARTED THIS LOCATION ON SECOND DELTA A/C.

3. PLEASE NOTIFY AG [REDACTED] RANGER ARRIVAL TIME.

BT
#248

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: OADR

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
CONTROLLED BY: 92
REVIEWED BY: NMCC
☐ DEL. 12-66
BY: S
REVIEWED BY: S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COM 2445
INT TTTT
O 281500Z APR 92
FM JTF/J-3
TO JTF/AC
BT

TOT/1450Z
RC

#510

SUBJ: MC/EC/AC-130 REDEPLOYMENT

1. (U) UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED, PLAN TO REDEPLOY AS FOLLOWS:

A. AC-130 (4) RETURN FROM [REDACTED] TO [REDACTED] IN TWO CELLS OF TWO AIRCRAFT EACH (24 HOUR SEPARATION BETWEEN CELLS). WILL BEGIN MOVEMENT 26/0000Z AND

CLOSE 26/2330Z. RON 15 HOUR GROUND TIME AT [REDACTED]

E B. PACAF MC-130 (3). RETURN FROM [REDACTED] IN A SINGLE CELL. WILL BEGIN MOVEMENT 27/0600Z AND CLOSE 26/0220Z.

PLAN 15 HOUR GROUND TIME AT [REDACTED] WILL REQUIRE THAILAND OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCE. PLAN TO CONDUCT FINAL OCEAN SURVEILLANCE SORTIE FROM [REDACTED] 26 APR.

E C. COMUS MC-130 (4) ABCCC (2). RETURN FROM [REDACTED] TO HURLBURT IN THREE CELLS OF TWO AIRCRAFT EACH. WILL BEGIN MOVEMENT 27/0600Z AND CLOSE 26/1940Z. PLAN 15 HOUR GROUND TIME AT [REDACTED] ONE MC-130 WILL PROCEED ON TO ONTARIO CA (DEPOT) AND THE ABCCS TO KEEGLER. DEPARTURES MAY HAVE TO SLIP PENDING REPAIR OF AIRCRAFT AT [REDACTED] AND RETURN TO [REDACTED]

(U) 2. (U) REQUEST YOU ASSIST IN OBTAINING THAILAND OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCE. DETAILS WILL BE PROVIDED BY JTF [REDACTED]

A, E 3. (U) FOR [REDACTED] REQUEST YOU CONTINUE TO BE REQUIRED ENTRIES FOR THAI OVERFLIGHT TO JTF/AC. PLAN IS TO DEPART [REDACTED] 26 APR/1992Z BT

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Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR 1310Z
KCL MCN
0209

MSG 0020
CO 251135Z APR 92
FM [REDACTED]
TO JTF/J-2
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

MESSAGE NUMBER 5
1. EC-130/02141: /REPULLIC 5/241535Z/2502.02
2A. NTP
2C. GOOD-HAZE LAYER STARTED APPROX 25 DEGREE AND CONTINUED TO L2
3. LZ 33P427N2100240E
3A. SCHEDULED 1930
LANDED 1930
2E. SUCCESSFUL INFIL A 30,000 LBS HP-4
3C. N/A
2E. LANDED LAST, TAXIED TO POSITION, RECEIVED
ONE HELO, REPUBLIC 4 HAD 2 HELOS,
HIGH CONCERN IF EXERCISE WAS GOING TO
CONTINUE.
HELO ROTOR BLADE WAS SPINNING
ON FRONT OF FUSelage. HELO PILOT JUMPED
OUT OF WINDOW AND WALKED OVER AND STOOD
IN FRONT OF NUMBER 1 PROP. CREW CHIEF FROM ONE
OF THE MARINE HELOS LED PILOT TO THIS ACFT.
SECURED THE AREA PICKED UP ALL POSSIBLE PERSONNEL
WITHIN THE AREA AND TAXIED.
DRAGON 3 TOOK OFF FOLLOWED
BY REPUBLIC 5. REPUBLIC 16 FOLLOWED
REPUBLIC 5 FOR

-515

TAKING OFF

2F. GOOD/CLEAR BUT A LOT OF DUST
AND SMOKE VERY 4 MILES
5A. SOME [REDACTED] INTERFERENCE (1) POSSIBLE [REDACTED] FROM ANOTHER
ACFT AND (2) SINGLE STROBING OF SLITS THAT COULD HAVE BEEN
GROUND RADAR.
5E. FLEW MODIFIED H2A IN AREA OF THREATS
5C. SAME AS INGRESS
5. LZ CONDITION WAS NOT AS BRIEFED
POL PEOPLE COULD NOT SEE HELOS AND VICE VERSA.
BT
200

A

....XLYUCC

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Declassified ONY OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOP / 251115
MCN 020k

MESSAGE IN RECEIVED.

1. 1007
2. 251115Z APR 72
3. [REDACTED]
4. 011700-1

#517

PIEDDER NUMBER 34
1. YEC-10N/07/FLORIDA- 70100T / 100000T
2. NIA
3. NIA
4. 0000, LOW CLIMB, AT 0100T, 0000T, 0000T
5. LT 0000/0000
6. 0000
7. 0000/0000
8. 0000
9. 0000
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NM
12 AUG

NO 440707
FM 001077
TO 0000

707/1029Z
RC

- (U) 1. ~~REDACTED~~ FOLLOWING PERSONNEL ARE UNACCOUNTED FOR AND PRESUMED TO HAVE PERISHED IN THE C-130/HELICOPTER COLLISION:
- (A) LE 10, HAROLD E. JR. CAPT USAF 040346000
 - (A) CREW MEMBER
 - (A) MCINTOSH, LARRY. CAPT USAF 210711001
 - (A) CREW MEMBER
 - (A) HAYO, JOEL C. TOPT USAF 203410012
 - (A) CREW MEMBER
 - (A) HAYES, RICHARD L. CAPT USAF 000711001
 - (A) CREW MEMBER
 - (A) MCILLIAN, CHARLES W. CAPT USAF 011007000
 - (A) CREW MEMBER
 - (A) JOHNSON, DEWAYNE L. CAPT USMC 011007000

#520

- 074
RHS3 CREW MEMBER
(G) HARVEY, JOHN D. SGT USMC 220521040
RHS3 CREW MEMBER
(G) POLHEU, GEORGE W. JR. CPL USMC
001-01-1341, AM US CREW MEMBER

- (U) 2. ~~REDACTED~~ PERSONNEL INJURED AS A RESULT OF THE COLLISION AND CURRENTLY BEING PLACED ABOARD C-130 FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT:

- (A) BRETHER, LUCILLE T. MAJ USMC
~~REDACTED~~ STATUS -
20-30 PERCENT SECOND AND THIRD DEGREE
BURNS OF EXTREMITIES AND TRUNK AND
IS CURRENTLY STABLE

- (G) SHAEFFER, JAMES H. MAJ USMC
~~REDACTED~~ RHS3 CREW MEMBER.
STATUS - 5 PERCENT SECOND DEGREE BURNS OF FACE
AND IS CURRENTLY STABLE.

- (G) HARRISON, JEFFERY B. LTJG USAF
~~REDACTED~~ 00130 CREW MEMBER
STATUS - 5 PERCENT SECOND DEGREE BURNS OF FACE AND IS STABLE

- (G) BEYERS, JOSEPH J. USMC USAF
~~REDACTED~~ CREW MEMBER.
STATUS - 5 PERCENT SECOND AND THIRD DEGREE BURNS OF FACE,
EXTREMITIES AND TRUNK AND IS STABLE.

- (G) TOWLE, WILLIAM V. MAJ USAF
~~REDACTED~~ CREW MEMBER.
STATUS - 5 PERCENT SECOND AND THIRD DEGREE BURNS OF FACE,
EXTREMITIES AND TRUNK AND IS STABLE.

THREE OTHER PERSONNEL WERE
TREATED FOR MINOR BURNS AND ONE
TREATED FOR CRACKED FINGER. ALL WERE RELEASED.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON _____
DERIVATIVE CL BY _____
☐ DEEL ☐ DOWNING TO _____
SERV ON _____
SERVED FROM _____

Declassified by:
DDO USMC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

82/09108
#098

MSN 3022

25 APR 30

EV [REDACTED] NES PRINT

EG

TO [REDACTED]

ET [REDACTED]

SUBJ: FORCE STAT

E

1. REALIZE THAT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS WILL GOVERN HOW LONG WE REMAIN AT [REDACTED] OUT FORCE STATUS FOLLOWS FOR PLANNING.

2. THERE ARE TOTAL OF 168 PERSONNEL HERE
3. AIRCRAFT STATUS FOR 6 C-130S:

A. THREE IN COMMISSION

B. THREE OUT OF COMMISSION

4. MC-565 HAD 4 AND ONE HALF GS LANDING AT REFUELING SITE WITH 150,000 POUNDS ABOARD. THIS IS AIRCRAFT OVERDUE FOR. WILL PROBABLY REQUIRE INSPECTION TEAM TO INSPECT WINGS AND MEN AND MATERIALS.

5. EC-130 AND 1357 NEEDS SEAL ASSEMBLY FOR ACCESSARY HOUSING, WILL FORWARD PARTS LIST LATER

6. EC-130 NO. 1313, ON TAKE OFF BECAUSE OF HEAVY LOAD AND RISING TERRIAN PILOT OVEG TORQUED ALL FOUR ENGINES FOR ONE AND ONE HALF MINUTES.

WE ARE INSPECTING ENGINES. MAY BE ABLE TO CLEAR FOR ONE TIME FLIGHT. WILL ADVISE.

7. PACAF MC-130S CAN TRANSPORT PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT EASTWARD. 8. CONUS BOUND C-130S REQUIRE SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT BECAUSE EC-130S HAVE FUEL BLADDERS INSIDE WHICH PRECLUDES OTHER LOADS.

ALSO MC-130 565, WHICH WAS OVER GS SHOULD NOT CARRY LOAD EVEN IF INSPECTION PERMITS FLIGHT. WE ESTIMATE TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENT FOR PALLETS TO BE 17-19 POSITIONS (INCLUDE ROLLING STOCK).

ALSO HAVE REQUIREMENT TO MOVE APPROX 90 PEOPLE. ALL OF THIS PARA IS FOR CONUS.

ET

3022

#521

14
MAC

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Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR / 1110
KCL / #0205

1125Z JUL 74 NMCC

G
O 2211Z JUL 74
FM NMCC
TO JCR JTF-ALPHA
BT

BT
//DO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER JCR JTF-ALPHA
REF: JTF-ALPHA 220552Z JUL 74

- (U) 1. RFL REQUESTS TANKER SUPPORT REQUESTS
2. ~~175~~ 17-74 APPROPRIATES AVAILABILITY OF TANKER AND LOGS
AND REQUESTS SUPPORT ON 17 AS REQUESTED. TO KNOW
ACQUISITIONS AT THIS TIME.
VERY RESPECTFULLY
ALVA: NMCC
BT

522

NNNN

Declassified by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

ZYU.

0313/1713

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR

1035Z

RCL

#0204

NO EOM.

MAN 0000

00 251000Z APR 60

FM

DO 51/0-2

LT

SUBJ: MISREP NUMBER 02

1. MC-137/505/DRAGON-1/2414007/2414007

2A. LMO NO INDICATIONS

2B.

2C. HAZE VSBY: 3 MILES

3. LD 0304005054L

3A. 241050Z

3B. SUCCESSFUL INFIL & TO PAX

3C. N/A

3D. LMO NONE

3E. TRACK NOTED ON ROAD BEARING WEST

DURING FLIP PAX. TWO OTHER

VEHICLES NOTED ON ROAD. LARGE EXPLOSION

FIREBALL NOTED AT 041000Z WEST OF LT. 2-4 MILES.

LANDED NEXT TO A CUL. ORIGINALLY

WERE GOING TO INFIL 444 PRISONERS. DID NOT GO

TO LOOT PAX WEAPON.

3F. HAZE VSBY: 3 MILES

3A. N/A

3B. POS F-4 WHILE AT 250000Z

SITING WAS SEEN AT 030000Z. 041000Z

UNKNOWN. ACFT REMAINING 100% NOT

00.

00. HAZE VSBY: 3-4 MILES

0. GENERAL REMARKS: CAT DOWN IN AREA OF

HOURS OF BOTH INFIL AND LMO. 041000Z

UPON LANDING.

BT

0025

(#524)

NNNN

Classified By: JCS DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NM.
12 AUG 9.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR / 1035Z
RCL / # 0203

11

5-525

NO 0026
00 001250 APR 82
FM [REDACTED]
TO JTF/J-2
BT

WISREP NUMBER 003

1. 1000-1300/777/0000-03/10147/0000Z/

2. [REDACTED] AT 000000 1100000000 AND AT 2010000000. AFT HEADING 070 AND 340 RESPECTIVELY. 1000Z AND 1001Z. MULTIPLE [REDACTED] VIO 0000000000 FOR AT JARLANE MOVED TO AFLD AT 1000000000 0147000000000000.

3. 0000 FIRST HALF. 1000 SECOND HALF. ON INGRESS RTE.

4. LT 3304000000000000

5. 1000-3 MINS LATE

6. SUCCESSFUL UNTIL 32. 1000. 1000 CAL TOLL.

7. N/A

8. NONE

9. SECONDARY EXPLOSION OFF TO LEFT UPON APPROACH

EXPLOSION WERE APPX 1-2 MILES AWAY FM LT. APPEARED TO BE POL TANK.

10. 0000:30H1 BROKEN CLOUDS-3700 SCAT TO BROKEN-(NO FACTOR)

11. N/A

12. 0000

13. NONE

14. PLANNED BUREAU NOT FOLLOWED TO EXPECTED

DEPT. EXPILTI POPL USE TO MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCES. 1000 00 0000 0000 0000 0000

FORMATION. 000000 000000 000000 000000

IMPROVED FM INGRESS TO 000000 000000 000000

BT

0026

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By ~~ERS~~ DDO NMCC
Declassified ON ~~OADR~~
Downgraded by: DDO NM
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DT/0910Z
RC

TO
JCN 2230
ZNY ~~XXXX~~
DTG 250000Z APR 86
FM JTF
TO JCRC/RC
BT

SUBJ: POST MISSION DEBRIEF/ISOLATION AREAS

REF: JTF/RC 250700Z APR 86

R. JTF/J3 250317Z APR 86

1. RANGERS SHOULD REDEPLOY TO [REDACTED] NO ISOLATION REQUIRED. REFS A AND B REFER.

BT
#230

521

Classified By JES
Declassified On: OADR File

CLASSIFICATION ACTION TO BE TAKEN
CONDUCTED BY PL 2006 92
REVIEW BY DDP NMCC
☐ DECLASSIFY TO CONFIDENTIAL
REVIEW BY OADR
REVIEW BY S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

TO 7
KCL
0932Z

USMC227
JTF
USS NIMITZ

SUBJ: RETURN OF HELO MISSION MEMBERS
TO CONUS

1. REQUEST THAT ALL HELO MISSION
MEMBERS INCLUDING SUPPORT PERS
BE RETURNED TO CONUS FOR

TRANSFER [REDACTED] OR DEBRIEF. FOR JTF/RC
REQUEST THAT YOU TASK CINCPAC FOR PRIORITY AIRFLIF.
REQUEST USS NIMITZ ASSIST TO PICKUP POINT.
BT

NNNN

i-529

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 92

REVIEWED BY DDO NMCC

CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED] Secret

DECLASSIFY ON OADR

EXEMPT FROM [REDACTED]

Classified By JCS
Declassified ON OADR

File

~~SECRET~~

COMM-100
FM 231520Z
FM JTF
TO 107/AC

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ARE PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION
FROM COMMANDING OFFICER JTF HELO DET

STATEMENT OF DEATH FOR
STAFF SERGEANT DENEY L. JOHNSON USMC
SERGEANT JOHN A. HARVEY USMC
CORPORAL GEORGE W. HOLMES USMC

1. SUBJECT INDIVIDUALS WERE CREW MEMBERS ABOARD
AN H-53 HELICOPTER WHICH CRASHED EARLY AM
25 APRIL 89 INTO A C-130.
2. I WAS AN EYE WITNESS TO THE ACCIDENT FROM
A DISTANCE OF APPROXIMATELY 100 YARDS. THE
H-53 WAS SITTING ADJACENT TO THE C-130
THE CABIN AREA OF THE H-53 BURST INTO FLAMES
ON IMPACT AND SUBSEQUENTLY EXPLODED.
3. THE CONFIGURATION OF THE H-53 CABIN,
WITH TWO FULL INTERNAL FUEL CELLS (APPROX 550-600
GAL OF JP-4) AND MISCELLANEOUS GEAR WOULD
HAVE BEEN TOTALLY PROHIBITIVE FOR REASONABLE
EGRESS.

4. SUBJECT MARINES ARE DECLARED DEAD. SIGNED
STATEMENT OF DEATH CONCERNING SGT D. JOHNSON,
SGT HARVEY, CPL HOLMES

I WAS SITTING IN MY RH53 ABOUT 100' FROM THE C-130 A/C
RH-53 NUMBER 3 WAS THE SECOND PLANE TO MY LEFT. RH53 NUMBER 3
WAS (300 GAL) FULL INTERNAL FUEL CELLS, 2 (700-750 GAL)
WING TANKS AND 2 FULL (300 GAL) SPONSOR TANKS. ABOUT 1000Z RH53
(3) PICKED UP AND FLEW AT AN ESTIMATED ALTITUDE OF ABOUT 25'-50'
A/C TOWARD THE LEFT SIDE OF THE C-130 TO OUR FRONT. THE DUST BECAME
VERY BAD BUT I COULD STILL MAKE OUT THE C-130 AND RH53-(3) AS THE
RH53-(3) WAS OVER THE C-130 THERE WAS THE LOUDEST EXPLOSION I HAVE
EVER HEARD ABOUT 30 SEC LATER THE C-130 STARTED EXPLODING. IN MY
OPINION NOBODY IN THE BELLY OF THE RH53 COULD HAVE SURVIVED THE
BLAST. SIGNED

STATEMENT OF DEATH
CASE OF: (1) SSGT D. JOHNSON, SGT HARVEY AND
CPL HOLMES.

I WAS THE CRASH OF THE H-53 HELO THAT HIT THE C-130 AIRCRAFT. I
WAS ABOUT 75 FT. BEHIND THE C-130 WHEN THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED.
IMMEDIATELY FROM IMPACT BOTH AIRCRAFT BURST INTO FLAMES. THE H-53
CABIN AREA WAS ENVELOPED COMPLETELY. IN MY OPINION, IT WOULD BE
IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANYONE TO SURVIVE THAT CRASH IF THEY WERE IN THE
CABIN AREA. THERE WERE 2 INTERNAL FUEL TANKS (550-600 GAL) THE RAMP
WAS CLOSED AND THE PERSONNEL DOOR WAS ALSO CLOSED. MOBILITY
IN THE CABIN AREA WAS RESTRICTED BECAUSE OF THE FUEL TANKS,
THE COIN STRAPS, AND MISCELLANEOUS GEAR. I SAW NO ONE EXIT THE
CABIN. SIGNED

TOT 23162
VL

6-508

Classified By JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

STATUS:

MSG SEG ORIG

31 32 R
30 SEGMENTS AVAILABLE.

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

MON 3021
00 252418Z APR 83
FM [REDACTED]
TO JTF7-2
BT

~~SECRET~~
MISREP NUMEEG 01

1. A/C TYPE/TAIL NO./CALL SIGN/TAKE OFF/LANDING
MU-138/564/Dragon-2/15172/2335Z

2A. EWO NO INDICATIONS

2B. NTR

2C. GOOD

3. LZ 33304N25557E

3A. 191 WITH ONE GO ARU

3E. SUCCESSFUL INFIL XSI PAX

3C. N/A

3D. EWO NO INDICATIONS

3E.

3F. GOOD VIZ APPX 7NM

ALL QUADRANTS

2. N/A

5A. EWO NO INDICATIONS

5B. CREW SAW MU-135 BEACON BUT COULD NOT
ESTABLISH EITHER COMM OR JOIN-UP

5C. GOOD VIZ APPX 7NM ALL QUADRANTS

6A. EEI SIGHTED POSS. POL TRUCK ON FIRE ON HIGHWAY

330425N255512E. WITH SECONDARY EXPLOSION.

BT

0021

NNNN

MESSAGE 03 RECEIVED.

NO EOM.

Classified By: JCS DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOP 0847
RCL 0196

ANK & HAVE ONE MORE TO GO AND HERE IT IS

A 250543Z APR 92
FM HELO BKT /NIN177/3-2 AND 3-3
TO SITE ALFA J-2

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA SPIRITEL BROADCAST
SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL COMPROMISE
REF: FONECON OF 250543Z APR 92 SAME INFO

(U) 1. (U) FOLLOWING IS HARD COPY BACK-UP REQUESTED DURING REF FONECON.
A. EACH A/C UNDER WAS ISSUED BLUE BINDER CONTAINING EMERGENCY
LTS IN TEHRAN. THIS BOOK IS FAMILIAR TO MAJ. [REDACTED] BUT I WILL
RECAP CONTENTS --- EACH LT WITH PHOTO (CAPTIONS/COORDS REMOVED)
AND COORDINATES; CITY MAP WITH EACH LT MARKED; PHOTO STRIP MAPS
OF HELD HIDE, TEHRAN EAST APPROACH, TEHRAN-MANTARIYEH, TEHRAN-
KARAJ. ALL PHOTO STRIPS WERE MARKED QUOTE SECRET UNQUOTE BUT MOST PILOTS
HAD SANITIZED BY CUTTING OFF CLASSIFICATION. BELIEVE SHOULD ASSUME
ALL OF THESE BLUE BINDERS ARE COMPROMISED UNTIL THEY ARE RETURNED
OR OTHERWISE ACCOUNTED FOR.

B. S-3 PREPARED KNEEBOARD CARDS FOR ALL PILOTS WHICH LISTED
EMERGENCY COMBAT AIR PATROL CHECKPOINTS. ONE OF THESE WAS QUOTE
UNQUOTE WITH SEC REF COORDINATES. WHILE IT IS UNLIKELY
THAT THE KNEEBOARD CARDS WERE LOST, PRUDENCE DICTATES CHECK AT
[REDACTED] THERE WERE NO, REPEAT, NO PHOTOS OF [REDACTED] GIVEN TO
[REDACTED].

C. ALL PILOTS WERE ISSUED PHOTO PRODUCTS QUOTE DESERT TRACK 1
AND DESERT TRACK 2 UNQUOTE. THESE ARE IN SAME CATEGORY AS SUBPARA
ALFA ABOVE.

D. ALL PILOTS REC'D CLOI EXTRACT OF VARYING DETAIL TAILORED
TO INDIVIDUAL PILOT NEED. THE CLOI SHOULD BE CONSIDERED COMPROMISED.

E. DELTA MATERIAL ISSUED AND NOT ACCOUNTED FOR AT THIS TIME
INCLUDES ONE (1) COPY OF USRAF 8312, ONE (1) COPY OF USKAT 2272
EDITION ALFA REG NO 13 DATED 24 APRIL 83 ONLY, ONE (1) KI-65 (PARKHILL)
AND ONE (1) KI-110 REITER.
REVA:25APR92
BT

NNNN

MESSAGE 04 RECEIVED.

AND DE TIGER RAG OSL FM FM M FML
K K K K K

NO LOM.

Classified By ~~FES~~ DDO NMCC
Declassified ON ~~OADR~~
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G

MSG 140
250418Z APR 87
FM JCS/NO (LTC)
TO JTF: (C)
BT

TOP

250425Z
0187

~~SECRET~~

1. AIRCRAFT COVERED IN REFERENCE WERE SCHEDULED TO MOVE FORWARD TO
COVER AFB IN ANTICIPATION OF FUTURE FORWARD DEPLOYMENT.

2. BASED ON INFORMATION THAT ALL PERSONNEL ARE ACCOUNTED FOR, ALL
PREPARATIONS FOR SAR PLANNING ARE CANCELLED.
LT

NR001

532

Noted

Classified By: JCS

Declassified ON: OADR

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

i-539/172

SITUATION REPORT

E (S) THE C-141 LOAD OF CARGO AND THREE COORDINATE ARE AWAITING PICKUP AT THIS STATION IS 11.00 AM 42.

WITH EXCEPTION OF 7 SUPPLY AND 12 PERSONNEL ALL OF ~~THE~~ SQM HAS

E (S) THE ELEMENT AT ~~THE~~ WILL DEPART FOR HANSTEIN ON MAC CHANN-
EL 11.00 AM 42. THE ELEMENT AT HANSTEIN WILL CONTINUE TO MAC

THE ELEMENT, FOURTH, WILL PERSONNEL AND NINE ~~THE~~ REAR
ARE DEPARTING THIS LOCATION AT APPROXIMATELY 251045Z FOR RAM-
AND THEN ANDREW ON THE ROAD WHICH 1740-4. REQUEST TRANS-
FER FOR THE ELEMENT AND HELD HANSTEIN BE COORDINATED/PROVIDED.
LOADS AWAITING TRANS-PORTATION THIS LOCATION:
1. MAINTENANCE PARTS AND EQUIP. (10 TONS).

- 2. JOPE (COALLETIC)
- 3. K135 MAINT EQUIP. AND PARTS.
- 4. 10-~~THE~~
- 5. 10-~~THE~~

(U) THE 10-1300S REMAIN. TWO ARE SCHEDULED TO DEPART TOMMORROW AND
REMAINING TWO ON WEDNESDAY.

E (S) UNARMED AMMO, CS AND PREPARED CHARGES HAVE BEEN TURNED OVER TO
THE COMMANDER AND USARV EOD TEAM. CHARGES WILL BE DESTROYED AT THIS
LOCATION. COORDINATED ~~THE~~.

(U) THE 10-1300S WILL BE LOADED ON THE MORNING 26
AND 27. THIS LOCATION ON 20 LOCAL 10 TOMMORROW AFTER-
NOON. ALL REMAINING LOADS WILL BE MARSHALLED PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

#539

Classified By ~~THE~~ DDO NMCC
Declassified On ~~THE~~ OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOI 1240636Z
RPO QSL 0637Z

SSN 0287
O 050670Z APR 80
FM SITE ALPHA/JTF
TO: JTF/RC
BT

SUBJ: STATUS OF INJECTED ASSETS
HAVE ASSETS BEEN ABLE TO INFILTRATE?
BT

542

Received
Verbal response
J

Classified By JCS
Declassified On OADR

Declassified by:
DOD NMCC
AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

701/87372

RC

SSN 3261
O 270725Z APR 87
FM JTF/J3
TO JTF/RC
BT

~~SECRET~~
SUBJ: AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT

- E (C) 1. TWO MC-130 AIRCRAFT (762,867) DEPARTED OUR LOCATION
270630Z AND 270635Z. ET (APPROX) 271130Z.
(C) 2. TWO MC-130 AIRCRAFT (507,875) DEPARTED OUR LOCATION
270700Z AND 270725Z. ET (APPROX) 272230Z.
3. REQUEST RELAY POC AT HQ TAC.

BT
#0281

i-547

NNNN

DDO NMCC
Classified By ~~SECRET~~
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

G

C. I

TOT 270619
VC

MESSAGE IS ASSIGNED.

SSSSN 8276
O 270500Z APR 80
FM JTF HEAD SITE ALPHA
TO JCS/RC
SUBJECT: DECLASSIFYING STATEMENT
REQUEST YOU SEND FORMATTED
JTF RICEBOWL DECLASSIFYING STATEMENT
VIA TTY
BT

1-550

Classified By: JES
Declassified ON: OADR

NNNN

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE 01 SELECTED.

TOT/0628Z
RC

SSN 0277
O 270615Z APR 60
FM JTF/ALPHA
TO JTF/RC
BT

SUBJ: MSG. DELTA LTC 261232Z AND SUBJ. DELTA STATUS RPT AND MORE.

(U) 1. REF UR MSG NO. 176 DTG 261356Z APR 60 SUBJ SAME AS ABOVE

(U) 2. LTC [REDACTED] DEP THIS LOCATION ON MAG SAAM NO. 1120/13 ENROUTE TO POPE. ETA ANDREWS 071400Z APR 60. POPE UNKNOWN. SUGGEST COORDINATE [REDACTED] MOVEMENT TO DTG FROM LOCATION.

ONLY 5 DELTA SUPPORT PERSONNEL REMAIN AT THIS SITE. INTEND TO REMAIN UNTIL ROLLUP IS COMPLETE. ONE DELTA OPERATOR IS REGARD NIMITZ AND ONE AT [REDACTED] ATTEMPTING TO RECOVERY BOTH TO ALPHA TO DAY. ETA CONUS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME.
BT
02277

551

NNNN

DDO NMCC
Classified By ~~JSAT~~
Declassified ON: OADR

Downloaded by
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 82

CONFIDENTIAL

OSN 0006
P 260530Z APR 70

FM: JTF [REDACTED]
TO: JTF/RC

SUBJECT: STATUS OF JTF FORCES
BT

~~SECRET~~
SUBJECT: STATUS OF JTF FORCES

1. HAVE RECEIVED UNCONFIRMED INFORMATION THAT VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE JTF HAVE BEEN CHOPPED FOR REDEPLOYMENT I.E. MCS AND AC TO EUROM.
2. PLEASE ADVISE.

BT

NR001

564

File

Classified By ~~JAS~~

Declassified On ~~OTAR~~

Declassified
DDO 10/20/01

MESSAGE 21 RECEIVED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO 11251921Z
CT

TO JTF ALPHA
FROM WASHINGTON (PITMAN)
JTF/CT

SUBJ: MISSION HELD PERG SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FROM USS NIMITZ
1. USS NIMITZ HAS 21 MISSION HELD
PERG AND 2000 LBS CARGO HELD
PERG LAUNCHED TO RETURN TO CONUS.
2. WILL TAKE TWO SOB FLIGHTS.

3. REQUEST JTF/RO EXPEDITED RETURN
FOR PERG.

FOR INFO SOME JTF SOB PERSONS
WILL REMAIN IN [REDACTED] UNTIL
END OF APR.

4. PITMAN AND [REDACTED] ARE
CONSIDERING COMMERCIAL TRAVEL
TO WASHINGTON VIA [REDACTED]
PARTICIPATE IN HELD CARGO DEPART
5. FOR USS NIMITZ HELD STATUS
OF HELD FROM CARGO DEPART
FOLLOWS

6. NR 1 HELD NO PROBL

7. NR 2 NO STAGE POOL FAILURE
3 HRS AFTER T/O

8. NR 3 2 NO STAGE POOL FAILURE
FAILURE ENROUTE. CRASHED IN
LA

9. NR 4 NO PROBL

10. NR 5 1 NO PROBL. LARGER AND
ABANDONED LARGE DEBERT CARGO
LAKE APPROX 1 HR INTO

FLT AFTER CONFIRMING TWO
GLASS. 4/5 WAS HAVING FULL
TRANSFER PROBL ALSO

11. NR 7: MINOR AFD PROBL

ENROUTE. NR 8: CARGO AFD SERV. INTERMEDIATE
NEAR SOB SHIP LIGHT AT COAST IN
POINT. CONT PROBL TO LA

12. EXPEDITED HELD CREWS TO DEPART JTF ALPHA
FOR CONUS TOMORROW
BT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355

CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

☐ DESI REL DOWN TO CONFID

REVW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM JS

C-565

Classified By JCS

Declassified On: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MSC161
251520Z APR 80

FM JIF-RC
TO JIF

1. DECISION MADE NOT TO SUPPORT
JCRX FLINTLOCK 22 WITH SECOND TAC
MC-130 FROM FOUR ASSETS. TAC.
AIR STAFF AND USECOM CONCUR.

REVW 25: -P4 87

NNNN

#567

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

707 / 1150 Z
KCL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

25112
[REDACTED]

- RECOVERY OF EQUIPMENT
1. DURING EXTRACTION ON NIGHT OF 24 APRIL
BETA PERSONNEL LOADED EQUIPMENT
FOUND IN THE FIELD ONTO VARIOUS DEPARTING AIRCRAFT.
IDENTITY OF A/C IS UNKNOWN. PERSONNEL DID
NOT DEPART ON THE SAME AIRCRAFT.
 2. SM STATED THAT HE PERSONALLY LOADED
TWO RUCKSACKS, ONE PISTOL BELT W/HANDGUN,
AND OTHER ITEMS ON AN AIRCRAFT.
 3. THIS EQUIPMENT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN
TRANSFERRED WITH THE PERSONNEL.
 4. REQUEST A THOROUGH SEARCH BE MADE FOR
ANY EXTRA EQUIPMENT WHICH MAY BE ON THE
AIRCRAFT. EXERCISE CARE WHEN HANDLING
RUCKSACKS OR
OTHER ITEMS. THEY MAY CONTAIN DEMOLITIONS,
AMMUNITION AND GRENADES OR
FRAGILE COMM/NIGHT VISION ITEMS.
 5. REPORT ANYTHING FOUND TO CTF, J-4 FOR
DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS.

#573

INWADND

Classified by [initials]
Declassified on [initials]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW FD 1235

DATE 11/17/01 BY [initials]
CLASSIFIED BY [initials]
DECLASSIFIED BY [initials]
DATE 11/17/01 BY [initials]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT / 1045Z
KCL

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12358

CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

☐ DECL ☒ DOWNER TO CONFID

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM JS

SSN 8235

NY

DTG 251835Z APR 80

FM ALPHA/J2

E/ TO [REDACTED] COL KYLL

SUBJ: OPSEC VIOLATION

1. [REDACTED] REPORTS THAT A USAF MAJOR WAS TAKING PHOTOS OF ACTIVITIES AT DESERT TRACK AND IN [REDACTED] WITH SONNY [REDACTED]. HE IS MEMBER OF EC- OR HC-130 FLIGHT CREW. ONLY IDENTIFICATION MAJOR, LIGHT BROWN HAIR.

(U) 2. PLEASE OBTAIN FILM OF INDIVIDUAL AND SEND IT TO JTF.

BT

8235

Classified By JCS

Declassified ON OADR

575

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JTF / 25 250
JOC

1-578

SSN 8221
ZNY TTTTT
O 288248Z
FM JTF/VAUCHT
TO JCS
BT

SUBJ: CLASSIFIED MATERIAL COMPROMISE
1. INITIAL DEBRIFFINGS INDICATE THAT
SUBSEQUENT TO THE COLLISION AND EXPLOSION OF THE RH-53 AND EC-130
AT DESERT TRACK, HELICOPTER ROUTE, MAPS, CEOI'S, KEYLISTS AND
OTHER SENSITIVE MATERIAL WERE INADVERTENTLY LEFT ABOARD THE
ABANDONED HELICOPTERS. CEOI'S INDICATE

(U) 2. WHILE THIS IS A SERIOUS CLASSIFIED MATERIAL COMPROMISE, I RECOMMEND
AGAINST A DESTRUCTIVE STRIKE TO DESTROY THIS MATERIAL.

Classified By: JES DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

1-578

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10T / 0400Z
JN

1-579

SSN 0222
O DTG 250315Z APR 80
FM: JTF/MOORE
TO: JTF/RC

~~SECRET~~
SUBJECT: PROPOSED DRAWDOWN OF JTF KC-135(TS)
1. (TS) RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE FOR
REDUCING KC-135 ACTIVITY AT SITE ALPHA AND

27 APRIL: 3 KC-135 ARTS REDEPLOY SITE ALPHA
TO [REDACTED]

2 KC-135 ARTS REDEPLOY [REDACTED]
TO GUAM

28 APRIL: 1 KC-135 ART AND 2 KC-135A'S REDEPLOY
SITE ALPHA TO [REDACTED]

1 KC-135 ART AND 1 KC-135A REDEPLOY
TO GUAM.

ONCE REACHING [REDACTED] AND GUAM, AIRCRAFT
COULD BE INTEGRATED INTO THE EUROPEAN/
PACIFIC TANKER TASK FORCE REDEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE.

2. (TS) FOUR AIRCRAFT WOULD REMAIN AT
SITE ALPHA AND [REDACTED] TO CONTINUE
KC-135 PRESENCE. IF IT IS DESIRABLE TO
RETAIN THESE LEVELS, AIRCRAFT COULD BE
REPLACED BY EUROPEAN/ PACIFIC TANKER
TASK FORCE ASSETS.

3. (TS) [REDACTED] WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE COULD
BE ADJUSTED TO SUPPORT REDEPLOYMENT OF
KC-135'S TO [REDACTED] IF DESIRED.
BT

#579

File

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By: JES DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAIL COACH

TO T 10600Z
10Z

(C) SSMB27E
NY TTTT
O 250500Z
FM JTF/ALPHA
TO NIMITZ

(i-587)

G [REDACTED] 6 CYS
FOR ALL ELEMENT
INFO JCS/RC
BT

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: JTF 79 CEOI (18 APR 82) (U)

1. LTST SUBJ CEOI NO LONGER REQUIRED. REQ ALL ADDRES DEST
REF CEOI AND FWD DEST REPORT DIRECT MAIL TO JCS J3 ATTN SOD.

E [REDACTED] INSURE ALL CYS RECD AND DIST ARE
ACCOUNTED FOR.

2. (U) REQ ALL ADDRES ACK RECT THIS MSG BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS AVAIL
BT

NICIN

#581

DDO NMCC
Classified By JES
Declassified ONI
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

*Placed
& Col [redacted]
Section
24/14102*

REDBARN. [redacted]
PASS [redacted]

G

STATES NO RPT NO QUESTION PERTAINING TO URSTA
FLASH MSG DTG 241251Z AND NO PROBELMS ON THIS END
ATT. DO URSTA COPY TTY MSG
GGNBTXV117

(#585)

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

00000

EG
RED BARN DE EDSEL AND FORR I WAS JUST ASKED BY LTC [REDACTED] IHI LTC [REDACTED]
(NAVY) WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE GENERATORS THAT THEY SEND YOU FROM [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] THEY (GENERATORS) WERE SENT OUT WITH [REDACTED]
ON THE J-130'S.....NEED TO KNOW IF THEY ARRIVED OK AND IF IN
THEY ARE OPERATIONAL AND FIVERS.....KKK//KKN
NNNNJOTJDUKMD
P.6722331: *336NLRXGVN7ATDIMPYURVNMZF LMMIO LLTL.

22;

i-4587

Classified By
Declassified On

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC 02
170 251307Z APR 68

FM: CJC
TO: SITE ALPHA/CDR JTF

~~SECRET~~
SUBJECT: OPERATION "RICE BOWL/EAGLE CLAW"

REF YOUR 250510Z APR 68
CONCUR WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATION.

BT
25 APR 68

NNNN

TOR / 1308Z

cc MCN #0124

588

Declassified by
DDO (mcc)
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1200 15 10 0001425.

EG

0101 1
13 0400 000 60

IN

TO NHTH

JTF/J

BT

BT

SUBJ: INTEL SUPPORT

1. INFORMATION CONCERNING POSITION DIRECTION

SPEED OF SHIP 6834 STOROCHEVOU, KRIVAK 1

LAST NOTED [REDACTED] END AGI PELENG

LAST NOTED [REDACTED] REQUIRED AT THIS

UNIT.

2. ADDITIONALLY REQUEST YOU PROVIDE THIS UNIT WITH

ALL CURRENT NAVAL POSITIONS IN GULF OF OMAN

AND ARABIAN SEA. INFO REQUIRED NO LATER

THAN 241100Z.

REVIEW 23 APR 10

BT

0213

MCN 0118

594

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW 12055

CONDUCTED ON

12 Aug 92

BY

DDO/MCC

DATE

12 Aug 92

BY

DDO/MCC

DATE

12 Aug 92

BY

DDO/MCC

DATE

12 Aug 92

BY

DDO/MCC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ON 0712

0 232500Z APR 82

TO JTF/LIG GAST

~~SECRET~~

1. JEDJ: [REDACTED] SITREP NUMBER 6

1.) 30 MINUTE C-141 SEPARATION SHOULD POSE NO PROBLEM. WE WILL PART AND OFF LOAD C-141'S ON LOOP TAXIWAY AT NORTH END OF MAIN RUNWAY. AFTER OFF-LOAD, THEY WILL TAXI TO NORTH RAMP NEAR TOWER. C-141 REFUELING WILL TAKE PLACE AFTER C-130 LAUNCH.

(U) 2.) INSURE THAT INBOUND C-130 ON 24 APR ARRIVES NLT 0800Z. REFUELING CAPABILITY INADEQUATE TO REFUEL C-130/C-141'S AND TOP OFF MC/EC-130S AT SAME TIME.

3.) ATC PROBLEMS AT [REDACTED] HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. SILENT ARRIVAL AND

PAGE 2 ~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTURE ARE NO PROBLEM AS LONG AS WE ARE ADVISED AHEAD OF TIME AND GIVEN ACCURATE ETA'S FOR COORDINATION PURPOSES.

4.) MET WITH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] INFORMED US THAT HIS [REDACTED] WHO [REDACTED] INSTRUCTED [REDACTED] TO STAND BACK AND OFFER SUPPORT ONLY WHEN REQUESTED TO DO SO. HE DID NOT QUESTION THE SEA SURVEILLANCE EXPLANATION. SPECIAL AIRLIFT FOR [REDACTED] TO [REDACTED] ON 25 APR WILL BE PROVIDED BY [REDACTED] [REDACTED] WILL PLAN TO RETURN TO [REDACTED] AT 0640Z 26 APR ON A SCHEDULED [REDACTED] FLIGHT.

BT

0712

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Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

100015Z APR 68
JTF CDR JTF

MSC 706
230015Z APR 68
FM: CJCS
TO CDR, JTF
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E (ADMIRAL LONG AND I AGREED THAT PACOM MC-130'S AT [REDACTED] ARE
CHOPPED TO JTF EFFECTIVE 221020Z.
BT

596

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Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

BT

Classified by
D. B. N. M. C.
Declassify on OADR
by D. B. N. M. C.
12 Aug 94

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G

3 10 A. 7/11 100 REFERENCE OVER SPINTEL BROADCAST

121446Z APR 62

REF PROVIDED MIXED 100 DATA AND REQUESTED

PLAN FOR MIXED 100 ACTIVITIES.

PRIME CONSIDERATIONS AND TRADEOFF OF

NORMAL FLYING PERIODS CAN COVER REQUESTED (4-6 ACFT) WINDOWS.

WILL THAT SATISFY LEVEL DESIRED OR DO WE NEED LARGER
EFFORT, WHICH COULD DEGRADE ALERT STATUS AND SUBSEQUENT CONTINGENCY
RESPONSE.

REV 1: 23APR62

BT

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MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

i-598

Classified by: DDONMC
12 Aug 92
OADR

Declassify by
DDONMC
13 Aug 92

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~~SECRET~~

TAPE FURS.

ZNY TTTT ZF

0 232752Z APR 80

FM HELO DET/NIMITZ/S-2

TO SITE ALFA/J-2

INFO JCS/R C-J2

BT

SC/TOT/13208

~~TOP SECRET~~ /DO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER OPINTEL BROADCAST

REF SITE ALFA MSG 082 DTG 221830Z

SUBJ: HELO DET INTREP 04

1. AS OF 0700Z 23 APR 80 SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY REMAINS ORIENTED
WELL TO SE OF NIMITZ TG.

VIRTUALLY ALL OTHER SOVIET SURFACE COMBAT-
ANTS ARE WITHIN 200 NM OF THIS POINT

2. AGI 477 IS STILL . CTF 70 IS IN
PROCESS OF MOVING ARG EASTWARD. THIS WILL UNCOVER AIRSPACE FOR
130 MISSIONS OUT OF . AGI HAS NO
OF TRACKING OUR BIRDS.

3. TWO ILGAEI'S FM . TO
SE OF SOCOTRA THIS MORNING.

ADDITIONALLY, IRANIAN P-3 AND C-130 ARE ACTIVE IN VISUAL
RECON OF US NAVAL UNITS IN GULF AND JUST SOUTH OF STRAITS. MORE
INFO WILL FOL IN NEXT INTREP. NO AIR ACTIVITY HAS BEEN DIRECTED
AT NIMITZ THUS FAR.

4. REF AREA OF INTEREST DESCRIBED IN YR MSG 082, AGI 477 IS ONLY
PLATFORM IN OR NEAR BOX AT THIS TIME. ANTICIPATE INTREP 05 WILL
BE COMING YOUR WAY APPROX 231800Z. WE HAVE GOOD HANDLE ON SIT AT
THIS END AND ARE PROVIDING INTEL SUPPORT TO CAG-8 FOR FIGHTER
COVERAGE OF NIGHT NR. 2 EXFIL OPS.

REWW 23 APR 00

BT

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#599

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW 13 12355
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONMCC
EXECL CL DOWN TO ACAT
REVIEW ON OADR
DIA

1
RECEIVED.

MCN 112

MSG
DTG: 220145Z APR 80

FM: JCS/RC-J2
TO: SITE ALPHA/J2

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY

REFERENCE: SITE ALPHA/J2 MSG 221705Z APR 80

BASED ON RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO YOUR SITE, INCLUDING INFORMATION FROM CYNOS, WE BELIEVE THAT YOU ARE PROBABLY IN A BETTER POSITION THAN US TO ASSESS THE CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE ARABIAN SEA AREA. WE STAND READY, HOWEVER, TO PROVIDE ANY BACKUP SUPPORT THAT YOU MAY REQUIRE, ALTHOUGH OUR INFORMATION MAY NOT BE AS COMPLETE OR CURRENT AS YOURS.
BT

L-#601

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Classified By JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

Classified by
DDO N/A
12/1/80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A DUPLICATE

TOR/230541Z
RBN/MCN 109

MSG# 731
DTG: 230935Z APR 80

FM: JCS/RC-J2
TP: SITE ALPHA/J2

SUBJ: KC-135 DETECTION

1. REF YOUR MSG 221710 APR 80, SA.

2. KC-135 ACFT COULD BE DETECTED AT 25,000 FT

[IF DETECTED] WOULD PROBABLY QUERY FIRST VIA OPEN ATC
COMM AND [REDACTED] AND, IF THESE WERE UNSUCCESSFUL, INTERCEPT
WITH FIGHTERS FOR VISUAL IDENTIFICATION. THE IDENTITY OF THE ACFT
WOULD PROBABLY BE ANNOUNCED IN THE CLEAR TO GROUND CONTROLLERS,
BUT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THEY WOULD ENGAGE. FOLLOWING A SIMILAR
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE, IRAQ WOULD PROBABLY ENGAGE IF THEY
PERCEIVED A THREAT FROM THE AIRCRAFT. IRAN WOULD ALSO PROBABLY
FOLLOW A SIMILAR IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE. ALTHOUGH IRAN WOULD
PROBABLY NOT ENGAGE IF THE ACFT STAYED OUT OF IRANIAN AIR SPACE,
THEY WOULD ANNOUNCE THE AIRCRAFT PRESENCE THROUGH THE AIR DEFENSE
COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM.

3. REDUCING THE POSSIBILITY OF DETECTION IS NOT CONSIDERED
POSSIBLE
BT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONmcc
☐ DECL BY DOWNS TO CONF
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM DIA

604

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSN 8811
O 230745Z APR 88
FM [REDACTED] KYLE
TO JTF/VAUGHT
INFO JTF/BECKWITH [REDACTED]
BT

SUBJECT: TRANSFER OF DELTA FROM C-141
TO MC-130 AT [REDACTED]

1. (U) I HAVE OBTAINED TWO TRUCKS
LOCALLY FROM [REDACTED] THAT ARE
DEDICATED ASSETS FOR OUR EXCLUSIVE
USE 24 APR 88. TWO (2) MAN DELTA
ADVANCED PARTY HAVE INSPECTED
VEHICLES AND HAVE PRACTICED
DRIVEN SAME. VEHICLES ARE
[REDACTED] ARMY STYLE AND IN
EXCELLENT CONDITION. ESTIMATE 20-30
PERSONNEL CAN BE MOVED ON EACH SHUTTLE
FROM OFFLOAD AREA TO MC-130 MARSHALLING
AREA. WE TIMES THE DRIVE
AT THREE MINUTES (3) FROM OFF-LOAD
POINT TO MC-130 AREA FOR
ON LOAD. WILL CONSTRUCT COVER
FOR TRUCK BED (TENT) TO ENSURE
SECURITY OF CARGO/PAX MOVEMENT.
ESTIMATE 100 PERSONNEL CAN BE
TRANSLOADED IN 40 MINUTES (40).
IF 2-C-141'S ARE LOADED TO SPREAD
DELTA EVENLY, CAN PROCEED PAINLESS
AND SECURE OPERATION. IF MOST
OF DELTA DRIVE ON FIRST C-141, WE
WILL MOVE THEM IN SHORT ORDER.
PATIENCE REQUESTED.
2. (U) I HAVE COME OUT TO THE
RUNWAY WITH DELTA [REDACTED] AND LTCOL
[REDACTED] TO PACE OFF POSSIBLE
BACKING OF C-130 TO C-141
FOR TRANSLOAD. THIS IS AN
EXTREMELY AWKWARD AND POTENTIALLY
ACCIDENT PRODUCING SITUATION SINCE
WE HAVE NOT PRACTISED SUCH
AN OPERATION.

3. (U) I OF THE TWO (2) ALTERNATIVES,
I STRONGLY RECOMMEND
TRUCKING AS SUREST, SECUREST,
AND MOST EFFICIENT MEANS
TO ACCOMPLISH THE JOB. THE
AREA SELECTED FOR C-141
PARKING IS DEPARTURE END OF
RUNWAY [REDACTED] (SHALL LOOP AROUND
TAXIWAYS). [REDACTED] HAS BEEN TO
AREA AND PACE OFF WING
CLEARANCE. C-141'S WILL NEED TO
SHUT DOWN OUT BOARD ENGINES
PRIOR TO LEAVING ACTIVE RUNWAY.
C-141'S WILL REMAIN ON HARD SURFACE
TAXIWAYS AT ALL TIMES. FOLLOW ME
WILL LEAD C-141 TO OFF-LOAD POINT
[REDACTED] WILL PART. C-141'S MAY OR
MAY NOT SHUT DOWN, YOUR CHOICE.
SUBSEQUENT TO OFF-LOAD WILL
REPORT C-141'S AT BASE OPS
RAMP FOR REFUEL AND RELAUNCH.
ANTICIPATE FUEL DELAY DUE TO
LIMITED TRUCKS WITH LIMITED
CAPACITY. AFTER ALL MC/EC-130'S
HAVE BEEN TOPPED OFF, GAS
TRUCKS WILL PROCEED TO C-141,
SUPPORT FROM [REDACTED] TODAY
(U) SUPER, WE ARE WORKING INTO
THEIR WEEKEND SCHEDULE NOW
TO ENSURE NECESSARY SUPPORT
IS AVAILABLE TO OUR OPERATION.

4. (U) I AM AWAITING YOUR INSTRUCTIONS.
BT
8811

Classified By [REDACTED]
Declassified ON: OADR

DDOW mcc
12 Aug 92
Kernighan to GNE
by DDOW mcc 12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10017.
222340Z APR 80

FM: HQ/RC-J2
TO: SITE ALPHA/J2

~~SECRET~~
SUBJ: EMERGENCY LZ'S FOR KC-135's

RESPONDING TO YOUR REQUEST 222340Z APR 80 SAB, THE FOLLOWING
LZ'S MEET THE REQUIREMENT SPECIFIED:

A. SAUDI ARABIA

(1) AL FATIN	(2754N 04631E)
(2) AL JORY	(2947N 04006E)
(3) RISHA	(1959N 04238E)
(4) DAHRAN INT'L	(2616N 05009E)
(5) GASSIM	(2610N 04346E)
(6) SIFAN	(1654N 04035E)
(7) HAIL	(2727N 34142E)
(8) JEDDAH INT'L	(2130N 03912E)
(9) KHAMIS MUSHAIT	(1619N 04229E)
(10) MEDINA	(2433N 03942E)
(11) NEJRAN	(1737N 04426E)
(12) RUJADH INT'L	(2443N 04644E)
(13) SHARURAH HS	(1725N 04706E)
(14) SULAYEL	(2028N 04536E)
(15) TAEUK	(2622N 03638E)
(16) TAIJ	(2129N 04033E)
(17) WEJH	(2612N 03629E)
(18) YENBO	(2409N 03807E)

B. KUWAIT

(1) KUWAIT INT'L	(2914N 04759E)
(2) KUWAIT MAINBASE	(2856N 04747E)
(3) KUWAIT WEST	(2921N 04731E)

C. OMAN

(1) MASIRAH	(2041N 05653E)
(2) SALALAH	(1702N 05406E)
(3) SEER INT'L	(2336N 05017E)
(4) THUMRAIT	(1740N 05401E)

BT

UNCLAS

Classified By JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

Declassified by
DDO NMC
12 Aug 90

#607

McN
102

0 22100 Z APR 71
FM: HELD DET/91
TO: JTF/J1
INFO: JTF/RC

101
2615

SUBJ: AIRCRAFT ASSIGNMENT

REF: (A) JTF/J1 220400Z APR 71

1. FOLLOWING AIRCRAFT ASSIGNMENT AS REQ BY REF (A) IS PROVIDED.
ACFT BUREAU NUMBER USED INSTEAD OF TAIL NUMBER. NONE OF THE
ACFT WILL HAVE TAIL NUMBERS. LIST IN FIVE COLUMNS.

ACFT NO	BUREAU NO	NAME	RANK	SER	SSAN
-1	150744	LTJ. STIFFERT	LTJCOL	USMC	
		HE [REDACTED]	CAPT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	GYSGT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	AD3	USN	
		[REDACTED] SGT	USMC	[REDACTED]	
		[REDACTED]	SSGT	USA	
-2	150753	[REDACTED]	MAJ	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	CAPT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	SSGT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	AT2	USN	
		[REDACTED]	SGT	USMC	
-3	150761	J.H. SCHAEFER	MAJ	USMC	
		W.B. PETTY	MAJ	USMC	
		W.L. JOHNSON	SSGT	USMC	
		J.N. HOLMES JR	CPL	USMC	
		J.D. BRYCE	SGT	USMC	
-4	150693	[REDACTED]	MAJ	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	CAPT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	SSGT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	CPL	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	GYSGT	USMC	
-5	150754	[REDACTED]	LCDR	USN	
		[REDACTED]	CAPT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	GYSGT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	CPL	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	SGT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	SGT	USA	
		C.H. PITMAN	COL	USMC	
-6	150750	[REDACTED]	MAJ	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	LT	USN	
		[REDACTED]	SSGT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	CPL	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	CPL	USMC	
-7	150686	[REDACTED]	CAPT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	CAPT	USAF	
		[REDACTED]	GYSGT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	AT2	USN	
		[REDACTED]	GYSGT	USMC	
-8	150756	[REDACTED]	CAPT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	LCDR	USN	
		[REDACTED]	AMH1	USN	
		[REDACTED]	SSGT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	AE2	USN	

2. ABOVE INFO BASED ON LAUNCH OF 8 ACFT. IF NO. 8 IS NOT A
FLYER, CREW COMPOSITION WILL CHANGE. WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED.

BT

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Declassified ON: OADR

12/1/71
JCS

MSG #71
DTG 222145Z APR 67
FM: 1-3011
TO: SITE, ALPHA

TOP 222310Z
LT 11CN 611

i #616

G ATTN: [REDACTED]
SUBJ: A/C 635569

1. AIRCRAFT 635569 MAY HAVE DEPARTED HOME STATION WITH THE FOLLOWING PROBLEM:
NUMBER THREE ENGINE TEMP DATUM SYSTEM INOPERATIVE, FLY IN NULL.
2. PRIOR TO ITS DEPARTURE, THE FOLLOWING MAINTENANCE ACTIONS WERE PERFORMED TO RESOLVE TO PROBLEM.
 - A. REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF THE RELAY BOX, COORDINATOR, AND TO AMP.
 - B. TROUBLESHOOT THE LEFT HAND ELECTRICAL HARNESS.
 - (1) EVERTHING VLFRCESA
 - (2) NINE WIRES WERE FOUND DANGLING IN THE ELECTRICAL HARNESS JUNCTION BOX, WIRES WERE REMOVED. THESE WIRES MAY HAVE CAUSED FAILURE OF THE PREVIOUSLY CHANGED TO SYSTEMS COMPONENTS.
3. THE ABOVE IS PROVIDED TO ASSIST IN FURTHER TROUBLESHOOTING IF PROBLEM STILL EXISTS WITH THE TEMP DATUM SYSTEM.
BT

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~~Classified by~~ JCS
~~Declassified on~~ OADR
Declassified by
DDO/Imcc
12 AUG 92

0 220950Z APR 80
FM NIMITZ/PITMAN
TO JTF/VAUGHT

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: COORDINATION DATA (U)

- A. SECURE PHONECON LTG GAST/COL PITMAN 221730Z APR 80
 - B. SECURE PHONECON COL PITMAN/CCL KYLE 221745Z APR 80
 1. AS PER REF, UNDERSTAND PLANNED "OVER THE WALL" TIME IS 2100Z. REQUEST FIRM TIME WHEN HELOS SHOULD GET AIRBORNE IN THE EVENT ALL COMM FAILS; NO RADIO LAUNCH TIME SHOULD PROVIDE FAIL SAFE METHOD OF LAUNCH.
 2. REQUEST EXPECTED TIMING BETWEEN MFA AND COMPOUND INFILTRATIONS, I.E. SIMULTANEOUSLY, MFA WHEN FORCE REACHES THE WALL, NJ WHEN OTHER FORCE DISCOVERED. WHAT HAPPENS IN THE EVENT OF LOST COMM BETWEEN GROUND FORCES?
 3. WEATHER DATA EXCELLENT DETAIL AND LOOKS GOOD FOR TARGET DATE.
 4. HELO STATUS 221300Z SEVEN MISSION CAPABLE. EIGHTH HELO, 736, UL HAS FLOWN BUT IS DOWN EST. UP BY 231000Z. FOUR HELOS HAVE BEEN PAINTED (LOOKS GOOD) AND THE OTHER FOUR ARE PRIMED. EST COMPLETION AT 231400Z.
 5. IN DISCUSSING PLANNED TACAIR SUPPORT ANCHORED AT NORTH-WESTERN END OF PERSIAN GULF ON NIGHT TWO, THE LIKELIHOOD OF NEEDING FIGHTERS TO PROTECT AIRBORNE WITHDRAWAL WOULD SEEM MORE PREVALENT THAN A REQUIREMENT FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. INDICATIONS IN REF A WERE THAT FIGHTERS WERE TO PROTECT THE TANKER AND ATTACK AIRCRAFT (A-6) WOULD RENDER CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, IF REQUIRED. REQUEST CLARIFICATION OF TACAIR MISSION NIGHT TWO. CTF 70 HAS INDICATED THAT HE COULD PROVIDE 4 F-14'S AND 2 A-6 TRANS WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FIGHTER COVER FOR THE EXTRACTION FORCE AS WELL AS THE TANKER AND NIGHT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT CAPABILITY.
 6. REF B CONFIRMED TANKING PLAN FOR DESERT ONE IF EIGHT HELOS ARRIVE. NO. 1 AND 2 ON NORTHERN MOST TANKER, NO. 3, 4 AND 5 ON MIDDGF TANKER (NORTH SIDE) AND 6, 7 AND EIGHT ON SOUTHERN TANKER. EST. 1600 GAL REQUIRED BY EACH HELO.
 7. STANDING BY FOR PAX/CARGO WT. BREAKDOWN FOR FIRST SIX HELOS.
 8. CONCERNING EMBASSY EXTRACTION, STADIUM LZ/STILL CONSIDERED PRIMARY AND BEST FOR MISSION DUE TO SPACE AND DEPARTURE AREA WHICH WILL PERMIT HEAVIER LOADS. UNDERSTAND REQUIREMENT MAY COME UP FOR USE OF EMBASSY LZ. THIS WILL BE PASSED TO INBOUND HELOS BY LZ CONTROL. RECOMMEND USE OF PRIMARY ZONE IF POSSIBLE.
- REVW: 22 APR 80
BT

TOR 2206
5B
#617
MKN 07E

Disclassified
DDA N
2 Aug 80

DAP

21364

TOP SECRET

#618

O 222045Z APR 80

FM NIMITZ/PITMAN
TO JTF/VAUGHT ✓

~~SECRET~~
SUBJ: STATUS (U)

A. NIMITZ/PITMAN 220845Z APR 80
1. PLEASE CORRECT REF A, PARA 3, LINE 7 TO READ - ONLY 200
RDS AMMO VKR GUN WITH ADDITIONAL AMMO IN NUMBER SEVEN AND...
REVW: 21 APR 80
BT

NNNN

Declassified
2008
12/1/08

REL ON
E U

BERGO

0 222040Z APR 80
FM NIMTZ/PITHAN
TO JTF/J-4 ✓

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SUBJ: PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT FOR HELO DET.~~

A. NIMITZ/PITMAN 220845Z APR 80

1. PARA 3 AND 4 OF THE REF REFS REQUEST VERIFY FOLLOWING MISSION
EQUAP IN QUANTITIES/LOCATIONS INDICATED:

ITEM	QTY	LOC
CANOE BAG NEP /SUPPORT 48		DESERT ONE
SYSTEMS (SACFT)		
CAL .50MG	02	
CAL .50 AMMO	1500 RDS	
BT		

NNNNJVH

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Declassified ON: OADR~~

~~SECRET~~

TOR/227/28
JC/men 23

OSL DTG 221710Z AT 2125Z

MSG #65
DTG 221930Z APR 60
FM: JTF/RC
TO: JTF/CDR

622

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUEJ: SENSITIVE LETTERS

1. CHIEF U.S. [REDACTED] IS DEPARTING
EUCOM FOR [REDACTED] VIA [REDACTED] DEPARTURE FROM EUCOM 2400HOURS
EUCOM TIME TODAY. HE WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO PICK UP A PACKAGE FROM [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] FOR DELIVERY TO [REDACTED] GEN. PUSTAY WILL DISPATCH
SEPARATE INSTRUCTIONS TO BOTH GEN. GAST AND [REDACTED] USMTM

2. YOUR [REDACTED] SUGGESTION BEING IMPLEMENTED HERE. YOU WILL GET
A COPY OF [REDACTED]
BT

Classified By JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

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~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED
JCS
O.D. 221930Z
JTF/RC
JTF/CDR
JTF/RC
JTF/CDR
JTF/RC
JTF/CDR
JTF/RC
JTF/CDR

REF ID: A66084
SITE ALPHA

TCR/222/z
VC/MCN 983

SUBJ: IRAN SITUATION REPORT AS OF 0500 22 APRIL 1963

2. FIGHTING BROKE OUT AGAIN YESTERDAY BETWEEN ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST AND LEFTISTS ON THE TEHRAN UNIVERSITY CAMPUS. THE FUNDAMENTALISTS, NOT ALL OF WHOM APPEAR TO BE STUDENTS, HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN SIMILAR CLASHES THROUGHOUT IRAN OVER THE PAST THREE DAYS AS OF YESTERDAY.

3. PRESIDENT-ELECT BANI-SADR DENOUNCED THE RIGHTWING MUSLIM ATTEMPTS TO TAKE OVER UNIVERSITIES AS BEING "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY," AND SAID THESE ACTIONS WERE DESIGNED TO UNDERMINE THE POLITICAL BACKING ENJOYED HIS GOVERNMENT AMONG MODERATE, CENTRISTS, AND OTHER GROUPS. HOWEVER, THE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS HAVE THE BACKING OF THE QOM THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY (WHICH HAS CLOSE TIES TO KHOMEINI) AS WELL AS SUPPORT FROM THE CLERGY-DOMINATED ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY. THESE ACTIONS, WHICH ARE PROBABLY DESIGNED TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE CLERGY'S HOLD ON THE COUNTRY, APPEAR TO BE YET ANOTHER FACET OF THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE MODERATE SECULARISTS AND THE HARDLINE CLERGY.

4. SHOOTING BETWEEN ARMY TROOPS KURDISH GUERRILLAS ENTERED ITS FOURTH DAY YESTERDAY IN THE KURDISH TOWN OF SAGGEZ.

5. THIS IS PROBABLY THE RESULT OF INTENSE EFFORTS BY THE IRANIANS TO IMPROVE AIR DEFENSE READINESS ALONG ITS WESTERN BORDER BECAUSE OF RECENT PROBLEMS WITH IRAQ.

TCS
ADR
ON

SOVIET PROPAGANDA CLAIMS THAT MOSCOW HAS ALREADY
BEGIN EFFORTS TO CIRCUMVENT A POSSIBLE US BLOCKADE OF IRAN. AN
IN THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE "MOSCOW NEWS WEEKLY" SAID CARGO
WEST EUROPE IS POURING INTO IRAN, AND THAT TRANSIT OF IRANIAN
VIA SOVIET TERRITORY IS OF "VITAL IMPORTANCE" TO IRAN
BECAUSE OF A THREATENED US ECONOMIC BLOCKADE. THERE ARE INDICA-
TIONS, HOWEVER, THAT RAIL TRAFFIC THROUGH JOLFA AND ASTARA IS
ALREADY THAT THE FREIGHT TIE-UP COULD LAST FOR MONTHS.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~14.~~ 14. SOVIET ACTIVITY IN INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTH CHINA SEA
A. AREA OF U.S. BATTLE GROUPS: AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR
AND A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE CONTINUE SURVEILLANCE AS THE USS NIMITZ AND USS
CORAL SEA BATTLE GROUPS AND AMPHIBIOUS READINESS GROUP ALPHA.

F. INDICATIONS OF IL-38/BEAR DEPLOYMENTS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN:
NO CHANGE, NO ACTIVITY.

G. IL-38/MAE DEPLOYMENTS TO THE INDIAN AND IL-38 RECCE MISSIONS:

MSG #33
DTG 251005Z APR 67
FM: JCRC
TO: JTF CLR/SITE "1"

TO: R / 3510.2
1. C / 1950
NEW 075

630

1. EUCOM HAS VERBALLY CHOPPED THEIR FORCE INVOLVED IN RICE BOWL TO THE JTF EFFECTIVE 1001Z TODAY. WAS AGREED TO BY GENERAL ROGERS, CINCEUR. HE HAS SO INSTRUCTED GEN. ALLEN, DCINCEUR AT EUCOM. GENERAL HUYSER, CINCHAC, HAS INSTRUCTED HIS PEOPLE TO COMPLY WITH YOUR OPERATIONAL ORDERS ON USE OF C-141 DURING EXECUTION PHASE.

2. WOULD YOU SEE ANY PROBLEM IN OUR CALLING THE EXECUTION PHASE EAGLE CLAW. THIS WOULD DIFFERENTIATE EARLIER PHASES FROM EXECUTION. ALSO EAGLE CLAW WILL CANNOT A STRONGER IMAGE IN THE AFTERMATH THAN RICE BOWL. IF ANY PROBLEM WITH THIS, WE WILL LEAVE ALONE.
BT

NNNN

Classified By ~~SCS~~
Declassified ~~ON OADR~~
Declassified by
DDONMCL
12 Aug 92

3644Z DUCK HUNTER DE FOX FIRE

G 0 230645Z APR 80
FM NIMITZ
TO CDR JTF
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ T//DO NOT RETRANSMIT ON OPINTEL BROADCAST

SUBJECT: COORDINATION DATA

REF: JTF 222353Z APR 80

1. REF REQUESTS CAP DATA

2. FOLLOWING INFO PROVIDED IN RESPONSE PARA 5. REF:

FUEL REQUIRED:

2F-14 PLUS 2A6: 2 HOURS...53,000 LBS; 3 HOURS...73,000 LBS.

4F-14 PLUS 2A6: 2 HOURS...81,000 LBS; 3 HOURS...111,000 LBS.

3. RATIONALE FOR 4 F-14S BASED ON POSSIBLE AIR THREAT FOR
WITHDRAWING FORCES.

4. ORDNANCE LOADS: EACH F-14...4SPW, 4SH & GUN; EACH A-6 (TRAM)...
B-APAM (CBU-59).

5. NO, REPEAT NO, OTHER MISSION PRIORITY HAS EVER OR NOW STANDS IN
WAY OF YOUR REQUIREMENTS.

VERY RESPECTFULLY

REVW: 23APR80

BT

NNNN

Declassified by
DDO/MCE
72 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MSG BT
DTG 221448Z DD 67
FROM JTF RC/MJ-4
TO ALPHA //COL [REDACTED] //COL KYLE//LTC [REDACTED]

MAN
#73

1. ALL ITEMS REQUESTED BY [REDACTED] MSG DTG 211830Z,
LESS THOSE TASKED TO ENCOM TOOK OFF FROM [REDACTED]
224000 LOCAL APR 68. INCLUDED ARE 45 1ST AID PACKETS
FOR [REDACTED]

2. ITEMS TASKED TO ENCOM ARE:
1942 50 T SWITCH
TUBING
SLEEVES
HYDRO PACKING ITEMS
5985-00-353-8518

3. MEDEVAC ACFT THAT DEPARTED POPE 22 APR 68 WILL
HAVE 45 AID PACKETS FOR [REDACTED] THIS WILL FILL
THEIR TOTAL RGMT.
BT

635

NNNNT

Classified By: DDONmcc
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by:
DDONmcc
12 Aug 92

ACRORS QSL 1543Z
KKKKKKK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

221300Z APR 80
FM HELD DET/NIMITZ/3-2
TO SITE ALFA/J-2
BT

~~SECRET~~

TOR 15
KCL

SECRET//NO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER OPINTEL BROADCAST
INT RLP 83

ACTIVITY IS NOW WELL SE OF NIMITZ. I ESTIMATE FOCUS OF USSR
2. KRIVAK 693 IS STILL UNLOCATED DESPITE AIR RECON
NEGATIVE SIGHTINGS VIC MAGIRAH IT APPEARS 693 IS BASED ON
HER VIC 313N 361E. 3. ONLY AGI 477 REMAINS IN CTF 70 SURVEILLANCE ROLE AT PRESENT.
GROUP VIC 23 22N 063 27E AT 3145Z.
4. SOVIET MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
OF ROGQV BY IL-33 MAYS BASED IN ADE. MISSION WAS FLOWN
ENTIRELY DURING 21-22 APRIL PERIOD OF DARKNESS. OTHER SOVIET AIR
ACTIVITY OF INTEREST

MCN
D7D

EXCESS OF 300NMS
5. AS OF 222000Z APRIL 80, NO INDICATION OF IRANIAN SOVIET OR
OTHER 3RD COUNTRY INCREASED INTEREST IN NIMITZ OR HELD OPS.
6. REF MFA GRIDS. WE REQUIRE 5 COPIES ONLY AT DESERT TRACK.
BT

(#638)

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 91
DERIVATIVE CL 89 JDD/mcc
DECLASSIFIED TO: JCS
REF ON OABP
REVIEWED ON: multiple times

JCS
Classified By: OADR
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOP SECRET
WE

MSG 52
UTC 201707Z APR 60
FROM JCS- RC (LTC [REDACTED])
TO JTF-SITE ALPHA (LTC [REDACTED])

SUBJ: RECOMMENDED CHANGE TO CE01.
PARAGRAPH 5. C. (1) REPLACE PERIOD AFTER
[REDACTED] WITH COMMA.

PARAGRAPH 5. C. DECODE SECTION.
(*) INSERT FOLLOWING CODEWORDS/MEANING
IN EXISTING PARAGRAPH IN ALPHABETICAL
ORDER.

CODEWORD

MEANING

ERONSON
CONCEPT
ELECTION
HERETIC
RED EARN

[REDACTED] SC-141 BASE

CORAL SEA
JTF-MAIN [REDACTED]

PARAGRAPH 7. A. CHANGE FIRST
KY-70 NUMBER TO 75847 RPT 75847.
CHANGE SECOND KY-70 NUMBER (CJCS) TO
75845 RPT 75845.
BT

MCN

869 ✓

ICY TO [REDACTED]

ICY TO COL [REDACTED]

639

Classified By
Declassified ON: 0 ADR 12 Aug 92

DDO NMC
12 Aug 92
Original sent to CDR
by DDO NMC
12 Aug 92

MESSAGE 07 RECEIVED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ST
17/00 () TRANSMIT OVER OPINTEL BROADCAST

SUBJ: STATUS (U)

- A. JTF 220150Z APR 82
- B. SECURE PHONE CON JTF CDR/DEPHELO OPS 220330Z APR 82
- 1. IN RESPONSE TO REF 4, ALL HELOS STRIPPED OF MIN. WT. AND PAINTING HAS COMMENCED. EST. PAINTING COMPLETE 231400Z. ENTIRE SHIP HAS TURNED TO IN SUPPORT OF JTF DET.
- 2. HELO STATUS AS REPORTED REF 3, SEVEN OF EIGHT UP. EIGHTH HELO UP FOR TEST 220330Z. BASED ON REF A AND B GUIDANCE EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO TAKE EIGHT.

TOR / 0920
TEL

AKN
066 ✓

3. JAW REF 3, ~~KEY~~ ~~KEYS~~ FOR JHF AND FM WILL BE REMOVED. EACH OF FIRST SIX HELOS WILL EXPECT CLOSE TO 5200 LBS OF PAX/CARGO AT DESERT TRACK PLUS SIX SETS OF ~~NETS~~ ~~AND~~ ~~POLES~~ FOR EACH HELO. NUMBER EIGHT HELO WILL REQUIRE SIX ADDITIONAL NETS AND POLES. RECOMMEND BRINGING OLD ~~NETS~~ ~~AND~~ ~~POLES~~ SINCE THERE ARE ONLY 42 SAND COLORED NETS AT YOUR LOCATION. HELO CREW WILL REMAIN FIVE, WITH TWO GUNNERS. ONLY 200 RDS AMMO IN NUMBER SEVEN AND EIGHT HELO AS WELL AS 1500 RDS PLUS TWO .50 CAL GUNS BEING POSITIONED AT CWO ~~REFUEL~~ POINT AT ~~ANCHORAGE~~.

4. REQUEST DETAILS OF MC/EC 130 FLT ROUTES INBOUND DAY ONE. HELO DATA BASED ON ESTIMATED WIND IS AS FOLLOWS:

POINT SHIP	LAT/LONG	TIME (ZULU)
COAST-IN		1505
TP 1		1534
TP 2		1544
TP 3		1616
TP 4		1711
DESERT 1		1739
DEPART DESERT 1		1933
TP 5		2033
TP 6		2039
TP 7		2237
DZ		2244
DEPART DZ		2246
HIDE		2251
		2306

642

5. CTF 70 HAS REQUESTED MOVING JTF SPECIAL COMM INTO FLAG BRIDGE AREA. INTEND TO RESPOND THAT COMM WILL REMAIN JTF DISCRETE UNTIL DISCOVERY OR ASSAULT TIME TO PRECLUDE EXPOSING OUR PLAN UNNECESSARILY. HOWEVER, ALL OUR DATA RECEIVED VIA BREVIETY CODE OR OTHER MEANS WILL BE PROVIDED DIRECTLY TO CTF 70, SO THAT HE MAY TRACK OUR PROGRESS. ONCE HIS FORCES ARE INVOLVED OR ABOUT TO BE INVOLVED, WE CAN REMOTE DIRECTLY TO HIS STAFF TO PROVIDE NECESSARY COORDINATION AND CONTROL. THIS REMOTING HAS ALREADY BEEN TESTED.

LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AGAIN SOON.

REML 21 APR 82

Classified by
DDO NMC
12 AUG 92
Declassify in OADR
DDO NMC
by DDG 100

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORY CLEAR.

TOR/0509Z
JB/MCN 062V

MESSAGE 01: RECEIVED.

EG (C) SSN 0307
O 220515Z APR 80
FM [REDACTED] COL [REDACTED]
TO JCS/SOD/LT GEN GAST
JCS/OPG/COL [REDACTED] JCS
JTF/LTCOL [REDACTED]
BT

E (C) ~~TOP SECRET~~
SUBJ: [REDACTED] SITREP NUMBER 5
1.) HAVE USED 26,000 U.S. GALLONS
JET A-1 FROM 19-21 APRIL. TOTAL
COST IS \$37,924 AT \$1.46
PER U.S. GALLON.

E (C) 2.) MORALE OF TROOPS IS EXCELLENT.
[REDACTED] PERSONNEL HAVE
COOPERATED FULLY AND CONTINUE
TO BE RESPONSIVE TO OUR NEEDS.
BT

27D 5
JCS
C-646

Classified By
Declassify On

DDO NMCE

DDO NMCE
12 AUG 9

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

MSC47
DTG: 220310Z APR 80

FM: JCS/RC-J2
TO: SITE ALPHA/J2

SUBJ: SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY

REF: UR 212210Z APR 80, SAB

1. CHECK WITH [REDACTED] AND DIA FAILED TO CONFIRM YOUR IMPLICATION THAT [REDACTED] HOWEVER, THE FOLLOWING DATA IS PROVIDED PER YOUR REQUEST:

A. SOVIET SURFACE UNITS OPERATING IN THE ARABIAN SEA
[REDACTED] HAVE NEVER [REDACTED]

B. THE LAST INCIDENCE NOT APPLICABLE.

C. SIGNIFICANCE TO POTENTIAL FRIENDLY OPERATIONS ARE PROBABLY MINIMUM AS THE BASIC PEACETIME PURPOSE OF [REDACTED]

D. UNABLE TO PREDICT ESTIMATED LENGTH OF TIME FOR SUCH AN EXERCISE. NOMINALLY SPEAKING WHEN WORKING IN A CONFINED AREA SUCH AS THE NORTHERN [REDACTED] THE PERIOD WOULD BE MEASURED IN HOURS VICE DAYS.

E. THE KRIVAK UTILIZING ITS HEADNET RADAR WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHIN [REDACTED] OF THE [REDACTED] FLIGHT ROUTE TO DETECT A/C FLYING AT 500FT ASL AND BELOW.

BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY JCS
DECLASSIFIED ON OADR

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1255
COMPLETED BY [REDACTED]
REVIEWED BY [REDACTED]
DATE OF REVIEW TO [REDACTED]
OADR

FM 100/10-01/1
TO: SIFT ALPHA 02
C 1ST 100/10-01/1

~~SECRET~~

i-#649

SUBJECT: TOT PRIORITIES

REF: UR MSG 210754Z APR 82

1. RECOMMENDED TARGET PRIORITIES AND STRIKE TIMES ARE PROVIDED PER YOUR REQUEST

(A) TEHRAN AREA

(1) KARIM KHAN 5 TAND POWER SUB-STATION TRANSFORMER YARD. STRIKE TIME COINCIDENCE WITH DETECTION OF GROUND ASSAULT

(2) SEPAH SQUARE PTT MICRO WAVE POWER COMPLEX. STRIKE TIME ASAP, AFTER FORCE INITIATES COMPOUND ASSAULT.

(3) MEHRAZAD ATC TOWER AND ASSOCIATED F4 ALERT AIRCRAFT. STRIKE TIME 10-12 MINUTES AFTER COMPOUND ASSAULT INITIATED.

(4) NATIONAL IRANIAN TV/RADIO ANTENNA. STRIKE TIME 10-12 MINUTES AFTER COMPOUND ASSAULT INITIATED.

(B) MANZARIYEH AREA

(1) KUSHK-E NUSRAT ATC RADAR. SHORTLY BEFORE ARRIVAL OF F4 AND HELICOPTERS.

(2) KUSHK-E NUSRAT MICROWAVE RELAY TOWERS. SHORTLY BEFORE ATC RADAR.

2. PRINCIPAL AIR THREAT TO EMBASSY WILL COME FROM [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AIR THREAT FROM OUTSIDE TEHRAN AREA WILL COME FROM [REDACTED]

3. PRINCIPAL AIR THREAT TO MANZARIYEH WILL COME FROM [REDACTED] AIRCRAFT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] BUT AIRCRAFT REMAIN A THREAT TO [REDACTED] IF THE LOCATION BECOMES UNPINPOINTED. BOTH F4 AND F14 CARRY 20MM CANNON. F-4 ALSO CARRIES SIDEWINDER AND SPARROW AAM.

REVW 21 APR 82

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW 04-17-85
COMPLETED ON 12-01-85
BY 100/10-01/1

~~SECRET~~

201 22 0416Z
P/W 1100 058

650

MSG 246
DTG: 220235Z APR 80

FM: JTF RC/ [REDACTED]
TO: JTF/J-3 [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

- (U) 1. HIGH LEVEL INTEREST HERE IN STATUS OF EC-130 AIRCRAFT (GENERATED BY ENGINE CHANGE) AND STATUS OF EIGHT HELOS ABOARD CV. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE UPDATE BY 22/0400Z IF POSSIBLE.
- (U) 2. FROM CHANGE IN TANKER ROUTS FIRST NITE OPS, APPEARS SOME CHANGES IN FLOW/PROFILE HAVE BEEN MADE. REQUEST INFO ON ANY CHANGE, BE RELAYED TO THIS LOCATION TO UPDATE BRIEFING CHARTS.
- (U) 3. REQUEST YOU CONFIRM THAT [REDACTED] HAS BEEN BRIEFED ON OPERATION OF PPN-18 BEACON, METHOD OF EMPLOYMENT, AND RESULTS TO EXPECT I.E. NO COMMO REQUIRED BETWEEN A-6 ACFT AND GROUND UNIT.
- (U) 4. REF OUR 211842Z APRIL 80 MSG, SUBJ: DELIVERY OF HIGHLY SENSITIVE LETTERS. [REDACTED] (USA) WILL COURIER LETTERS VICE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER. AS STATED IN REF MSG.
- BT

Classified By *SES*
Declassify On *OADR*

Declassified by
Donna
12 Aug 82

NNNN

FOR THAT IS ALL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO 210811Z APR 68
FROM JCS/DC-JE
CITE ALPHA 3.1
INFO CTRM

i-652

SUBJECT: OVERFLIGHT REACTION
REF: UR SSN 0027 DTC 210811Z
[REDACTED] REACTION TO US OVERFLIGHT TO.

(1) EXAMINATION OF [REDACTED] REACTION
TEAM ANALYSIS OF [REDACTED]
OVER FLIGHT ROUTE INDICATES
PROPOSED ROUTE IS FEASIBLE

[REDACTED] RADIO SILENCE IS STILL
ESSENTIAL. RECOMMENDED [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] EGRESS FOR
MC 130 IS ALONG LINE
[REDACTED]

THEN TURNING NORTH TO CIP.

(2) IF [REDACTED] WERE TO DETECT
KC 135/MC 130 DURING REFUELING
THEY WOULD (A) CHALLENGE, SCRAMBLE
TO INVESTIGATE, IDENTIFY AND UPON RECOGNITION
WOULD VOICE CHALLENGE THEN SAF
AIRCRAFT AND DEPENDING
THE US EXPLANATION AND DIRECTION
FROM THE [REDACTED] FIGHTER CONTROLLER
WOULD DIRECT THE AIRCRAFT TO
A [REDACTED] AIR FIELD OR ESCORT
THE AIRCRAFT OUT OF [REDACTED]
AIRSPACE.

(3) IF [REDACTED] SUSPICIONS COULD BE [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] IT IS AT LEAST POSSIBLE THAT
THE [REDACTED] MAY ALLOW THE ACFT TO PASS.

(4) [REDACTED] ACFT WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY MORE LIKELY TO ATTEMPT
FORCE DOWN OR TO ENGAGE AN ACFT WHICH COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED.

Classified By [REDACTED]
Declassified ON [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR/220156Z
1401 055
✓

MSG 341
DTG 212357Z APR 50
FM: JCS-RC
TO: ALPHA (RELAY TO USS NIMITZ) ✓

FOR CDR
FM: LTC

REQUEST FOLLOWING

- UHF FREQUENCY FOR KC-135 TANKERS TO CONTACT USS NIMITZ ON NIGHT 1 AND 2.

- STATUS OF HELO WSC-3 AND FLIGHT TEST.

EX HOW DO YOU CALL [REDACTED] FROM USS NIMITZ.
BT

✓ Relayed
Nimitz
MSG #049
AT
220220Z

653

NNNN

Classified By JCS DDO N MCC
Declassified ON OADR 12 Aug 92

Declassified by
JCS DDO N MCC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR / 2340
VC

MSG336

DTG 212220Z APR 67

FM JTF/RC

TO CDR JTF

SITE ALPHA (RELAY TO [REDACTED])

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: UPDATE REPORT

Relayed as
050
22/0313Z

(U) 1. STE ACTIVATION. CJCS WILL ACCOMPLISH BY PHONCON TO CINOS
EITHER LATE 21 APR OUR TIME OR EARLY 22 APR OUR TIME. WILL ADVISE.

(U) 2. CJCS CONCERNED ABOUT YOUR DOWN BLADDER BIRD. PLANNING
HERE IN PROGRESS TO GET YOU ANOTHER AIRCRAFT BUT DOUBTFUL.
ADVISE US IF YOU THINK YOU CAN GET THREE OPERATIONAL.

#654

(U) 3. SENSITIVE LETTER WHILE CONTACT [REDACTED] TO HAVE
MIN REPORT TO [REDACTED] 0000Z 23 APR TO PICK UP A LETTER AT
[REDACTED] LOCATION.

(U) 4. JTF CMDR NOT AUTHORIZED TO RELEASE ANY SENSITIVE LETTERS
TO ANY ONE UNTIL AUTHORIZED BY FURTHER COMMUNICATION.

[REDACTED] TO COORDINATE CONTACT WITH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] GEN CAST TO DELIVER [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] FOR [REDACTED] OR COL KYE TO DELIVER [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] BUT NOT PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE
GENERAL DELIVERIES

(U) 5. CINCONC LETTER DELIVERIES. LETTERS TO BE PLACED IN U.S.
MAILBOXES FOR DELIVERY TO U.S. AMBASSADORS TWO HOURS
BEFORE TO [REDACTED] MAIL TIME. NOTIFICATION OF DELIVERY TO
RESPECTIVE U.S. AMBASSADORS DONE ONLY ON THE DIRECTION OF
CJCS. WILL AUTHORIZE DELIVERY OF LETTERS AFTER SECURING
REMOVAL AND KNOWLEDGE THAT VAL HAS BEEN CROSSED.

(U) 6. REPEAT JTF CMDR NOT AUTHORIZED TO RELEASE ANY
SENSITIVE LETTER TO ANY ONE UNTIL AUTHORIZED BY FURTHER
COMMUNICATIONS.

(U) 7. FOR GEN CASTS HAVE RECEIVED ASSURANCE NAVY AWARE OF [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] GROUND FORCE

REV 21 APR 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FM: WLLD 06T/S-20)
59 05170-2
30001 INTRAP 02

~~SECRET~~

CRIV4

1 FFG 693 HAS DEPARTED CTF 70 MODLOC. KRIVAK LAST
LOCATED VIC 21 53N 362 12E ON COURSE 190 AT 10 KTS AT
131300Z.

AGI 477 REMAINS IN SURVEILLANCE
OF AMPHIB READY GROUP

THIS ACTIVITY MAY BE
RELATED TO MOVEMENT OF IVAN ROGOV TASK GROUP.

NO SOVIET MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY TODAY. US BRUMBY WAO
RECONNOITERED BY IRANIAN C-130 VIC 25, ON 057 46E AT 0650Z.

ING 0800 HOURS

4. NIMITZ IS ENDEAVORING TO GET POSITIVE PLOT MN KRIVAK 693.
MEANWHILE, BELIEVE JTF SHOULD BE AWARE THAT HEADNET RADAR

IS A POSSIBLE THREAT TO FLIGHT OPS VI

IN 693 IS IN THAT AREA.

5. WOULD APPRECIATE WX EARLY AM 22 APR 80.

FATHER 808

BT

NO TAPE

DTG

2/20/02

658

NINT 05L GMM ANN D NEED ZDR DE YOUR LAST K

88005FJSA

2830/73

XHP INKD
B YRNTHCQURDCL

Classified BY JES
Declassified ON DA PR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

847 ✓
MESSAGE 01: RECEIVED.

JRGHP

NO EOM.

TOR 1805
Nimitz
✓

659

FM NIMITZ/COL
TO JTF/J3

REF JTF/J3 201855Z APR 80

SUBJECT - FLEET TACAIR SUPPORT CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

(U) 1. (TS) REF REQUESTED TX-70 KC-135 SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.

2. (TS) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - DAY 1: WHEN CALLED FOR BY
CJTF RICEBOWL, TF-70 CAN PROVIDE [REDACTED]
(WORST CASE) ARRIVING AT 1 PLUS 50 FOR 2 PLUS 45 (NEW FLIGHT
AT :15; 2 ROCKEYE, 2 AIM-9, 1000 RDS 20MM PER AIRCRAFT) USING
ONLY FLEET REFUELING ASSETS AND 35589, 8, & 1 SET OF EXTERNAL
TANKS FROM A 5 MIN COCKPIT ALERT POSTURE. SUBSEQUENT COVERAGE
MUST BE SUPPORTED BY KC-135'S. RECOMMEND FOLLOWING DISPOSITION OF
KC-135'S IF ONLY 5 KC-135 ARTS AVAILABLE:

[REDACTED] 2 ARTS, 2 ALFA (STRIP ALERT/ARTS BASKET
[REDACTED] - 3 ARTS/6 ALPHA (5/3 ARTS) STRIP ALERT/ARTS BASKET
UPON COMPROMISE OF RICE BOWL MISSION IN DAYLIGHT HOURS, CJTF
WILL IMMEDIATELY LAUNCH A BASKET EQUIPPED ARTS, AND COMPANION
ALPHA TANKER FOR BUDDY REFUEL, FROM [REDACTED] DIRECT TO
24-40N, 56-00E. (ETE AT 480KTS - 2.8 HRS) TO MAXIMIZE AVAILABLE
OFF LOAD TANKER SHOULD PLAN TO RECOVER WITH MINIMUM FUEL AT [REDACTED]
FOLLOW-ON TANKERS WILL LAUNCH AS NEEDED AT APPROPRIATE INTERVALS.
TF-70 CAN THEN MAINTAIN AIR ASSETS TO COVER EMERGENCY
DISPOSITION AS REQUIRED. TANKERS SHOULD ALSO BE PREPARED FOR

INSERT WORD

"JETTISONING"

POSSIBLE TANKER SUPPORT COULD BE PROVIDED BY NOTIONALLY TRAINED
TANKER SUPPORT COULD BE PROVIDED BY NOTIONALLY TRAINED
ING KC-135'S FROM [REDACTED] AT INTERVALS DURING DAYLIGHT AND
NERABILITY PERIOD, THUS MAINTAINING THE TRAINING SIGNATURE PRESENTLY
ESTABLISHED.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - DAY TWO: TF-70 WILL PROVIDE [REDACTED]
AIRCRAFT TO CAP PLANNED EXFILTRATION ROUTE FROM AN
ANCHOR POINT IN VICINITY OF 29-00N, 50-00E. KC-135 TANKERS WILL
LAUNCH NOTIONALLY (INTERVAL DEPENDS ON ARTS/ALPHA MIX) FROM
[REDACTED] TO ARRIVE OVER TF-70 AT PLANNED ASSAULT TIME. IF
ARTS AVAILABLE, 3 HOURS INTO MISSION BUDDY REFUELING WILL GIVE EACH
ARTS 3.5 HOURS OF ORBIT PLUS 50,000 LBS AN HR OFFLOAD
CAPABILITY. (FOUR F-14'S REQUIRE 40,000 LBS FOR 3 HOURS LOITER).
AS KC-135(S) ARRIVE VICINITY OF NIMITZ F-14'S WILL LAUNCH, JOIN
AND ESCORT THEM TO ABOVE MENTIONED ORBIT POINT. TANKER ON-STATION
CAPABILITY CAN BE INCREASED BY [REDACTED] OR [REDACTED] RECOVERY.

3. RECOMMEND FOLLOWING COMMON REFERENCE POINTS BE USED BY
CAP AIRCRAFT/GROUND FORCES TO FACILITATE LINK-UPS

E CAP ALFA (REFUEL AREA)
E CARUBRAVO (HELIO HIDE)
E CAP CHARLIE
E CAP DELTA (EMBASSY)
E CAP ECHO
E CAP FOXTROT
E CAP GOLF
E CAP HOTEL

GROUND FORCES/AIR FORCES MUST HAVE ONE RADIO CONTACT ON 341.4 MHZ
(PRIMARY) 240.5 MHZ (SECONDARY) BEFORE AIR FORCES CAN COMMIT.

GROUND FORCES SHOULD HAVE SMOKE OR SIMILAR MARKING DEVICE.

CALL SIGNS WILL BE COORDINATED PRIOR TO MISSION EXECUTION.

4. SUMMARY: IF RADIUS OF ACTION IS SUBSTANTIAL, TF-70 WITH SUPPORT FOR
GROUND FORCES IS LIMITED WITHOUT KC-135 AIR REFUELING SUPPORT.

MINIMUM FUEL RECOVERIES INTO [REDACTED] ENHANCE O
OFFLOAD POTENTIAL. WE HAVE ESTABLISHED AN AIR REFUEL PRACTICE
SIGNATURE WHICH MUST BE CONTINUED (1 MISSION A DAY)

AND CAN BE USED AS COVER TO DISCREETLY PREPOSITION TANKERS AT
ALTITUDE DURING PERIODS OF VULNERABILITY. NECESSARY DURING MISSION

(ASSETS (A-6'S, KA56'S) REMAIN DEDICATED THROUGHOUT. ALSO, [REDACTED]
TF-70 TACAIR PILOTS ARE NOW QUALIFIED IN KC-135 REFUELING NEED

PLANNED WITHDRAWAL ALTITUDES OF SVTRACTION C-141'S/AC, KC-135'S FROM
TARGET COUNTRY ON NIGHT TWO. WHILE DAY ONE IS A CONTINGENCY CONCEPT, DAY
TWO F-14 CAP U CONSIDERED A PRUDENT ENHANCEMENT FOR MISSION
SUCCESS.

VERY RESPECTFULLY, [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED] DDONMCC
Declassified ON: OADR 12 Aug 92

Unoriginal to COM-
by DDONMCC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

i-659

~~SECRET~~

1754

MSG 107
070 311400L WPT 07
FM: JCC/RC-U-2
TO: CITE ALPHA
INFO: SFOC/S2
1-SOW/S2

MCN
046

SUBJ: SATRAN EXTENSION (U)

1. (S) THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE
SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 230400/230001
TO 240400/240000

660

Classified By
Declassified On

OADR

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 94
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONMCA
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
EXEMPT FROM: DLR

MSG #25
DTG 211245Z APR 88
FM JTF RC/ [REDACTED]
TO: [REDACTED]
INFO: ALPHA/ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: RESUPPLY OF EXERCISE PLAYERS

1. YOUR ELEMENTS REQUEST THE FOLLOWING ITEMS TO BE FORWARDED BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS:

A. 1942 50TW SWITCH 2EA	
B. ZC 5898 NSN 6145-00-635-1536 COMMO CORD	50FT ROLL
C. PN U544U NSN 5935-00-553-9352 CONNECTOR	TEN EACH
D. PN HG 005004 ALTIMETER	ONE EACH
E. PN HS 3106A-145-5P IP CONNECTORS	TEN EACH
F. PN HS 3057-06 CONNECTOR	TEN EACH
G. 15 FOOT INTERCOM CORD ASSY FOR HJTR POSITION	
H. PN HS 20320-A1 POT RELAY/56-06	TWO EACH
I. INS PROGRAMMER (PSP)	CNF EACH
J. POP RIVIT SET	ONE EACH
K. NSN 0805-20-033-7011 INDICATOR	THREE EACH
L. 5005-02-353-0510 HF COUPLER	TWENTY FIVE EACH
M. 5021-02-300-2070 HF HT UNIT	ONE EACH
N. METHOL ETHYL KETONE	TWENTY GALLONS
O. 5041-00-007-7040 DOPPLER FREQ TRACKER	ONE EACH
P. YELLOW LOX ENGINE ANALYZER	
Q. TUBING, ASSORTED 3/8 OR 1/2 INCH	
R. F NUTS AND SLEEVES FOR TUBING	
S. HACK SAW FRAME AND BLADES	
T. #40 DRILL BITS	TWO EACH
U. TULC FLARE/CUTTER	ONE EACH
V. HYDRAULIC PACKING STS PK 300-02 STS PK 300-06 LS4634-7 LS4634-10 LS4634-12	FIFTEEN EACH FIFTEEN EACH FIFTEEN EACH FIFTEEN EACH FIFTEEN EACH
W. SHEET METAL PATCH FLAP	
X. ATH SOLENOID 1650-00-723-8722 1650-02-707-0722	ONE EACH ONE EACH
Y. C-120 ENGINE OIL DIP STICK	
Z. CABLE 3/32 AND 3/16 IN FOOT CABLE FITTINGS FOR SWAGE FOR EACH SIZE	
AA. RG 58U COAX CABLE ELEC	HUNDRED FOOT
AB. OYLITE 2003 (FUEL)	ONE BOX
AC. WIRE TOOTH BRUSHES FOR FUEL	ONE BOX
AD. ACID BRUSHES FOR FUEL	ONE BOX
AE. BRICK BATTERY CHARGER	ONE EACH
AF. BRICK BATTERY	TWO EACH

2. PLEASE ADVISE ON YOUR CAPABILITY TO MEET AND SHIP THIS REQUIREMENT. ITEM II IS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE.

Classified By *JCS*
Declassified ON: *OADR*
Declassified by
DDO W/ MCD
12 Aug 88

INT OML PLS KMDUP

1800Z AND CSL 1715Z

MSG030
DTG 211600Z APR 80

FM: JTF RC//
TO: ALPHA//

SUBJECT: LOG UPDATE

(U) 1. CRITICAL RADAR PARTS WILL DEPART 1ST SQW LOCATION
221300Z TO ARRIVE 231400Z.

(U) 2. C130 ENGINE REPAIR PARTS & GROUND EQUIPMENT WILL
LAND YOUR LOCATION 1800Z TODAY.

(U) 3. FULTON RIG FENDING LINES WILL ARRIVE FROM
EUROM TODAY AT 1800Z.

(U) 4. 1ST SQW TASKED TO PROVIDE ITEMS REQUESTED IN
MSG. DTG 211245Z APR 80 SUBJ RESUPPLY OF EXERCISE PLAYERS.
PARTS SHOULD DEPART EGLIN NLT 221300Z ARRIVING 231400Z.

(U) 5. REQUEST STATUS OF MA-3 AIR CONDITIONERS.

(U) 6. IF RADAR PARTS ARE FOR FORWARD DEPLOYED ACFT. RECOMMEND
YOU CANNABALIZE FROM YOUR LOCATION (COMMENT FROM J-3).

(U) 7. PLEASE FORWARD ANY UNRESOLVED LOG ACTIONS WITH
DESIRED PRIORITIES.

REVW 21 APR 80

170
MICRO 13
669
Declassified by
DDO mcc
12 Aug 92

664

2 CY 70 : Col
70K 15222
RC

G

G

THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITTED WITH APPROVAL OF MR. [REDACTED] THIS STATION.

Classified By *JCS*
Declassified On *OADR*

NNNN P000000000000C000009000000000000

Oxley

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE 01: RECEIVED.

P 211117Z APR 80
FM [REDACTED]
TO JCS/SOS (LTG GAST)

~~TOP SECRET~~
SUBJ [REDACTED] SITREP #4

REF SITREP #3 DTG 210850Z APR 80
1. REF DISCUSSED 24 APR VIP VISIT TO [REDACTED] WITH [REDACTED] OPERATIONS OFFICER
HE ASSURED US THAT IT IS [REDACTED] DESIRE NOT TO ALLOW NEWSMEN TO ACCOMPANY
VIPS. EXPECT THE VISIT TO BE ROUTINE AND UNEVENTFUL.

NNNN

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

MCN

838

666

Classified By: [REDACTED] DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by DDO NMCC 12 Aug 91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOV 21 1967
TO DIRECTOR

FROM JAG
TO JTF/NAVJAG ✓

E ~~REDACTED~~
SUBJECT: RE VISIT TO ~~REDACTED~~

RE HAVE ARRANGED FOR VISIT TO EL CANCELLED.

REF: 01-122-11

NNNN

10/11
1967

i-# 667

Classified by 12 Aug 1967
DDA/MC
Declassify on: OADR
Referred to
DDA/MC
by 12 Aug 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE 01: RECEIVED.

O 210925Z APR80
FM WALNUT
TO DUCKHUNTER
BT

~~SECRET~~
SUBJ: AIRCRAFT PARTS REQUIREMENTS.
1. ACFT 62-1843 REQUIRES

- A. PUMP ASSY, FUEL P/N 6827283 T.O. 2J-T56-44
FIG. 4 INDEX-1 1 EACH
- B. PACKING, PREFORMED P/N M59321-213 T.O. 2J-T56-44
FIG. 4 INDEX-33 4 EACH
- C. PACKING, PERFORMED P/N MS 9020-04 T.O. 2J-T56-44
FIG. 4 INDEX-25 2 EACH
- D. PACKING, PREFORMED P/N MS 9020-10 T.O. 2J-T56-44
FIG. 4 INDEX 29 2 EACH

2. ACFT 63-7785 REQUIRES

- A. VALVE, ANTI-ICING P/N 26130010 T.O. 1C-130(H)H-10
FIG. 4-7 INDEX 22 1 EACH
- B. GASKET P/N 750244-4 T.O. 1C-130(H)H-10
FIG. 4-7 INDEX 23 2 EACH

BT

NNNN

Classified By JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

Declassified by
DDI/MCC
avg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR 210518Z
C 2935

#670

210530Z APR 80

FM [REDACTED]
TO JTF [REDACTED]
JCS/SCD (LTC GAST)

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: [REDACTED] SITREP #3

1. WE ADVISED THAT [REDACTED] AIRFIELD WILL BE VISITED BY A PARTY OF [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] DIGNITARIES ON THURSDAY 24 APRIL BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 0800-1800 LOCAL. THE GROUP WILL BE HEADED BY [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] FOR [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

WE ARE ALSO INFORMED THAT [REDACTED] WILL ACCOMPANY THE GROUP AS WELL AS SEVERAL [REDACTED] NEWS REPORTERS.

2. WE WERE QUERIED LAST EVENING BY JTF CONCERNING THE SUITABILITY OF [REDACTED] AIRFIELD FOR C-141 OPERATIONS. APPARENTLY MAC IS RELUCTANT TO USE THE FIELD WITHOUT FIRST CONDUCTING AN OFFICIAL MAC SURVEY. SUCH A SURVEY DOES NOT APPEAR NECESSARY AT THIS TIME NOR WOULD IT BE POLITICALLY PRUDENT SINCE IT WOULD TEND TO OVERLOAD THE SYSTEM WITH ANOTHER SHORT NOTICE DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE REQUEST. BASED ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACILITY AND THE JUDGEMENT OF FORMER C-141 CREWMEMBERS WHO ARE WITH THE MC-130 DETACHMENT, THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEM IN USING THE MAIN RUNWAY FOR TAKEOFF AND LANDING AND THE [REDACTED]

FOR FURTHER DETAILS ON [REDACTED] AIRFIELD, OPERATORS SHOULD REFER TO THE [REDACTED] TECHNICAL FACILITIES REPORT, FEBRUARY 1980, REFERENCE IN REPORT TO [REDACTED] BEING C-130 CAPABLE WAS BASED ON CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS, LANDING AND TAKEOFFS, OF C-130 AIRCRAFT.

Classified By: J [REDACTED]
Declassified ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

213030Z APR 67
FM: JTF RESPONSE CELL
TO: JTF ONOR SITE "A"
BT

2147
34
#671

~~SECRET~~

LTG GAST ARRIVING BY KC-135, ETA YOUR LOCATION 211535Z. REQUEST
YOU CONSIDER HIS PLANNED DEPARTURE FOR [REDACTED] ON A LATER AIRCRAFT.
BT

NNNN

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

Classified by
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92
Declassified by
CONF NMCC
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

15
10 701.

ASC 1.
TO 210000Z APR 66
FROM JTF RESPONSE CELL
TO ALPHA//CCL

REF: YOUR MSG DTS 201500Z APR 66 (LTC RICHARDS)

1. SLEEPING EQUIPMENT & CANTEENS WILL ACCOMPANY
TO 130 FROM [REDACTED] THAT DEPART 210000Z.

2. FENDING LINES ARE NOT AVAILABLE AT [REDACTED]
1ST SCH INDICATES LINES ACCOMPANIED BASIC RIG. USAF
HAS BEEN TASKED TO PROVIDE TWO SETS FOR CARGO
ON MC130 THAT DEPARTS E-M TOMMOROW 2700Z. IS THIS
SUFFICIENT?

3. MA-3 AIR CONDITIONERS ARE NOT AT RAMSTEIN.
IF AC UNITS ARE NOT YET AT YOUR LOCATION WE
WILL GO BACK & TRACE FROM ORIGINAL SOURCE.
PLS ADVISE.
BT

NNNN

MESSAGE 07 RECEIVED.

*7478

708/130
VC
✓(1)
#674
Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR
Declassified by
DDO nmc
12 Aug 92

NO COM.

TOP- 2020072
C-# 678

MSG 17
DTG 201935 2 APR 68
FROM JTF RICE ECHL (REAP)
TO ALPHA/

REF YOUR MSG 201620Z APR 68

1. REF INDICATED NO MA-3 AIR CONDITIONERS HAVE
ARRIVED. INDICATED THAT THREE HAVE
ARRIVED. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT A TOTAL
OF FIVE ARE REQUIRED.

2. PLS INFORM US:
HOW MANY HAVE ARRIVED?
ARE THEY NEW?
HOW MANY MORE DO YOU REQUIRE?

3. BE INFORMED RAMSTEN HAS 14 PALLETS BACKLOGGED.
WE ARE WORKING TO EXPEDITE SHIPMENT.
BT

NNNN

MESSAGE 34 RECEIVED.

Classified By SCS
Declassified On OADR

Declassified by
DDO WMEC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U
CBMBIMBDEBHDZ.FOXFIRE JMCYOU HAV

SAW YURCU43U.2?

NO TXPING 4.

8629-13

-- WILL SEJATWS
ZFEOCRON YU ESSAGE S H
CI ROEFIVER:3MHGTEN IS EE
HE VOICE ..

TOP 201172

25
#679

RETRANS 201105Z
BDM JCS

~~SECRET~~

PRIORITY

FM: JTF NIMITZ (PITMAN)

TO: JTF (VAUGHT)

JCS (SOD)

SUBJ: HELO DET. STATUS (TS)

(U) 1. (TS) TONIGHT'S PERSONAL RECON INDICATES HELO LAUNCH
COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED AS EARLY AS 1500Z (1900 LCL)
BASED ON ACTUAL LEVEL OF DARKNESS. ACTUAL COAST-IN WILL
OCCUR ABOUT 25 MIN AFTER LAUNCH. THIS WILL PERMIT A SLIGHTLY
EARLIER ARRIVAL AT REFUEL POINT.

2. (TS) NON-REF PINS, SERCOS: 007 AND 011 RETURNED TO
[REDACTED] TODAY VIA MAC C-121. DOCUMENT INDICATED MARCH
4th AS FINAL DESTINATION.

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JCS
Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassified On: OADR
Classified by
DDO NMC
12 Aug 82
Ungraded by
COTB
DDO NMC
12 Aug 82

MESSAGE 01 SELECTED.

G
O 231800Z APR 83
FM JALNUT
TO DUCKHUNTER
BT

S
SUBJ: AIRCRAFT PARTS/MISSION STATUS

1. WE REQUIRE THE FOLLOWING PARTS FOR JVA AIRCRAFT.

IGNITION RELAY PN6732647 T/O 20-700-44 FIG 3 IND 14

NAVIGATION COMPUTER UNIT P/N 78320-1 T/O 10-130(Y)-4 2 EA
FIG 50 IND 17

MEMORY MODUCE UNIT P/N 782320-1 T.O. 10-130(Y)-4 2EA
FIG. 50 IND. 22

RT /APN153 DOPPLER RCVR/TYMR 2 EA
F 50 IND. 9

2. FLEW ONE SEA SURVELANCE MISSION
BT

NNNN

Classified By JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

Declassified by
220 n m c
12 Aug 89

TOP 1616Z
REL

MCN

024

1 CY TO M
VAV

1 CY TO C

G →
#680

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE IS RECEIVED.

100 14
LTG 201001Z APR 60
FROM DEPCOM JTF WASH DC
TO COMJTF, [REDACTED]

7 APR 1960
AC

MCN
003

EX SUBJECT: [REDACTED] COMPROMISE

WE JUST TALKED TO CGH [REDACTED] HE WILL
DO WHAT HE CAN. ACTION WILL BE TAKEN
MORNING, YOUR TIME.
BT

#681

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

NNNN

Classified by [signature]
Declassify on
OADR
[signature]
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MSG IN
DTG 201800Z APR 87
FROM JCC/EC-J2
TO SITE ALPHA/J2

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] REQUEST

(1) WILL HAVE SAC PENETRATION ANALYSIS
TEAM IN BLDG TOMORROW (21 APRIL 87)

(2) REQUEST YOU PROVIDE
SPECIFIC MAC QUESTIONS
VIA MESSAGE TO REDUCE
CHANCE OF MISINTERPRETATION.

(3) WILL PROVIDE RESULTS
AS OBTAINED.
BT

NNNN

7CA 15452
SPH
MCN
822
#682
Classified By *tes*
Declassified *ON 10/10/01*
Declassified by NMC
DP 12/01/01

~~SECRET~~

TOR 1510Z
RC 20

684

MSG 11
DTG 201445Z APR 80
FROM JCS/RC-J2
TO SITE ALPHA/J2

~~SECRET~~
SUEJECT: QUERY RESPONSE
REF: (A) UR DTG 201445Z APR 80
SUEJ: HOSTAGE UPDATE

(B) JCS/RC-J2/DTG 201330Z APR 80
SUEJ: REQUEST FOR INFO



(2) REF B CAUTIONS AGAINST
ASSUMING ALL HOSTAGES ARE
BEING HELD IN CHANCERY.
BT

NNNN

Classified By JCS
Declassified On OADR

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY 1235
CONDUCTED ON 142 Aug 92
REVIEWED BY DDO NME
Secret
DIA

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BUCKHUNTER DE FOXFIRE AM TWO IMMEDIATE MESSAGES

TCR/1200Z
KCL/12

0 201015Z APR 80
FM JTF NIMITZ (PITMAN)
TO JTF [REDACTED] VAUGHT)
BT

~~SECRET~~ 177000Z APR 80 NOT PASS ON INTEL BROADCAST
SUBJ: ARRIVAL REPORT (TS)

1. (TS) PARTY OF SIXTY THREE ARRIVED [REDACTED] 200600Z AND NIMITZ 200915Z.
2. (TS) AT [REDACTED] ONE OF THE DUTY WORKING PARTY PROVIDING SUPPORT DURING C-141 LAYOVER WAS MEMBER OF HM-16 AND RECOGNIZED HM-16 MEMBERS IN OUR PARTY. [REDACTED] THE HM-16 SAILOR INVOLVED, WAS THEN TAKEN TO NIMITZ WITH THIS PARTY. OSTENSIBLY, HE WAS TO ESCORT SPECIAL EVENING LIGHT CARGO TO HIS SHIP. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY AWARE THAT SOMETHING WAS HAPPENING BECAUSE HE WOKE HIS OINC, [REDACTED] FROM HM-16 TO TELL HIM WHO HE'D SEEN. LT [REDACTED] HAS BEEN CAUTIONED, AND TOLD THAT [REDACTED] WOULD BE ESCORTING HIGH PRIORITY CARGO TO THE NIMITZ. NO UNUSUAL REACTION EXPECTED WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR.
- (U) 3. (TS) REQUEST LATEST DATA ON EC-130 FUEL OFF LOAD CAPABILITY USING 6000 GALLON SYSTEM. LAST REPORT INDICATED 900 GALLONS UNUSEABLE.
- (U) 4. (TS) CURRENT HELO STATUS SEVEN OUT OF EIGHT MISSION CAPABLE (HM-16 REPORT).
- (U) 5. (TS) REQUEST PROVIDE DAILY SURFACE TO 2000 FT WINDS FORECAST FOR TRACK, TEMPERATURE AND DENSITY ALTITUDE PREDICTIONS ON THE SURFACE AT LAND AND TAKE-OFF TIMES FOR SHIP, DESERT TRACK, HIDE AND CITY.
- (U) 6. (TS) REQUEST HELO LOADS BY AIRCRAFT 1 THROUGH 6. NUMBER OF PAX, THEIR WEIGHT (WITH GEAR), CARGO WT AND ITS DESCRIPTION.
- (U) 7. CINCPAC LNO HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH TANKER TASK FORCE COMMANDER RE: OPTIONS FOR FIGHTER SUPPORT REFUELING. 20 FLEET AIRCRAFT (F-14, RA-65) COMPLETED LAST NIGHT. EXPECT AS MANY MORE TONIGHT. ALL TRAINING DONE RADIO SILENCE ON SECURE VOICE.
- BT

689

Classified by: [REDACTED]
Declassified on: [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

P. 200300Z APR 92
FM WALNUT
TO DUCKHUNTER/MAJ G
BT

~~SECRET~~
SUBJ: SITREP NUMBER 1
COMMUNICATION CENTER IS OPERATING ON COMMERCIAL POWER WITH GENERATORS
AS BACK UP.

EQUIPMENT STATUS

2 GENERATOR GREEN

1 GENERATOR AMBER. WE HOPE TO HAVE IT REPAIRED TODAY. TWO OF THEM HAD WATER
AND SAND IN FUEL BOWL.

1 TT-76 AMBER. KEY BOARD NEEDS REPLACING.

1 UGC-129 GREEN

1 WSC-3 GREEN

1 KH-7 GREEN

2 TH-22'S GREEN

ALL OTHER ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT IN GOOD WORKING ORDER.

EQUIPMENT NEEDED.

1. TT-76 KEYBOARD

1. THREE MAN TENT WITH POLES AND METAL STAKES

C-RATIONS FOR THREE MEN TO LAST AT LEAST 12 DAYS.

MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS NEEDED.

SOFT DRINKS, ICE IF POSSIBLE, COLEMAN STOVE OR HOT PLATE AND

SOME JUNK FOOD.

MORAL IS GOOD THIS FAR. THANKS FOR ANY HELP YOU CAN GIVE US "I"

NNNN

Classified by FCS
Declassified on OADR

Declassified by
DDO/MCC
12 Aug 92

692

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PTC 152705Z APR 68
FM: JTF 732
TO: ~~SECRET~~

70R / 16402

696

SUBJ: MFA HOSTAGES

1. ON 16 APRIL 1968 DOS/INOC RECEIVED TELECON FROM LAINGEN, HOWLAND, TOM SETH. THE FOLLOWING IS QUOTE FROM DOS MEMO: THE TRIO HAS BEEN MOVED TO A NEW ROOM WITHIN THE PROTOCOL SUITE OF OFFICES. BRUCE DESCRIBED IT AS THE DINING ROOM. HE SAID THEY ARE NOW ALLOWED ONE HOUR A DAY IN THE OUTSIDE GARDEN UNDER SUPERVISION OF A GUARD. UNQUOTE

2. DURING CONVERSATION LAINGEN GAVE THEIR NEW TELEPHONE NUMBER AS 321-246 REPEAT 321-246.

3. JTF EXPLORING ALL MEANS TO DETERMINE EXACT LOCATION WITH MFA FLCC.

REVW 15 APR 68

NNNNX

Classified by
DOD WHCC
12 AUG 12
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. IN THE PAST, THE U.S. AT FIRST FOR CONSIDERING AGAINST IRAN. SOME OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, HAVE EXPRESSED DISPLEASURE THAT THE U.S. HAS PRESENTED THEM A FULL ACCORD WITHOUT REGARD TO ITS ALLIES NATIONAL INTERESTS AND VALUES CONSULTATION.

[REDACTED]

I-698
"2"

3. WHILE THE AMBASSADORS OF COUNTRIES ALLIED WITH THE U.S. ARE RETURNING HOME FOR CONSULTATIONS ON THE HOSTAGE CRISIS, SEVERAL NATIONS ARE SEEKING TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TEHRAN.

[REDACTED]

7. RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ REMAIN TENSE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR/1002
KOL

MEMORY CLEAR.

MESSAGE 81 RECEIVED.

P. 200985Z APR 80
FM WALNUT
TO DUCKHUNTER
INFO EUCON
BT

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: DREAM LIST

1. THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WOULD BE DESIRABLE AT THIS LOCATION TO
IMPROVE MORALE.

2. STERNO FUEL 200 CANS

STERNO STOVES 100 EA

200' EXTENSION CORDS W/LIGHTS 12 EA

COLEMAN LANTERNS W/FUEL 12 EA

COLEMAN STOVES W/FUEL 6 EA.

8-TIPS

BASEBALL CAPS (VARIOUS SIZES FROM 7 TO 7 5/8)

AIR MATTRESSES 80 EA

BEANBANS 8 EA

BEANBANS 9 EA

LARGE POT 3 EA

BAR-B-QUE GRILL 3 EA & CINDER BLOCKS 12 EA

ICE MAKER

PLASTIC TRASH BAGS

SMALL COOKING POTS

COORDINATES FOR BOTH ENDS ACTIVE RUNWAY

WHISKY (MEDICINAL) DRINKING

PILLOWS 70 EA

BBLS (ASSORTED) 10 LBS

KOOL A10

ALUMINUM FOIL

BREAD

FIELD REFRIGERATOR 3 EA

TOILET CHEMICALS

COFFEE 30 LBS

SUGAR 10 LBS

DRY CREAMER 5 LBS

CANNED HAM

PORTABLE SHOWERS

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: OADR

Classified by
DDO n m c
Declassify on: OADR
made to DD a d m

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR 1220
KCL

G
LTC 101007 APR 74
FROM LTR
TO: NCS NIMITZ
SSP

JTF EMPLOYMENT LOG (14 APR 74)

1. (U) JTF INDEX
INDEX
CALL SIGNS
RADIO NETS, FREQUENCIES AND KEYLIST
TELEPHONE LISTINGS

ITEM NO

2

3

4

(S) CALL SIGNS

A/C
A-E
JCS (SOD)
JTF MAIN
JTF ALTERNATE
NCS (LT BRAGG)

C-141
MC-130
MC-130
MC-130
NIMITZ

HELD (ON BOARD NIMITZ)

TOOTHPICK
DUCKHUNTER
SKYDIVER
TRANSFER
WALNUT
MOON GLOW
TIDE RIP
BROADWAY
STARLIGHT
FOX FIRE
FLACKEEAD
CROWS NEST

TOT 1407
KCL P PMTB
ONE COPY TAK
BY TSgt

MEN 0008

701

(S) RADIO NETS, FREQUENCIES AND KEYLIST

(S) ATLANTIC OCEAN MSC-2 UHF TACSAT NET SECURE
POLICE OR ITY. JCS IS NCS

(1) OPERATING STATIONS: JCS JTF MAIN, JTF ALTERNATE

(2) SATELLITE CHANNEL: ATLANTIC OCEAN AT SAT 21 DEC 73

(3) FREQUENCIES: UPLINK XMIT 295.875 MHZ, DOWNLINK 261.475 MHZ (OFFSET 33.6 MHZ)

(4) KEYLIST: PARKHILL: USKA CRESTES: USKA

(5) THIS NET MAY ONLY BE USED IN SECURE MODE. EVEN
INITIAL CONTACT WILL BE MADE IN SECURE MODE. PLAIN
TRANSMISSIONS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED.

(S) INDIAN OCEAN MSC-3 TACSAT NET SECURE POLICE OR ITY
JTF MAIN IS NCS

(1) OPERATING STATIONS: JTF MAIN, JTF ALTERNATE
NIMITZ

(2) SATELLITE CHANNEL: INDIAN OCEAN AT SAT 15 DEC 73

(3) FREQUENCIES: UPLINK XMIT 295.875 MHZ, DOWNLINK 262.875 MHZ (OFFSET 33.6 MHZ)

(4) KEYLIST: PARKHILL: USKA CRESTES: USKA

(5) THIS NET MAY ONLY BE USED IN SECURE MODE. EVEN
INITIAL CONTACT WILL BE MADE IN SECURE MODE. PLAIN TRANSMISSIONS
ARE NOT AUTHORIZED.

1200

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U) 100-10000

PARKHILL
TTY
ANTICOMM
ANTICOMM

200-3000
207-3000
207-3040
217/3/3

~~(U)~~ JTF MAIN
ANTICOMM
PARKHILL
TTY
KY-7

JTF ALTERNATE
PARKHILL TTY

ANTICOMM
PARKHILL

PARKHILL
TTY

PARKHILL
TTY

(U) YUMA (HELOS)
PARKHILL
TTY

898-2120
898-2130

NOTE: WHEN CALLING JTF MAIN AND ALTERNATE SAY ONLY "GO GREEN".
WHEN PARTY ANSWERS AND IMMEDIATELY GO PARKHILL
SECURE. JTF MAIN AND ALTERNATE WILL IDENTIFY THEMSELVES ONLY BY TELEPHONE
NUMBER, NOT NAMES OR LOCATION. PLAIN CONVERSATIONS EVEN OF
UNCLASSIFIED MATTERS WITH THESE TWO LOCATIONS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED.
THESE RESTRICTIONS ALSO APPLY TO CALLS ORIGINATING AT
JTF MAIN AND ALTERNATE.

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR / 1600
VC

TOT / 1654
RC

MESSAGE 01 SELECTED.

DTG 0315

DIG 031515 APR 50
FM JTF/CS
TO: USS NIMITZ/ [REDACTED]

717

SUBJ: FORCE DEPLOYMENT RECALL

1. (U) REFERENCE: MSG 021500Z SUBJ: ARRIVAL ARRANGEMENT.

2. (U) THE ANNOUNCED DEPLOYMENT OF THE MARINE ELEMENT TO THE NIMITZ HAS BEEN DEFERRED INDEFINITELY.

3. (U) YOUR ADVANCE ELEMENT WAS DIRECTED BY A SEPERATE MESSAGE TO RETURN TO CONUS.

4. (U) REQUEST ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

BT

NNNN

~~Classified By: JCS~~

~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassified by
[Signature]
2 Aug 90

~~TOP SECRET~~

BTG 311550Z MAR 80

FM: JTF/J-2/

TO: SPOC 19 07

STATION ALPHA

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: SITUATION IN IRAN AS OF 0530 EST, MARCH 31 1980

1. WHITE HOUSE PRESS SPOKESMAN JODY POWELL DENIED AGAIN LAST NIGHT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS SENT A LETTER TO IRAN SUCH AS THE ONE ALLEGEDLY RECEIVED BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI FROM PRESIDENT CARTER. AT THE SAME TIME, POWELL SAID HE WOULD "NOT DISPUTE" A SWISS FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT THAT SWITZERLAND'S CHARGE IN TEHRAN PASSED A MESSAGE TO KHOMEINI AND PRESIDENT EANI-SADR FROM PRESIDENT CARTER EARLIER THIS WEEK.

2. TEHRAN RADIO'S DOMESTIC SERVICE THIS MORNING REPORTS, ACCORDING TO FEIS, THAT "JODY POWELL HAS CONFIRMED THAT CARTER SENT A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF IRAN". THE BROADCAST SAID THE MESSAGE, RECEIVED LAST WEEK, WAS MEANT "TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS BETWEEN AMERICA AND IRAN AND EXPEDITE THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES." POWELL IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT REVEALING THE DETAILS OF THE MESSAGE "MIGHT ENDANGER FINDING A SOLUTION" TO THE CRISIS.

3. THE WASHINGTON POST TODAY WRITES THAT FOREIGN MINISTER CHOZEZAKH BELIEVES, THANKS TO "PRESIDENT CARTER'S NOW ADMITTING MISTAKES IN PREVIOUS U.S. POLICY," THAT HE HAS SUCCEEDED IN CONVINCING THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL TO APPROVE THE TRANSFER OF THE HOSTAGES TO IRANIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL. HOWEVER, A NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE THIS MORNING CLAIMS IRANIAN OFFICIALS SEE THE U.S. MESSAGE AS THREATENING."

4. KHOMEINI IS NOW REPORTED BY AP AS SAYING HE WILL ALLOW A VATICAN REPRESENTATIVE TO VISIT THE FIFTY HOSTAGES. IT IS NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, WHETHER THE FILM CLIP ON WHICH THE REPORT IS BASED IS RECENT AND REPRESENTS A NEW DEVELOPMENT OR NOT. "IF THE POPL WANTS TO BE REASSURED ABOUT THE CONDITION OF THE HOSTAGES, HE MAY SEND AN ENVOY TO COME AND SEE," KHOMEINI IS SHOWN TELLING THE PAPAL NUNCIO IN TEHRAN.

5. THE NINE COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES SENT LETTERS OVER THE WEEKEND TO IRANIAN AUTHORITIES URGING THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES, ACCORDING TO AP. BRITISH AND WEST GERMAN OFFICIALS HAVE CONFIRMED THAT PRIME MINISTER THATCHER AND CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT HAVE WRITTEN TO EANI-SADR, BUT THE DETAILS OF THEIR MESSAGES WERE NOT DISCLOSED.

6. FORMER IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER SEAN MCBRIDE TOLD REUTER TODAY THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAS APPROVED A MCBRIDE PLAN FOR A NUREMBERG-STYLL INTERNATIONAL TRIAL OF THE DEPOSED SHAH. THE TRIBUNAL WOULD BE CREATED UNDER U.N. SPONSORSHIP, ACCORDING TO MCBRIDE. THE U.N. WOULD ALSO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THE VERDICT WAS CARRIED OUT. WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION FROM IRANIAN SOURCES THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAS ENDORSED MCBRIDE'S PROPOSAL.

7. THE DOS MANAGED TO CONTACT BRUCE LATINGEN YESTERDAY. HE AND POLITICAL OFFICER TOMSETH INDICATED THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE PRESS PLEA IN TEHRAN OVER THE PURPORTED CARTER-KHOMEINI MESSAGE. TOMSETH FELT THAT THE IRANIANS MIGHT BE TRYING TO PREPARE PUBLIC OPINION FOR POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. THE CONVERSATION WAS TERMINATED AFTER ABOUT SEVEN OR EIGHT MINUTES.

8. A REPORT BY CBS CORRESPONDENT TO FENTON IN TEHRAN HAS THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL VOTING TO APPROVE THE TRANSFER OF THE HOSTAGES TO GOVERNMENT CONTROL. ACCORDING TO THE CBS NEWS DESK, FENTON CLAIMS AYATOLLAH HANDAVI KANI PROVIDED A CRUCIAL SWING VOTE. REPORTEDLY, OPPONENTS OF THE TRANSFER WILL TRY TO ORGANIZE DEMONSTRATIONS TO BLOCK THE MOVE. HANDAVI KANI HAS ISSUED A PUBLIC STATEMENT REMINDING ALL CONCERNED THAT DEMONSTRATIONS WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE AUTHORITIES ARE NOT PERMITTED, EXCEPT FOR THE STATEMENT ABOUT AND DEMONSTRATIONS WITHOUT PERMIT. WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION OF THE

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355

EXEMPTED ON 12 Aug 93

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TOP SECRET

A.C

11. IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH IRAQ REMAIN COOL WITH BOTH
NATIONS CONTINUING TO ACCUSE THE OTHER OF HINDERING DIPLOMATIC
ACTIVITY. IRAN ALSO REMAINS VARY OF IRAQI MILITARY INTENTIONS


POETS, HOWEVER, STATED THAT THE FIGHTING IN WEST AZERBAI-
JAN PROVINCE HAS BEEN FAR MORE EXTENSIVE WITH SEVERAL LOCATIONS
TO THE SOUTH OF URMIAH INVOLVED (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

TOP SECRET

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I-725



AN IRANIAN P-3 ORION CONDUCTED AN AERIAL SUR-
VEILLANCE MISSION IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ ON 27 MARCH

THE P-3 CIRCLED AT LEAST TWO OF THE SHIPS AT AN ALTITUDE OF
10,000 FEET, PASSING WITHIN 1,000 YARDS OF THE VESSELS.

BT

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

121000Z APR 68

TO: [REDACTED]
FROM: [REDACTED]
SUBJ: [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED]

SUBJ: DEPLOYMENT REPORT [REDACTED] NUMBER 1.

(1.) [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] COOPERATION AND SUPPORT HAS BEEN EXCELLENT SO FAR.

(2.) HOWEVER, AS SIZE OF FORCE GROWS, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OFFICES ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY APPREHENSIVE. THIS MAY BE DUE TO ABSENCE OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WHO HAS BEEN OUT OF COUNTRY SINCE BEFORE WE ARRIVED AND HAS NOT BEEN IN ON THE PLANNING AND DECISION-MAKING NORMALLY. [REDACTED] INVOLVES HIMSELF IN EVEN THE ROUTINE [REDACTED] DECISIONS AND THIS OPERATION IS OF GREATER MAGNITUDE THAN THAT TO WHICH [REDACTED] IS ACCUSTOMED.

(3.) JET A-1 STORES AT [REDACTED] TOTAL

PAGE 2 TOP SECRET

OVER 1 MILLION [REDACTED] GALLONS. VERSUS EARLIER ESTIMATE OF 2.4 MILLION. HOWEVER,

[REDACTED] INDICATES THIS IS NO PROBLEM.

REFUELING OPERATIONS ON 19 APR TOTALLED

12,000 [REDACTED] GALLONS. PROCEDURE OF

TRUCKING FUEL FROM TANK FARM BY THE

THREE AVAILABLE REFUELERS HAS WORKED

SATISFACTORILY. CONTRACTOR WILL PROVIDE

AFTER-HOUR SERVICE IF NECESSARY. ANTICIPATE

NO DIFFICULTIES WITH REFUELING.

(4.) REPLENISHMENT OF [REDACTED] FUEL STORES

SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY 12 MAY, PRIOR

TO MONSOON SEASON. JET A-1 PRICE IS

APPROXIMATELY 50 CENTS PER GALLON.

(5.) [REDACTED] C-130 AND [REDACTED] MC-130

ARRIVED WITH MOST REQUIRED EQUIPMENT

AND SUPPLIES. WE DO NOT HAVE LATRINE

CHEMICAL, GARBAGE BAGS, AND LIGHTS FOR

PAGE 3 TOP SECRET

CAMP. REQUIRE C-RATIONS FOR 3 COMM

PERSONNEL WHO ARRIVED WITHOUT. CHARCOAL

WOULD BE A HELPFUL GUID TO GIVE TO

THE [REDACTED] SINCE THERE IS NO

FIRE WOOD ON THE [REDACTED]

(6.) AIRCRAFT AND CAMP ARE CO-LOCATED AT

EAST END OF DIRT RUNWAY, A CONSIDERABLE

DISTANCE FROM BASE PROPER.

(7.) WE ARE USING BASE ELECTRICAL POWER TO

OPERATE W-3 SYSTEMS. [REDACTED] HAS SET

UP TELEPHONE LAND LINE FROM CAMP TO

TOWER AND SQUADRON OPERATIONS.

(8.) TEMPERATURE TODAY WAS 103 DEGREES. PEOPLE ARE

TAKING PRECAUTIONS. WOODEN TENT PEGS WON'T PENETRATE

GROUND. WE PRECURED METAL STAKES IN LOCAL VILLAGE.

(9.) ADVISE MAC THAT [REDACTED] HAS NO CAPABILITY FOR

TRANSMITTING FLIGHT PLANS OR PROVIDING ENROUTE WEATHER.

Classified By: [REDACTED] 12
DDO NM
OAPR



~~SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON D.C 20301

6-735

THE JOINT STAFF

12 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAROLD L. MILLER, LEGAL ADVISOR AND
LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Helicopter Maintenance Records

1. Maintenance records for the eight US Navy RH-53D aircraft used on the attempted hostage rescue in Iran are available for review as requested by the Senate Armed Services Committee. Please contact me, RADM Tom Cassidy (ext 52749), or LTC Stephen D. Olynnyk (ext 74546) when arrangements have been made for the review.
2. Attached is a summary prepared on the basis of a careful review of both the helicopter maintenance records and the performance of the eight RH-53Ds on the rescue effort. It is intended that a copy be provided SASC personnel when they review the records.
3. This has been a major area of interest and we stand ready to assist with records review or answer questions as appropriate.
4. Note that the attached report is SECRET.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachment
a/s

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT
THIS MEMORANDUM IS
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

8 May 1980

~~SECRET 73~~

OPERATION EVENING LIGHT

POST MISSION SUMMARY

RH-53D HELICOPTER

MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL CONDITION

~~NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS
PRIVILEGED INFORMATION AND IS
NOT FOR GENERAL DISTRIBUTION~~

~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR~~

30A02

COPY 1 OF 10

~~SECRET~~
OPERATION EVENING LIGHT

POST MISSION SUMMARY
RH-53D MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL CONDITION

1. (U) PURPOSE. To determine the adequacy of maintenance performed on HM-16 RH-53D aircraft used on the rescue mission, to evaluate maintenance/ supply support procedures used to prepare the aircraft for the mission, and to assess the failures that occurred to helicopters in the mission.

2. (U) SCOPE. Effort expended and sources of information utilized were as follows:

- a. Review of CTF-70/NIMITZ message traffic
- b. Review of OPG point papers
- c. Review of mission aircraft logs and maintenance records.
- d. Personal interviews with:
 - (1) Mission flight crews
 - (2) Mission aircraft maintenance officer
 - (3) Selected passengers in mission aircraft
 - (4) Shipboard squadron aircraft maintenance officer
 - (5) Shipboard squadron aircraft maintenance control officer
 - (6) Shipboard squadron aircraft maintenance control chief.

3. (U) AIRCRAFT DESCRIPTION

a. The single main rotor RH-53D helicopter is designed for both land and ship based operation. The helicopter was manufactured by Sikorsky Aircraft. It is powered by two General Electric T64-GE-415 turboshaft engines. The Automatic Flight Control System gives the helicopter an all weather capability. An auxiliary power plant (APP) gives the helicopter a self-starting capability. The helicopter has a fuel jettisoning system, rescue hoist, and seats for 37 passengers or 24 litters. It also has a rear ramp loading system and cargo tiedown facilities. There are provisions for external auxiliary fuel tanks, internal range extension tanks, air-to-air, and helicopter in flight refueling (HIFR) capabilities. It also has an external cargo hook and provisions for door guns. See TAB A for an aircraft illustration.

b. The primary mission of the RH-53D is airborne mine counter-measures (AMCM), which includes mine sweeping and ancillary tasks. The helicopter's secondary utility mission involves the movement of cargo and equipment and the transportation of passengers. The helicopter may be used for the rescue of personnel and the transportation of external cargo or inoperable aircraft.

c. The aircraft utilized for EVENING LIGHT were modified with commercial Omega navigation systems and provisions for the palletized inertial navigation system (PINS). Two internal fuel tanks and door mounted .50 caliber guns were also installed. Flight crewmembers were equipped with night vision goggles and aircraft landing lights were modified with infrared filters. Various items considered non-essential for this mission were removed for weight reduction. Items removed/added are contained in TAB B. Normal allowable gross weight for the RH-53D is 42,000 pounds. The Naval Air Systems Command provided a waiver to operate to 47,500 pounds for this mission.

4 ~~(B)~~ SUMMARY OF EVENTS

a. Pre-Mission Phase

E (1) On 21 November 1979, six (6) RH-53D helicopters from HM-16 were air lifted from Norfolk to [REDACTED] by C-5, reassembled, and flown aboard KITTY HAWK on 28 November 1979.

E (2) On 29 December 1979, two (2) additional RH-53Ds were transported by C-5 from Norfolk to [REDACTED]. The helos were reassembled and flown aboard NIMITZ at [REDACTED] on 2 January 1980.

(3) On 23 January, the six (6) RH-53Ds, HM-16 personnel, and equipment were cross-decked from KITTY HAWK to NIMITZ making a total of eight (8) helicopters aboard NIMITZ. It was the determination of mission planners, based on past operational history, that eight RH-53D aircraft would support a launch of seven

(4) During the period the RH-53Ds were deployed aboard KITTY HAWK and NIMITZ, they were flown at such a rate and in such a manner as to maintain maximum readiness and OPSEC. See TAB C for pre-mission flight-time and TAB D for pre-mission availability.

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(5) The mission aircraft maintenance officer had visited the ship approximately three weeks prior to mission execution to review maintenance records and personally inspect the aircraft. He had provided specific and detailed guidance to HM-16 squadron maintenance supervisors regarding items to be inspected, additional maintenance actions desired, and other pre-mission preparations to be accomplished. He also screened all related records and log books and did not note any components that exceeded allowable removal times. Based upon his guidance, the HM-16 squadron aircraft maintenance officer developed a pre-mission checklist and procedures for its completion (See TAB E). Completion of these actions was verified by the mission aircraft maintenance officer upon his return to NIMITZ on 20 April.

(6) On 20 April, eight mission aircrews and supporting personnel arrived aboard NIMITZ. The total team consisted of 50 personnel. During the period 20-24 April, mission crews participated in familiarization flights, maintenance check flights, deck turn-ups and mission preparation activities. All eight aircraft were given a full functional check flight during this period and the engines were adjusted to provide maximum allowable power. At least one pilot in each assigned mission flight crew was a qualified functional check pilot. Maintenance records were reviewed by the mission aircraft maintenance officer for appropriate maintenance action, and crewmembers made repeated inspections of their assigned aircraft.

(7) The loading of mission equipment commenced early evening of 23 April immediately upon completion of painting. All eight aircraft were turned up and those discrepancies noted were corrected (TAB F). Except for assistance specifically requested by mission maintenance crews, HM-16 personnel were restricted by HM-16 CO's direction from aircraft access. Without exception, all mission equipment was loaded exclusively by mission crews.

(8) The engine air particle separators (EAPS), one for each engine, were designed to remove sand, dust, and other foreign particles entrained in the engine inlet air. The foreign particles are scavenged and exhausted overboard allowing clean air to enter the

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engine. The aircraft mission commander directed the removal of EAPS. There is no prohibition from removing the EAPS from the RH-53D. EAPS removal increases power available from each engine by 2% and reduces weight of each aircraft by approximately 200 lbs. A decrease in overall engine life was not a factor for the relatively short total time of this mission. Although sand and dust were anticipated, engine damage from FOD was not a consideration because of the conditions at the planned landing sites. Aircraft weight and power available from the engines were critical factors in mission planning.

(9) All eight RH-53D aircraft were full mission capable to perform the rescue mission at the time of execution. Aircrews were familiar and comfortable with their assigned aircraft. Mission pilots reported the material condition of their aircraft was excellent. All agreed that mission aircraft were in better material condition than either the CH-53s or the RH-53s in which they trained in CONUS.

(10) HM-16 troubleshooting teams were assigned to each aircraft for the mission launch with spare parts immediately available and were standing by on deck to provide assistance for the launch. Assistance requested was of a minor nature and was not related to navigational equipment.

b. Mission Execution Phase

(1) On 24 April, eight fully mission capable aircraft launched on the mission. Shortly after take off, aircraft #8 experienced an intermediate gearbox chip warning light. Since this gearbox had been recently replaced, this discrepancy was not considered aborting. Such occurrences are common during break-in of a new gearbox. The mission was continued uneventfully.

(2) Approximately two hours into the flight aircraft #6 experienced an in-cockpit redundant BIM (Blade Inspection Method) indication of impending main rotor blade failure and made an emergency landing in the desert. After rotor shutdown, the crewchief confirmed visually by checking the indicator on the blade that one main rotor blade had lost pressure, indicating a possible cracked spar. This was an aborting discrepancy since it cannot be determined

in the field if a crack has developed in the blade or if the indicator is faulty. Average flight time on all blades on this aircraft was 956 hours and the high time blade was 1546 hours. Main rotor blade established replacement life is 3000 hours. It is not known which blade failed. Aircraft #6 had experienced a second stage hydraulic system low pressure indication a short time earlier; however, hydraulic quantity was normal. This situation is not uncommon and could have been an indicator problem. The crew was in the process of changing the indicator in flight when the blade emergency occurred. Further, the crew suspected fuel was not transferring from one of the two internal range extension tanks. Manual transfer would have been possible. Neither the hydraulic pressure indication nor the perceived electric fuel transfer problem were causes for aborting the mission.

(3) Aircraft #8 landed and recovered the crew and classified material from aircraft #6. At this point seven RH-53Ds were proceeding with the mission.

(4) Shortly after departure from the NIMITZ, #5 experienced loss of the TACAN (ARN-52) and loss of yaw stabilization associated with the AFCS. The copilot, who was in control of the aircraft, was required to continuously make heading corrections with the rudder pedals. Since the copilot was wearing night vision goggles, the pilot was required to monitor the needle ball and continually advise the copilot of required rudder inputs. Once in the sand/dust storm, the situation became very vertigo-inducing. Because of the reduced visibility and an abrupt maneuver by the aircraft flying lead, flight integrity was lost. At this point the co-pilot notified the pilot that he had vertigo. The pilot took control of the aircraft, leveled the wings, and noticed that the RMI was frozen and there was a 15 degree bank error in his vertical gyro indicator. This was verified by checking the needle ball. By actuating the vertical gyro transfer switch, the pilot switched to the copilot's gyro. At this point the cockpit conditions were extremely difficult. The wet compass was required for heading information and navigation was limited to the PINS System, which the pilot reported had an approximate 5 NM error. With an inaccurate navigation system, lack of precise heading instrumentation, aircraft

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stabilization problems, and no TACAN, the pilot considered mission continuation in instrument meteorological conditions at low level through the mountains which lay ahead to be impossible. Based on these factors, the decision was made to abort the mission and return to NIMITZ. Upon returning to NIMITZ, inspection revealed failure of the ASN-50 power supply by overheating due to failure of the power supply cooler blower. The ASN-50 powers the AHRS and AFCS. The TACAN blower motor, which is located in the nose electronics compartment, was also found inoperative. Although these failures caused an abort under the unexpected IMC flight conditions experienced, #5 could have continued the mission if forecast visual meteorological conditions had existed. On #5's recovery on NIMITZ, HM-16 maintenance personnel found one mission duffle bag wedged between a rib next to the left gunner station and the ASN-50 cooling intake. Overlapping the top of the air duct and the duffle bag were two mission flak jackets. The items were heavy enough and wedged in place securely enough to avoid movement under normal aircraft maneuvering. The positioning of these items severely restricted the airflow. A quantification of this restriction is not possible, however, it is the opinion of squadron maintenance personnel that the airflow intake was essentially secured by the mission equipment. Loading of mission equipment commenced on 23 April immediately after completion of painting. Except for assistance specifically requested by mission crews, HM-16 personnel were restricted from aircraft access and Marine guards were posted. Without exception, all mission equipment was loaded by mission crews. It cannot be determined when the items were placed against the intake. The aircraft commander supervised placement of mission gear on 23 April 80 and stated that gear was not placed in the area of the ASN-50 intake. The aircraft commander further stated that in his personal estimation and direct observation that gear stored directly in front of the master internal fuel cell was moved by maintenance personnel to the vicinity of station 222 port side to gain access to the ASN-50 compartment (after landing). It is not possible to arrive at any firm conclusion regarding the possible obstruction of the cooling air intake.

(5) Six aircraft eventually landed at the refueling site. Arrivals were approximately 45 minutes to 1 hour and 25 minutes later than the planned estimated time of arrival. The delays were caused by weather and visibility problems experienced enroute that

AIRCRAFT LOGS AND RECORDS

(c) The aircraft Logs and Records (OPNAV 4790/19), Weight and Balance Data (NAVAIR 01-1B-40), and Aircraft Inventory Record (DD Form 780) were reviewed. The aircraft was received from Sikorsky Aircraft by HM-12 on 1 Nov 73 and was transferred to HM-14 on 12 May 78. On 28 Dec 79 aircraft was disassembled for C-5A airlift to [REDACTED] and reassembled. It was flown aboard NIMITZ on 2 Jan 80. Aircraft was transferred to HM-16 on 23 Jan 80.

The last major rework was completed at NARF North Island on 15 Dec 76. On 1 Feb 80, the aircraft commenced a 3 month extension of its service period. A one hundred hour Phase D scheduled airframe inspection was completed on 1 Apr 80. No significant discrepancies were noted during this review. The time remaining on the aircraft until the next scheduled airframe inspection was 78.5 hours.

All maintenance records indicate the aircraft was full mission capable at launch time.

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AIRCRAFT SUMMARY

MISSION #4 BUNO: 158693 MODEX: 631
MISSION STATUS: Full mission capable
HOURS FLOWN: 19-23 Apr: 8.8
Total Apr: 9.1
Total Dec 79 - Apr 80: 83.1

MISSION EQUIPMENT/SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

Aircraft was left at Desert One upon mission abort. No abort discrepancies existed at Desert One.

PRE-MISSION MAINTENANCE SUMMARY (19-24 Apr)

No significant maintenance discrepancies existed prior to the mission (TABS F and I).

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE SUMMARY (Dec 79-Apr 80)

A review of all reported maintenance discrepancies and corrective actions revealed no outstanding, or significant discrepancies that would affect/degrade mission performance.

(C) AIRCRAFT LOGS AND RECORDS

The aircraft Log and Records (OPNAV 4790/19), Weight and Balance Data (NAVAIR 01-1B-40), and Aircraft Inventory Record (DD Form 780) were reviewed.

E The aircraft was received in the Navy by HM-12 on 6 Feb 74. The aircraft was transferred to HM-16 on 27 Oct 78. On 21 Nov 79, the aircraft was disassembled for airshipment via C-5A, and was reassembled at [REDACTED] on 25 Nov.

The last major rework was completed by NARF Pensacola on 25 Oct 77. On 1 Mar 80 this aircraft commenced a 3 month extension of its service period. A 100-hour Phase "C" scheduled airframe inspection was completed on 18 Mar 80. No significant discrepancies were noted. The time remaining on the aircraft until the next scheduled airframe inspection was 85.3 hours.

All maintenance records indicate aircraft was full mission capable at launch time.

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AIRCRAFT LOGS AND RECORDS

The aircraft Logs and Records (OPNAV 4790/19), Weight and Balance Data (NAVAIR 01-1B-40), and Aircraft Inventory Record (DD Form 780) were reviewed.

The aircraft was received in the Navy by HM-12 on 20 Jul 73. Aircraft was subsequently transferred to HM-16 on 27 Oct 78. The aircraft completed scheduled depot level maintenance by NARF Pensacola on 14 December 1979. The aircraft was disassembled on 28 Dec 79 for transport aboard a C-5A and was received aboard NIMITZ 2 Jan 80. The time remaining on the aircraft until the next scheduled airframe inspection was 42.3 hours.

All records indicate this aircraft was full mission capable at launch time.

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7. ^(U)~~(S)~~ SUPPLY SUPPORT PROCEDURES

a. Normal Support. When deployed, RH-53Ds are supported by a 90 day pack-up kit for support of 8 aircraft. The kit consists of 1289 line items including dynamic components. Historically, these pack-up kits have been deployed with 85% range and depth. Follow-on support during deployment is as follows:

(1) Common items are obtained from nearest Naval Air Station.

(2) All requirements that cannot be satisfied at the operating site are passed to supply officer NSA, Norfolk via phone or message. He coordinates supply action with other supply activities and the inventory control point.

(3) Material is transported via Air Parcel Post, QUICK TRANS and MAC as appropriate.

b. EVENING LIGHT. The following actions constituted special, high priority treatment of support for the RH-53D mission:

(1) A 90 day pack-up of 1289 line items was deployed with 99.2% range and 98.8% depth.

A, B (2) An additional pack-up of 169 line items augmented the normal 90 day pack-up. This additional pack-up increased the depth of some dynamic components by over 100%.

A (3) Special logistics procedures to provide follow-on support were established on 27 Dec 1979. A special project code 807 was established for EVENING LIGHT. All support activities were directed to expedite all requirements identified to that project code. No reference was made as to what project EVENING LIGHT entailed.

A (4) Points of contact were established at NAS Cubi Point, COMNAVAIRLANT, and COMNAVAIRPAC.

(5) All requisitioning and expedite action was accomplished by phone or priority message. No reference to aircraft type was made in telephonic exchanges.

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(6) All requisitions for RH-53D aircraft on KITTY HAWK/NIMITZ were processed through NAS Cubi Point. Cubi conducted an in-theater screen for assets. If not available in-theater, requirements were passed to NAS Norfolk. All actions were coordinated with points of contact established at various support activities.

(7) On 5 March 1980, NAVSUP initiated action to establish contact points at various transportation activities such as NAVMTO Norfolk, NATCO Travis AFB, and NATCO Clark AFB to coordinate the expeditious movement of material for EVENING LIGHT.

(8) In early March OP-51D was designated as OPNAV contact point to monitor movement of material. Daily phone contact with COMNAVAIRPAC provided a constant monitoring of material flow. Additional action was directed whenever material movement appeared stalled. This involved duplicate shipment of material in several instances.

(9) A daily SITSUM was provided both to OP-05 and the OPG in JCS.

c. Supply Support Summary. During the entire support phase of the RH-53D mission, supply support was considered excellent. The daily monitoring by OP-51D which began in March indicated that for the most part 7 aircraft had no unresolved material requirements and were reported in an up status.

8.(u) (S) CONCLUSIONS

a. Maintenance performed on the eight mission RH-53Ds was adequate in all respects. Special maintenance procedures in the form of additional check lists, which included extensive inspection procedures, were accomplished to the satisfaction of the mission maintenance officer. Mission pilots felt the aircraft were in excellent material condition. The aircraft had been flown as necessary to exercise the dynamic components and to verify/evaluate maintenance actions. Special supply support was also provided. Eight mission ready RH-53Ds launched from NIMITZ on time for the rescue mission.

b. Transition from maintenance by HM-16 squadron personnel to mission preparation by mission flight crews was accomplished smoothly and professionally. Independent

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~~SECRET~~SPECIAL PROCEDURES ACCOMPLISHED SPECIFIC TO MISSION PREPARATION
ONBOARD NIMITZITEMS REMOVED FOR WEIGHT CONSIDERATION (WEIGHT INDICATED IN LBS)

Crew Chief Seat (11)	Cargo Hooks (42)
KB-18 (3)	MCM Cutter Supports (7)
MCM Mirrors (94)	IFR Probes (242)
Cargo Winches (94)	Heaters (86)
Cargo Pendants (3)	Rescue Hoists (Except for 2 ACFT) (4)
Cargo Straps (85)	Exposure Suit Blowers/Hoses (30)
Smoke Flares (25)	Upper Personnel Doors (15)
Stowage Container (21)	Passenger Seats/Fittings (121)
Tow Lines (5)	Tie Down Fittings (6)
Equipment Container Bags (8)	IFF and Control Box (21)
Heater Ducting (10)	Ky-28 (20)
Windshield Anti-Ice Control (2)	Ky-28 Control Panel (2)
EAPS and Control Panel (201)	Drip Pans (10)
#7 Tail Rotor Drive Shaft Cowling (10)	ICS Overhead Reels (11)
Emergency Exit Lights (3)	External ICS Phone (2)
Static Discharge/Excitor Box (56)	Tow Winch Guillotine Tester (14)

ITEMS ADDED FOR MISSION

PINS (101)	50 Cal Mounts (86)
OMEGA (61)	50 Cal Weapons (164)
Range Extension Tanks (Int) (700)	Armor Plating (Engine) (200)
Crew Night Vision Goggles (40)	IR Filters on Landing Lights (0)

ITEMS RECEIVING SPECIAL INSPECTION/ADJUSTMENT

Engine topping increased	
Hydraulic lines/fittings checked for leakage	
Fuel lines checked for leakage	
Clocks synchronized (GMT)	
Dampeners checked for wear/limits	
Sleeve and spindles checked	
All rotor blades inspected	
Hydraulic pumps inspected for leakage	
Primary servos/AFCs servos	TOTAL REMOVED -1308
Flight controls/linkages	TOTAL ADDED -1352
Hydraulic compartment control rods	
Rotor head control rods	
Tail rotor control rods	
Tail rotor control cables	
Thomas couplings	
APP drive shaft/couplings	
MGB oil cooler	
MGB oil cooler drive shaft/couplings	
MGB high speed drive shaft/couplings	
All lights	
Windscreens	
HF radios	
FM radios	
Rescue hoist (2 ACFT)	
Cockpit instruments	
Armor plating (Engine)	

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TAB C

AIRCRAFT PRE-MISSION FLIGHT HOURS (While Embarked)

<u>158744/632 (#1)</u>	
DEC 79	4.8
JAN 80	42.7
FEB 80	29.2
MAR 80	52.9
APR 80	32.7
TOTAL	162.3

<u>158753/634 (#2)</u>	
JAN 80	12.2
FEB 80	13.9
MAR 80	48.7
APR 80	17.1
TOTAL	91.9

<u>158761/637 (#3)</u>	
DEC 79	3.1
JAN 80	21.5
FEB 80	9.3
MAR 80	20.7
APR 80	24.0
TOTAL	78.6

<u>158693/631 (#4)</u>	
DEC 79	10.7
JAN 80	29.2
FEB 80	17.9
MAR 80	16.2
APR	9.1
TOTAL	83.1

<u>158754/635 (#5)</u>	
DEC 79	5.7
JAN 80	24.6
FEB 80	56.0
MAR 80	25.7
APR 80	19.6
TOTAL	131.6

<u>158750/633 (#6)</u>	
JAN 80	6.0
FEB 80	0.0
MAR 80	8.6
APR 80	22.1
TOTAL	36.7

<u>158686/630 (#7)</u>	
DEC 79	6.8
JAN 80	19.6
FEB 80	54.0
MAR 80	27.2
APR 80	15.1
TOTAL	122.7

<u>158758/636 (#8)</u>	
DEC 79	2.4
JAN 80	4.8
FEB 80	36.1
MAR 80	0.0
APR 80	1.2
TOTAL	44.5

<u>TOTAL FOR DET</u>	
DEC 79	33.5
JAN 80	160.6
FEB 80	216.4
MAR 80	200.0
APR 80	140.9
TOTAL	751.4

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TAB D

PRE-MISSION AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY

<u>0800-0800 DAY</u>	<u>UP/ASSIGNED STATUS</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS FLOWN</u>
25 MAR 80	6/8	0	0.0
26 MAR 80	6/8	4	13.6
27 MAR 80	7/8	0	0.0
28 MAR 80	7/8	0	0.0
29 MAR 80	7/8	1	3.7
30 MAR 80	7/8	2	6.1
31 MAR 80	6/8	4	15.7
1 APR 80	6/8	2	7.0
2 APR 80	6/8	5	14.2
3 APR 80	7/8	0	0.0
4 APR 80	7/8	0	0.0
5 APR 80	7/8	1	3.5
6 APR 80	7/8	2	10.0
7 APR 80	7/8	1	0.1
8 APR 80	7/8	2	2.1
9 APR 80	6/8	2	3.6
10 APR 80	6/8	3	6.1
11 APR 80	6/8	2	6.2
12 APR 80	7/8	0	0.0
13 APR 80	7/8	0	0.0
14 APR 80	7/8	4	10.2
15 APR 80	7/8	1	1.5
16 APR 80	7/8	4	10.1
17 APR 80	7/8	2	7.5
18 APR 80	7/8	2	7.2
19 APR 80	7/8	3	5.6
20 APR 80	7/8	7	7.1
21 APR 80	7/8	6	13.2
22 APR 80	7/8	2	4.0
23 APR 80	8/8	0	0.0

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TAB F

MAINTENANCE TURN-UP/DRESS REHEARSAL ON THE NIGHT OF 23 APRIL 80

The below listed discrepancies were noted by mission crews and squadron personnel during a maintenance turn-up/dress rehearsal on the night of 23 April:

MISSION #1

1. Upper rotating beacon needs more -I/R paper.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: This discrepancy was repaired by the mission crew.

2. Install spot light panel and check operation.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Installed spot light panel and functionally operated system.

3. Install rescue hoist and panel.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Installed hoist and control panel, operationally checked good.

MISSION #2

1. TACAN inoperative.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Operationally checked, TACAN worked as it should. The ship's TACAN was not transmitting during this turn-up evolution.

MISSION #3

1. HF&FM inoperative.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced both receivers and transmitter.

2. Gunner's ICS inoperative.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Repaired cannon plug and operationally checked system, it worked as it should.

3. Master caution light illuminated periodically during engine turn.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced master caution panel and checked same.

4. Tail rotor anti-collision light needs more paper.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Mission crew repaired this light.

MISSION #4

1. Lower anti-collision light inoperative.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced lower anti-collision light.

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MISSION #5 CONTINUED

1. Pilot's 8 day clock in operative.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced clock.

2. Pilot's spot light rotates side to side but will not sweep fore and aft.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Due to absence of spare spot lights and with direction from mission #5 crew, swapped the pilot and copilot light.

MISSION #6

1. No UHF side tone.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced UHF radio.

2. 8 day clock inoperative.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced 8 day clock.

MISSION #7

1. Pilot's spot rotates side to side but will not sweep fore and aft.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Due to the absence of spare spot lights and with direction from Mission #7 crew, swapped the pilot and copilot light.

MISSION #8

1. UHF radio inoperative.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced UHF radio.

2. Pilot's spot light rotates side to side but will not sweep fore and aft.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Due to absence of spare spot lights and with direction from mission # 8 crew, swapped the pilot and copilot light.

3. #2 internal fuel tank will not transfer.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced tank and pressure refueled aircraft in order to check for leakage.

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TAB I

~~SECRET~~MISSION AIRCRAFT #1SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
4 Dec	Rotor	#1 blade dampener bearing high limit	Removed and replaced
17 Dec	Fuselage	Pilot's windshield needs replacement	Removed and replaced
21 Dec	Airframe	Massive oil leak #2 nose gear box	Reseated "O" ring in filter
24 Dec	Flight Control	Lateral cyclic stick drive, both directions	remove and replace roll trim sensor
31 Dec	Airframe	Pilot's emergency exit window latch broken	Repaired latch
1 Jan	Rotor	Steady #2 BIM caution light	Found and repaired bad electrical connection
4 Jan	Rotary Wing	#1 high speed shaft Thomas coupling out of limits	Removed and replaced shaft/couplings
9 Jan	Electrical	#2 nose gear box pressure switch sticks	Removed and replaced
18 Jan	Rotary Wing Drive	Accessory gear box chip light	Cleaned and replaced chip plug, cleaned filter and did 30 min. penalty run
21 Jan	Rotor System	Tail rotor blade damaged during move	Removed and replaced
30 Jan	Landing Gear	Port main mount tire bald	Replaced tire
3 Feb	Rotor System	Tail rotor blade damaged	Removed and replaced
4 Feb	Radar Nav	Radar altimeter failed	Removed and replaced
12 Feb	Rotor System	#3 Main rotor blade Pocket #18 bent down	Removed and replaced blade

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
14 Feb	Rotor System	Tail rotor blade damaged	Removed and replaced
15 Feb	Transmission	Intermediate gear box leaks	Removed and replaced
17 Feb	Transmission	Accessory gear box chip light	Replaced APP clutch
19 Feb	Flight	1st stage hydraulic filter button	Found bad pump; removed and replaced same
24 Feb	Flight Reference	Pilot's turn-rate needle inop	Replaced Pilot's turn rate gyro
1 Mar	Electrical	Cyclic trim inop	Found broken wire to roll servo, repaired same
3 Mar	Radio Nav	TACAN inop. No DME Azimuth good	Removed and replaced
10 Mar	Radio Nav	TACAN inop. No DME	Replaced TACAN. Checks O.K.
10 Mar	Flight Control	Pilots beeper trim intermittent	Replaced bad switch
11 Mar	Flight Control	Beeper trim still inop.	Replaced pilot's cyclic stick
15 Mar	Rotor	Solid #1 cockpit BIM	Found and repaired two broken wires
24 Mar	Engine	When motoring #1 engine, #2 engine would motor also	Replaced dual start valve
1 Apr	Electrical	#2 generator quit	Replaced #2 generator
2 Apr	Flight Ref	Pilot's turn rate gyro has full deflection	Replaced bad gyro
6 Apr	Radio Nav	TACAN breaks lock-on	Removed and replaced

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
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MISSION AIRCRAFT #1 (continued)

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
6 Apr	Radio Nav	Omega dropped off line five minutes	Replaced control box
11 Apr	Rotor	#4 Blade BIM check out of limits	Replaced main rotor blade
14 Apr	Radio Nav	Erratic TACAN Azimuth/DME	Replaced TACAN
17 Apr	Radar Nav	Radar altimeter inop.	Replaced bad alt
20 Apr	Radio Nav	TACAN stopped after one hour	Replaced TACAN
24 Apr	Aircraft	None noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

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~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~MISSION AIRCRAFT #2SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (JAN 80 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
24 Jan	A/C	HM-16 Acceptance Inspection	Complied with acceptance inspection
3 Feb	Rotor Sys	A/C has medium freq in all flight regimes	Inspected all main rotor components. Found 3 bad dampners; removed and replaced. A/C checks good.
19 Feb	Flt Controls	2nd stage hyd sys overserviced	Deserviced
21 Feb	Radio Nav	DME portion of TACAN inoperative	Removed and Replaced TACAN
21 Feb	Instruments	Flickering BIM	Could not duplicate discrepance 2 adel clamps replaced, cleane all cannon plugs.
21 Feb	Navigation	Litton Omega Nav wanders 150 miles west SW during flt	System checked good on ground power
28 Feb	Navigation	TACAN bearing inop DME good	Removed and replaced TACAN
1 Mar	Navigation	Litton Omega Nav inop all modes	Tech Rep check system - Checks good on ground power.
1 Mar	Navigation	TACAN inop both DME and Azimuth	Found suppression pulse cables crossed. Corrected cables. System checks good on ground power.
1 Mar	Navigation	BIM #2 flickers constantly in flight	Troubleshoot system. Found bad #1 harness; removed and replaced same.
6 Mar	Navigation	TACAN - No DME or Azimuth any channel	Removed and replaced. Checked bad on ground power, no DME.
6 Mar	Navigation	Litton Omega outputs unreliable	Removed and replaced Omega

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~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~MISSION AIRCRAFT #2 (continued)SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (JAN 80 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
9 Mar	Navigation	TACAN - No DME Azimuth O.K.	Removed and replaced TACAN. Checks good on channel
15 Mar	Flt Control	2d stage hyd system between Yellow & Green on deck. Drops 1/4" into Yellow inflight. Suspect air in system.	Serviced 2d stage to proper level cockpit qty level chec good. Found no air in syste
21 Mar	Airframe	Inspect all rigid & flex hyd lines in cabin ovhd for chafing, proper routing and replacement if needed.	Complied with same.
24 Mar	Navigation	Omega nav showed 75 mile error from known position.	Omega check good on next flight.
24 Mar	Airframe	2d stage hyd qty sys has mod leak. Dropped from full to top of yellow in 2.5 hrs. Suspect air.	Bled reservoir and serviced to proper level. No evidence of leakage.
24 Mar	Rotor	#2 blade BIM block cracked all the way through.	Potted crack in #2 BIM block.
26 Mar	Airframe	2nd stage hyd press filter button found popped on pre-flt insp.	Replaced 2nd stage pressure filter element.
9 Apr	Transmission	#1 NGB chip lite, 10 mins after T/O. Recycled ckt bkr...Lite stayed on.	Pulled chip detectors and oil filters, found no chips. Flushed NGB twice and reserviced. Checked good after 30 min penalty run.
11 Apr	Main Rotor Blade	#5 blade heavily scratched (to metal) 3rd pocket from inboard side.	Blended, cleaned and preserved.

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
11 Apr	Main Rotor	#4 blade pocket dented, Inspected pocket, O.K. 2d pocket from tip	
24 Apr	Aircraft	None noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

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SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (JAN 80 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
3 Jan	Airframe	Both wind screens scratched	Replaced same
5 Jan	Engine	#2 engine would not start	Replaced ignitor plugs
7 Jan	Ground Accident	Tail rotor gearbox Tail rotor hub assy Tail rotor pitch beam assy Tail rotor pitch link assy Tail rotor blades (3) Main rotor head Swashplate Main rotor blades (4) Pitch rod assy	Removed and replaced damaged components
20 Jan	Fuselage	Winch-engine start pump case cracked	Replaced pump
22 Jan	Electrical	#2 steady BIM light	Replaced electrical harness
29 Jan	Rotor	#1 and #6 main rotor blades damaged	Replaced blade
14 Feb	Rotor	Tail rotor blade cracked	Replaced blade
28 Feb	Instruments	1st stage hydraulic quantity low light pressure & quantity O.K.	Replaced caution panel
22 Mar	Radio Nav	Omega display frozen	Repaired by FSR
8 Apr	Electrical	#2 generator failed in flight	Replaced supervisory panel
24 Apr	Aircraft	None noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

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
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MISSION AIRCRAFT #4

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u> <u>79</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
07 Dec	Main Rotor Blade	Bad BIM indication on #3 blade. Shows partly black	Removed and replaced #3 main rotor blade
23 Dec	Navigation	TACAN #2 needle would not search	Removed and replaced TACAN
<u>80</u> 16 Jan	Flight Reference	Pilot's gyro has intermittent "OFF" flag	Troubleshooting pilots gyro using ASN-50 test set found power supply to be bad. Removed and replaced power supply.
16 Jan	Navigation	TACAN has no DME	Removed and replaced TACAN
18 Jan	Hydraulic	1st Stage manifold filter popped	Checked manifold for metal particles and replaced filter.
26 Jan	BIM	Flickering #2 BIM in flt.	Cleaned #6 BIM block and harness. Checked Good.
11 Mar	T/Rotor Blade	T/R blade has 4 dents on leading edge	Removed and replaced T/R Blade.
20 Mar	Hydraulic	2nd stage hyd qty indicator fluctuates from center green to 1/8 inch from bottom of yellow in 3.1 hr Flt.	Serviced reservoir system checks good.
21 Mar	Hydraulic	Inspect all rigid and flex hyd lines in cabin ovhd area for chaffing proper routing, and replacement if needed.	Complied with same.
29 Mar	BIM Sys	#1 MRB has 2 cracks in BIM block	Repaired BIM block

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MISSION AIRCRAFT #4

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u> <u>80</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
08 Apr	Engine	#1 Engine experienced 3 loud pops, followed by another pop and torque decreased from 80% to 30%. Incident occurred after maint hover, when A/C transitioned to fwd flt.	Removed and replaced #1 eng:
24 Apr	Aircraft	None noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

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~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~MISSION AIRCRAFT #5SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
17 Dec	Flight Reference	ASN-50 Power Supply missing from Acft	Installed ASN-50 Pwr supply
17 Dec	Airframe	Pilot's windshield hazy	Replaced windshield
27 Dec	Integrated Guidance	Roll trim inop all AFCS channels	Found disconnected cannon plug. Reconnected same.
01 Jan	Flight Reference	Compass card on BDHI frozen	Replaced ASN-50 Gyro
05 Jan	Fuel	Internal range extension tank control box inop	Removed, repaired and replaced
09 Jan	HF Comm	HF Radio inop	Replaced HF Radio
02 Feb	Radio Navigation	TACAN inop in Azimuth/DME	Removed and Replaced
06 Feb	Electrical	Lost #2 Generator	Replaced #2 Generator
08 Feb	Radio NAV	TACAN 40 ⁰ lock-off	Replaced TACAN
11 Feb	UHF Comm	UHF failed after take-off	Removed and replaced UHF
15 Feb	Rotor	Tail rotor blade bent	Replaced T/R blade
16 Feb	Rotor	#4 Main rotor blade has bad pocket	Replaced #4 MRB
16 Feb	Power Plant	Auxiliary power plant shaft sheared	Removed and replaced APP support/shaft
23 Feb	Integrated Guidance	AFCS YAW problems above 150' and 60 Kts	Replaced AFCS AMP and blown Fuse
27 Feb	Integrated Guidance	AFCS YAW hardover #2 AFCS	Repaired broken wire
28 Feb	Integrated Guidance	Stiff right pedal with #1 AFCS servo on	Replaced bad #2 dual input servo valve

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MISSION AIRCRAFT #5 (continued) ~~25~~

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
07 Mar	Integrated Guidance	AFCS and CoPilot Gyro problem in roll	1080Y Gyro found bad, replaced same.
12 Mar	HF Comm	HF Radio inop	Replaced HF Radio
01 Apr	Rotor	Tail rotor blade has FOD damage	Replaced T/R blade
14 Apr	Integrated Guidance	With AFCS AMPS off got sharp yaw kick when switching servo from #1 to #2	Adjusted #2 Moog valve check good
14 Apr	Radio NAV	TACAN inop all channels Azimuth/DME	Removed and replaced TACAN
19 Apr	Rotor	Remove and Replace tail rotor blade due to bad balance	Completed same.
19 Apr	Radio NAV	#2 needle on TACAN will not rotate	Removed and replaced blower motor and TACAN
24 Apr	Aircraft	None, noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

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~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~MISSION AIRCRAFT #6SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (JAN 80 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
24 Jan	A/C	A/C acceptance inspection	Performed acceptance inspection
25 Jan	Main rotor blade	Removed #3 MRB for installation on A/C #3	Replaced on 28 Feb 80
28 Jan	Hydraulics	Removed 1ST stage hydraulic pump for A/C #8	Replaced on 31 Jan 80
28 Jan	Hydraulics	Removed winch engine start pump for A/C #8	Replaced on 25 Feb 80
15 Feb	Main rotor blade	Removed #1 MRB for A/C #4	Replaced blade 28 Feb 80
15 Feb	Main rotor blade	Removed #6 MRB for A/C #7	Replaced on 26 Feb 80
16 Feb	Main rotor blade	Removed #5 MRB for A/C #5	Replaced on 26 Feb 80
18 Feb	Intermed. gearbox	Removed IGB for A/C #1	Replaced on 19 Feb 80
20 Feb	Main rotor blade	Removed #4 MRB for #5	Replaced on 26 Feb 80
28 Feb	A/C	Ground incident involving T/R blade striking overhead	Replaced all dynamic components aft of main gear box during period from 28 Feb to 19 Mar 80
13 Mar	Hydraulics	Removed 1ST stage hydraulic pump for A/C #1	Replaced 18 Mar 80
16 Mar	Full system	Check all internal tanks	Complied with same

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
21 Mar	Hydraulics	Insp all rigid and flex. hyd. lines in cabin ovhd. for chafing, proper routing and replacement, if needed	Complied with same
24 Apr	Aircraft	None noted	None, aircraft full mission capable

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SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
06 Dec	Instruments	Pilots AFCS indicator erratic regardless of AFCS status	Removed and replaced
18 Dec	Integrated Guidance	Hardover to right in yaw with both feet off pedals	Repaired bad AFCS control panel
30 Jan	Integrated Guidance	AFCS has right hardover	Indicator out of adjustment. Repaired same.
12 Feb	Flight Control	Cyclic hunts and drives any configuration	Replaced bad roll sensor
13 Feb	HF Comm	Unable to transmit or receive on HF	Removed and replaced
14 Feb	Rotor	#6 Main rotor blade has cracked 3rd pocket	Replaced main rotor blade
16 Feb	Flight Controls	Cyclic hunts in roll	Replaced bad AFCS roll sensor
20 Feb	Integrated Guidance	#1 AFCS Amp on with #2 Amp off result in full right YAW	Replaced Lateral accelerometer
21 Feb	Flight Reference	Copilot turn Rate Gyro inop in norm position	Replaced Turn Rate Gyro
21 Feb	Navigator	OMEGA INOP	Replaced OMEGA Control Box
28 Feb	Flight Control	Excessive Force Required to move cyclic with Trim off	Replaced Roll Trim Valve
7 Mar	Navigation	OMEGA quit half way through flight	Replaced Power Supply
16 Mar	Integrated Guidance	Acft yaws right any AFCS Configuration	Adjusted Lateral accelerometer

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
16 Mar	Flight Reference	Pilot's Gyro Precesses in flight	Replaced ASN 50 Gyro
29 Mar	Engine	Unable to start Aux Power Plant	Replaced ignitor Plugs
29 Mar	Engine	Aux Power Plant pump cavitated	Replaced pump
30 Mar	Integrated Guidance	With AFCS 1 or AFCS 2 Servo on and AFCS #1 amp off, have outer loop drive	Replaced bad AFCS Roll Sensor
11 Apr	Flight Reference	Pilot's Gyro shows extreme nose down	Replaced ASN 50 Gyro
11 Apr	Integrated Guidance	AFCS has roll oscillations	Replaced bad AFCS Amp
11 Apr	Rotor	Tail rotor blade cracked	Replaced blade
19 Apr	Instruments	1st stage hydraulic pressure fluctuations	Replaced bad indicator
19 Apr	Integrated Guidance	#2 YAW indicator stays 1 mark to right of neutral	Replaced bad AFCS Amp
22 Apr	Nav	OMEGA Alert Lite intermittent	Replaced by FSR
23 Apr	Rotor	Tail Rotor Blade Abrasive Strip coming off	Replaced T/R Blade
24 Apr	Aircraft	None, noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

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~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~MISSION AIRCRAFT #8SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
10 Dec 79	Transmissions	#1 nose gear box chip-lite, recycled chip detector CKT-BKR lite went out.	Removed and cleaned chip-detector, No evidence of fuzz.
30 Dec 79	Transmission	#1 nose gear box chip lite.	Removed and cleaned chip detector, no evidence of fuzz. Penalty run conducted, system checks good.
8 Jan 80	Flight Reference	Pilot's attitude gyro warning flag stays on-Transfers to Co-pilot when VGI transfer switch activated.	ASN-50 power supply system bad. Removed and replaced.
8 Jan 80	Transmissions	#1 nose gear box chip lite illuminated stays on when CKT-BKR is reset.	Removed all chip detectors, no evidence of metallic chips. Electrical continuity checks performed. 30 Min penalty run. No lite.
28 Jan 80	Hydraulics	1st stage hyd system pressure did not come online.	Removed and replaced 1st stage hyd. Pump reserve Checks good.
5 Feb 80	AFCS	Heading hold hunts with feet off pedals.	Replaced yaw sensor.
11 Feb 80	AFCS	#2 amplifier has no dampening in roll mode. @ 140kts A/C has porpoise in pitch.	Removed and replaced roll-rate and pitch-rate gyros.
21 Feb 80	Hydraulics	Cannibalization of 1st stage hyd pump.	Replaced pump on 29 Feb 80
4 Mar 80	Intermed GB	Removed IGB for A/C #6	Replaced on 22 Mar 80

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MISSION AIRCRAFT #8

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
21 Apr 80	Aircraft	Functional check flight flown with following discrepancies: <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Dampners require servicing.- FM squelch does not work. TACAN no lock-on.	All discrepancies repaired prior to mission launch
24 Apr 80	Aircraft	None noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

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OpOrd

Withheld in full

JTD Exercise

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355

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
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REF IN OADR

REASON 5200.1R, PAR 2-301c(5)

STORM CLOUD



CLASSIFIED BY JCS, J-3, JTD
REVIEW ON 15 NOVEMBER 2000
EXTENDED BY JCS, J-3,
REASON 5200.1R, PAR 2-301c(5)

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OPORD STORM CLOUD (U)

1. (U) Situation
2. (U) Mission
3. (U) Execution
4. (U) Support
5. (U) Command Control, Communications

ANNEXES:

A. (U) Task Organization

B. (U) Intelligence

Appendix 1 (U) Weather

C. (U) Operations

Appendix 1 (C) Delta

Appendix 2 (C) Rangers

Appendix 3 (U) Helo Ops

Appendix 4 (C) [REDACTED]

Appendix 5 (U) MC/EC-130

Appendix 6 (U) [REDACTED]

Appendix 7 (U) Air Defense

Appendix 8 (U) C-5/C-141B

Appendix 9 (U) KC-135

Appendix 10 (U) [REDACTED]

Appendix 11 (U) Airfield Plans, Clamity Jane procedures

D. (U) Logistics

Appendix 1 (U) Medical

J. (U) Command Relationships

Appendix 1 (U) Command Structure Chart

K. (U) Communications

L. (U) Operations Security

X. (U) Flight routes, Flow Chart

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1. (U) Situation:

(U)
(C) a. General: A wealthy, radical "third world" nation, Calivada, is in the final stages of becoming a nuclear power. Peaceful nuclear facilities purchased from European nations have helped this process. Recently this nation has decided to speed the process by kidnapping three US nuclear physicists and stealing components and plans for nuclear weapons. The self proclaimed President-for-Life of Calivada has clearly stated that he will attempt to use his future nuclear capability to coerce the US on a number of regional issues. The US has confirmed that Calivada was responsible for the kidnapping and theft. An exhaustive search has located the US physicists and the plans/components (hereafter collectively referred to as "critical cargo") in a large city within the country.

(U)
(C) The physicists are being held in a government research office, BACON, while the plans and components are being kept at a nearby research facility, LIMESTONE.

(U)
(C) The objective of JTD Exercise STORM CLOUD is to recover the critical cargo intact and the physicists alive and well.

(U)
(C) b. Enemy: The country of Calivada is extremely hostile to the US. The neighboring countries of Arizona and New Mexico, while hostile to both the US and Calivada, would nonetheless probably warn Calivada of any US attempt to recover the critical material. Although Calivada's armed forces are relatively inefficient, there are adequate military resources available to present a hostile environment to any US recovery attempt.

(U)
(C) c. Friendly: The countries east of the Mississippi are sympathetic to the US and have granted the US overflight rights and a few staging facilities. These facilities are in sufficiently remote areas to allow short-term use without drawing undue attention.

(U)
(C) 2. Mission: JTD STORM CLOUD forces covertly penetrate the hostile territory of Calivada and conduct simultaneous air assault operations to recover the US assets being illegally held at locations LIMESTONE and BACON.

3. (U) Execution:

a. (U) Concept of Operation

A (1) (S) Phase I. Pre-Deployment. At D-1, [REDACTED] and DELTA move to an isolated area of Ft Bragg to conduct day and night rehearsals. [REDACTED] conducts rehearsals at a site to be determined.

b. (U) Coordinating Instructions:

- (1) (U) Annex A - Task Organization
- (2) (U) Annex C - Operations
- (3) (U) Annex X - Execution Time Chart
- (4) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Location Designators:

CAMELOT (Edwards AFB)
RIVERSIDE (Desert Rock)
EVERGLADE (Indian Springs)
BACON (Jackass Flats)
LIMESTONE (MX Site)
BROOMCORN (Campbell)
CANVASBACK (Hurlburt)
HORSESHOE (Bragg)
REMINGTON (Hunter)
GARRISON (Pahute Mesa)

(5) ^(U)~~(S)~~ CPX to be conducted 19 Nov. Message to follow.

(6) ^(U)~~(C)~~ Alternate evacuation sites are RIVERSIDE and CAMELOT in order.

(7) (U) Tasking:

(U) JTD:

- (a) (U) Provide OPSEC/cover story.
- (b) (U) Staff weather services.
- (c) (U) Provide overall guidance/command.

A

^(U)~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] (RGR) [REDACTED] Inf.

(a) ^(U)~~(C)~~ Provide required forces for LIMESTONE, RIVERSIDE and EVERGLADE.

(b) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Provide OPFOR at exercise area. OPFOR to deploy to GARRISON 20 Nov.

(c) ^(U)~~(C)~~ Assist at CAMELOT as required.

(C) DELTA

(a) ^(U)~~(C)~~ Provide required forces for LIMESTONE.

(b) ^(U)~~(C)~~ Provide control of UH-60 assets during assault phase.

A

(c) (C) Provide guidance/control of [REDACTED] assets chopped to use in assault phase.

(C) [REDACTED]

- (a) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Provide required forces for BACON.
- (b) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Provide control of OPCON [REDACTED] assets during assault phase.
- (c) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Verify headcount to DELTA at EVERGLADE.

A

(C) [REDACTED]

- (a) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Construct BACON/LIMESTONE objectives.
- (b) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Provide control of their [REDACTED] during attack phase.
- (c) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Provide OPSEC evaluation of exercise area at conclusion of trainex.
- (d) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Provide focal point for coordination with DOE.

^(U)~~(S)~~ 101st

- (a) (U) Provide required helo force. ?
- (b) (U) Provide admin recovery capability for downed helos.
- (c) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Coordinate administrative backhaul from Edwards AFB.
- (d) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Schedule assault force arrival at BROOMCORN to preclude standing time.
- (e) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Interface with [REDACTED]

A

(C) 1st SOW

- (a) (U) Provide required fixed wing support.
- (b) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Provide CCT support as required.
- (c) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Insure CCT conducts liaison with CAMELOT and EVERGLADE prior to 21 Nov 80.
- (d) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Coordinate emergency abort plan and Calamity Jane procedures with ground commanders.
- (e) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Develop helo ground refuel plan and provide OPCON of 101 Pathfinders for refuel operations at EVERGLADE.

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~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] AWACW

A

(a) (U) Provide AWAC support as required.

(b) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Develop, coordinate and control under separate Frag Order: F-14 Cap, F-4 Aggressor package and associated tanker support.

(C) USA QM Unit

(a) (U) Support as required.

(b) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Establish FAR system at EVERGLADE and RIVERSIDE.

(8) (U) Debrief will be conducted at 1300 on 25 November 1980. Commanders and unit representatives should report to the Pentagon, Room 2C840.

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4. (U) Support.
Annex D - Logistics
5. (U) Command, Control, Communications
 - a. (U) Communications:

(1) (U) There will be three JTD Command Nets; SATCOM, ALPHA, SATCOM BRAVO, and HF CHARLIE. All will operate in the secure voice mode.

(2) (U) The mission element nets will operate in the categories of inter-air, air-ground, ground, and fire support. HF VHF-FM, VHF-AM, and UHF, both secure and non-secure, will be the modes of operation.

(3) (U) See C-E Annex K and the CEOI, published separately, for additional information.

b. (U) Command and Control:

(1) (U) JTD command communications will operate from eight locations; the JTD base (photography), two JTD relays (POCKETBOOK and RYE GRASS), the JTD forward command posts (CAMELOT and EVERGLADE), a JTD response cell (BRASS RING), the JTD airborne command posts (E-3A and AC-130), and the JTD Main (HAMMER).

(2) (U) All primary element commanders will report directly to the CDR, JTD.

(3) (U) The Main JTD command post will be located with the CDR, JTD at all times.

(4) (U) See Annex J for additional information.

ROBERT A. TURNER
Colonel, USA
Joint Test Director

OFFICIAL:

ROBERT C. DUTTON
Colonel, USAF
J-3

~~(S)~~ DISTRIBUTION

ANNEXES:

- A. Task Organization
- B. Intelligence
- C. Operations
- D. Logistics
- J. Command Relationships
- K. Communications-Electronics
- L. OPSEC
- X. Time Chart

Unit	Cys
1 SOW	2
101st	4
DELTA	2
AWACS	1
C-141/C-5	2
KC-135	5
JTD	2
USA Qm Unit	6
	6
	1

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ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) TO OPORD STORM CLOUD (U)

(U) Task Organization

1. ~~(S)~~ Unit:

JTD HQ

~~██████████~~
TF 79.1 (DELTA)

~~██████████~~
101st AVN GP (-)
1st SOW(+)
AIR CAP (F-74)
AWACS
QM Det
Ele JCSE
Ele ADA

2. ~~(S)~~ Mission Area:

LIMESTONE

TF 79.1
~~██████████~~

BACON

~~██████████~~

RIVERSIDE

CO, ~~██████████~~
Ele, 1st SOW

EVERGLADE

~~██████████~~
1st SOW (-)
Ele ADA
QM DET

OTHER

JTD HQ
AWACS
~~██████████~~

FIRE SUPPORT

AC-130
AIR CAP
AH-1G

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ANNEX B. (INTELLIGENCE) (U)

a. (U) Strategic Setting: Joint Training Exercise STORM CLOUD will be held utilizing the following: Hurlburt Field, FL; Ft. Bragg, NC; Ft. Campbell, KY; Edwards AFB, CA; Indian Springs Aux, NV; Desert Rock Aux, NV; and Nevada Test Site. This is a JCS coordinated, JTD sponsored exercise. The setting is a representation of world-wide capabilities in a hostile environment.

b. (U) Setting Countries: In the exercise strategic setting, country Calivada is surrounded by countries inimical to its own as well as to US interests. In the region there are friendly countries which will allow US forces use of their territories as landing/staging sites, as long as the influx of forces are kept as inconspicuous as possible.

c. (U) Political Situations: Country Calivada has long been suspicious of US and European motives in the region. Despite Calivada's continuing attempts to rid the region of US and European influence, it has continued to do business and purchase arms from both. Calivada is also regarded by its neighbors as being a threat to the stability of the area. Its neighbors suspect Calivada of planning to develop a nuclear capability that will allow it not only to influence US actions, but to intimidate its neighbors as well. There is ample reason for this suspicion, as Calivada has had historical territorial designs on its neighbors as well as a history of irrational actions. Calivada's armed forces, while inefficient by Western standards, is one of the largest and best equipped in the area. Calivada has shown itself to be extremely security conscious and has attempted to arm itself with the best and latest military equipment.

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APPENDIX 1 (WEATHER) TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) (U)

Situation Climatic Brief
CAMELOT

November

1. General. Site E is generally clear to partly cloudy in November with chilly nights and mild days. Skies are clear 42-68% of the time. Maximum cloudiness occurs between 0900 and 1700 local time. Mean cloudiness is 17-23% at night and 28-34% during the day. Morning minimum temperatures average 36F increasing to 66F during the afternoon. Precipitation occurs on about three days per month. Thunderstorms are very rare. The prevailing surface wind direction at night is southwest to west (11-17% of the time) at mean speeds of 3-10 knots. Calm winds occur 19-29% of the time. Daytime wind directions are variable, but show a slight tendency to be north-easterly. Speeds are 3-16 knots, and calms occur 19-34% of the time.

2. Flying Weather. Good to excellent. Cloudy and rainy conditions are infrequent. Ceilings less than 5000 feet and/or visibilities less than 5 miles occur 3-6% of the time; less than 1500/31% of the time or less. Conditions less than 55/1 are rare. Icing and turbulence are usually not a problem.

3. Exposure Weather. Generally pleasant. Nighttime temperatures are chilly, but reach the mid 60's during the afternoon. Sunshine is abundant and rain is rare. Relative humidity varies from an early morning high of 60-65% to an afternoon low of 35-40%.

ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	85
MEAN MAXIMUM	66
MEAN MINIMUM	36
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	16
NUMBER OF DAYS WITH PRECIPITATION	3
SNOW	*
FOG	1
95% WORST DA	4800 Ft
95% WORD PA	2400 Ft

* = Less than 0.5 day

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- e. (U) Coordinating Instructions:
 - (1) (U) Actions at downed aircraft: TAB C (Downed Aircraft)
 - (2) (U) Aircraft load plans: TAB D (Load Plans)
- 4. (U) Service Support: SOP
- 5. (U) Command and Signal:
 - a. (U) Signal: TAB E (SIGNAL)
 - b. ^(U)~~(S)~~ Command: The TF 79.1 Commander is in UH-60 #4 during the assault flight, in the vicinity of point GRANGE during the assault, in the vicinity of the SW corner of EZ WHISKEY after the evacuation to objective GOLD, and is UH-60 #6 during the exfil.

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DELTA: SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

(C)

EVENT	XMIT TO	BREVITY
1. ASSAULT FORCE ON GND, ASSAULT IN PROGRESS.	[REDACTED] RGR BN CDR TO DELTA CDR, DELTA CDR TO CDR, [REDACTED]	ACCLAIM
2. # PERSONNEL ENROUTE TO EXFIL AIRFIELD.	DELTA CDR TO CDR [REDACTED]	ANTELOPE
3. FORCES DEPART OBJ, RGR BN CDR ASSUMES FSC.	DELTA CDR TO [REDACTED] RGR BN CDR,	BASKETBALL
4. FORCES CLOSED INTO FIELD.	DELTA CDR TO CDR [REDACTED]	CITADEL
5. TM DELTA (-) ENROUTE TO EXFIL AFLD VIA HELO.	[REDACTED] RGR BN CDR TO CDR [REDACTED]	DENTIST
6. TM RANGER ENROUTE TO EXFIL AFLD VIA HELO.	UH-60 FLIGHT LDR TO CDR JTF.	FOOTNOTE

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PHASE I

CAMELOT

(U) 1. OFF LOADING/BUILD UP

(U) 2. ASSEMBLY AREA

~~(S)~~ 3. T/O TIME

A. 4 UH-60 0310Z

B. 8 AH-1S 0320Z

C. [REDACTED] 0321Z

D. 20 UH-60 0515Z

(U) 4. ENROUTE MAP

~~(S)~~ 5. ARRIVAL AT RIVERSIDE

A. 4 UH-60 0428Z

B. 8 AH-1S 0438Z

C. [REDACTED] 0508Z

D. 20 UH-60 0633Z

~~(S)~~ 6. REFUELING TIME

A. AH-1S 0508Z

B. [REDACTED] 0633Z (21)

0648Z (24)

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PHASE II

RIVERSIDE TO BACON & LIMESTONE

~~(C)~~ 1. T/O TIME (RIVERSIDE)

A. 16, [REDACTED] 1, AH-1S	0824Z
B. 24, UH-60/2, AH-1S	0825Z
C. 8, [REDACTED]	0826Z
D. 3, AH-1S	0829Z
E. 1, AH-1S	0832Z
F. 1, AH-1S	0838Z

(U) 2. ENROUTE MAP

(U) 3. AH-1S TARGET MAP

~~(C)~~ 4. EGRESS TIME

A. 16, [REDACTED]	0900Z
B. 8, [REDACTED]	0902Z
C. 8, UH-60	0915Z
D. 16, UH-60	0945Z
E. 8, AH-1S	0945Z

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PHASE III

EVERGLADE:

~~(S)~~ 1. ARRIVAL AT EVERGLADE

A. 16, [REDACTED]	0932Z
B. 8, UH-60	0939Z
C. 16, UH-60	1009Z
D. 8, AH-1S	1005Z

(U) 2. REFUEL/DEPARTURE

A. 8, UH-60	1004Z
B. 16, UH-60	(8) 1034Z
	(8) 1039Z
C. 8, AH-1S	1139Z

RIVERSIDE:

(S) 1. 5, [REDACTED] ARRIVE	0923Z
2. 5, [REDACTED] DEPART	1003Z

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APPENDIX 5 (MC/EC-130) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)

1. (U) ~~(S)~~ Seven (7) Aircraft (5-MC's/2-EC's)
2. (U) ~~(S)~~ Takeoff CANVASBACK - 0100Z to 0130Z (as required)
3. (U) ~~(S)~~ Refueling Times: 0300Z - 3 aircraft
(at the ARIP) 0310Z - 2 aircraft
0320Z - 2 aircraft
4. (U) ~~(S)~~ Low level entry times: 0430Z till 0455Z

Low level entry point: N35-07 W99-50
5. (U) ~~(S)~~ TOT's:
 - a. EVERGLADE - 0845/46/47/48/55Z
 - b. RIVERSIDE - 0855Z/0905Z
6. (U) ~~(S)~~ Takeoff times: (Approx 2 hrs on ground)

1045Z till 1115Z
7. (U) ~~(S)~~ Low level exit time: 1500Z till 1520Z (N35-07 W99-50)
8. (U) ~~(S)~~ Refueling times: 1540/1550/1600Z
9. (U) ~~(S)~~ Land times CANVASBACK: 1820/1830/1840Z

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APPENDIX 8 (C-5, C-141B OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)

1. (U) TASKS:

(a) (U) Provide 8 C-5 and 3 C-141B aircraft to airlift JTD STORM CLOUD forces/equipment to required destinations.

(b) (U) Provide Combat Control Team as required to:

(1) (U) Exercise positive control of all fixed wing and rotary wing takeoffs and landings except for initial blacked out MC-130 landings at EVERGLADE and RIVERSIDE and initial helicopter landings at RIVERSIDE.

A (2) (U) Assist and plan with [REDACTED] for the safe transloading of passengers from helicopters to fixed wing assets.

(3) (U) Coordinate emergency abort plan with the on-scene ground commander.

(4) (U) Develop helicopter ground refueling flow plan.

2. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL: COMJTF exercises command and control of MAC forces through the COMALP.

3. (U) EXECUTION:

a. (U) C-5: 8 C-5 aircraft will airlift helicopters and forces from BROOMCORN to CAMELOT.

#1	T/O BROOMCORN	212030
#2	"	212040
#3	"	212050
#4	"	212100
#5	"	212110
#6	"	212120
#7	"	212130
#8	"	212140
#1	ARV.CAMELOT	220130
#2	"	220140
#3	"	220150
#4	"	220200
#5	"	220210
#6	"	220220
#7	"	220230
#8	"	220240
#1-8	ON-LOAD	221800
-	CAMELOT	

b. (U) Depart times and arrival times at BROOMCORN to be determined.

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c. (U) (S) C-141B EVERGLADE 3 C-141B aircraft will airlift fuel blivets.

#1	T/O HORSESHOE	220333
#2	"	220335
#3	"	220337
#1	ARCP	220500
#2	"	220500
#3	"	220500
#1	ARV. EVERGLADE	220908
#2	"	220913
#3	"	220918
#1	T/O EVERGLADE	221000
#2	"	221020
#1	ARCP	221330
#3	"	221350
#1	SVN/POB	221530
#3	"	221550

d. (U) (S) #2 C-141B will remain at EVERGLADE to admin airlift bivits and load personnel to HORSESHOE. T/O time to be determined.

e. (U) LOAD/BACKHAUL PLAN:

See Charts

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APPENDIX 9 (KC-135 OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)

1. (U) (S) Concept of Operations: SAC will provide inbound and outbound refueling support for AC/MC/EC-130 and C-141B aircraft, as well as refueling for E-3A/F-14 fighter cap package. The 1SOW will coordinate special tracks for low altitude refueling. For high altitude operations, fighter cap package will use A/R 3E, while C-141Bs will use AR 112 W/E. All refueling operations will be conducted using only minimum essential communications.

a. (U) (S) E-3A/Fighter Support: A tanker task force at March AFB will support F-14 refuelings with drogue-equipped KC-135s. Specific mission details will be contained in E-3A air-to-air annex for STORM CLOUD.

b. (U) (S) C-141B Support: Altus AFB KC-135s will support both inbound and outbound refuelings in A/R 112, using point parallel procedures. The inbound ARCT will be a firm preplanned time; outbound ARCT will be adjusted based on the receiver's launch time. Tankers will be prepared to hold, awaiting C-141 late outbound arrival.

TANKER CALL SIGN	RECEIVER CALL SIGN	A/R TRACK	RATIO TNKR/RCVR	ARCT	ALTITUDE	OFFLOA
THEM 51	TBD	112W	1:3	220500Z	270	15m ea
THEM 52	TBD	112E	1:1	221330Z	270	25m
THEM 53	TBD	112E	1:1	221350Z	270	25m

c. (U) Communications/Rendezvous Plan is as published in FLIP.

d. (U) (S) AC/MC/EC-130 Support: A tanker task force at Grissom AFB will support all 1SOW refuelings, using overhead comm-out rendezvous for inbound refueling; modified point parallel for outbound A/R. Inbound ARCT (time at the RZ point) will be preplanned; outbound ARCTs will be adjusted based on receiver launch time. The 1SOW will coordinate the special low altitude refueling tracks to be used for this exercise.

(1) (U) (S) Planned A/R tracks:

TRACK	RZ POINT	ARCP	EAR
A	TXK 316/33	ADM 087/85	ADM 067/20
B	ADM 306/33	ADM 067/20	TXK 316/33
C	(Between Abilene, TX and Roswell, NM)		
D	(Between Prescott VORTAC and St Johns VORTAC)		

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Final determination of AR Tracks will depend upon 1SOW requirements and FAA constraints.

(2) ^(U)~~(S)~~ MC/EC-130 Support:

<u>TANKER CALL SIGN</u>	<u>RECEIVER CALL SIGN</u>	<u>A/R TRACK</u>	<u>ARCT(Z)</u>	<u>ALT</u>	<u>RECVR ON-LOAD</u>	<u>A/A TACAN</u>	<u>KC-13 BEACC</u>
BAR 11/12	TBD (3)	A	220300Z	11,000	25m	31/94	1-1-
BAR 13	TBD (2)	A	220310Z	11,000	25m	32/95	2-1-
BAR 14	TBD (2)	A	220320Z	11,000	25m	33/96	2-1-
A/R FREQ	P.366.3	/BU	391.8				
BAR 15/16	TBD (3)	B	221540Z	11,000	25m	31/94	1-1-
BAR 17	TBD (2)	B	221550Z	11,000	25m	32/95	2-1-
BAR 18	TBD (2)	B	221600Z	11,000	25m	33/96	2-1-
A/R FREQ:	P.366.3/B.U.	391.8					

(3) ^(U)~~(S)~~  Support:

A

<u>TANKER CALL SIGN</u>	<u>RECEIVER CALL SIGN</u>	<u>A/R TRACK</u>	<u>ARCT(Z)</u>	<u>ALT</u>	<u>RECVR ON-LOAD</u>	<u>A/A TACAN</u>	<u>KC-13 BEACO</u>
BAR 21/22	TBD (2)	C	220455Z	10,000	32m	30/93	2-1-
BAR 25/26	TBD (2)	D	221140Z	11,000	38m	30/93	2-1-
A/R FREQ:	P.361.7/B.U.	350.7					

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APPENDIX 10 (Det A Operations) TO ANNEX C (Operations)

A

1. ~~(S)~~ Mission: [REDACTED] conducts [REDACTED] assault of BACON at 220745Z Nov 80 to recover US assets.

2. ~~(S)~~ Execution:

a. (U) Concept of Operations: The operation will be conducted in three phases.

(1) ~~(C)~~ Phase I: Unit will be moved from CANVASBACK to BROOMCORN on 21 Nov in time to outload on C-5s.

(2) ~~(C)~~ Phase II: Unit will conduct [REDACTED] assault of BACON to recover assets.

A

(3) ~~(C)~~ Phase III: Unit will exfiltrate [REDACTED] to EVERGLADE where they will transload to C-141 aircraft for return to CANVASBACK.


~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Everglade:

C-130 OFF-LOADING POSITIONS


MC-130 #1 LANDS AT H HOUR
MC-130 #2 LANDS AT H+1MIN
MC-130 #3 LANDS AT H+2
MC-130 #4 LANDS AT H+3
EC-130 #5 LANDS AT H+10



Everglade

C - 141B GROUND MARSHALLING PLAN

1 & 3 MAKE 180°
TURNS WHEN FINAL PARK
LOCATION IS REACHED



26

REFUELING POINTS

SECRET

Everglade

PARKING PLAN:


~~SECRET~~

UH-60 TRANSLOAD POINT

OH-6A LZs

26

84




REFUELING POINTS

~~SECRET~~

Everglade

REFUEL / DEPARTURE OPERATIONS:



~~SECRET~~

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OPERATIONS: CLAMITY JANE PROCEDURES

CALAMITY JANE Procedures - ELEVATE. The "CALAMITY JANE" procedure is devised in the interest of safety and to insure orderly aircraft spacing in the event that any go around is required.

Format: "(Aircraft Flight) This is (Command Agency), ELEVATE XX at YY; acknowledge." Where (Aircraft Flight) is the string of aircraft to which the procedure applies, and (Command Agency) is the agency commanding the procedure.

XX is the number of minutes each aircraft will delay.
YY is the time in minutes at which the procedure will be initiated.

Procedure: If necessary to implement a "CALAMITY JANE" procedure, the ELEVATE call will be given early enough to allow each aircraft to receive and acknowledge the call prior to YY. After acknowledgement, all aircraft will fly their assigned route to the location corresponding to time YY. At YY, all aircraft will initiate a 180 degree standard rate turn to the right. Even suffixed aircraft will initiate a climb to base altitude plus 500 feet. Aircraft will fly a single holding pattern so as to arrive back at YY location at time YY plus XX. Even suffixed aircraft will descend to base altitude when reestablished on course.

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ANNEX D (LOGISTICS)

LOGISTICS (U)

1. (U) Concept. Initial logistics provisioning will be through normal Service channels to the extent possible. Equipment maintenance is a responsibility of the providing Service/ command. Minimum resupply is planned. Emergency requirements which cannot be satisfied in objective areas will be forwarded to JTD J-4.

a. (U) Supply:

(1) Class I. Operational rations will be used throughout. Each command is responsible to deploy into area with sufficient rations for consumption until return to home station.

(2) (U) Class III:

(a) (S) 101st will operate FARRP (2 points) at RIVERSIDE. POL, Blivit and pumps will be provided from JTD assets at Ft Bragg. 101st will coordinate pickup of material.

(b) (S) QM detachment will operate refuel point (8 points) at EVERGLADE.

(c) (S) Refuel of AH-1G [REDACTED] by UH-60 refuelers will be conducted by 101st at RIVERSIDE.

(d) (S) [REDACTED] will be refueled administratively at EVERGLADE after ENDEX either by QM detachment or base tanker truck in order of priority.

(e) (U) No other refueling except for air refueling of aircraft is planned.

(3) (U) Class V:

(a) (U) All deploy with sufficient Class V for conduct of operation.

(b) (S) Only resupply is at FARRP at RIVERSIDE for AH-15 [REDACTED] Requirements to be determined by 101st. (Simulate carrying Class V into RIVERSIDE.)

(4) (U) Other Classes of Supply: No other resupply is scheduled.

b. (U) Medical. Tab 1.

c. (U) Transportation. Deployments/redeployments will be coordinated between HQ JTD and MAC. Requirements for additional transportation will be forwarded to JTD-J4.

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APPENDIX 1 (MEDICAL) TO ANNEX D (LOGISTICS)

MEDICAL SUPPORT

1. (U) Unit level medical support utilizing organic medical assets will be the responsibility of the organization commander.
2. (U) Medical support beyond the capability of unit level medical personnel will be planned, coordinated, and controlled by the designated JTD Surgeon.
3. (U) JTD level medical support for Exercise STORM CLOUD is as follows:
 - a. (U) ~~(S)~~ CAMELOT Forces: Aboard C-5A #6, two Delta Med personnel and two medical chests. (101 Flight Surgeon to accompany UH-60 flight at the discretion of Helicopter Air Mission Commander.)
 - b. (U) ~~(S)~~ EVERGLADE Forces: (MC-130) Two Delta Med personnel and two medical chests aboard aircraft #5.
 - c. (U) ~~(S)~~ EVERGLADE Forces: (C-141) Two Delta Med personnel and two medical chests aboard C-141 # 1.
 - d. (U) RIVERSIDE Forces: Medical support to be provided by 1st SOW flight surgeon personnel.
4. (U) ~~(S)~~ Evacuation procedures in the event of actual evacuation requirements during staging activities (Campbell, Pope, Hurlburt) casualties should be evacuated to local base medical facility. Evacuation of personnel involved in operations in-and-around Edwards AFB should be directed to USAF Medical Clinic, Edwards - Main. Evacuation of personnel involved in operations in-and-around DOE, Indian Springs, and Desert Rock should be directed to Nellis AFB Hospital. Air crews should be briefed on potential evacuation requests and routes.
5. (U) In the event of actual emergencies--evacuation procedures will be handled in accordance with normal SAR.

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ANNE J (COMMAND AND CONTROL) TO OPORD STORM CLOUD (U)

1. (S) JTD Succession of Command:

A

<u>Individual</u>	<u>Call Sign</u>	<u>Location</u>
a. HAMMER	LANCER	JTD MAIN
b. STONE	ARCHER	[REDACTED]
c. SNUFFY	CYCLONE	SCORPION (AWACS)
d. BG SCHOLTES	OUTLAW	EVERGLADE
e. Col TURNER	COMANCHE	PHOTOGRAPH

2. (U) Command Relationships (See attached diagram Appendix 1):

A

- a. (U) JTD CDR - Is in full, overall command of all forces, during all phases of the exercise. (See paragraph 1 above for Command Succession). All of the following commanders report directly to the JTD commander when appropriate and required. (See paragraph 3 for Command Concept).
- b. [REDACTED] JTD Deputy Commander - Located [REDACTED]
 - (1) [REDACTED] Manages and directs [REDACTED] AH-1S assets in providing supporting fires in response to assault commander within pre-established priorities.
 - (2) (U) Manages and directs SAR assets and efforts.
 - (3) [REDACTED] Controls [REDACTED] assets upon their completion of initial objectives.
- c. (C) Air Support Commander - Located AWACS.
 - (1) (U) Manages and directs the employment of E-3A and F-14 assets in provision of CAP.
 - (2) (U) Manages the employment of all KC-135 assets.
 - (3) (U) Provides track information and firing recommendations on low altitude targets to the ADA controllers at designated ground sites.
 - (4) (U) Manages the employment of all KC-135 assets.
- d. (U) Air Mission Commanders (CAMELOT, EVERGLADE, RIVERSIDE):
 - (1) (U) Command all fixed wing assets designated to support their respective objectives.

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(2) (U) Each is Dominant Authority while airborne on his in-bound and out-bound routes.

(3) (U) Responsive to Ground Commander while landed.

A (4) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] assets chop to JTD Deputy Commander during on station time.

e. (U) Ground Commanders (CAMELOT, EVERGLADE, RIVERSIDE).

A (1) ~~(S)~~ Command all security ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] Rangers) forces, ~~(S)~~ CT personnel, and support elements at their respective locations.

(2) ~~(S)~~ Security forces include, under the subordinate command of the on-site Ranger Commander, the ALO, Fire Support Coordinator, and ADA elements.

(3) (U) Support elements include Medics and a substantial DACO effort at EVERGLADE, and a FARRP at RIVERSIDE.

(4) ~~(S)~~ Is the Dominant Authority at their location while forces are on the ground.

f. (U) LIMESTONE Assault Commander.

A (1) ~~(S)~~ Commands LIMESTONE assault forces (Delta, [REDACTED])

(2) ~~(S)~~ Commands LIMESTONE UH-60 assets from RIVERSIDE launch until EVERGLADE landing.

(3) (U) Dominant Authority from RIVERSIDE launch until EVERGLADE landing.

A (4) ~~(S)~~ Determines time of final assault (H-Hour) within guidance provided by JTD Commander, and coordinates launches of BACON assault forces/helicopter assets, [REDACTED] helicopter assets, and attack helicopter assets at appropriate times.

g. (U) BACON Assault Commander.

(1) (U) Commands BACON assault forces (Detachment A).

A (2) ~~(S)~~ Commands BACON [REDACTED] from RIVERSIDE launch until EVERGLADE landing.

(3) (U) Dominant Authority (along with LIMESTONE Assault Commander who has priority) from RIVERSIDE launch until EVERGLADE landing.

h. (U) ~~(C)~~ Commander.

(1) (C) Commands ~~(U)~~

A (2) (C) Commands designated ~~(U)~~ assets from RIVERSIDE launch until EVERGLADE landing.

(3) (U) Upon completion of initial assigned mission chops to JTD Deputy Commander for employment in SAR and/or combat forces role.

i. (U) Helicopter Mission Commander.

(1) (U) Becomes the Ground Commander at CAMELOT on landing at that location.

A (2) (C) Commands all helicopter assets from CAMELOT take-off until RIVERSIDE landing. The Deputy Helicopter Mission Commander in the flight of four UH-60 refueling helicopters will in fact, for the HMC, command all ~~(U)~~ AW-15 assets from CAMELOT take-off to RIVERSIDE landing. DHMC during this period will report directly to JTD if required.

(3) (U) Chops all assets to appropriate mission commanders at RIVERSIDE.

(4) (U) (C) Commands all UH-60 and AH-1S forces upon exfiltration take-off from EVERGLADE.

3. (U) JTD Command Concept:

a. (U) The Commander, JTD, is in full overall command of all forces, during all phases of each JTD operation. All subordinate commanders will function in an Imperative Activity/Dominant Authority Mode.

b. (U) Imperative Activity is defined as the portion of the operation which, at a given point in time, is critical to successful mission completion.

c. (U) The term Dominant Authority denotes the commander responsible, at that time, for execution of the Imperative Activity.

d. (U) The Dominant Authority concept implies temporary OPCON of one or more lateral elements; not a formal transfer of command. For example, during an airfield seizure phase, the Ground Forces Commander (GFC) has the

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Imperative Activity and, for that period, is the Dominant Authority. The Air Mission Commander (AMC) who had just landed, would remain in the JTD command net, but would be prepared to execute, on order of the GFC (under the monitoring of the Commander, JTD), various tasks necessary to successfully complete the seizure phase of the operation.


- e. (U) At certain times during an operation, there may be more than one Dominant Authority. An example might be the Air Support Commander defending against an air attack over the target area at the same time the ground assault phase was in progress. In these instances the general situation and the nature of events will dictate which commanders respond to the requirements of the others. Priorities will be monitored and adjusted, and positive command guidance will be provided when required, by the Commander, JTD.

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JTD COMMAND STRUCTURE
EXERCISE STORM CLOUD

APPENDIX 1 (JTD COMMAND STRUCTURE)
TO ANNEX J TO OPORD STORM CLOUD (U)



----- FIRE SUPPORT REQUESTS
..... PROGRESS/STATUS REPORTS

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ANNEX K (COMMUNICATIONS) TO OPORD STORM CLOUD (U)

1. (U) Communication Doctrine.

a. (U) Radio listening silence is required for OPSEC reasons in certain situations prior to H-Hour.

(1) (U) When Direction Finding (DF) or local monitoring of aircraft station transmissions would reveal movement towards or within a hostile country.

(2) (U) When DF or local monitoring of ground station transmissions at in-country staging/refueling sites would reveal the in-country presence and possibly the exact location of such sites.

b. (U) Once the actual assault has begun there are few security limitations. ~~_____~~

A ~~_____~~ should probably remain secure (on FM or UHF), but most other transmissions can be made in the clear, and as often as necessary.

2. (U) Procedures for EXERCISE STORM CLOUD.

a. (U) General: Except for JTD Base and relay stations operating in the Broadcast Mode;

(1) (U) Radio listening silence to maximum degree practical.

(2) (U) Minimum transmissions are at other times.

b. (U) Procedures by phase.

(1) (U) Pre-deployment. For one week prior, establish patterns of base stations/relay stations broadcasting messages on secure SATCOM and secure HF. Each message acknowledged by at least one other base or relay station and broadcast back. Stations include unit admin stations at home bases, and JTD deployed base/relay stations.

(2) (U) Deployment. Same as pre-deployment.

(3) (U) Insertion (includes all inbound fixed-wing flights, landing at Camelot, assembly, flights to Riverside, and staging at Riverside).

(a) (U) Nominal radio listening silence by all aircraft and ground stations on all frequencies.

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(b)(8) Base stations periodically broadcast information messages on secure SATCOM and secure HF. Acknowledged (and repeated) only by other base or relay stations. These transmissions include weather updates, time checks, and aircraft progress reports (as observed by the AWACS).

(c)(8) Transmissions by aircraft/ground stations only when absolutely required to report difficulties. Use the ZEBRA channels in the clear, with the ZEBRA number code. The in-the-clear, numeric transmissions reduce the total time on the air, eliminate the give-away sounds of the PARKHILL, and eliminate the use of English spoken code words. The base stations will then initiate detailed questions, comments, and instructions, fully secured on the broadcast channels, with answers, if required, using in-the-clear numbers on the ZEBRA channels.

(d)(8) In cases of extreme difficulty approval may be given to use secure UHF between aircraft, if the situation permits.

(4) (U) Assault.

(a)(8) Enroute is the same as the Insertion Phase until H-Hour, or until operation is detected, whichever comes first.

(b)(8) During assault [REDACTED]

A
should use secure FM and/or UHF. All other transmissions in extraction zone areas secure or in the clear if needed to facilitate operations. During this period, all the out-of-CALIVADA transmissions will use two-way secure SATCOM and HF radio (single channel), on the SATCOM ALPHA or BRAVO net as appropriate.

(5)(8) Extraction (includes flights to Riverside, transloading, and outbound flights).

(a)(8) Same as Assault through outbound flight Riverside.

(b)(8) Absolutely minimum transmissions on outbound flights.

4. (U) For all other communications information, see CEOI.

ANNEX L TO OPLAN STORM CLOUD (U) OPERATIONS SECURITY (U)

References:

- a. (U) JCS Pub 18, "Doctrine for Operations Security."
 - b. (U) DODR 5200.1R
1. (U) GENERAL: This annex provides guidance for the secure planning and conduct of exercise STORM CLOUD (U).
 2. (U) RESPONSIBILITY FOR OPSEC: All participants in this exercise share responsibility for OPSEC. In order to efficiently manage this responsibility OPSEC points of contact (POC) will be appointed by each participating unit and cognizant higher headquarters. These POC's will work directly with JTD security to coordinate all security matters. JTD security will provide a specific hostile all source intelligence collection report at D-3., Updates will be provided as required.
 3. (U) OPSEC THREAT: Because the STORM CLOUD exercise areas are normally associated with high priority science and technology, a potential OPSEC threat exists at both home bases and in the exercise areas.
 - a. (S) SIGINT - A variety of hostile spaceborne, seaborne, and land based stations pose a threat to this exercise. Among these will be: Soviet and Cuban land based HF DF stations; diplomatic missions in Washington, San Francisco, and Mexico [REDACTED] In addition, periodic overflights by Communist Bloc airlines pose a threat.
 - b. (S) The WSC-3/Parkhill communications signature which is identifiable with the JTD may be subject to hostile traffic analysis techniques. Pre and post exercise management of traffic levels will partially counter this threat. Specific guidance on desired traffic levels will be provided in separate message. Another partial counter to this traffic analysis threat will be the use of Parkhill secure phones. Outside of maintaining minimum acceptable traffic levels on the WSC-3, an effort should be made to use the PARKHILL secured phone lines for necessary coordination. The possibility of detecting phone conversations is less than radio-satellite communications.
 - c. (S) HUMINT. This threat is posed by both both overt and covert means. Among these are hostile diplomatic travel, merchant seamen transiting the CONUS, students and cultural/scientific exchange personnel. The best counter to this

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threat is good continuing unit OPSEC training and clear guidance concerning current activity. Specifically, unit personnel should, to the degree possible, act in a business as normal manner. While there is no desire to publically announce the exercise, it is recognized all necessary preparations cannot remain hidden. Therefore, unit personnel should understand that the unit will/did participate in a TRAINEX is unclassified.

- (U)
- d. (S) Open sources. Media stories currently present an extremely great threat to STORM CLOUD security. The unusually large deployment/redeployment activity at Campbell may provoke media inquiries. The on-going exercise BRIGHT STAR, increases this possibility. Noise or accidents during the exercise may also result in media inquiries. The primary means of defusing this threat will be timely responses to inquiries. This will require a combination of contingency press releases and rapid cross tell between units and JTD HQ in the event of inquiries. FAA flight plans and communications frequency coordination are also potential open source threats. To the extent possible, frequency coordination will be done via secure means. While hostile intelligence will be able to note fixed wing flight plans to the Edwards and Nellis AFB areas, rotary wing aircraft operating between these points will attempt to file flight plans for general radi of action vice specific routes.
- (U)
- e. (S) PHOTINT: Soviet photo satellites may pose a threat to the deployment/redeployments and to the construction of exercise facilities. JTD security will provide satellite warnings and to the extent possible, daylight exercise related activities will be adjusted. Separate JTD message will provide further details on this threat.

4. (U) EXECUTION:

a. (U) JTD will provide:

- (1) Satellite warnings for home bases and all exercise locations beginning on D-3 with updates as appropriate.
- (2) AGI, merchant ship, Communist Bloc airline warnings beginning on D-3 with updates as appropriate.
- (3) Notices of pertinent Soviet Bloc attache travel will be provided when available.
- (4) Liaison with OSD, JCS, and service public affairs officers as required.

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(5) Numbered, accountable copies of this OPORD.

b. (U) All units will:

- (1) (U) Make the maximum use of secure vice non-secure comms.
- (2) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Immediately report to JTD HQ any incidents which have a potential security impact. Aircraft accidents or personnel injuries are prime examples.
- (3) (U) Provide daily (NLT 2400 local) feedback on security situation. Reports should begin on D-3 and extend through D+3. Security situations requiring assistance/coordination with JTD should be reported ASAP.
- (4) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Politely refer all media/public inquiries to public affairs channels and immediately alert JTD security. Inform the person who makes the inquiry that it is the function of the public affairs to provide the information they seek.
- (5) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Instruct all personnel, that in the event of an accident/incident they should provide as necessary; name, rank, unit, and if necessary, admit to participating in a joint training exercise. Provocative actions or words (classified, sensitive, etc) should be avoided. Additional inquiries should be directed to public affairs.
- (6) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Appoint a POC to liaison with INSCOM team performing counter-intelligence assessment. Note, INSCOM team will not be cleared for JTD information. Neither confirm or deny INSCOM findings; however, use their information to take corrective action. If necessary INSCOM reps can be asked for clarification of their findings or OPSEC recommendations.
- (7) (U) Transmit INSCOM reports to JTD HQ in a timely fashion.
- (8) (U) At the conclusion of the exercise each unit may retain one copy of OPORD STORM CLOUD. All other copies of the OPORD are to be collected and returned to JTD HQ.
- (9) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Beginning on D-8, all units will insure that at least a minimum level of activity is established on the WSC-3. Details on this will be provided in separate message.

- (10) (U) (S) The use of Edwards AFB will be treated as CONFIDENTIAL information until arrival at Edwards AFB. As an exception to this pre-exercise coordination with MAC concerning airfields usage at Fort Campbell and Edwards will be For Official Use Only. To the extent possible this coordination information should be limited to as few personnel as required. After arrival of the main body of exercise forces at Edwards, the Edwards AFB location will no longer be treated as CONFIDENTIAL. All other locations will, however, be classified as CONFIDENTIAL prior to, during and after the exercise.
- (11) (U) (S) All unit personnel will be briefed that the fact that the unit participated in a TRAINEX is unclassified. Unit personnel should also be briefed to refer to all requests for specifics of the TRAINEX to their unit commander.

c. (U) Unit hosting exercise debrief:

- (1) (U) Insure that normal security procedures contained in DODR 5200.1R and service supplements are followed. Among these are:

- (a) (U) Insure that adequate space is available for conducting TOP SECRET debriefings.
- (b) (U) Insure that access to debriefing is controlled.
- (c) (U) Double check the conference area at conclusion of the debrief.

(2) (U) 101st will:

- (a) (U) To the extent possible, avoid overflight of inhabited areas between exercise points.
- (b) (U) (S) Act as primary security POC for Edwards AFB.
- (c) (U) (S) Perform a double check to insure that no classified information is left at Edwards AFB.
- (d) (U) (S) Coordinate directly with Delta and JTD HQ to insure that the cross load at Campbell is conducted in a low key, non-provocative manner.

(3) (U) Rangers will:

- (a) (U) (S) Act as primary security POC for Indian Springs.

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- (b) (U) Perform a double check to insure that no classified information is left at Indian Springs.

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(U) (4)

- (a) (U) Act as primary security POC for Desert Rock and exercise locations within the Department of Energy (DOE) area.

- (b) (U) Perform a sweep to insure that no classified information is left in above mentioned area.

- (5) (U) ISOW will:

- (a) (U) To the extent possible, avoid low altitude flights of inhabited sections of the exercise area.

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~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX L TO EXERCISE STORM CLOUD OPLAN ESSENTIAL
ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION

<u>Subject Requiring Protection</u>	<u>Plan Phase</u>	<u>Prep Phase</u>	<u>Exec Phase</u>	<u>Post Phase</u>
A Participation of DELTA, [REDACTED]	X	X	X	X
A Identities of Personnel attached to DELTA, [REDACTED]	X	X	X	X
Use of Edwards AFB range	X	X		
Use of NTS areas	X	X	X	X
Lessons learned	N/A	N/A	N/A	X
Identification of specialized equipment not normally a part of a units TA	X	X	X	X

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JTD Exercise


STORM CLOUD



CONFIDENTIAL

JTD Exercise

STORM CLOUD



ANNEX X TO OPLAN STORM CLOUD (U)
ROUTE CHART

CONFIDENTIAL

②

!LOCAL, PST!

OTW
0845Z

CAMELOT

| 2020 BROOMCORN → CAMELOT 0130 |
 | 2040 BROOMCORN → CAMELOT 0140 |
 | 2060 BROOMCORN → CAMELOT 0150 |
 | 2100 BROOMCORN → CAMELOT 0200 |
 | 2110 BROOMCORN → CAMELOT 0210 |
 | 2120 BROOMCORN → CAMELOT 0220 |
 | 2130 BROOMCORN → CAMELOT 0230 |
 | 2140 BROOMCORN → CAMELOT 0240 |

C-130
EVERGLADE

1045 ———— / ———— CANVASBACK 1220
1046 ———— / ———— CANVASBACK 1221
1047 ———— / ———— CANVASBACK 1222
1048 ———— / ———— CANVASBACK 1223
1049 ———— / ———— CANVASBACK 1224
1050 ———— / ———— CANVASBACK 1225
1051 ———— / ———— CANVASBACK 1226
1052 ———— / ———— CANVASBACK 1227
1053 ———— / ———— CANVASBACK 1228
1054 ———— / ———— CANVASBACK 1229
1055 ———— / ———— CANVASBACK 1230

RIVERSIDE
COPTER
ORCES

PHASE I (CAMELOT TO RIVERSIDE)

PHASE II (EMPLOYMENT)

PHASE III (REFUEL, EXFIL TO CAMELOT)

8 BACH
 AM - 1
 0320 CAMELOT
 RIVERSIDE 0420
 0321 CAMELOT
 RIVERSIDE 0508

[illegible]

1170 → EACH UN . 60
1004 → 1150 → 16 EACH UN . 60
1129 → 1300 → 8 EACH UN . 1

DEPART RIVERSIDE AD



10130	CANVAS
10131	CANVAS

[illegible]

CANVASBACK	1750
CANVASBACK	1760

101

Country	Percentage of the population aged 15 and over who are literate in 1990
Argentina	85
Mexico	75
Brazil	65

DISPATCH
DEPT

ANNEX X TO OPLAN STORM CLOUD (U)
FLOW CHART

WILLIS TOWERS WATSON

138035

I-760

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OPERATION POTENT CHARGE

(U) Purpose -

1. Train to deployability readiness a SNOWBIRD mission-capable force consisting of: 4 UH-1H's, 5 HH/HH-53C's, 5 CH-47C's (HICAP), 10 UH-60A's (HICAP).
2. Train a cadre of mission - ready crews for the purpose of conducting SNOWBIRD - oriented individual and unit training.
3. Articulate doctrine and procedures for the conduct of joint helicopter special operations missions, and document for the future.

(U) Concept -

1. 1 Aug 80 - Establish Joint Aviation Plans and Operations Directorate directly subordinate to JTF.
2. 6 to 8 Aug 80 - Conduct Joint Helicopter Operations Doctrine and Procedures Conference, sponsored by JTF. Attendees from HQ, JTF; HQ, 101 AFB GA; HQ, 1st Special Operations Wing; US Army Aviation Center; and Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One. Determine, in conference, using HONEY BADGER evaluations as a basis, doctrine and procedures for conduct of future helicopter special missions. Document procedures.
3. 19 to 31 Aug 80 - Conduct operational training of a mission package to refine and test doctrine and procedures. Conduct a mission-oriented exercise over realistic distances, in a type mission environment. Evaluate special mission package potential to successfully conclude a SNOWBIRD mission.

(U) Assets -

- 10 - UH60 HICAP
 - 5 - CH47 HICAP
 - 5 - HH53H
 - 5 HH/CH53C/D
- Select crew:
- 8 UH60, Army
 - 4 CH47, Army
 - 4 HH53H, Air Force
 - 4 HH/CH53, Air Force/USMC

~~SECRET~~
Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: OADR
Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
(U) Doctrinal/Procedural Subject Areas -

1. Briefings:

- a. Briefing format/guide
- b. Pre-mission data and lists
- c. Map/chart/flight log presentation
- d. Formation briefs
- e. Emergency procedures briefs
- f. Cell standardization
- g. Tactical situation briefs
- h. Mission note cards

2. Mission, profile, enroute phase -

- a. Ground abort procedures
- b. Communications plan
- c. Spare aircraft procedures
- d. Departure join-up
- e. Enroute link-up
- f. Lost lead link-up
- g. Formation visual signals
 - (1) lead change
 - (2) frequency change
 - (3) position change
 - (4) emergency
 - (5) break
- h. NVG navigation check points - route selection
- i. Lost comm
- j. Lost visual contact - signals and procedures
- k. Evasive maneuver battle drill
- l. Wing man abort
- m. Downed crew recovery
- n. Re-link procedures, enroute, holding area, LZ/PZ.
- o. IP procedures
- p. Holding area procedures
- q. Hides
- r. AR procedures
 - (1) timing
 - (2) missed AR
 - (3) cell procedures
 - (4) lighting

3. Mission profile, terminal phase

- a. Aircraft spotting in LZ/PZ/holding area
 - b. ROE/LZ status/threat/security
 - c. Rejoin by aircraft left in holding area
 - d. RRP closeout procedures - signals and counts
- ~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- e. PZ closeout procedures - signals and counts
- f. Authentication procedures
- g. Evasive maneuver, re-link
- h. Pax onload/offload procedures

- (1) count
- (2) control
- (3) conform

- i. Lost lead
- j. LZ lost comm

- (1) visual signals
- (2) withhold

- k. Rescue and recovery response procedures
- l. Signals - compromise/pickup/proceed
- m. Holding area communications -

- (1) call forward plan
- (2) re-link plan
- (3) withhold plan
- (4) NLT times

- n. Passenger instructions
- o. Transload area procedures

- (1) pax instructions
- (2) pax marking
- (3) pax accounting
- (4) ingress/egress
- (5) lighting
- (6) communications plan
- (7) lost comm plan - signals
- (8) control points/holding areas

- p. RRP/LZ/PZ timing/traffic/holding
- q. RRP/LZ/PZ HA procedures
- r. Go around procedures
- s. CCT/Pathfinder coordination

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5 August 1980

JTD PROCEDURAL CONFERENCE
EXERCISE POTENT CHARGE - PHASE I

Following is a list of participants in POTENT CHARGE Joint
Doctrine Conference:

<u>NAME/RANK</u>	<u>CLEARANCE</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>SSN</u>
COLONEL [REDACTED]	TS	USAAVNC	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	DA, ODCSOPS (JCS)	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	USAAVNC	[REDACTED]
CAPTAIN [REDACTED]	TS	USAAVNC	[REDACTED]
CWO-3 [REDACTED]	S	USAAVNS	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	101 AVN GP	[REDACTED]
CWO-3 [REDACTED]	S	D/158 AVN BN	[REDACTED]
CWO-3 [REDACTED]	S	C/158 AVN BN	[REDACTED]
CAPTAIN [REDACTED]	S	C/158 AVN BN	[REDACTED]
CWO-4 [REDACTED]	S	A/159 AVN BN	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	1st SOW	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	AF/RDQL	[REDACTED]
CAPTAIN [REDACTED]	S	1st SOW	[REDACTED]
CAPTAIN [REDACTED]	TS	1st SOW	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	437 MAW/CCT	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	MAWTS-1 Yuma AZ	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	HMX-1 Quantico	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	6510th Test Wg (JCS)	[REDACTED]

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EXPENDABLES

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PROVIDED BY</u>	
250	40MM [REDACTED]	Anniston	
400	[REDACTED]	Anniston	
300	Ammo Pouches	Anniston	
660	7.62MM Tracer Ctg.	Anniston	
48	White SMOke Grenade	Navy	
400	Concussion Grenades	Navy	
100	Practice Concussion Grenades	Navy	D
272	Rocket Incendiary 66MM 4rd Clip	Anniston (48 Bragg)	<u>Del</u>
936	40MM CTG HEDP for M79	Anniston	[REDACTED]
40	All weather goggles	Bragg	Delta
100	Ear Protectors	DSC Richmond	Delta
100	Navy Watch Caps	Navy Exchange (paid)	Delta
272	Navy Watch Caps	DLA	Delta/ [REDACTED]
100	Navy Watch Sweaters	Navy Exchange (paid)	Delta
60	Navy Watch Sweaters	DLA	Delta/H
150 (1)	Mountain Sleeping w/covers	XVIII ABN Corps	<u>Delta/Helo</u>
150	Air Mattresses	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta/Helo
10 (1)	5 gal water cans	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta/Helo
100	Panel Markers SRU-22/P	DPSC	Delta
5130	"C" Ration Meals	Bragg	Delta

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I 761

EXPENDABLES

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PROVIDED BY</u>	<u>PROVIDED TO</u>
250	40MM [REDACTED]	Anniston	Delta
400	[REDACTED]	Anniston	Delta
300	Ammo Pouches	Anniston	Delta
660	7.62MM Tracer Ctg.	Anniston	Delta
48	White SMOke Grenade	Navy	Delta
400	Concussion Grenades	Navy	Delta
100	Practice Concussion Grenades	Navy	Delta
272	Rocket Incendiary 66MM 4rd Clip	Anniston (48 Bragg)	Delta
936	40MM CTG HEDP for M79	Anniston	[REDACTED]
40	All weather goggles	Bragg	Delta
100	Ear Protectors	DSC Richmond	Delta
100	Navy Watch Caps	Navy Exchange (paid)	Delta
272	Navy Watch Caps	DLA	Delta/[REDACTED]
100	Navy Watch Sweaters	Navy Exchange (paid)	Delta
60	Navy Watch Sweaters	DLA	Delta/H
150 (1)	Mountain Sleeping w/covers	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta/Helo
150	Air Mattresses	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta/Helo
10 (1)	5 gal water cans	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta/Helo
100	Panel Markers SRU-22/P	DPSC	Delta
5130	"C" Ration Meals	Bragg	Delta

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<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PROVIDED BY</u>	<u>PROVIDED TO</u>
*	M16 Repair Parts	Belvoir/Bragg	Delta
48	Batteries for goggles	Sacramento	Delta
4 (1)	Immersion heaters & cans	XVIII ABN Corps	JTF
89	Distress Markers	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta
8	A2 Marking Lights	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta
*	Various gear to rig loads for airdrop	XVIII ABN Corps	JTF
60 (1)	Parachutes [REDACTED]	82nd	JTF
*	Railroad ties	[REDACTED]	JTF
*	Demolitions	Navy	JTF
204	Shoulder Patches (American Flag)	Local Procurement	Delta [REDACTED]
995	Ctg, Barrier Penetrating Model SGA-300	Local Procurement	Delta
400	Baseball grenades	Local Procurement	Delta
200 lbs	C-3	[REDACTED]	Delta
5	BAT Drones for Redeye Tng	Red River AD	Delta
54	[REDACTED]	Letterkenny AD	Helo/1st SOW
6 Boxes	Grenade Hand Smoke	Sierra AD	Helo
12	IR Filters	Anniston AD	[REDACTED]
60 sets	Air Force Fatigues (JTF)	JTF/Delta	DLA

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<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PROVIDED BY</u>	<u>PROVIDED TO</u>
60 sets	Air Force Flight Suits (JTF)	DLA	JTF/Delta
12 sets	Air Force Fatigues	DLA	
50	Parkaliners and sweat pants	DLA	JTF
100 pr	Boot Socks	DLA	JTF
6 pr	Combat Boots	DLA	

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NONEXPENDABLES

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>(S) PROVIDED BY</u>	<u>(S) PROVIDER</u>
8	TRK, M274A4 (mule)	XVIII ABN Corps	JTF
6	TRK, M151A2 1/4T	"	[REDACTED]
66	Parachute T-10	"	JTF/Delta
29	" G-12D	"	JTF
69	" G-11A	"	JTF
4	Mount Pedestal	"	[REDACTED]
90	Drum Fuel Collection	"	JTF
42	LSS	"	JTF
36	LSS Support	"	JTF
2	Pump 100 GPM	"	Helo
2	Nozzle	"	Helo
43	Parachute Ext 15'	"	JTF
32	" Pilot 68"	"	JTF
20	Container A22	"	JTF
8	Dirt Bikes	Intelligence Materiel Support Office (IMDSO)	[REDACTED]
120	Protective Masks	IMDSO	Delta
35	Kevlar Vests	Natick Labs	Helo
12	Riot Guns	IMDSO	Delta
41	Evasion & Escape Kits	Langley	Delta
20	M16A1 Rifles	Anniston AD	Delta
8	Inerital Nav Sys	SOFD-D	CV
6	Walkie Talkies	SFOD-D	Helo
8	Fares W/8-100GPM Pumps	2/Bragg & 6/Campbell	JTF

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<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u> (S)	<u>PROVIDED BY</u>	<u>PROVIDED TO</u>
1	350 GPM	Ft Campbell	JTF
7	AN/PAQ4 IR Aiming Light	Night Vision Labs	Delta
9	T-MEG Beacons	Hurlburt	Delta
1	Small Arms Repair Kit	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta
72 (40)	AN/PVS-5A Night Vision Goggles	Sacramento AD	Delta 1 SOW/MAC
4	PSC-1	Ft Monmount	Delta
75	Promethium Night Sight (M16)	IMDSO	Delta
5	3000 Gal bladders & 10 pumps for airborne refueling system	MacDill (Harvest Eagle)	1st SOW
2	R-144 Refuel system (100,000 Gal)	EUCOM	
10			
6	Omega Navigation Systems	CINCLANT	Helo
	Commo Equipment	JCSE	
9	PRC 90 Radios	Eglin AFB	
10	Search light set, infra-red AN/VSS-3A	Tobbyhanna AD	helo/1st SOW
2	R-9 Tankers	EUCOM	
2	Coleman Tugs	EUCOM	
1	Demineralization Trucks	EUCOM (SAC)	

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<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u> (S)	<u>PROVIDED BY</u> (S)	<u>PROVIDED TO</u> (S)
2	100 GPM Filter Separators	Ft Stewart	1st SOW
2	350 GPM Filter Separators	Ft Stewart	1st SOW
8	Fuel Filter Separators	Tooele AD	1st SOW
144	Fuel Filters	Tooele AD	1st SOW
18	Shoulder Holsters	Red River AD	[REDACTED]
50	45 Cal SMG AMMO pouches	DLA	[REDACTED]
10	[REDACTED]	JFK Center	[REDACTED]
40	[REDACTED]	JFK Center	[REDACTED]
10	[REDACTED]	JFK Center	[REDACTED]
70	[REDACTED] magazines	JFK Center	[REDACTED]
10	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] Rangers	[REDACTED]
3	Daytime Filters for PVS-5's	Ft Rucker	1st SOW
10	Motorola PT-25-A Radios	CERCOM	Delta
24	MX360 Motorola Radios plus components	Local Procurement	[REDACTED]

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I 763

ARMY AIR SUPPORT FOR JTF

Aircraft used were U-21/C-12

<u>ONLOAD</u>	<u>DESTINATION</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
APG, MD	Langley	Protective Mas
Simmons AF	Langley	AMMO
Anniston	Langley	AMMO
Davidson	Pat Henry Airport	Pax
Davidson	Ft Stewart	FTX Plan
Elizabeth City	Cherry Point	Pax
Davidson	Pope	Pax
Elizabeth City	Pope	Pax
Pope	Elizabeth City	Pax
Davidson (NOTE)	Pope	Pax
Pope	Davidson	Pax

NOTE: Numerous trips between JTF HQ and POPE have been conducted to include return flights.

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I-764

MAC MISSIONS FOR JTF

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<u>MSN</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>ONLOAD</u>	<u>DESTINATION</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
2101-01	C-5	Norfolk	[REDACTED]	Helo's & Pax
2101-02	C-5	Norfolk	[REDACTED]	Crane & Pax
2101-03	C-5	Norfolk	[REDACTED]	Helo & Pax
2101-04	C-5	Norfolk	[REDACTED]	Helo & Pax
2101-05	C-141	Norfolk	[REDACTED]	Helo Spt Equi
2101-06	C-141	Norfolk	[REDACTED]	Helo Spt Equi
2101-07	C-141	Norfolk	[REDACTED]	Helo Spt Equi
2101-08	C-141	Cherry Point	[REDACTED]	Fuel Tanks
2101-09	C-141	Cherry Point	[REDACTED]	Wpn, Ammo & P
1092-01	C-130	Maxwell/Pope	Langley	Ammo, vehicle bladders
1092-02	C-130	Hanscon	Cherry Point	Protective ve
1092-03	C-130	Pope/Andrews/Maxwell	[REDACTED]	Jeeps, Bikes, explosives
1092-04	C-130	Langley	N/A	Air Drop
1092-05	C-130	Bergstom	Langley	Radios
1092-06	C-130	Maxwell	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
1092-07	C-130	Virginia	Langley	Helo Pilots
1092-08	C-141	Langley	Laguna	Helo Pilots
1092-09	C-141	McDill	Laguna	JCSE
1092-10	C-130	Virginia	Langley	Delta & Equip
1092-11	C-141	Langley	Laguna	Delta & Equip

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<u>MSN</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>ONLOAD</u> (6)	<u>DESTINATION</u>	<u>CARGO</u> (6)
1092-12	C-141	Langley	Laguna	Delta & Equip
1092-13	C-141	Langley /Pope A	Yuma	Equip & Pax
1092-14	C-141	Pope	Davis Monthan	Fuel Blivets
1092-15	Cancelled			
1092-16	C-141	Pope/Andrews	Yuma/Monthan	Fuel Blivets Commo
1092-17	C-141	Yuma	Langley	Delta
1092-18	C-141	Yuma	Langley	Delta
1092-19	C-130	Langley	Farm	Delta (shutt)
1092-20	C-141	Monthan	Pope	Fuel Blivets
1092-21	C-141	Yuma	Pope	Cargo & Pax
1092-22	C-130	Maxwell	Langley	Wpns
1092-23	C-130	Farm	Langley/Phillips	Delta & Palle
1092-24	C-141	Langley	Laguna	Pax
1092-25	C-141	Pope	Norton	Fuel Blivets
1092-26	C-130	Maxwell	Langley	Ammo
1092-27	C-130	Farm	Pope	Delta & Equip
1092-28	C-141	Laguna	Pope/Charleston	Pax & Equip
1092-29	C-141	Yuma	Cherry Pt/Norfolk	Pax & Equip
1092-30	C-130	Yuma	Tampa	Trucks, Pax
1092-31	C-130	Yuma	Tampa	Trucks, Pax
1092-32	Cancelled			
1092-33	C-130	Travis	McDill	Trucks & Pax
1092-34	C-130	Norton	Pope	Blivets, Pax

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<u>MSN</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>ONLOAD</u>	<u>Destination</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
1092-35	C-130	Norton	Pope	Blives, Pax
1093-01	C-141	Norfolk	Yuma	Pax
1093-02	C-130	Pope	Yuma	Pax, Nets
1093-03	C-130	Yuma/RR	Pope	Nets, Bats
1093-04	C-130	Pope	Eglin	Jeep
1093-05	C-130	Pope/Warminister	Yuma	Qrt, Searchl
1093-06	C-141	Hurlburt	Yuma	[REDACTED]
1093-07	C-130	McChord	Yuma	Wpns
1093-08	C-130	Yuma	[REDACTED]	Pax & Wpns
1093-09	C-130	Andrews/HAAF	Nellis	Model, Pax, ?
1093-10	C-141	[REDACTED]	Hurlburt	[REDACTED] Equip
1093-11	C-141	[REDACTED]	Hurlburt	[REDACTED] Equip
1142-01	C-141	Hurlburt	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] Equip
1142-02	C-141	Hurlburt	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] Equip
1142-03	C-141	Nellis	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] Truck
1142-04	C-141	Yuma	Cherry Pt., Norfolk	Helo Pax, JCS

II In addition to above flights, fourteen T-39/T-43 flights provided to JTF for passengers and intelligence material movements.

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